Chapter 7: The Secret Agent

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Welcome to the Deep Dive.

We're the place you turn to when you want the core insights from complex sources.

Today we're tackling a chapter from Michael Beschloss's The Crisis Years.

Kennedy Khrushchev, 1960, 1963.

That's right.

One of you asked for a way to really get the gist of this chapter quickly, you know, learn the key facts, maybe some surprising details without getting bogged down.

And that's exactly our mission today.

This chapter is all about a really fascinating clandestine development in early 61.

Which is?

The setting up of a secret communication channel between the Kennedy White House and the Kremlin.

Okay, a back channel.

Exactly.

And we're gonna look at how it started, who was involved and why it mattered, especially leading up to that really pivotal Vienna summit between JFK and Khrushchev.

And the central figure in starting this channel was a Soviet named Georgi Bolshakov.

That's the one, Georgi Bolshakov.

So how does he enter the picture?

It sounds pretty dramatic.

It really does.

He approaches a journalist, Frank Holman, from the New York Daily News and essentially asks Holman to set up a meeting with Robert Kennedy, the attorney general.

Just like that.

What was his pitch?

His claim was pretty bold.

He said he was the only person in the Soviet embassy who had a direct line to Khrushchev himself.

Wow.

Okay, that would definitely raise eyebrows, like something from Le Carre.

Absolutely.

Now, officially, Bolshakov's background was interesting.

He'd been a task correspondent back in the 50s.

Tep PSS, the Soviet news agency, often a cover for intelligence, right?

Very often.

Then he pops up again in 59, this time as an information secretary at the embassy, and he's editing this magazine called USSR.

So, officially, maybe not top tier.

On paper, no.

He was ranked something like 40th out of 67 embassy staff.

But, and this is key, he was under intense surveillance.

By whom?

The FBI.

The FBI, yes, but also apparently by Soviet intelligence too.

Holman, the reporter, even said Georgi was being tailed by everybody on earth.

That tells you something.

It certainly suggests he wasn't just a magazine editor.

So, what's the real story, according to Beschloss?

Well, Beschloss cites Khrushchev's son -in -law, Adzube, who suggested Bolshakov was likely GRU Soviet military intelligence.

Ah, okay.

Apparently, he used to work for Marshal Zhukov, the famous World War II general.

When Khrushchev sacked Zhukov, Adzube supposedly vouched for Bolshakov, got him the USSR magazine job, but his real function was to be Khrushchev's personal sort of deniable representative in Washington.

That makes a lot more sense of the surveillance and the direct access claim.

It does.

And think about the Kennedys.

They liked secrecy, they liked bypassing the bureaucracy.

Soviet intelligence would have known this.

So, sending someone like Bolshakov was tailored to their style.

It seems highly likely.

And you can bet Bolshakov was thoroughly briefed on the Kennedys, their personalities, politics, everything.

So, Holman tells Robert Kennedy's aide about this strange request.

What happens then?

RFK goes to his brother, the president.

JFK has apparently told Bolshakov is, quote, an important agent of the Soviet secret police.

Doesn't sound like a ringing endorsement.

Not exactly.

But despite that,

President Kennedy tells Robert to go ahead, meet with him, feel him out, see what he wants.

They were willing to explore it.

It seems risky, but may be necessary given the stakes.

Possibly.

And, you know, this wasn't actually the first time the Soviets had tried something like this.

The book mentions a similar effort back in the late 50s.

Khrushchev's people were worried Nixon might win the presidency, despite his anti -communist reputation, and they wanted a back channel to him.

And who was their go -between then?

Believe it or not, Frank Holman again.

The same reporter.

No kidding.

This guy Holman was certainly well -connected.

He really was.

He had a friendly relationship with Nixon.

Beschloss even tells this funny story from the 52 campaign where Nixon put Holman in the motorcade next to Pat Nixon as a joke, basically letting him impersonate the candidate for a bet.

