Chapter 7: Countdown to the Nomination

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Hey everyone, and welcome back to the Deep Dive.

You know, history isn't just dates and names, it's really a story, isn't it?

Full of ambitions, sometimes miscalculation, and yeah, incredible genius.

And today we're doing a deep dive into one of those moments, a really pivotal one.

We're pulling from Doris Kearns, Goodwin's team of rivals, to see how Abraham Lincoln, well, how he basically engineered his path to the presidency.

It's a fascinating period.

So let's set the scene.

We're talking 1859, early 1860.

The U .S.

is kind of teetering on the brink, right?

Its greatest crisis looming.

The states couldn't have been higher.

The union itself felt like it was hanging by a thread.

And the presidency is up for grabs.

So we're going to explore how Lincoln, who, let's be honest, a lot of people saw as a total dark horse from Illinois, an outsider, how he managed to outmaneuver these, like, political giants of the time to get the Republican nomination.

And what's really captivating, I think, is not just what happened, but digging into the why.

You know, that intricate dance of political strategy, personal ambition, and, well, some really critical mistakes that ended up paving Lincoln's path.

You'll see how his sort of unique mix of caution, conviction, and, frankly, cunning,

let him navigate this landscape full of really seasoned rivals, rivals who were all convinced the prize was theirs.

And our goal today, really, is to make these dense historical details clear, engaging, help you see the political genius without needing charts or visuals.

Absolutely.

So our mission is to pull out surprising facts, those aha moments, give you a front row seat to the choices that really shape history.

So let's unpack this.

Let's do.

Okay, let's start with Lincoln himself.

So 1859 opens.

He's feeling maybe cautiously optimistic after his Senate run.

Guardedly optimistic, yeah.

But outwardly, he was really downplaying any presidential hopes.

Yeah.

Very humble about it.

So what was the strategy there?

Why seems so, I don't know, dismissive when others were already campaigning pretty openly.

Well, that was absolutely key to a strategy.

Lincoln knew, he understood he was an outside chance for the nomination in 1860.

Okay.

Unlike the big names, the established giants, you know, they had political machines, managers.

Lincoln, he mostly had himself.

Right.

So by positioning himself as maybe a second choice, someone other candidate supporters could pivot to if their main guy faltered.

He minimized the risk of opponents mobilizing directly against him early on.

Very smart for a dark horse.

I remember reading about Jesse Fell, you know, the Illinois Republican secretary asking Lincoln for info for a campaign biography.

And Lincoln basically blew him off saying there is nothing in my early history that would interest you or anybody else.

That sounds almost too humble, doesn't it?

Was he just trying to avoid the spotlight or?

It does seem counterintuitive, but yeah, it was calculated.

He deliberately shut down early efforts to announce his name.

He knew instinctively maybe that timing was critical.

That's a skill we see him use again and again as president.

Announce too early, you just rally the opposition.

So this cautious approach, it really contrasts sharply with his rivals.

They often seemed, well, over eager.

Okay.

So while Lincoln's carefully laying his groundwork, we've got William H.

Seward,

New York Senator,

widely seen as the front runner.

The presumptive nominee for many.

But his confidence, it seems, led to some big mistakes.

Oh, indeed.

His advisor, Thurlow Weed, usually very savvy, made this rare bad call, an eight month tour of Europe.

Eight months.

Wow.

Yeah.

Seward, already this huge figure.

Maybe he thought the nomination was basically in the bag.

That kind of overconfidence, you know, that sense of entitlement, it can blind even seasoned politicians.

Yeah.

But eight months away from domestic politics, right before the nomination, that's a critical absence.

Gave his rivals room to maneuver to chip away at his lead.

And his daughter Fanny, she was just 14.

Her diary entries show how sad she was he was leaving.

It kind of puts a human face on these big political moves, doesn't it?

It really does.

I mean, today, a candidate vanishing for eight months, unthinkable.

