Chapter 8: Not as a Cripple

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Welcome to the Deep Dive.

Today, we're jumping right into a really tense moment in the Cold War 1961, focusing on those first critical meetings between JFK and Nikita Khrushchev.

Our main source for this is Michael Beschloss's fantastic book, The Crisis Years, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 -1963.

He really gets into the details.

Yeah, he does.

Back then, 1961, it was just incredibly tense, wasn't it?

You had these two superpowers, these two very different personalities about to collide for the first time as leaders.

Absolutely.

For you listening, our goal here is to give you really solid grasp of what happened in these initial encounters.

We'll pull out the key moments, the strategies, the behind -the -scenes stuff, all based on Beschloss.

Exactly.

We want to make it clear, thorough, but not overwhelming.

We're going to walk through Kennedy's trip to Paris, first meeting De Gaulle, that whole dynamic.

We'll touch on something often overlooked Kennedy's health issues at the time, which Beschloss covers.

Right.

And then the main event,

that first summit in Vienna, so our mission,

extract the crucial events, the political maneuvering, the diplomatic back and forth, the crises simmering beneath the surface, and Beschloss's analysis.

Basically, equip you with a really sharp understanding of this pivotal time.

Okay, let's get into it.

Paris, May 31st.

Kennedy arrives.

And right away, there's this interesting little detail.

De Gaulle greets him in English, asks about his aerial voyage.

A bit unusual, right?

Breaking protocol slightly.

And then Kennedy apparently makes a small slip -up with honor guard.

De Gaulle has to gently correct him.

Yeah, just a minor thing.

But then there's the translator incident.

Kennedy gives his arrival remarks, and the French translator apparently makes it sound incredibly formal, almost theatrical.

Like something out of Moliere, someone apparently quipped.

Exactly.

Kennedy later joked they wouldn't be using that translator again.

Bit of humor there.

And his mother, Rose Kennedy, she was already in Paris.

She was, yeah.

On a fashion trip,

Kennedy seemed a bit surprised to see her, according to her account.

And Lem Billings, his friend, noted Kennedy could be sensitive about family tagging along on these big trips.

Trying to conject that strong independent leader image, maybe?

Especially being so new and having one by such a slim margin.

Could be.

But the welcome for the Parisians themselves was massive.

Beschloss describes like a million people lining in the streets.

Chanting, Kennedy and Zachy.

Yeah.

And Dave Powers, Kennedy's aide, apparently leans out of the car trying to speak French, asking, come down here, boo, pal.

You can just imagine.

Meanwhile, behind the scenes, Kennedy's really suffering with his back pain, right?

Oh, severely.

Beschloss mentions he gets to the Cote d 'Or, say, the residence, and practically dives into this huge loo, this sixth bathtub for relief.

Saying they needed one like it in the White House.

Apparently so.

Aides were even joking about trying to sneak it home if he charmed de Gaulle enough.

Just a human detail amidst all the high politics.

But beyond the pain, he was really prepping hard for de Gaulle.

He was fascinated by him.

Absolutely.

Read his memoirs, or rather, Jackie read parts to him.

He'd memorize French phrases.

Studied up on de Gaulle's push for French independence within NATO.

NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, that Western military alliance against the Soviets.

Right.

And he'd even analyze this memo about de Gaulle's personality, his negotiating style.

Things like managing the dialogue, referring to himself in the third person.

Kennedy did his homework.

And de Gaulle, he already had an impression of Kennedy, didn't he?

Especially after the Bay of Pigs.

Yeah, Beschloss says de Gaulle saw him as maybe somewhat fumbling and overeager.

And worried about his stance on Berlin.

So Kennedy, being strategic, brings up Berlin pretty early.

Talks about Khrushchev's recent tough talk.

He does.

Lays out two options.

Stand completely firm on Western rights, or give the appearance of negotiating with minor concessions.

Kind of an Eisenhower -era tactic.

How did de Gaulle react to that?

De Gaulle basically said the whole Berlin issue boils down to whether the Soviets really want to taunt that easing of tensions.

He was skeptical.