Huh.

But Holman also played a more serious role.

Yes.

He helped convince the National Press Club to admit Soviet diplomats, including a guy named Jerry Gvozdev.

And Gvozdev became the Nixon contact.

He did.

In early 58, Gvozdev used Holman to pass on an urgent query about Lebanon.

What would the U .S.

do if Soviet -allied Syria moved in?

High -stakes stuff.

Definitely.

Holman relayed it, got a firm warning back from Nixon's people.

Then later, when Eisenhower actually sent troops to Lebanon, Gvozdev told Holman the Soviets thought war was coming,

and any U .S.

move into Iraq would mean a direct attack on the U .S.

mainland.

Wow.

Passed through a journalist?

Chillin'.

It really underscores the precariousness of communication back then.

Gvozdev also used Holman during the Berlin Crisis to reassure Nixon's camp that it wouldn't lead to war.

So these messages might have actually influenced events.

Potentially, yes.

Gvozdev also conveyed Khrushchev's interest in Nixon visiting the USSR, laying out conditions that were eventually met.

And Nixon kept this channel secret.

Very secret.

Nixon might not have even known Gvozdev's name.

By the time Nixon went to Moscow in 59, Gvozdev was gone from D .C.

He later got kicked out of Brazil as a spy.

Okay, so back channels weren't unprecedented.

Now let's return to Bolshakov and Robert Kennedy.

Holman sets up the meeting.

Yes.

Holman brings Bolshakov to the Justice Department, even using RFK's private elevator.

Very discreet.

And Bolshakov makes his pitch.

He has this special link to Khrushchev.

Can give a truer picture of Kremlin thinking than, you know, the official ambassador.

And did he get straight to the point?

Immediately.

He asked Robert Kennedy about President Kennedy's letter from February proposing a summit.

Ah, summit proposal.

This is right after the Bay of Pigs, right?

Exactly.

So the timing is awkward for Kennedy.

Suddenly Khrushchev seems interested again, just when Kennedy might look weak.

So Kennedy felt cornered.

He couldn't really back out now.

That's the implication.

He felt he kind of had to follow through.

Ben Bradley reminded him that Eisenhower used to set preconditions for summits.

So Kennedy adopts that tactic.

Yes.

He tells Robert to tell Bolshakov he's leaning towards a summit.

But the final decision depends on allied approval and, crucially, genuine progress, on talks about Laos and nuclear testing.

And what does Bolshakov say to that?

He assures RFK that progress will happen.

And he hints very strongly, according to Robert Kennedy's memory, that Khrushchev is ready to make big concessions on a nuclear test ban.

That would have been huge.

A major carrot for Kennedy.

A very tempting prospect.

RFK also recalled they discussed Laos, the U .S.

commitment to and arms control in that first meeting.

And this meeting kicks off a regular series of contacts.

It does.

Robert Kennedy and Bolshakov met frequently, maybe two or three times a month for the next year and a half.

Why bypass the official ambassador Menchikov?

What was RFK's rationale?

Robert Kennedy later said the Soviets apparently didn't trust Menchikov to give Khrushchev an accurate picture of the U .S.

They felt the chairman didn't really understand America.

And Holman kept facilitating these meetings.

Yes.

Acting is the quiet go -between.

They used taxis, met in RFK's office, sometimes a donut shop, even just walking along Constitution Avenue trying to dodge surveillance.

And Bolshakov's social life provided cover, too.

Apparently, yes.

He knew a lot of people in Washington, which helped mask his more clandestine meetings.

Who else in the U .S.

government knew the details of these talks?

That's a critical point.

Beschloss emphasizes that only the president and Robert Kennedy were fully briefed on the substance and frequency.

And RFK didn't keep detailed notes.

He later admitted, rather astonishingly, that he stupidly never kept written records.

He just reported verbally to his brother.

Which inevitably must have caused some concern elsewhere in the administration.