It really shows how different campaigning was.

Totally different.

The whole communication landscape, the idea of a full -time campaign manager was still pretty new.

So Seward finally gets back in early 1860.

February 29th, he gives this major Senate speech designed to calm down the moderates.

OK.

He had help from a reporter, Henry Stanton, and apparently Seward was feeling pretty good, buoyant spirits, thought they'd go down to posterity together.

So this speech was a conscious effort to like rebrand himself a bit, soften his image.

Precisely.

The Senate chamber was packed.

It was a very deliberate shift.

He toned down his famous irrepressible conflict rhetoric.

Right.

The idea that slavery and freedom were bound to clash.

Exactly.

Now he's calling slave states, capital states, free states, labor states,

trying to find less confrontational language.

He talked passionately about the union's bonds, unbreakable bonds, even suggested Republicans weren't pushing for Negro equality.

It got huge applause, apparently.

Half a million pamphlets circulated.

But trying to please everyone, that often backfires, doesn't it?

I read the abolitionist Cassius Clay said it killed Seward with me forever.

What does that tell us about the Republicans, then?

It really highlights the deep splits, the ideological fault lines within the party.

They weren't monolithic at all.

And then there were these unforced errors back home.

Horace Greeley, the powerful newspaper editor.

The New York Tribune.

Right.

He had this long list of grievances against Seward and Weed, felt they'd looked him for political office.

He even wrote this letter cataloging the sharp, pricking thorns.

But Seward kind of dismissed it.

Big mistake.

Greeley then subtly used his Tribune columns to undermine Seward, sort of laying the groundwork for another rival, Edward Bates.

And speaking of missteps, Weed, Seward's top guy, he actually failed to meet with Simon Cameron, the big political boss in Pennsylvania.

Apparently, Weed was just so sure Cameron would deliver Pennsylvania, he ignored an invitation.

How bad was that?

Oh, it was a major, major blunder.

Cameron was, let's say, a pragmatist, famously defined an honest politician as one who, when he is bought,

stays bought.

Pennsylvania's delegation was split.

Weed not engaging directly meant Seward lost crucial insight, maybe lost potential support, that a face -to -face meeting could have

Classic case of hubris costing a frontrunner.

Okay, so then there's Salmon P.

Chase, another big name.

He had a chance, right, with Seward out of the country.

He did, but Chase.

Yeah?

Well, he wasn't the sharpest political operator.

He kind of assumed the nomination would just, you know, fall into his lap without much personal intervention, as he put it.

Really?

Yeah, he tended to dismiss bad news even from close friends like Gamaliel Bailey, who'd been loyal for years.

Bailey wrote him that really candid letter, didn't he?

Saying, 1860 was now or never for Seward because of his age, and Chase should wait for 64, he'd be stronger then.

How did Chase take that advice?

Not well.

He got pretty testy, called the now or never idea babyish.

Felt his own candidacy was just happening naturally, spontaneous growth.

Spontaneous growth?

Doesn't sound very political.

Right.

He refused to campaign manager, didn't bother much with state organizing, turned down speaking gigs.

He even thought his own state, Ohio, would just unanimously back him, even though Senator Ben Wade had his own supporters there.

It shows a real disconnect from reality.

It sounds like after a trip to Washington with his daughter, Kate, Seward hosted a dinner and Chase felt like, everybody seems to like me?

Did he really think dinner parties equal delegates?

It seems he did.

He came back convinced there was this great change over men's minds.

But, you know, personal charm, social events, that doesn't automatically translate into pledge delegates.

You need organization.

Lentless organization.

Okay, who's next?

Edward Bates.

Respected guy, but maybe his supporters were more into it than he was.

Yeah, Bates mostly just stayed home in Missouri.

His strength was with the old wigs and the nativists, people wary of immigrants, especially in those crucial border states.

Right.

His distance from the really fiery debates of the 1850s seemed like an asset at first, but it also meant he didn't fully get the Republican Party's different factions, or just how polarized things were over slavery.

