Chapter 10: “An Intensified Crossword Puzzle”

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Imagine stepping into the presidency with your nation just fracturing.

States are threatening to secede.

Civil war feels almost inevitable.

Yeah, and your very first task, it's assembling a cabinet, but not, you know, not with your friends and loyalists.

Right, but with the very rivals who fought you tooth and nail for that job.

It sounds like fiction, but that was Abraham Lincoln's reality.

It's an almost unimaginable scenario, isn't it?

That kind of pressure and the sheer strategic thinking required to bring those powerful, often clashing personalities into his inner circle.

Especially when the whole country is keetering right on the brink.

Exactly.

Welcome to The Deep Dive.

We're here to unpack complex topics and give you the essential insights.

Today we're diving into a really pivotal moment in American history, looking through the lens of Doris Kearns Goodwin's team of rivals, the political genius of Abraham Lincoln.

And our focus today is that critical four -month window between Lincoln's election in November 1860 and his inauguration way off in March 1861.

Yeah, a long wait back then.

Yeah.

Our mission for this deep dive is to try and understand how Lincoln, who was still just working out of his home in Springfield, Illinois, how he navigated a nation literally tearing itself apart.

Right.

He had to prep for this, this unimaginable conflict while also building his, quote, official family, a cabinet deliberately made up of the most ambitious, most influential men in the new Republican Party.

And many of them felt they should be president, not Lincoln.

Oh, absolutely.

The stakes just couldn't have been higher.

The South wasn't just making threats.

States were actually starting to secede.

And Lincoln, remember, he was still a relative newcomer on the national stage.

He faced this monumental task making decisions that would literally determine the fate of the Union.

And apparently from day one, he knew he wanted to, quote, make a difference.

That was his goal.

Which ultimately meant preserving the Union.

Absolutely.

That was the overarching goal.

But he understood quite shrewdly that to do that, he needed a strong, balanced administration, one that could somehow unite all the different, often squabbling, factions of this brand new Republican Party.

So that meant bringing his biggest rivals right into his inner circle, using their strengths, their political capital.

Even their ambitions.

It was about harnessing everything.

So who are we talking about, these formidable figures?

First up, William H.

Seward of New York.

Right.

The front runner for the Republican nomination before Lincoln's surprise win, slated for Secretary of State.

And Seward definitely saw himself as the natural leader, right?

She felt his experiences influenced.

It was paramount.

Yeah.

He kind of expected to be the power behind the throne, maybe even more.

Then you had Salmon P.

Chase.

From Ohio.

An ardent abolitionist.

Lincoln wanted him for the Treasury.

Chase was, well, immensely proud, very ambitious, and really quite particular about his standing.

Made him a challenge, but Lincoln saw him as crucial.

And then there was Edward Bates.

An elder statesman from Missouri, a former Whig, considered for attorney general.

He had kind of stood out because he genuinely seemed to value duty to the country over, you know, personal comfort or gain.

So managing these personalities, all with their own agendas, it was going to take all of Lincoln's skill.

Definitely.

So picture this, the night after the election.

Springfield is celebrating like crazy, but Lincoln,

he feels, quote, oppressed with the load of responsibility, couldn't sleep.

Wow.

But even then he's already working, already laying the groundwork for his cabinet.

He actually lists his main rivals, Seward, Chase,

Bates.

Along with others to represent different factions, right?

Like former Democrats, Montgomery, Blair, and Gideon Wells.

Exactly.

It shows his commitment right from the start to building this broad coalition, not just surrounding himself with yes men.

But that quiet planning in Springfield didn't last long.

Goodwin describes this mad scramble for jobs.

Oh yeah, hordes of office seekers descending on his house.

It sounds chaotic.

She paints this picture, doesn't she?

Men in muddy boots and hickory shirts, right alongside people in finest linen, all just desperate for a moment with Lincoln.

And somehow Lincoln handles this deluge with, well, remarkable tact.

He held two receptions a day and observers, like the journalist Henry Villard, noted his skill.

