Chapter 9: He Just Beat Hell Out of Me

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Welcome to the Deep Dive.

Today we're going straight into a really pivotal clash of wills during the Cold War.

The June 1961 Vienna Summit between President John F.

Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.

Yeah, this was their very first face -to -face meeting,

a moment just charged with tension.

You know, the recent Bay of Pigs disaster had really weakened Kennedy's standing internationally.

Made it critical.

Absolutely, made this encounter all the more critical as these two leaders, you know, representing totally opposing worldviews, commanding nuclear arsenals.

They were preparing to engage for the first time.

Exactly.

So our Deep Dive today tackles this crucial chapter from Robert Dalyk's The Crisis Years, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 -1963.

We're going to try and pull out the key moments, the strategic political moves and those underlying deep tensions that really shaped this summit.

Our mission really is to give you a clear understanding of its immediate impact and, well, its long -term significance in the whole Cold War story.

It will impact the complexities without getting bogged down in jargon.

Right, and we're drawing this straight from Dalyk's account, which pulls together diplomatic cables, historical analysis.

It's quite comprehensive.

Okay, so let's unpack what happened.

Where did it begin?

Well, the initial setting was the Soviet embassy.

Quite grand, apparently.

Discussions started around this large Oval Table, and the attendees really signal how important this meeting was.

Who was there?

For the U .S., you had Secretary of State Rusk, seasoned diplomats like Chip Bolin and Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador Kohler, too, and across from them, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Ambassador Dobrynin, who'd become a fixture in Washington, and Menshikov.

High -level stuff.

Definitely.

And interestingly, Khrushchev apparently made this gesture, urging the foreign ministers, who were maybe sitting a bit formally, to move closer.

A small detail, maybe, but it hints at this initial, perhaps slightly misleading, attempt at cordiality.

So what was first on the agenda?

They started with Laos, which, on the surface, seemed like a less volatile issue.

Kennedy, apparently using a new approach suggested by Russ, said the U .S.

wanted to reduce its involvement there.

Saying it wasn't worth a major fight.

Exactly.

Stating it wasn't worth a confrontation, hoping the Soviets felt the same.

And Khrushchev's reaction?

Immediate pushback.

Very direct, quite critical.

He basically challenged the whole idea of American commitments in Laos, saying the U .S.

had no business interfering all over the globe.

Wow.

Straight out of the gate.

Yeah.

He accused U .S.

policy of delusions of grandeur, and even megalomania, and then firmly stated the Soviet Union's unwavering support for, you know, global independence movements.

So right away, you see Khrushchev's mindset.

Absolutely.

It immediately shows Khrushchev arrived with this deeply critical view of American foreign policy, seeing it as interventionist, self -important.

A real insight there.

How did Kennedy handle that bluntness?

He seemed, well, maybe a bit taken aback, but clarified that U .S.

obligations in Laos predated his administration.

He stressed his priority was just getting a ceasefire, ending the conflict.

Did Khrushchev buy that?

Not really.

He pressed on, suggesting he saw Kennedy's own hand in the situation.

He started citing American press reports about U .S.

military advisors, a canceled Marine landing.

A landing Kennedy denied authorizing.

Firmly denied authorizing, yeah.

And this whole exchange just highlights the massive mistrust, right?

How each side was reading the situation, using totally different information, different narratives.

And Khrushchev brought up Molotov.

That seems a bit random.

It does seem a bit strange.

He brought up Molotov's initial resistance to the 1955 Austrian state treaty.

You know, the treaty that made Austria neutral and how he, Khrushchev later reversed what he called unreasonable decisions.

Trying to draw a parallel, maybe?

Hmm.

Okay.

And then came a warning.

A chilling one.

He talked about refined threats of using Marines and warned it could lead to another Korea or an even worse situation.

Another Korea.

That really lands, doesn't it?

Given the recent past.

It absolutely underscores the fear of escalation hanging over everything.

A clear, if subtle, threat framing any U .S.

intervention as incredibly dangerous.