He called the Negro question a pestilent question in a public letter, right?

Thought it just riled people up.

Did that work for him?

Well, it worked for some.

Wigs, nativists, they liked it.

But a lot of Republicans, they were critical.

Schuyler Colfax warned him straight up it sounded like he was denouncing the Republican Party.

Ouch.

Bates thought it secured his base in the border states, but that was a risky calculation for trying to win a national nomination in that party.

And then the German American Republicans in Missouri, they were still uneasy about his nativist past, right?

They pushed him with a questionnaire.

That must have put him in a tough spot.

It really did.

Forced him to take clearer stances.

He ended up endorsing Congress's power over slavery and territories, supporting equal constitutional rights, opposing slavery's expansion,

basically sounding more like a standard Republican.

So he pleased the Republicans.

He placated some, yeah.

But it was a disaster in border states.

Papers like the Lexington Express, the liberal journal, they branded him a black Republican.

That was the slur Southerners used for Republicans they saw as radicals.

Wow.

So he lost his natural base, those Southern conservatives, and didn't gain enough new Republican support to make up for it.

He basically alienated both sides he needed.

So, okay, while all these rivals are dealing with overconfidence, maybe some delusion, internal contradictions, Lincoln is just steadily gaining ground.

Hard work, skill, maybe a little luck.

His key advantage was staying right in the dead center on slavery.

He was incredibly consistent.

Slavery spread must be fairly headed off, but, and this was crucial, he had no wish to interfere with slavery where it already existed.

And that hit the sweet spot for most Republicans.

Perfectly.

It aligned with the moderate majority.

He wasn't flip -flopping.

He was just clearly articulating this position that appealed to the widest possible group within the party.

And he kept working, published the debates with Douglas, people read those, and while Seward's off -site seeing in Europe.

Lincoln's out west, Iowa, Ohio, Wisconsin, Indiana, Kansas,

introducing himself to literally tens of thousands of people.

That kind of grassroots effort, it made a huge difference.

You can picture it.

Yeah, the crowds got bigger at every stop.

People wrote about his tall, gaunt form, but they were captivated by his arguments, his intellect.

In Cincinnati, remember, where he'd been publicly slighted years before.

Right, the Reaper trial.

Now he's greeted with thunder of canon, treated in princely style.

Prominent citizens turning out.

It really showed how far he'd come, how he could connect.

And he wasn't afraid to confront the Southern threats directly, telling Kentuckians,

basically, we're just as good as you and there are more of us.

Pretty blunt.

It was straightforward common sense.

Lincoln was rapidly becoming a national voice for the party.

He kept emphasizing Republican unity, warning them not to alienate any faction.

He knew his letters were being copied and spread throughout the union, so his words carried immense weight.

He was shaping the message carefully.

OK, so Lincoln's building this momentum.

Things are looking up for him.

And then, bam,

John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry, October 1859.

That must have thrown everything into chaos.

Oh, completely shifted the landscape.

Yeah, a pivotal moment.

Brown, this white abolitionist, he and his small group seized the federal arsenal.

The plan, wildly unrealistic, was to spark a massive slave uprising.

And it failed quickly.

Very quickly.

Robert E.

Lee, J.

E.

B.

Stuart, they retook the arsenal.

Brown was captured.

His trial, his execution, it turned him into a martyr in the North.

Church bells ringing.

Public mourning.

But in the South.

Absolute terror.

A shiver of fear, Goodwin calls it.

Escalated fears of slave revolts led to this reign of terror, where just expressing anti -slavery views was dangerous.

And southern politicians immediately tried to link Brown to the Republicans.

Especially to Seward.

Yeah, specifically to Seward's irrepressible conflict idea.

They claimed that rhetoric had inspired Brown.

Some radicals even put a $50 ,000 bounty on Seward's head.

Wow.