He listened patiently.

Didn't he use stories a lot?

Yes.

Often used a humorous story or an anecdote to, quote, explain a meaning or enforce a point.

Villard said it was always perfect.

These weren't just jokes.

They were tools to heal wounded feelings and mitigate disappointments.

Smart.

But amidst all that chaos, he kept his eye on the main prize, that balanced cabinet.

Right.

And he decided almost immediately that William Seward, because of his, quote, ability, his integrity, and his commanding influence, deserve the top spot Secretary of State.

And Seward certainly agreed.

He felt his campaigning for Lincoln earned him the role, and he kind of expected to influence the other cabinet picks too, didn't he?

Aiming for a more Whig -dominated setup.

He did.

His close ally, Thurlow Weed, even tried to set up a meeting at Seward's house for Lincoln to basically form the cabinet there, like past presidents had done.

But Lincoln shut that down.

Wisely, yeah.

Declined politely.

He was willing to consult, absolutely, but he made it clear, subtly but firmly, that the, quote, ultimate decisions would emanate from Springfield and would be his alone.

Establishing his authority early on.

A key move.

Crucial.

So December 10th, Vice President -elect Hannibal Hamlin formally offered Seward the State Department job.

And Seward's reaction was?

Kind of guarded, even a bit dismissive initially, suggesting maybe he didn't really want it.

Testing the waters, perhaps?

But Lincoln anticipated this.

Seemed so, because he had prepared two letters.

One is the formal invitation, the other was this brilliantly designed private note.

What did it say?

Well, it basically flattered Seward.

Assured him the offer was absolutely genuine, based on his integrity, ability, learning, and great experience.

Really stroked his ego.

Did it work?

Apparently.

Goodwin says Seward's face went pale with excitement.

But interestingly, he still delayed accepting.

Still wanted to see if he could influence those other cabinet choices.

Exactly.

He wanted to test his leverage, see if he could shape the rest of the team.

Okay, so while Seward is mulling that over, Lincoln moves on Bates.

Yep.

December 15th, Edward Bates comes to Springfield.

Lincoln meets him, offers him Attorney General directly.

And stressed that Bates' participation was, quote, necessary to its complete success.

Making him feel essential.

Right.

And Bates, being the man he was, accepted out of patriotism, he apparently preferred a quieter life, especially given his finances, but felt the country's trouble and danger compelled him to serve.

And Lincoln, ever the strategist.

Leaked the appointment, got it into the Missouri Democrat.

He knew it would have a good effect, especially, quote, in the border slave states, sending a signal of moderation and unity.

Smart politics.

Then came Thurlow Weed.

Ah, Weed.

The power broker from New York.

His visit on December 20th was highly anticipated.

He definitely expected to have a major hand in shaping the cabinet.

And he had objections.

Oh, yeah.

Straight away.

Objected strongly to Salmon Chase, too, abolitionist.

Gideon Wells, a former Democrat and kind of a thorn in Seward's side in Connecticut politics.

And Montgomery Blair, another former Democrat.

Weed argued they weren't true Whigs, and they'd create a Democratic majority in the cabinet.

How did Lincoln counter that?

Very shrewdly.

For Wells, he sort of claimed it was Hamlin's choice, though we know Lincoln wanted a New England Democrat anyway to balance things.

For Blair, he stressed the absolute need for border state representation Maryland and Missouri.

Crucial.

And then came that famous line about balancing the cabinet.

Yes.

When Weed fretted about the Democratic majority, Lincoln apparently just looked at him and said, You seem to forget that I expect to be there, and counting me as one, you see how nicely the cabinet would be balanced and ballasted.

Huh.

Gently reminding Weed exactly who was president.

Precisely.

It perfectly showed his mix of humor and authority.

Weed left Springfield impressed, convinced Lincoln had, quote, capacity in the largest sense of the term.

Though privately, he grumbled to Seward about the cabinet's complexion.

He did.

Seward himself wasn't thrilled about not being consulted more.