He told Kennedy, look, Khrushchev's been making threats for years.

If he wanted war over Berlin, he probably would have started it already.

But the key was whether Khrushchev believed the West would actually fight for Berlin.

Exactly.

De Gaulle even brought up his own past doubts about whether the U .S.

would risk, say, New York for Paris.

It's about credibility.

So de Gaulle's advice was pretty direct.

Very.

Remind Khrushchev he's the one demanding change.

And make it absolutely clear.

Any use of force in Berlin means general war.

Full stop.

Which de Gaulle figured Khrushchev definitely didn't want.

And Jackie Kennedy played a role here too, didn't she?

Vishaloss highlights her contribution.

Oh, definitely.

Even though she was still recovering from childbirth, she's at lunch speaking fluent French with de Gaulle, talking French history.

Louis the Sixth and all that.

Right.

De Gaulle was seriously impressed.

Told Kennedy his wife knew more history than most French women.

And that great little anecdote,

de Gaulle points at McGeorge Bundy, asks Jackie who he is.

Qui est ce jeune homme?

Who is this young man?

Jackie explains de Gaulle talks down to Bundy about Harvard.

And Bundy replies in perfect French.

Jackie's thinking score one for our side.

Just a little moment of diplomatic one -upmanship.

Oh, love that.

So after lunch, back to Berlin.

Military plans.

Kennedy pushes de Gaulle on what to do if the Soviets make a move.

The existing plans were mostly for small stuff, probes.

De Gaulle considered bigger possibilities.

De Gaulle's recommendations.

Pretty clear.

Blockade.

Start the airlift again.

Shoot down a plane.

Respond forcefully.

And he's stressed using economic pressure on the Soviets, saying the West's position was stronger than they thought.

But then they hit a point of disagreement.

Right.

Laos.

Big time.

Kennedy asked for more French troops in Laos.

De Gaulle just shuts it down.

Calls Laos and its neighbors fictitious countries, totally unsuited for Western military involvement.

And he warns Kennedy.

Warns him straight up about getting sucked into a bottomless military and political quagmire if the U .S.

gets deeper into fighting communism there.

Says it'll just make the communists look like heroes of independence.

Wow.

Talk about foreshadowing in Vietnam.

That's a chilling warning from De Gaulle early on.

Isn't it?

Then that same night, things get chaotic with the news about Trujillo being assassinated in the Dominican Republic.

Ah, the Salinger incident.

Kennedy's press secretary.

Right.

Salinger gets word.

Rusk, the secretary of state, is delayed because of the situation.

He assumes the assassination news is public and announces Rusk is delayed because of, well,

the assassination.

Which wasn't public yet.

Oops.

Big oops.

Reporters immediately start wondering if the U .S.

was involved, especially coming so soon after the Bay of Pigs and rumors about plots against Castro.

Kennedy was reportedly furious.

Terrible timing right before the cruise ship summit.

Absolutely.

But despite all this, De Gaulle still focused on French independence.

Completely.

Tells Kennedy, look, France will stick with NATO during a Berlin crisis, but afterwards, we're going our own way.

Pursuing French interests.

And they talk nukes.

Nuclear deterrence.

Yep.

Kennedy gives the standard U .S.

line.

Soviet attack on Europe means U .S.

nuclear response.

He warns against separate European nuclear forces.

Says defense is indivisible.

But De Gaulle is polite, but skeptical.

He basically asks, are you really sure you trade New York for Paris, given how much damage the Soviets could inflict now?

He suggests France's own smaller nuclear force.

The force to frap could deter an attack by threatening to, quote, tear off an arm of Russia.

Classic De Gaulle.

Believing in French independence right down to the nuclear level.

Exactly.

The evening ends with this huge state dinner at Versailles.

Hall of Mirrors, ballet, fireworks.

The Jackie was a huge hit in Paris.

Immense.

Kennedy apparently said his good relationship with De Gaulle was probably thanks to his charming wife.

Watched her work in the room, connecting with De Gaulle.

And Kennedy asks De Gaulle for leadership advice.

Yeah, drawing on his decades of experience.

De Gaulle's advice.