But they did agree on something for Laos.

They did, remarkably.

They agreed their foreign ministers, Rusk and Gromyko, would try to work out a solution.

So even amidst all that tension, a small bit of common ground shows the mix of conflict and, well, potential cooperation.

Kennedy had wanted to pull troops out anyway, hadn't he?

Right.

He stressed he was eager to withdraw U .S.

personnel and had been wary of a Marine landing, precisely because it could provoke a Soviet counteraction and endanger peace.

And Khrushchev agreed on neutrality.

He echoed that, agreeing on needing a neutral Laotian government.

The main challenge they both sort of acknowledged was getting the different Laotian factions themselves to agree.

Okay.

So Laos navigated just about, where do they go next?

They shifted to another critical and, frankly, more contentious area, nuclear testing.

And this really exposed the fundamental differences and trust and priorities.

Kennedy had some hope here, didn't he, based on back channels?

He probably did, likely influenced by what Georgi Bolshakov, a Soviet contact, had told Robert Kennedy just the month before.

Something about Soviet willingness to accept maybe 20 inspections a year for a test ban treaty.

That sounds promising, but it didn't last.

Not at all.

Khrushchev immediately poured cold water on that.

He stated flatly that only three inspections annually should be enough.

Anything more.

He called it tantamount to espionage.

Espionage.

Strong word.

Very strong.

Said the Soviet Union would never permit it.

His preferred solution, he declared, was complete and general disarmament, possible in two years, he claimed, if both sides showed goodwill.

And this is where the Troika comes in.

Exactly.

The really contentious Troika proposal for the test ban monitoring commission.

Khrushchev wanted this three -person leadership east, west, and neutral nations.

Which effectively gave the Soviets a veto.

Precisely.

A veto over any decisions about monitoring.

Which is why Kennedy fought it so hard it completely undermined the point of verification.

He used an analogy, I remember.

Oh, a vivid one.

Adjoining rooms where neither person could check suspicious noises in the other room without permission.

He rightly said the US Senate would never ratify a treaty like that.

Kennedy pushed on verification, didn't he?

How could he assure Americans?

Yeah, he asked how he could reassure his people the Soviets weren't secretly testing without proper verification.

He acknowledged it was less of an issue for the closed Soviet society.

And Khrushchev's response.

Pretty dismissive.

Something like, but what about Alan Dulles?

Isn't that secret?

Just underscoring that deep, deep suspicion.

Then Khrushchev shifted focus.

Away from just the test ban.

He did.

It's fascinating.

He started downplaying the test ban itself, arguing the real danger wasn't testing, but the production of bombs.

So focus on general and complete disarmament instead.

Right.

Under that, he claimed, the Soviets would agree to any controls even without looking at the document.

Which, you know, sounds good, but it shifts the goalposts entirely.

It suggests he saw the test ban more as a bargaining chip, maybe, than a core goal.

But Kennedy saw the test ban as key to stopping proliferation.

Exactly.

He countered that while a test ban wouldn't cut existing stockpiles, was crucial to stop other countries getting the bomb.

He diplomatically mentioned Britain and France.

Implicitly China, too?

Implicitly China, absolutely.

He argued, failing to agree would just push more nations towards developing their own nuclear weapons.

Makes sense.

Did Khrushchev concede that point at all?

He actually acknowledged it had some logic, which is why they were negotiating in Geneva.

But then he immediately undercut it by pointing to France.

France was still testing, so a test ban alone wouldn't work, he argued.

So back to linking it to disarmament.

Always back to linking it.

He insisted it had to be tied to broader disarmament to put everyone on an equal footing and remove the incentive for others.

Kennedy tried to pin him down on inspection under general disarmament, though.

He did.

Asked point blank.

Would a Soviet plan for general disarmament allow inspection anywhere in the USSR?

Khrushchev actually said yes.

Seemed a breakthrough moment, maybe.

But then the disagreement over where to start came right back.