But eventually, on December 27th, he formally accepted the Secretary of State position, claimed he would try to save freedom and my country.

His wife Frances had a slightly different take, didn't she?

More about his ambition.

She did.

She saw his ambition perhaps more clearly than he admitted to himself.

Okay, so Seward's in.

Bates is in.

Next up, Salmon Chase for Treasury.

But there was a complication.

A big one.

Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania.

There was intense lobbying for him.

Apparently, promises, or at least strong hints, had been made to his faction back at the Chicago Convention to secure Pennsylvania's delegates.

Right, so a deluge of letters poured in, Goodwin says.

Even though Cameron had this unsavory reputation, corruption charges lingered.

Yeah, it wasn't a great record.

And Lincoln, maybe feeling the pressure, impulsively offered Cameron in writing either Treasury or War Secretary.

Which Cameron, then?

Unwisely brandished among his friends.

Big mistake.

Because the backlash was immediate.

Instantaneous.

Opponents warned Lincoln about the odor about Mr.

C and how detrimental it would be.

Evidence of his, well, moral unfitness was presented.

And Lincoln listened?

He did.

He realized his mistake and pretty quickly retracted the offer.

January 3rd.

He told Cameron things had developed and the deciding factors were now wholly outside of Pennsylvania.

It showed Lincoln could admit a mistake and change course.

He had boundaries.

Then Chase arrives the next day.

January 4th.

Lincoln makes the offer for Treasury.

Goodwin calls the conversation awkward, but Lincoln was direct.

He acknowledged the whole Cameron mess, even Chase's different stance on tariffs.

How did Chase react?

Initially irritated by the delay in the Cameron situation, yeah.

But Lincoln apparently smoothed things over, flattered him a bit, and Chase accepted, though contingently at first.

So Lincoln still had this Pennsylvania problem, the Cameron cry.

Right.

He needed to satisfy that faction somehow, but he wanted Chase at Treasury.

So he came up with this tentative solution.

Which was?

Chase gets Treasury.

Lincoln valued his ability, firmness, and purity.

Plus, it might reassure New York merchants.

And Cameron gets the lesser but still significant post -of -war secretary.

Appeases Pennsylvania.

Fills a spot.

A complex balancing act.

Did Chase accept fully, then?

Not immediately.

He remained agitated by the uncertainty for a while, but Lincoln seemed to understand that Chase's own ambition would ultimately make him take the Treasury job.

He played the waiting game well.

So while Lincoln is meticulously piecing together this team, this team of rivals,

the nation itself is just coming apart at the seams.

Chiragically, yes.

December 20th, 1860, the very day Lincoln met with Thurlow, Weed, South Carolina, votes unanimously to secede.

And that was just the start.

It triggered this rapid snowballing process.

Over the next six weeks, six more deep south states followed.

Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Texas.

Gone.

What were their mainstated grievances again?

Primarily the election of a black Republican, as they called Lincoln.

Fears about the future of slavery being excluded from territories, the Fugitive Slave Act not being enforced strongly enough,

John Brown's raid still fresh.

A whole mix of things culminating in this moment.

And President Buchanan's reaction was?

Stunned inaction, mostly.

Contrast that with South Carolina Congressman Lawrence Keat, who reportedly shouted, thank God.

Oh, thank God.

I feel like a boy let out from school when the secession vote passed.

Wow.

Meanwhile, Lincoln stuck in Springfield.

Can't take office until March 4th.

Imagine the frustration.

Goodwin describes his mounting anxiety and frustration.

He felt the government had the power to maintain its integrity, but he didn't have the reins yet.

People were pushing him to say something conciliatory, right?

To calm things down.

Constantly.

But he steadfastly refused to, quote, shift his ground.

He believed any apology or backtracking would just dishearten his own supporters in the North without actually appeasing the South anyway.

He did authorize one small thing, though.

A passage in a speech by Senator Trumbull.

Reluctantly, yes.

And just as he predicted, it backfired.