Simple,

but profound.

Trust your own judgment.

Don't just rely on advisors or what was done before.

Good advice for any leader, really, but especially a new one on the world stage.

For sure.

Baseless flags that.

De Gaulle finishes by telling Kennedy, I have more confidence in your country now.

High praise.

Though Kennedy privately thought De Gaulle was mostly looking out for France's selfish interests, but appreciated him keeping their disagreements quiet.

Right.

Issues like Berlin, Laos, NATO.

They didn't really agree, but De Gaulle didn't make a public fuss.

So Paris wraps up.

Kennedy has dinner with his advisors.

Harriman gives them some last minute advice for Khrushchev.

Yeah, Harriman, who'd just been in frustrating talks about Laos, basically tells Kennedy,

go in and relax and take it easy and be humorous and funny and open.

Easier said than done, maybe, given the stakes.

You think?

Okay, so next up, Vienna.

Saturday, June 3rd.

And Kennedy's really worried about appearing weak or sick, isn't he?

Deeply concerned.

His back is killing him, but he refuses to use crutches.

He absolutely does not want to look like, quote, a cripple meeting Khrushchev.

He remembered criticizing Roosevelt Ayelta for looking frail.

Right.

So he's very conscious of the image.

Very.

And Beschloss really digs into Kennedy's health issues here.

Stuff kept very secret at the time.

He had Addison's disease.

Which required daily cortisone.

Right.

And Beschloss notes, cortisone can have side effects, mood swings, maybe even inflated stamina.

Could it have affected his judgment?

It's a question Beschloss raises.

Plus the chronic back pain from the PT -109 incident in the war.

He was getting regular pain injections.

Procane shots from Dr.

Travel.

Yeah.

But also, more controversially, treatments from Max Jacobson, Dr.

Feelgood.

Ah, yes, the amphetamine injections.

Amphetamine, steroids, who knows what else?

Supposedly to boost his mood and energy.

Again, Beschloss points out the potential impact on Kennedy's state of mind during these intense Vienna talks without saying definitively it did affect him.

But the potential was there.

And the level of secrecy around his health was extraordinary.

It really was.

Trying to hide the Addisons during the campaign, even alleged break -ins at doctors' offices.

They were terrified it would make him look unfit for the job, especially in the Cold War context.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev arrives in Vienna on Friday.

And his delegation includes Molotov.

Yeah.

His old rival, the hardliner from Stalin's time.

Kind of a strange choice.

Signaled.

Well, something complex within the Soviet leadership.

And the CIA was actually thinking about trying to get Molotov to defect.

Incredible, isn't it?

Beschloss says they were considering offering him a huge sum of money.

Shows that the kind of high -stakes games being played.

So the atmosphere when Kennedy arrives in Vienna.

Pretty electric.

Big crowds, despite Soviet efforts to keep things low -key.

People holding signs like give him hell, Jack, and help Berlin.

And leaflets reminding him about Yalta, the post -WWII conference, often seen as conceding too much to Stalin.

Right.

The local CIA station had apparently worked to ensure a warm welcome for Kennedy.

It was clear who the Viennese public preferred.

Len Billings noticed Kennedy seemed pleased by the crowds.

Definitely.

A stark contrast to the welcome for Khrushchev.

And the American residents itself had a grim history.

Yeah, a stone building that used to be SS headquarters.

A really somber place for this crucial meeting.

So Kennedy's pacing the halls, waiting,

probably thinking about Khrushchev, wondering if he'd remember their brief meeting back in 59.

And Jacobson, Dr.

Feelgood, apparently gives him an injection just before Khrushchev arrives.

According to Jacobson's own account, yes.

Yeah.

For his back.

Okay.

12 .45 p .m.

The ZIA limo pulls up.

Khrushchev gets out, the first face to face.

Beshlas described Kennedy as looking stiff, that back corset again.

A forced smile.

How are you?

Glad to see you.

Khrushchev shakes his hand, maybe a little patronizingly, heads up the steps.

Photographers yelling for more handshakes.

Of course.