Kennedy pushed for the test ban as the first step.

He even used that Chinese proverb.

A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.

That's the one.

But Khrushchev didn't like that framing.

He preferred starting with a ban on manufacturing weapons or getting rid of missile bases.

And he took the proverb personally.

Apparently so.

He seemed to think Kennedy mentioning the Chinese proverb was a kind of jab, implying Kennedy knew Mao might be hostile towards him.

Things got tense again.

Kennedy must have been getting frustrated.

Clearly.

He pointed out the unverified testing moratorium had already lasted three years.

Extending it further while just talking about disarmament.

That would worry Americans deeply.

But Khrushchev wouldn't budge on inspections being espionage.

Remade absolutely steadfast.

He even brought up Eisenhower's Open Skies Proposal from 55 as another example of the West trying to spy.

His view was fixed.

Inspection stations were just cover for intelligence gathering.

It shows the depth of the mistrust, doesn't it?

A huge chasm.

This fundamental disagreement over verification just permeated everything.

And how did this whole nuclear testing discussion end?

On a really worrying note, Kennedy basically warned that if they couldn't agree, it would inevitably hit both countries' national security and significantly hike the grim tone.

Indeed.

And from there, they moved on to Berlin.

Absolutely.

And Dalek notes Khrushchev's intensity just visibly ratcheted up as soon as Berlin came onto the table.

Highly charged, incredibly dangerous.

Khrushchev started with history, right?

WWII losses.

He did.

He launched into this perspective, emphasizing the Soviet Union's immense sacrifices, 20 million dead, the devastation, and voiced this deep concern about a remilitarized West Germany becoming dominant in NATO.

Seeing it as a potential path to World War III.

Exactly.

A precursor to another war.

And his fundamental aim, it became crystal clear, was to draw a line under WWII by finally signing a peace treaty with East Germany, the GDR.

And that treaty would change everything for Berlin access.

In his view, yes.

Signing it would automatically invalidate all the existing agreements about Berlin, including those crucial Western access rights.

You have to remember, the Western powers were in West Berlin based on those post -war occupation agreements.

A situation the West obviously wouldn't accept.

No way.

Khrushchev's treaty aimed to hand control over access routes to the East German government, which the West didn't even recognize legitimacy for at that point.

So what was his proposal, his offer?

He offered to establish West Berlin as a free city, guaranteed against interference, keeping its external ties.

He even floated the idea of token troop contingents from both sides, maybe under a UN agreement.

Sounds reasonable on the surface.

But then came the hammer, the ultimatum.

Khrushchev stated point blank,

if the US rejected his proposal and he blamed potential rejection on pressure from West German Chancellor Adenauer, then the Soviet Union would just sign the peace treaty unilaterally anyway.

And that unilateral treaty would end Western access rights.

That was his argument.

He claimed it would end the state of war and therefore nullify the post -war agreements that guaranteed those rights.

A direct challenge.

How did Kennedy respond to that?

Firmly.

Very directly.

He stressed this wasn't just some legal quibble.

It was about vital practical facts hitting US national security square.

Reminding Khrushchev the US was there by right.

Exactly.

By right of conquest, having fought their way there, not by anyone's permission.

And he reminded Khrushchev that every single US president since WWII had reaffirmed the commitment to Berlin.

He tied Berlin to Western Europe security too.

Powerfully.

He argued, if the US got pushed out of Berlin, accepted losing its rights, nobody anywhere would ever trust American promises again.

He explicitly linked West Berlin security to all of Western Europe of vital US interest.

Abandoning Berlin meant abandoning Europe, essentially.

Then came that point about the ratios of power.

Bush lost flags this one.

Yeah, this was perhaps not Kennedy's best moment rhetorically.

He noted the current ratios of power seemed balanced and questioned why the Soviets would want to rock the boat in Berlin where the US had such huge interests.

Why was that so problematic?

Well, as Beschloss points out, it was just six weeks after Kennedy himself tried to change the power balance with the Bay of Pigs.