Misconstrued by both North and South, it just showed how deep that division already was.

There was almost no common ground left.

He was also dealing with splits within his own party, wasn't he?

Huge splits.

You had the conciliators desperate to keep the border states like Virginia and Kentucky in the Union, maybe willing to compromise more.

And then the hardliners who thought any compromise would just embolden the South, or that only force would work.

And Lincoln, from 700 miles away in Springfield, is trying to manage all this.

Performing these complex and subtle maneuvers, as Goodwin puts it, just to keep the Republican Party itself from fracturing before he even took office.

But on one issue, he was completely unyielding.

Absolutely firm.

No compromise on the question of extending slavery into the territories.

He wrote, the tug has to come, and better now, than any time hereafter.

He feared allowing expansion would inevitably lead to trying to annex Cuba or Mexico for more slave states.

But he was willing to compromise on other things.

Yes.

Things like the Fugitive Slave Act enforcement, slavery in the District of Columbia,

the internal slave trade within existing slave states.

He signaled flexibility there.

And then he did something really clever, almost secretive, with Seward.

Right.

He secretly drafted three resolutions.

Had Seward introduced them in the Senate's Committee of 13, crucially, without revealing Lincoln was the author.

What were they?

One, a constitutional amendment saying Congress couldn't interfere with slavery in the states where it already existed.

Two, guaranteeing a jury trial for accused fugitive slaves.

And three, recommending repeal of those state personal liberty laws that hindered the Fugitive Slave Act.

So concessions, but carefully chosen ones.

Yeah.

Did Seward agree?

He did, though he was apparently skeptical they'd do much good with the Deep South by that point.

But Lincoln's firm hand behind the scenes also ensured that key Republicans, including Seward, didn't back the much bigger Crittenden Compromise.

Why was Lincoln so against Crittenden?

Because it would have allowed slavery to expand south of the old Missouri Compromise line.

That crossed his fundamental red line.

It shows how he could appear flexible while holding absolutely firm on his core principle.

Meanwhile, the situation with the federal forts in the south is heating up, especially in South Carolina.

Became a real flashpoint.

Lincoln heard rumors that President Buchanan might surrender Fort Moultrie in Charleston Harbor.

He was reportedly furious.

If that is true, they ought to hang him, he supposedly exclaimed.

Strong words.

And he immediately sent a message to General Winfield Scott, the army chief, telling him to prepare to hold or, if necessary, retake the federal forts.

Then Major Robert Anderson made a move.

Yes, the commander at Charleston.

On December 26, he preemptively moved his small garrison from the more vulnerable Fort Moultrie to the stronger, island -based Fort Sumter in the middle of the harbor.

Which just inflamed the situation further.

Exactly.

South Carolina saw it as an aggressive act.

The crisis deepened.

Washington was gripped by feverish excitement.

And this is where Edwin Stanton enters the picture in a really unexpected way.

Right.

Stanton was actually in President Buchanan's own cabinet as attorney general, a Democrat, but a staunch unionist.

He became convinced there was a real plot by secessionists within the government to seize Washington, D .C.

and prevent Lincoln's inauguration.

So what did he do?

Something extraordinary.

He made what Gidwin calls a momentous decision, to essentially become an informant, to work behind President Buchanan's back, feeding secret intelligence to the incoming administration.

Wow.

He used a middleman, Peter Watson, to communicate secretly with William Seward, Lincoln's designated secretary of state.

So Seward gets this inside info.

Uh -huh.

On January 10th, Seward writes an urgent letter to Lincoln, relaying Stanton's warnings about a plot urging Lincoln to come to Washington earlier than planned.

Seward wrote, Treason is all around.

And Stanton wasn't just talking to Seward.

No, he was cunning.

He also leaked information to other key Republicans like Senator Charles Sumner and Salmon Chase.

Apparently, he strategically thwarted some potentially treasonous officers from handing over federal supplies or positions.

Incredible.

And Seward, getting all this information, dealing with the crisis.