And then that slightly awkward moment where Menshikov, the Soviet ambassador, steps on Secretary Rusk's foot.

Lots of apologies.

Kennedy just watching Khrushchev intently, curious to know what's going on.

Beshlas also mentions a journalist, Frank Holman, meeting his Soviet contact, highlighting how little real info is getting out on either side.

Exactly.

Unlike the 55 Geneva Summit, where the CIA apparently had a source inside, this time it was more of an information blackout.

So the first formal session.

In the music room.

Which, ironically, was above an old SS escape tunnel entrance.

Yeah, quite the setting.

They start with some pleasantries.

Kennedy mentions Ambassador Thompson.

And Khrushchev jokes, you mean our ambassador?

Trying to be playful.

Kennedy hopes for better understanding.

Khrushchev recalls their 59 meeting.

Ribs Kennedy about being late back then, saying he looked younger.

Aged a lot since then.

Even jokes about swapping ages.

Then they get down to it.

Kennedy frames the challenge.

How do our two different systems compete without starting a war?

Khrushchev insists the Soviets want friendly relations, but not at others' expense.

Admits the US is richer, but says the USSR aims to catch up through development, not conquest.

He literally says their goal is to become richer than the United States.

Then the ideological clash starts.

Khrushchev says the West needs to accept communism's eventual triumph through ideas de facto recognition.

Contrasting it with what he saw as the US goal of liquidation of the communist system.

Kennedy pushes back hard, says the Soviets are the ones trying to liquidate the free system elsewhere while objecting to any challenged communism.

Khrushchev denies that.

Says they don't want to implant their policy, it's impossible.

He argues communism will win because people choose it, like the French Revolution overthrowing feudalism.

He points to disarmament proposals as proof of peaceful intent.

It's a battle of ideas, he says.

Kennedy focuses on free choice.

Disagrees that communist minorities taking over is inevitable historical progress, but hopes it can avoid a direct clash.

Khrushchev uses this metaphor, you can't build dams against the human mind, he says.

Like the Inquisition failed, history will judge based on who improves lives more.

It's about victory of ideas, not a military victory.

Kennedy then brings up Mao's line about power coming from the barrel of a rifle.

Right, a pointed comment.

Khrushchev kind of dismisses it, doubts Mao said it, claims Marxists oppose war.

Maybe not entirely sincere there.

Kennedy tries to bring it back to practicalities.

How do we manage this ideological struggle without threatening vital security interests?

Avoid direct confrontation, he warns about how easily things could escalate, the danger of miscalculation with modern weapons.

And that word miscalculation sets Khrushchev off.

He explodes.

Pretty much.

Claims Americans always use that word.

Demands to know if the US expects the USSR to just sit passively.

We don't make mistakes, he insists.

We will not make war by mistake, says Moscow will defend its interests, tells Kennedy to bury that word.

Says they don't want war but won't be intimidating.

Wow, how does Kennedy respond to that outburst?

Calmly.

Says history is full of unpredictable actions, misjudgments even by the US, citing the miscalculation about China and the Korean War.

Says the whole point of this meeting is to get clearer understanding, more precision.

Khrushchev agrees, hopes the meeting succeeds for the sake of the world.

And they break for lunch.

A bit of a breather.

Khrushchev tries a dry martini, compares it to vodka.

They have beef wellington.

Kennedy asks about Khrushchev's medals.

He points out the Lenin Peace Prize.

Kennedy jokes he hopes they never take it away.

Then they talk space.

Khrushchev shares stories about Gagarin, how scientists worried about space affecting his mind, even encoded his controls.

Kennedy suggests a joint moon mission.

He does.

Khrushchev is hesitant at first, mentions military concerns, but then tentatively agrees.

Interesting moment.

Then some banter about corn and vodka made from natural gas.

Yeah, Rusk boasts about American corn.

Khrushchev counters with vodka from gas.

Kennedy makes a crack about Rusk's corn stories.

Khrushchev then claims he voted for Kennedy by holding back those RB -47 flyers before the election.

Playfully, yeah.

Said it stopped Nixon from claiming he could handle the Soviets.

Kennedy laughs, concedes the point.