And for months, Kennedy had been telling Khrushchev through back channels to just drop his Berlin demands from 58, basically asking Khrushchev to accept a political defeat.

So Kennedy talking about ratios of power sounded like a boast.

To Khrushchev, it likely sounded exactly like that.

Like Kennedy was saying, we're strong so your concerns don't matter, even while ignoring Soviet anxieties about Germany and NATO.

It came across as arrogant, dismissing legitimate Soviet security worries.

Khrushchev's reaction.

Anger.

Dalek says it built steadily.

He started calling Berlin the most dangerous spot in the world, a sore spot, a thorn, an ulcer that needed an operation.

Strong language.

Very.

He argued the peace treaty was needed to stop West German revanchists.

He even compared them to Hitler's generals who wanted to revise borders and start a new war.

This fiery talk really shows how deep his anxieties ran.

And he made it personal too, didn't he?

Mentioning his son.

He did.

A deeply personal moment.

Reminding Kennedy of the horrific human costs of WWII for the Soviets millions dead, including his own son, relatives of other leaders.

He stressed almost every Soviet family had suffered losses, underscored the immense emotional weight this held for them.

Was his intention to sign the treaty was firming up?

Absolutely.

He reiterated his firm intention, making it clear that after signing, any violation of East German sovereignty would be seen as open aggression against a peace -loving country.

And the USSR would respond.

A significant escalation.

Kennedy countered on West German buildup.

He did.

Said he opposed a West German buildup that could threaten the USSR,

stressed the serious consequences of Khrushchev's plan, and also mentioned his own brother's death in the war.

Trying to find some calming ground in shared loss, perhaps?

But Khrushchev just kept hammering on his points, formalizing borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia, normalizing East Germany, ending all Western occupation rights in West Berlin.

Dismissing the Potsdam agreement?

Pretty much.

Arguing the war ended 16 years ago, Kennedy retorted that Roosevelt couldn't have predicted the Cold War alignment back then.

They were talking past each other on the legalities.

Khrushchev also argued Berlin had no military value.

Right.

Said it held no real military significance, and Western rights stemmed only from the war, so they'd naturally expire with a peace treaty.

That was his logic.

Then he brought up that interim arrangement idea again.

From Camp David.

Yeah.

He revisited that.

Suggested maybe a six -month window for talks on German unification.

If nothing came of it in six months, then the Soviet Union would feel free to sign its peace treaty.

Blaming the U -2 incident for derailing it before.

Exactly.

Express regret it didn't happen at the Paris summit in 1960 because of the U -2 spy plane incident.

Trying to frame it as a missed opportunity, he was now reviving.

But then came the real bombshell.

The deadline.

He dropped it.

Declared the Soviet Union couldn't delay any longer on Berlin.

They would likely sign a peace treaty by the end of the year.

December.

Even unilaterally if needed.

And warned about war.

Didn't mince words.

Warned about the potential for war if the U .S.

resisted.

Even used that stark image of putting any madman who wants war in a straight docket.

A clear, direct ultimatum.

The crisis just went critical.

Kennedy's response.

He talked about being a serious country.

He did.

Emphasized the strategic importance of the world seeing the U .S.

as a serious country.

This provoked what Dalek calls cold anger from Khrushchev.

Khrushchev shot back the USSR would never, under any conditions,

accept U .S.

rights in West Berlin after a peace treaty.

Cited U .S.

actions with West Germany and Japan as precedents for changing status after treaties.

He just kept repeating the ultimatum about East German sovereignty.

Over and over.

Nullification of surrender obligations.

Kennedy countered.

Stressing the popular support for the U .S.

in Berlin.

Denying the U .S.

wanted war.

Hoping for a broader German solution eventually.

Kennedy also pointed out how big a change this was after years of U .S.

presence.

A fair point.

Khrushchev then sort of circled back to the interim agreement idea again.

Maybe trying to make it look like the Germans were sorting it out.

But the threat of unilateral action was still right there.