So how did the main rivals handle this explosion?

What did their reactions show?

Well, Seward publicly called Brown's execution necessary and just.

Trying to distance himself, you know.

But the damage was kind of targeted.

Bates just thought Brown was a madman.

And Chase.

His family actually sympathized with Brown, didn't they?

Yeah.

His daughter Nettie built this little fort with a Freedom Forever flag.

But Chase publicly condemned the raid.

The violation of law.

He had to explain to his daughter that you couldn't right a great wrong.

Brown's way.

On Lincoln.

Lincoln.

Speaking in Kansas after the execution.

He found that careful middle ground again.

Acknowledge Brown's great courage.

His rare unselfishness.

But firmly condemned the violence, bloodshed and treason.

Smart.

Condemn the act.

Not necessarily the motive entirely.

Exactly.

It was nuanced.

It appealed to conservatives by condemning treason.

But didn't completely alienate the more radical anti -slavery wing.

Once again, it served him really well.

So Lincoln then turns his focus to something that seems small.

Where the Republican National Convention would be held.

But that wasn't small at all, was it?

No way.

December 1859.

Astor House Hotel.

Lincoln's ally Norman Jed plays it perfectly.

When the rivals couldn't agree.

New York, Ohio, Missouri all wanted it.

Test Chicago.

Jed pitches Chicago as neutral ground.

Clever.

And he promises a warm welcome.

A free hall.

And it sways the vote.

By one single vote.

And Seward's team still overconfident.

They do immediately.

Said later if the convention had been in St.

Louis, Lincoln would not have been the nominee.

Shows how these seemingly minor logistical things can be huge.

And Judd didn't stop there, did he?

No.

Judd was a railway lawyer.

He arranged for cheap train tickets, special excursion rates, so Lincoln supporters could actually afford to get to Chicago in large numbers.

Wow.

Smart, practical stuff.

Exactly.

Subtle, practical moves the big names just weren't focused on.

And around this time, Lincoln finally gives Jesse Fell that short autobiography.

Very modest.

Talks about his humble beginnings.

A wild region with many bears.

And he wanted it written as if someone else wrote it, right?

Yeah, he wanted it to seem modest.

Not like he was bragging.

Which, again, was clever.

It let his supporters craft that powerful narrative.

The whole rail splitter image.

A man of the people.

He really understood the power of narrative, maybe before others did.

Downplaying his own role, let his story resonate more powerfully.

Okay, so Lincoln's national profile gets this huge boost, right?

Yeah.

Invitation to speak at Cooper Union in New York, February 1860.

And it came from a Chase supporter.

James Briggs, yeah.

And interestingly, Chase himself had turned down a similar invitation earlier.

Maybe he didn't see the value.

So Lincoln goes to New York, arrives looking travel stained and will be gone.

Not exactly presidential.

Maybe not initially.

Yeah.

But he visits Matthew Brady's photo studio.

And Brady creates this incredible portrait.

An arresting image, Goodwin says.

That steady and melancholy gaze.

That famous photo.

That was the one.

It got circulated everywhere.

For many people in the East, that photograph was their first introduction to Lincoln.

It really helped shape his image.

And then the speech itself.

Cooper Union, February 27th.

A packed house.

He'd done his homework right.

On the founders and slavery.

Deep homework.

He meticulously argued that the majority of the founders viewed slavery as an evil.

Something not to be extended.

And the speech worked for everyone.

Moderates, radicals.

Brilliantly.

He pleaded for calm.

Even reached out to Southerners.

But he was passionate, absolutely firm on the core Republican principle.

No expansion of slavery into the territories.

And that ending.

Let us have faith that right makes might.

And in that faith, let us, to the end, dare to do our duty as we understand it.

I electrified the audience.

Apparently one person said, he's the greatest man since St.

Paul.

High praise.

Wow.

So that speech immediately makes him a hot ticket across New England.

He speaks in Hartford, Connecticut.