Oh, absolutely.

Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, the U .S.

ambassador to Moscow, was deeply unhappy about it.

What were his objections?

He saw it as a serious error of judgment, bypassing proper channels, ignoring staff work, not having a full picture based on all the facts.

He was worried the Soviets could exploit careless talk.

And he warned Kennedy about the lack of records.

He did.

He strongly advised keeping detailed notes.

But as we heard, that advice wasn't taken.

What about others?

Rusk?

Bundy?

They weren't enthusiastic either, and apparently didn't even know how often these meetings were happening.

James Simington, one of RFK's aides, really resented Bolshakov's access, called it a dangerous game.

And the FBI was watching both of them?

Yes.

Hoover's FBI had surveillance on both Bolshakov and Robert Kennedy.

There was definite suspicion.

Beschloss mentions RFK's anti -communist credentials gave him some cover.

Yeah.

The idea was that his strong public stance made it harder to accuse him of being soft or easily manipulated.

But the core problem remained.

The imbalance.

Exactly.

Robert Kennedy was accountable.

If he misled, it reflected directly on the president.

Bolshakov, though, he was deniable.

If caught lying, the Kremlin could just say he was mistaken or acting alone.

And Khrushchev used similar channels elsewhere.

Yes, with Castro in Cuba.

He used another TSS correspondent, Alexander Alexeyev, bypassing the official Soviet ambassador there, who Castro apparently disliked.

Why did Khrushchev favor these back channels so much?

Was it just about deniability?

Beschloss suggests it was also about distrust within his own system.

He worried about holdovers from the Molotov era in the foreign ministry.

People loyal to Stalin's old guard.

Right.

He feared they might sabotage his attempts at detente with the West or paint him as too soft to his hardline critics at home.

But using agents wasn't risk free for Khrushchev either.

No, his moves towards easing tensions, relaxing the police state that threatened the KGB's power.

The KGB chairman at the time was apparently critical of Khrushchev's softer line on the US and tougher line on China.

So despite all this skepticism and internal politics, the Bolshakov channel is up and running as the Vienna summit approaches.

Yes, and after Khrushchev via Bolshakov signals renewed interest, Kennedy feels he pretty much has to agree to the summit.

Why?

Because refusing would look bad after the Bay of Pigs.

Partly, the Soviets could have leaked Kennedy's earlier letter proposing a meeting, making him look hesitant or scared after the Cuba fiasco.

But Kennedy also saw potential upsides to meeting Khrushchev.

Yes, he recognized that so many crises – Congo, Laos, Cuba, Berlin looming, Vietnam heating up – had Soviet roots or involvement.

He hoped a summit could maybe establish some ground rules, sort of stand still in the Cold War, a more rational framework, considering both sides' needs.

And politically, a summit could help Kennedy too, domestically and internationally.

Definitely.

Eisenhower summits, even the failed Paris one, tended to boost unity.

For Kennedy, meeting Khrushchev face to face could counter the image of inexperience lingering after the Bay of Pigs.

He even made that cynical comment about presidents getting more popular after failures, didn't he?

He did, a sort of dark humor about the rally around the flag effect.

So while R .F .K.

and Bolshakov are talking secretly, the official diplomatic track moves forward too.

Yes.

On May 4th, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko formally proposes the summit to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow.

He specifically notes that recent events make a meeting even more necessary.

Thompson encourages Kennedy to accept.

Strongly.

He urges Kennedy to go ahead, and even suggests JFK should reveal his own earlier summit proposal to counter any narrative that he's being forced into it by the Bay of Pigs.

Did Thompson think a summit could actually achieve something concrete?

He thought it might moderate Khrushchev's behavior before the upcoming Soviet Party Congress.

He also speculated it could worsen the Sino -Soviet split.

Thompson still believed Khrushchev aimed for global communism, but through peaceful means, not war.

And right around this time, the U .S.

finally gets a man into space.

Yes.