But Kennedy wouldn't bite on the interim deal.

No.

He refused to even discuss it if it meant letting Khrushchev save face.

Or implied any weakness in the U .S.

commitment to Berlin.

Beschloss notes this was much tougher than Eisenhower might have been.

Kennedy wasn't giving an inch here.

And Kennedy decided he needed one more meeting.

Just interpreters.

He did.

Dalek highlights this.

Kennedy was privately determined to have one final session.

Just him, Khrushchev, and the interpreters.

He had to be sure Khrushchev understood the U .S.

position on Berlin.

Understood American resolve.

Even if it meant delaying his departure significantly.

Shows how serious he felt it was.

Absolutely.

He needed absolute clarity to avoid a catastrophic miscalculation.

Okay.

Before that final meeting, there were some other interactions.

Lunch.

Gifts.

Yeah.

Some less substantive moments.

The lunch with Jacqueline Kennedy and Nina Khrushchev.

The gift exchange.

Kennedy gave a replica of the USS Constitution.

Khrushchev gave a silver coffee service and other things.

Kennedy wasn't impressed with the coffee set, apparently.

Privately, no.

Viewed it a bit cynically.

These small moments just kind of highlight the strained atmosphere.

Even when they weren't debating policy.

Khrushchev made a toast somewhere.

At a Soviet embassy gathering.

He toasted the importance of leader -to -leader contact.

Interestingly, he acknowledged they'd reached no understanding, but still hoped for future improvement.

Still blaming Adenauer for Berlin.

Yep.

Reiterated Adenauer was the main obstacle on Berlin.

Dismissed Strauss.

His toast was this odd mix.

A religious nod to Kennedy.

A pragmatic appeal to common sense.

Trying different angles, maybe.

And Kennedy's reply.

Focused on avoiding confrontation.

Very much so.

Focused on the absolute need to prevent a direct U .S.-Soviet clash, given their destructive power.

He used that analogy.

The Constitution's cannons versus modern weapons stressing both sides needed to stay in their own area.

They had a personal chat, too.

About careers.

A brief one.

About what they wanted to be at different ages.

Ended with Kennedy's quip, Boston would be fine.

A fleeting moment of something like normal conversation amidst the tension.

Okay, but then came that final interpreters -only meeting.

The climax.

The real climax.

Kennedy started, again, emphasizing Berlin's critical importance, hoping to avoid hitting U .S.

national interests hard.

Khrushchev complained about being humiliated.

He did.

Said the U .S.

wanted to humiliate the USSR, but he repeated the offer.

A six -month interim agreement on Berlin.

After that, Western presence had to end.

Still sticking to his guns.

Kennedy warned him directly about the consequences.

Delivered a stark warning.

Called it a drastic action.

Mentioned his upcoming meeting with Macmillan in London.

Basically framed it as, you do this, you force us to choose between accepting it or confrontation.

Laying it right on the line.

And Khrushchev's response to that.

He countered with the token -trip idea, again, U .S., U .K., French, and Soviet troops, under a U .N.

agreement, with access controlled by East Germany.

And then,

the drama.

The hand slam.

He slammed his hand on the table.

Declared, I want peace.

But if you want war, that is your problem.

A chilling physical display of force backing up his words.

Wow.

What was the mood like after that?

Heavy silence, apparently.

Just the ticking of a clock.

Then Kennedy, echoing the Gull's line, replied very pointedly.

It is you and not I who wants to force a change.

Standing his ground.

Absolutely refusing to be intimidated.

But Khrushchev was just as resolute.

Said the USSR had no choice but to accept the challenge they would respond.

War would only happen if the U .S.

imposed it.

And he repeated the deadline.

Repeated his firm and irrevocable decision.

Peace treaty in December, if no interim deal was reached.

Leading to Kennedy's famous line.

Kennedy's grim reply.

If that is true, it's going to be a cold winter.

Really captured the bleak outlook and the potential for dangerous escalation.