And the joke about Gromyko looking like Nixon.

That gotta laugh, too.

Just trying to lighten the mood a bit.

Toaster exchanged.

Kennedy welcomes him to a small piece of the United States in Vienna.

Khrushchev talks about Eisenhower,

regrets Ike's canceled Soviet trip, invites Kennedy to visit the USSR someday.

Then Khrushchev takes a shot at Nixon's dream kitchen display in Moscow, complains about commercial language in their dealings, denies knowing foreign communist leaders.

But he also acknowledges Russian admiration for American tech, recalls historical cooperation, like U .S.

engineers helping after the revolution,

tells a slightly odd story about an American engineer supposedly building military bases in Turkey disguised as houses.

He toasts Kennedy's health, reaffirms the competition continues despite his age.

Then, after lunch, Kennedy suggests a walk in the garden, just the two of them, and interpreters, trying that Eisenhower tactic again.

Maybe, trying to get a more personal feel.

But O'Donnell, watching from a window, said Khrushchev looked pretty animated, like he was really laying into Kennedy.

Kennedy's account suggests he tried to talk about shared responsibility for peace.

Khrushchev's later account claims Kennedy pleaded weakness, narrow election win, tough Congress asking him not to demand too much.

Hard to know exactly what was said.

But Khrushchev definitely went off on Berlin again, mentioned losing his son in the war.

Yeah, very personal.

Kennedy acknowledges his family's losses too, but stands firm on defending West Germany and Berlin.

The core issue remains.

Is Khrushchev serious about war?

Or just testing Kennedy?

That uncertainty hangs over everything.

Kennedy tries to lighten things by asking how Khrushchev manages such long talks.

Compared to his own packed schedule, Khrushchev credits decentralization.

Kennedy explains the U .S.

system, Congress.

And Khrushchev jokes, why don't you switch to our system?

Then they go back inside for more private talks.

Back in the music room.

Kennedy restates his point about managing historical transitions peacefully given modern weapons need to avoid direct clashes.

And then he admits the Bay of Pigs was a failure.

Tries to build some common ground.

Seems like it.

Calls it more than a mistake.

It was a failure.

It kind of backfires.

He gets frustrated, asks Khrushchev directly, We admit our mistakes.

Do you ever admit you are wrong?

And Khrushchev only admits Stalin's mistakes.

Not his own.

Hmm.

Then they shift to wars of national liberation.

Khrushchev agrees with Kennedy's point about supporting ideas that improve lives, but rejects the idea that Moscow instigates these uprisings.

He flips it.

It says the U .S.

causes revolution by backing dictators.

Like Batista in Cuba.

Cuba becomes the big example.

Exactly.

Khrushchev argues U .S.

support for Batista The Bay of Pigs strengthened Castro.

He asks how tiny Cuba could possibly threaten the U .S.

Draws that parallel to Turkey and Iran on the Soviet border with U .S.

bases.

Mocks the Shah of Iran's claim to divine right.

Warns about miscalculation if the U .S.

intervenes in Cuba, implying the Soviets might do the same regarding Turkey or Iran.

Kennedy pushes back.

Says he's no fan Batista acknowledges need for change in Iran.

But objects to Castro crushing free choice, his potential expansionism, downplays the threat from Turkey -Iran to the USSR,

just like Khrushchev downplayed Cuba's threat to the U .S.

Kennedy brings up the Warsaw Pact, how the Soviets don't tolerate hostile neighbors.

Says the U .S.

is committed to free choice.

Stresses managing change without dragging in their prestige or treaties.

Predicts governments that don't serve their people will eventually fall.

Khrushchev insists Cuba's internal affairs aren't grounds for intervention.

Hopes for better U .S.-Cuba relations.

Mentions Soviet neutrality during a coup in Turkey, as an example.

Then Laos again.

Khrushchev accuses the U .S.

of backing the coup against Suvarnabhumi.

Admits both sides are sending arms, but predicts the Soviet backside will win, like Mao in China.

Urges patience.

Warns against backing moribund reactionary regimes.

Says it sets a bad precedent.