May 5th, Alan Shepard makes his suborbital flight, a huge relief for Kennedy after Gagarin and the Bay of Pigs, a much -needed boost.

But things were going badly in Laos.

Very badly.

The U .S.-backed forces were crumbling.

Ambassador Brown in Vientiane was asking for U .S.

airstrikes.

Which could have led to a much wider war.

Exactly.

Intervention could have derailed the ceasefire talks and drawn the U .S.

into conflict, potentially involving North Vietnam and even China.

Kennedy was caught between wanting to look tough after Cuba and fearing another Korea -style war with China.

Precisely.

And many top officials, like Rusk and congressional leaders,

didn't think much of the Laotian regime they were backing anyway.

What about the military?

The Joint Chiefs were divided.

Some predicted heavy U .S.

casualties just from disease.

The assessment was that communist forces could easily encircle any U .S.

troops sent in.

And the ultimate risk?

Nuclear war.

Intervention could potentially escalate to a nuclear exchange with both China and Russia.

So Kennedy decides against sending U .S.

ground troops.

Yes, he makes that call, later saying the Bay of Pigs experience influenced him.

Instead, a U .K.-Soviet brokered ceasefire leads to a conference in Geneva on Laos.

Avril Harriman represents Kennedy there.

Though LBJ was apparently pretty pessimistic about Laos behind the scenes.

He was.

And Robert Kennedy even raised Laos with Bolshakov, worrying that a neutral settlement might just become a tunnel for communist infiltration into South Vietnam.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev is sounding moderate and public.

Relatively, yes.

Talking about coexistence, which seemed to pave the way for Vienna.

Then Word of the Summit starts leaking out anyway.

It does.

And on May 16th, Ambassador Menshikov formally delivers Khrushchev's acceptance letter to Kennedy.

How does Kennedy respond if he'd been waiting a while?

He's somewhat cool, reserved.

He stresses the importance of Laos and the general international climate.

He suggests Vienna as the location.

Does he bring up the leaks with Menshikov?

He does.

Menshikov denies any Soviet leaks.

Kennedy explains his talks with the Gaul made wider knowledge inevitable.

He emphasizes the test ban talks as a key reason for meeting, but warns against expecting big breakthroughs on Laos or testing at Vienna itself.

So the wheels are formally in motion.

Rusk isn't thrilled, though.

No.

Gerard Smith relays Kennedy's wishes to Rusk in Geneva, but Rusk is apparently even less keen on the summit now than before the Bay of Pigs.

Still, with the news out, he tells Kennedy to go ahead.

And Kennedy informs Khrushchev it's officially on.

That's right.

And the very next day, the Kennedys head off on their first official foreign trip together.

To Ottawa, Canada.

Not a smooth visit, apparently.

It's not at all.

Beschloss describes real mutual dislike between JFK and Prime Minister Diefenbaker.

Diefenbaker annoyed Kennedy by publicly offering Canada as a mediator on Cuba.

The whole atmosphere was tense.

And wasn't there some infamous memo incident?

Ah, yes.

The SOB memo.

A staff memo critical of Diefenbaker was accidentally left behind, causing a diplomatic kerfuffle.

And Kennedy heard his back again.

Yes.

During a tree planting ceremony.

Ignored doctor's advice, apparently.

Came back to Washington in a lot of pain, using crutches again.

So May 20th, the Vienna summit is announced publicly in both capitals.

What's the reaction?

Mixed.

Definitely not the usual hopeful buzz surrounding summits.

Some White House aides thought Khrushchev might see Kennedy as decisive for agreeing to meet.

But the wider reaction was more nervous.

Much more.

Colonists pointed out, Kennedy seemed to be ditching his own previous insistence on preconditions for summits.

European diplomats worried Khrushchev would exploit the meeting.

Any specific criticism in the U .S.?

Oh yeah.

Senators Gore Sr.

and Hickenlooper were critical.