How did Khrushchev remember Kennedy looking?

He later recalled Kennedy seemed visibly anxious, upset during that final showdown.

The summit ended with just a somber handshake.

No breakthroughs.

Just unresolved crisis hanging in the air.

What was the immediate reaction back in the American camp?

Shock.

Rusk was reportedly stunned by the open talk of war.

Kennedy himself was clearly upset.

Feeling Khrushchev had tried to bully him.

And quietly, the Soviets handed over that aid memoir.

Demanding the German settlement within six months.

Kennedy didn't publicize the aid memoir right away.

No, he chose not to initially.

Which highlights the impact they knew how serious this was.

And Kennedy wanted to manage the message coming out of Vienna.

No false optimism.

Definitely.

He wanted to avoid any misleading spirit of Vienna.

While Chip Bullen was giving a somewhat positive briefing, Kennedy told his press secretary, Salinger, to get the word out to key reporters about the somber reality of the talks.

Trying to control the narrative.

Very much so.

Understanding the high stakes and needing a realistic public view.

He spoke to James Reston privately, didn't he?

The roughest thing, quote.

Yeah, a famous conversation.

Told Reston of the New York Times it was the roughest thing in my life.

And he blamed Khrushchev's hostility on the Bay of Pigs failure.

Believing Khrushchev saw him as weak.

Exactly.

Thought Khrushchev saw him as young, inexperienced, lacking resolve.

Someone he could just, quote, beat hell out of.

And Kennedy knew that perception was a huge problem going forward.

The flight to London must have been tense.

Described as silent, depressed, even Jacqueline Kennedy seemed on edge.

And in London, Prime Minister Macmillan wrote in his diary that Kennedy seemed stunned, like someone meeting Napoleon at his peak.

Quite a contrast to Khrushchev's return.

Stark contrast.

Khrushchev apparently returned to Moscow seemingly triumphant, exuberant even, at an Indonesian embassy party.

Shows how differently they viewed the outcome.

What did Khrushchev tell his own people about Kennedy?

It was mixed.

He reportedly told Kremlin colleagues Kennedy was intelligent, but too weak.

And he was surprised Kennedy seemed so reliant on inherited policies, didn't seem to have his own strong convictions yet.

That worried Khrushchev.

But his aides saw differently.

Some did.

Interpretations varied.

One saw Kennedy more like an advisor than a leader.

But Khrushchev's son, Sergei, later recalled his father actually saw Kennedy as a worthy, likable partner.

So even within the Soviet leadership, there was uncertainty about Kennedy.

Kennedy remained preoccupied in London.

Very much so.

Those around him noted his depression.

He told columnist Jacef Alsop he wouldn't give in no matter what happens, which Alsop found chilling.

Despite the royal events, Christening's dinners, his mind was clearly still back in Vienna.

And then back to Washington.

Still visibly affected.

Dalek mentions him scribbling a Lincoln quote about foreboding.

He even made that joke to Charles Bartlett.

Well, I got my dose of salts.

I got a Russian of my own now.

Shows the deep impression Khrushchev made.

How did he plan to present Vienna to the American public?

Carefully.

Preparing for his TV address, he wanted to frame it as a direct, frank, and civil exchange.

Emphasize American vigor and confidence, but downplay expectations for breakthroughs.

Did he tell Congress about the deadline?

He briefed congressional leaders, yeah.

Told them Khrushchev was confident and cocky and had set that December deadline for a peace treaty.

But he also said he planned to downplay the deadline in his speech, trying not to corner Khrushchev publicly.

So the speech itself, how did he characterize the talks?

He acknowledged the colorful memories of the European trip, but stressed the sober nature of Vienna.

Called the talks immensely useful for getting firsthand knowledge, reducing misjudgment.

He highlighted the deep ideological divides and called the Berlin exchange most somber.

But he didn't mention the ultimatum.

Crucially, no.

This is a really significant point Dalek makes.

Kennedy deliberately misled the public.

He claimed no threats or ultimatums by either side regarding Berlin.