And then Kennedy makes that huge statement about the balance of power.

Yeah, says the U .S.

views Sino -Soviet forces and U .S.

Western European forces as more or less in balance.

Which sends Khrushchev into near ecstasy, according to Beschloss.

He saw it as official recognition of parody, something he boasted about constantly afterwards.

The U .S.

military chiefs back in D .C.

were apparently furious.

It really shows the different perspectives on Soviet strength, even within the U .S.

government.

Kennedy lays out U .S.

goals.

Free choice.

Defending strategic interests, maintaining the power balance.

Worries about China getting nukes.

Maybe probing Khrushchev on that.

Khrushchev just gives the standard lines on China.

U .S.

recognition.

U .N.

seat.

End Taiwan occupation.

Though privately, the Soviets were trying to restrain Mao.

Kennedy cites China's hostility.

U .S.

interests in Taiwan.

Back to Laos.

Kennedy admits it's not vital strategically, but mentions Seattle commitments.

C .O.

that Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the Asian counterpart to NATO.

Right.

Kennedy even concedes past U .S.

policy in the region wasn't always wise.

Uncertain about what the Laotian people want.

Acknowledges the path at Laos are strong, thanks to North Vietnamese support.

But they do agree on aiming for a neutral, independent Laos with a ceasefire.

Khrushchev then brings up guerrilla warfare.

Warns against U .S.-backed guerrillas without local support.

Says modern weapons make it all too dangerous anyway.

Mutual destruction.

He criticizes the U .S.

for backing colonial powers, contrasts it with America's revolutionary past, mentions the Tsar not recognizing the U .S., now U .S.

not recognizing China.

Kennedy voices concern about Khrushchev's speech endorsing wars of national liberation.

Uses Vietnam as an example of groups seizing power.

Says they need to avoid direct involvement, but will support their respective sides.

Khrushchev draws a line.

Liberation struggles are sacred, like the American Revolution.

U .S.-backed actions are different.

Downplace socialist winds in Africa.

Warns against interference leading to war.

Makes the standard complaint about U .S.

bases surrounding the USSR.

Kennedy clarifies, U .S.

doesn't oppose all different systems, mentions Yugoslavia, India, Burma.

But close alignment with Moscow in sensitive areas, meaning Cuba, is a problem.

Then Kennedy makes a really pointed comment about Poland.

Suggests if Poles had free choice, they might lean west.

Ooh, that must have angered Khrushchev.

Big time.

Khrushchev snaps back that Poland is none of Kennedy's business.

Praises the Polish government.

Calls its elections more honest than U .S.

ones.

Accuses the U .S.

of seeking a pretext for war if its policy is just preserving the status quo balance.

He also denies North Vietnamese involvement in Laos.

Claims U .S.

actions started from Thailand.

Shows little real interest in Laos despite earlier talk.

But agrees to urge cooperation on the ceasefire.

And that's the end of day one.

Beschloss says Kennedy looked dazed.

Asks Ambassador Thompson, is it always like this?

And Thompson says.

Par for the course.

Just another day at the office dealing with Khrushchev.

Dr.

Jacobson claims he checked on Kennedy during a break.

Kennedy tells his secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, the meetings went not too well.

He tells Dave Powers he managed to stay calm during Khrushchev's tough talk, but decided he wouldn't use the word miscalculation again.

Beschloss thinks Kennedy tried to impress Khrushchev with his confidence and knowledge, but maybe debating ideology was a mistake.

Because their fundamental beliefs were just too different.

Khrushchev the true believer, Kennedy the pragmatist.

Exactly.

And Kennedy struggled to sell the U .S.

as revolutionary or anti -colonial, given its alliances.

Thompson had warned him Khrushchev really believed in communism, but Kennedy seemed to dismiss it, which might have looked like weakness to Khrushchev.

So asking Khrushchev to accept a standstill, accept U .S.

predominance, it was a huge ask.

Basically asking him to give up his core beliefs.

A very difficult position.

Beschloss doesn't find proof drugs hampered Kennedy, but says he tempted fate with the treatments.