George Ball called the timing unfortunate.

Arthur Goldberg supposedly told Kennedy bluntly he wasn't ready.

Even friends like Senator Mansfield expressed concern.

Yes.

Mansfield wrote to Kennedy, warning it could just become a verbal slugfest.

James Reston noted the world seemed more focused on Khrushchev than Kennedy now.

So Kennedy felt like events were running away from him.

Beshlaw says he felt overtaken by events.

Even stopped tracking those American prestige polls.

So how does Kennedy try to regain the initiative before Vienna?

He decides to give a second State of the Union address, just 12 weeks after the first one.

May 25th.

A re -State of the Union.

Why?

To signal a powerful new start, outline a renewed sense of purpose.

He pushed ahead with new military requests, despite some advisors warning against it so close to the summit.

What'd she ask for?

More money for the military, expanding the Marines, boosting counterinsurgency capabilities, new hardware, and tripling funds for fallout shelters.

And the big one?

The huge one.

Committing the U .S.

to landing a man on the moon before the end of the decade, by 1970.

A massive undertaking.

Was this purely about the space race?

Well, it certainly had huge political appeal, boosting morale, the economy, national pride after Gagarin.

But there was debate about the scientific versus political justification.

Eisenhower, for one, privately thought it was an almost hysterical stunt.

A costly stunt.

Extremely costly.

Senator Bush, Prescott Bush, and even Kennedy's own father worried about the expense.

But Kennedy saw how space success could distract from Cold War problems.

So armed with this new agenda, Kennedy prepares for Khrushchev himself.

What was the advice he was getting?

He read Khrushchev's biography, CIA, and State Department briefing books.

State advised him to show he understood the world situation and intended to shape it.

The intel suggested Khrushchev, worried about China, might actually want some kind of deal with the West.

What did the CIA profile say about Khrushchev's personality?

Complex.

Folksy style, but shrewd.

Self -proclaimed expert on everything.

Theatrical, proud of his work in class roots, determined to be seen as a world leader.

But also potentially tricky.

Oh yes.

Capable of frankness, but also a gambler and dissembler, believed he'd see communism triumph in his lifetime.

The CIA warned he might try to rattle Kennedy, pull stunts like he had before.

Their secret assessment called him a chronic, optimistic opportunist.

Any specific advice on how to handle him?

Bryant Wedge, a psychological warfare specialist, said, Just state the Western positions clearly.

Leave no room for miscalculation.

Kennedy also reviewed transcripts of Khrushchev's past talks with others.

Did others chime in?

Adlai Stevenson gave him a memo on the Soviet worldview.

Humphrey, Restin, Chip Bolin all offered advice on handling Khrushchev's personality.

Bolin used that French word, méchanceté, suggesting a kind of maliciousness or spitefulness.

Walter Lippmann advised patients, calling Khrushchev a committed revolutionist.

McKennedy thought Khrushchev wouldn't risk war.

That seems to have been Kennedy's underlying belief, despite some of the warnings.

Beschloss gives us quite a bit of Khrushchev's backstory too, doesn't he?

To understand the man Kennedy was about to meet.

He does.

Paints a picture of his peasant origins.

Working in coal mines, his role in the revolution and civil war, losing his first wife.

His rise to the party.

Yes, educated at a minor school, rose under Kuganovich's patronage, eventually ran the Moscow party organization.

He was a minor figure during Stalin's Great Purge, survived it.

Then sent to Ukraine.

As Stalin's viceroy.

Involved in the early chaos of WWII.

Beschloss includes that interesting anecdote about him meeting an American, Marshall McDuffie, during the famine and having a surprisingly frank chat.

And he rose higher under Stalin later.

Back in Moscow, he became very powerful during Stalin's final paranoid years.

Then Stalin dies in 53.

And Khrushchev moves fast.

Undermines Malenkov by appealing to the military and secret police with hardline talk.