He completely concealed Khrushchev's December deadline.

Why do that?

Presumably to manage public reaction, avoid panic, keep diplomatic options open, maybe avoid boxing Khrushchev in.

But it was a significant omission.

And interestingly, the New York Times headline after the speech was misleadingly positive,

shows the difficulty of public diplomacy in a crisis.

And then the Laos agreement fell apart almost immediately.

Pretty much.

A path at Laos attack happened soon after, which infuriated Kennedy.

Made him wonder if Khrushchev had just played him on Laos.

Did his advisors reassure him?

Ruskin Thompson tried to smooth it over, suggesting maybe it wasn't a direct breach.

Maybe Khrushchev was sincere about a temporary deal.

But ultimately, Kennedy faced criticism for inaction and decided to go back to the Geneva conference to negotiate.

Shows how hard it was to get any real agreement to stick.

So summing up Vienna from Kennedy's viewpoint,

largely a failure.

From his perspective, yes.

No test ban treaty.

No strong working relationship with Khrushchev.

No other diplomatic wins.

Instead, he came away facing this incredibly dangerous confrontation over Berlin.

It really shaped his whole approach to the Cold War afterwards.

Okay, let's bring in Beschloss's analysis here.

Why was Khrushchev so hardline on Berlin in 61?

Beschloss argues it wasn't just about Kennedy.

Several factors were pushing Khrushchev regardless of who was U .S.

president.

Like the situation in East Germany.

Exactly.

The brain drain the emigration hemorrhage through West Berlin was becoming unsustainable for East Germany.

Plus, the deep -seated Soviet fear of a rearmed West Germany in NATO.

And internal pressures.

China.

Yeah, needing to assert Soviet power against critics, including the Chinese communists who accused him of being soft.

And frankly, just a long -held expectation that something had to be done about Berlin after years of postponement.

He expected some satisfaction.

Beschloss also thinks Kennedy's early actions played a role.

He does, argues Kennedy's first five months inadvertently encouraged Khrushchev.

How?

By making Kennedy seem both more passive and more militant than Eisenhower.

Passive because of Bay of Pigs?

Militant because of rhetoric?

Sort of.

The Bay of Pigs failure suggested weakness, lack of resolve.

But maybe some of the rhetoric or the defense buildup seemed aggressive.

Khrushchev's advisors apparently noted this ambivalence.

Khrushchev might have thought Kennedy could be pushed around.

And Beschloss suggests Khrushchev created the crisis because Kennedy seemed to be ignoring Berlin.

That's part of his analysis.

Unlike Eisenhower, who had at least engaged in negotiations about Berlin, like at Camp David, Kennedy initially seemed to just want the problem to go away, so Khrushchev might have felt he had to force the issue create a crisis to get Kennedy's attention.

What about Khrushchev's behavior at the summit, the theatrical bellicosity?

Beschloss interprets that largely as a deliberate performance.

Khrushchev acting incredibly tough, belligerent, maybe even irrational, to convince Kennedy he was absolutely serious, even ready for nuclear war over Berlin.

It may be linked to backing out of the test ban.

Possibly.

Beschloss suggests reneging on the test ban agreement could have been part of demonstrating Soviet nuclear strength, especially if he perceived Kennedy as weak, a power play connected to the Berlin pressure.

How did the meeting affect Kennedy personally?

We touched on this.

Significantly.

People close to him, Billings, Herrmann, his brother Robert, Ben Bradley, observed him as shaken, deeply disturbed.

He himself made that comparison.

Dealing with Khrushchev was like dealing with his demanding father, Joe Kennedy.

Lyndon Johnson apparently did an impression.

Yeah, LBJ later did this dramatic and pretty critical reenactment of Kennedy's supposedly being weak and overwhelmed in Vienna.

Kennedy, for his part, hated suggestions he wasn't tough enough, famously quipped something like, What was I supposed to do?

Take my shoe off and pound it on the table.