Charles Bartlett thought the back pain and fatigue from Paris were bigger factors.

The press briefing after day one sounds like a non -event.

Frank, courteous and wide -ranging.

Journalists were skeptical.

Randolph Churchill walking out dramatically kind of summed it up.

No real news.

Beschloss adds some color.

Mrs.

Khrushchev at an art exhibit.

Jackie visiting a factory.

Jackie's popularity was huge.

Definitely.

That night, the state dinner at Schoenbrunn Palace.

Big contrast to the day's tension.

Kennedy apologizes for being late.

Khrushchev shows up in a business suit, told his whole delegation no black tie.

Didn't want to bring his wife initially, but bowed to custom, and makes a point of shaking Jackie's hand first.

Right.

Khrushchev later remembered Jackie as young and pleasant, if not stunningly beautiful.

Rose Kennedy noted Nina Petrovna seems strong and capable.

De Gaulle had warned Jackie that Mrs.

Khrushchev was more malicious than he.

Though Jackie found her hard and tough.

Beschloss thinks that might be unfair, seeing Nina Petrovna as strong and shrewd, but also sweet.

Jackie liked Khrushchev's daughter, not her boastful husband.

Eunice Shriver, Kennedy's sister, apparently lightened the mood, got a big laugh out of Khrushchev.

And during dinner, Jackie has that famous exchange with Khrushchev.

He starts talking Ukrainian statistics, and she cuts in, Oh, Mr.

Chairman, don't pour me with statistics.

Then ask for a space dog puppy.

Huh.

Gotta admire the nerve.

Right.

But despite those moments, Kennedy was apparently feeling down after dinner.

Felt he hadn't budged Khrushchev on the balance of power issue.

Advisors try to cheer him up, tell him to focus on specifics the next day.

Yeah.

Ballin, Thompson, Kohler.

Rusk suggests that line.

You aren't going to make a communist out of me.

I don't expect to make a capitalist out of you, so let's get down to business.

Be pragmatic.

So, Sunday morning, Kennedy's go to mass, Khrushchev lays a wreath.

A reporter asks Khrushchev about Kennedy.

He gives a non -committal answer, that is for the American public to say, but does invite Kennedy to Moscow.

Kennedy and Rusk arrive at the Soviet embassy for the final meeting.

Crowds wanted Jackie.

Kennedy jokes to Rusk he's a hell of a substitute.

Rusk worries Khrushchev might resent the difference in public enthusiasm.

They have one last brief meeting inside.

And that's the Vienna summit.

Okay, so wrapping up this deep dive into that crucial chapter, we've really walked through those intense first interactions between Kennedy and Khrushchev in 61.

Yeah, the clash of personalities, their completely different goals, the shadow of the Cold War hanging over everything, the ideological divide.

It's all there in Beschloss's account.

And we saw the prelude in Paris de Gaulle's insights, his warnings, his own agenda, plus that underlying factor of Kennedy's health, which Beschloss carefully details.

Some definite takeaways leap out, don't they?

De Gaulle's bluntness, especially that quagmire warning about Southeast Asia, wow.

Or the sheer fact the CIA was thinking about trying to get Molotov to defect.

That's Cold War intrigue right there.

And the public reaction in Vienna.

The clear preference for Kennedy.

It tells you something about the mood at the time.

Beschloss really brings these details to life.

Absolutely.

We've drawn directly from his work here, summarizing the key events, the strategies, the diplomacy, the crises brewing, the whole historical context of this chapter.

We've covered de Gaulle, Molotov, the advisors, the key dates in May and June 61, and what it all meant going forward.

It sets the stage for so much that follows.

And it leaves you thinking, doesn't it?

How did these first impressions, these tense exchanges, influence later crises like Cuba?

Right.

What if Kennedy's health had been public?

Would Khrushchev have seen him differently?

Could a different approach in Vienna have changed anything?

These are the big questions that linger after reading Beschloss's detailed account.

Food for thought.

Definitely.

And with that, we can confirm we've provided a comprehensive summary of this specific chapter from the crisis years.

Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 -1963.

Thanks for joining us for this deep dive.