He started to feel, maybe understandably, that he was, quote, virtually the ruler of the country in that chaotic interregnum.

The pressure on him was immense.

Which maybe led to his big Senate speech.

Very likely connected.

January 12th.

Huge anticipation.

Gidwin says the anxiety was intense, the speech seen as equivalent to a speech from Lincoln himself.

What was the scene like?

Packed galleries.

Senators, including future Confederate President Jefferson Davis, hanging on every word.

Seward delivered this powerful warning against dissolving the union, predicting perpetual civil war, and inviting foreign interference if they split.

And what concessions did he offer?

He essentially proposed Lincoln's secret resolutions.

No federal interference with slavery in the states, jury trials for fugitives, repeal of personal liberty laws.

He also floated the idea of a future constitutional convention to settle things down the road.

What was the impact?

Didn't change minds in the Deep South.

Five senators resigned right after.

But crucially, Gidwin notes it helped steady the crucial border states.

Virginia, Tennessee, Missouri, they all saw unionist sentiment strengthen, defeating secessionist moves in the short term.

So Seward felt he'd bought time.

He did.

He believed he'd gained time for Lincoln's administration to take over.

But the Republican hardliners Sumner, Thaddeus Stevens, even Chase, were absolutely outraged.

They saw it as a total betrayal of antislavery principles.

It was his own wife, Frances.

Wrote him a blistering letter, just tore into him, denounced the compromises, saying he was heading for an unhonored grave like Daniel Webster, prioritizing union over the liberty of nearly 4 ,000 human beings.

Really harsh.

How did Seward defend himself?

He argued they weren't really compromises, but explanations to disarm the enemies of truth, freedom, and union, trying to reframe it.

But this whole episode really highlights Lincoln's strategy, doesn't it?

It's a masterclass in what Goodwin calls Lincoln's intricate game of political engineering.

He privately encouraged Seward, approved of the conciliatory effort, because it did help calm the border states, which was vital.

But publicly.

Publicly, Lincoln maintained this unyielding image to keep the hardline Republicans on board.

He even told Carl Schertz later that Seward had made the speech without consulting him.

Which was technically true.

Technically accurate, as Goodwin says, if undeniably misleading.

It allowed Seward to take all the heat, absorb the backlash from the abolitionists, while Lincoln remained publicly firm on not extending slavery.

It kept his incredibly fractious party from exploding right before the war began.

Amazing political maneuvering.

So looking back at this deep dive into those incredibly precarious four months,

it just underscores Lincoln's unique political genius, doesn't it?

Unparalleled, really.

It wasn't just about winning.

It was about forging that team of rivals.

Somehow balancing these huge personalities and competing factions under the most intense pressure imaginable.

Yeah, and it definitely showcases the need for strategic ambiguity sometimes.

Calculated risks in leadership.

We saw that clearly with how he handled both Seward and Cameron.

Absolutely.

And it brings home just how complex compromise is during a massive national crisis.

Figuring out what you can yield on.

What you absolutely must stand firm on.

And being aware of the immense moral and political costs tied to every single choice.

And you get that sense of the hidden gears turning, right?

Like Stanton's secret warnings.

Things happening behind the scenes that massively shaped events leading up to the Civil War.

Totally.

Ultimately, this period, it reveals the really effective leadership.

It isn't always about the bold, loud pronouncements.

So often it's about the subtle maneuvering, the quiet balancing of deeply competing interests, and just maintaining an almost superhuman composure when the entire world around you seems to be collapsing.

So a final thought maybe.

What does Lincoln's approach during this incredibly divisive time tell us about the nature of effective leadership, perhaps even in our own divided times today?

Something to definitely ponder.

We really hope this deep dive has given you a clearer, maybe more nuanced picture of Lincoln's early leadership challenges.

And that just incredibly precarious political landscape of 1860 to 61.

Thanks so much for joining us on the deep dive.

Yeah, thanks everyone.

We look forward to exploring more fascinating topics with you next time.