Interestingly, the Soviets thought Kennedy seemed scared.

Bolshakov reported back that the Russians were apparently amazed by Kennedy's reaction, finding him affected and scared.

Different perspectives again.

Kennedy went to Palm Beach afterwards.

Yeah, retreated there to recuperate.

The official line was back pain and Jackie delayed her return from Greece.

But privately, he was likely processing Vienna.

He speculated Khrushchev might call a peace conference, but ultimately seemed to think Khrushchev was bluffing about signing the treaty.

But then the Soviets publicized the ultimatum.

Right.

Rusk initially hoped keeping the aid memoir secret meant Khrushchev wanted to avoid a crisis, but then Pravda published it, including the December deadline.

That really put it out in the open, escalated things publicly.

And Kennedy returned to DC knowing war was possible.

Returned on clutches, actually, due to his back.

And privately acknowledged to advisors that the US could soon be very close to war with the Soviet Union, a very sobering realization.

Did he second -guess his approach?

He reflected later with David Ormsby Gore, the British ambassador, about what went wrong, wondering if maybe his earlier defense messages had been too menacing, contributing to Khrushchev's stance.

Robert Kennedy saw it as a test.

RFK viewed Berlin as Khrushchev's first big test of his brother after the Bay of Pigs failure.

And Macmillan in London remained pessimistic, noting the huge potential for disaster over Berlin.

Kennedy started planning for contingencies, like a blockade.

He did, as Defense Secretary McNamara about supplies for West Berlin in case of a blockade, echoing the Berlin airlift situation under Stalin, shows how real the threat felt.

It's interesting to contrast this with Eisenhower's earlier open skies idea.

Yeah, Eisenhower had proposed things like exchanging military blueprints, surveillance flights, trying to build transparency, however unlikely it was to be accepted.

A very different approach to managing suspicion than the confrontation in Vienna.

Just a couple of quick clarifications from the notes.

Sergei Khrushchev's later views.

Right, worth remembering his later positive view of Kennedy might color his memories of Vienna somewhat.

Hindsight and later events can do that.

And the joint spaceflight idea.

That was about a joint mission to the moon, not Mars.

Small detail, but good to be accurate.

Ambassador Thompson's observation really sums it up.

Perfectly.

Llewellyn Thompson, who knew the Soviets well, observed that both leaders looked at the same set of facts and saw completely different things.

It just encapsulates the fundamental challenge of that summit and maybe the Cold War itself.

Different worlds, different interpretations.

So let's wrap up this deep dive into the Vienna summit.

The key takeaway.

It's clear this was hugely consequential, but far from productive in a positive sense.

Khrushchev came in aggressive on Berlin, likely fueled by Kennedy's perceived weakness post Bay of Pigs and his own longstanding goals.

This set the stage for a really dangerous prolonged crisis.

And Kennedy.

Kennedy left, shaken, deeply impacted by the confrontation, but also determined not to be bullied.

He returned ready to stand firm against Soviet pressure, which inevitably led to a major escalation in Cold War tensions over the next year or two.

And hopefully this detailed exploration has given you, our listener, a really nuanced understanding of everything that went down.

The key events, the strategies, those intense exchanges, the analysis from Beschloss.

Right.

We covered the initial setting, the talks on Laos, nuclear testing, the huge confrontation over Berlin, those bilateral moments, the final tense meeting, and then the aftermath and what historians like Beschloss make of it all.

We looked at Kennedy's perspective, Khrushchev's, their advisors, the whole picture.

So finally, a thought to leave you with.

What if things had gone differently in Vienna?

What if Khrushchev had read Kennedy as stronger, maybe more experienced?

Or what if Kennedy had shown more flexibility on Berlin in those first hours?

How might the Cold War have played out?

It's a huge what if, isn't it?

Something to really ponder.

And with that, we can say we've thoroughly explored the key events, political strategies, diplomatic exchanges, crises,

historical context, and Beschloss's analysis within this pivotal chapter on the Vienna Summit.