Meets Didion Wells, who later ends up in his cabinet.

Right.

Future Secretary of the Navy.

Wells was a former Democrat.

Had been leaning towards Chase.

He was wary of Seward.

Didn't like his expensive ruler's philosophy or his higher law talk.

The idea that there's a moral law above the Constitution.

Exactly.

Seward said that.

And it made Moderates nervous.

But Lincoln, in Hartford, he uses that famous snake in the bed metaphor.

He refined it there.

How did it go again?

He said, look, killing a venomous snake out in the road, that's one thing.

Easy decision.

But if the snake's already in bed with your children,

well, you have to be careful how you deal with it.

Yeah.

Here's the key part.

If you're making up a new bed for the children,

the question of whether to put snakes into it or not.

Well, that's an easy decision.

Nobody wants snakes in the new bed.

That is so vivid.

It just sticks with you.

What does it tell us about his strategy on slavery?

And why was it better than what the others were offering?

It perfectly captured his stance.

Except Slovery, where it exists because of the Constitution, you have to be careful.

But absolutely under no circumstances allow it to spread into new territories, the new beds.

It was much clearer, much more relatable than, say, Seward's Trojan Horse metaphor about slavery sneaking into free states.

Yeah, that's a bit abstract.

Exactly.

Wells was blown away.

Noted Lincoln's intellect, generosity,

great good nature, and keen discrimination,

called his logic clear as crystal.

Cooper Union and this New England tour really established Lincoln as a serious contender in the East.

He wasn't just some Western guy anymore.

But back home in Illinois, he still had work to do, right?

Divisions in the party, feuds.

Oh,

yeah.

Internal party politics are always messy.

He had to smooth things over with Senator Lyman Trumbull, reassure him he wasn't trying to stir up trouble, had to mediate this bitter fight between Norman Judd, his convention guy, and the mayor of Chicago, John Wetworth.

So managing those local fights was critical before the national stage.

Absolutely crucial.

Lincoln even wrote to Judd saying something like, look, it won't hurt me that much if I don't get the national nomination, but it will hurt me if I don't get the Illinois delegation.

He knew he needed that unified home base.

Totally.

He understood the power of that united front, and he worked tirelessly behind the scenes to get it.

And it worked.

The Chicago Tribune endorsed him.

It's resounding editorial, yeah.

Then finally, the Illinois state convention indicator, May 10th, 1860, just before the national convention, his friends introduced a resolution.

Lincoln is the state's choice.

And the delegates are instructed to use all honorable means and to vote as a unit for him.

That's the leverage he needed.

That was crucial piece heading into Chicago.

It just shows, despite sometimes talking like a fatalist, things just happen.

His diligence and true strategy were much more important than luck.

He worked for this skillfully, one calculated step after another.

So there you have it.

Just an incredible story of Lincoln's strategic brilliance, really, in the run up to 1860.

We've seen how he kind of quietly built his image, patiently made alliances, and just masterfully framed his vision,

while his more famous rivals were tripping over their own feet with overconfidence or detachment or saying the wrong thing at the wrong time.

Yeah.

What really stands out about Lincoln's journey here, it wasn't about being the loudest voice or having the longest resume on paper.

It was about this deep understanding of the political moment, this unwavering commitment to one core idea, stopping slavery's spread and this just uncanny ability to unite different groups.

That blend of caution and conviction.

Exactly.

Caution, conviction, and cunning.

That's what let him win.

And it really makes you think, doesn't it?

In times of deep division, like then, maybe like now,

does that patient, unifying strategy often work better in the long run than bold, maybe more polarizing rhetoric?

Definitely food for thought.

Yeah.

Well, that brings us to the end of this deep dive into Lincoln's road to the nomination.

We hope you feel a bit more informed, maybe a lot more intrigued by how history really works behind the scenes.

Thanks so much for joining us.

And until next time, keep digging deeper into the stories that shape our world.