Gets Malenkov ousted, allies with Bulganin.

And then the big turning point, the secret speech in 56.

Huge moment.

Denouncing Stalin's crimes.

It sent shockwaves through Eastern Europe uprisings in East Germany, Poland, the Hungarian Revolution, which was brutally crushed.

Did that cause problems for Khrushchev back home?

Yes.

A backlash from hardliners against de -Stalinization.

He temporarily toughened his rhetoric against the West.

Then came the anti -party II attempt in 57.

Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich trying to oust him.

Right.

But Khrushchev fought back, crucially with Marshall Zhukov's support.

He won, but then rather ungratefully ousted Zhukov soon after.

Consolidating power.

By 58, he held both top jobs, party first secretary and premier.

The undisputed leader.

Okay.

So that's the man.

Now the big issue looming over Vienna,

Berlin, that was Khrushchev's top priority, right?

Absolutely.

While Kennedy was focused on the test ban, Khrushchev was zeroed in on Berlin.

Remind us of the basic setup there.

After WWII,

Germany and Berlin were divided into four zones.

US, UK, French, Soviet.

The initial idea was eventual unification.

But the Cold War changed that.

Exactly.

You get West Germany, FRG, and East Germany, GDR.

But Berlin stays divided, deep inside East Germany.

West Berlin became this Western island in a communist sea.

Which Khrushchev hated.

He called it a bone in the throat of East Germany.

Saw it as a center for spying, propaganda, a showcase for Western prosperity that undermined the East.

And Stalin had tried to force the West out before.

With the 1948 Berlin blockade, the West responded with the airlift, a huge success and symbol of resolve.

Then the Soviets created the GDR, controlling East Berlin, which the West never recognized.

So Khrushchev renewed the pressure in 1958.

November 1958.

Issues in ultimatum.

West must sign a peace treaty recognizing East Germany within six months, or the USSR will sign its own separate treaty with the GDR.

Which would threaten Western access rights to Berlin.

That was the clear threat.

If the GDR controlled the access routes, it could lead to a direct confrontation.

Khrushchev kept boasting about Soviet missiles saying they mean business.

What did Khrushchev want from this peace treaty ultimately?

Formal recognition of two Germanys.

Solidifying the division.

Make West Berlin a demilitarized free city with no Western troops.

Undermine Western guarantees.

Basically demonstrate Soviet power and fracture NATO.

And underlying all this was a deep Soviet fear of Germany.

A profound fear of a reunified, possibly nuclear armed, revanchist Germany.

Think of the Soviet losses in WWII.

Khrushchev's own experiences at Stalingrad.

This was visceral.

Whereas the West publicly wanted reunification via elections.

Publicly, yes, expecting a pro -Western outcome.

Though privately, Beschloss argues, most leaders on both sides, including Kennedy, thought reunification was unlikely and probably dangerous.

Eisenhower might have still held out hope for it within NATO, though.

West Germany got sovereignty in 55, but pledged not to seek nukes.

Yes, but Khrushchev didn't trust that pledge.

He strongly suspected they'd eventually get them.

He backed the Repakee plan for a nuclear -free zone in Central Europe.

Which Eisenhower rejected.

And Beschloss suggests that rejection might have pushed Khrushchev towards the 58 ultimatum.

How did Eisenhower respond to the ultimatum back then?

Cautiously.

Reinforced troops in Berlin, but avoided big mobilizations or budget hikes.

Khrushchev's deadline passed.

Then at Camp David in 59, Ike conceded Berlin's status was abnormal, and agreed to talk concessions.

But the U -2 incident blew up the Paris summit and halted those talks.

But Khrushchev warned again in early 61 that Berlin had to be solved that year.

He did, right before Kennedy took office.

So Kennedy inherits this ticking time bomb, having largely avoided the issue during the campaign.

The risk of Holocaust or humiliation was immediate.

And Kennedy's initial strategy seemed to be avoidance.

Pretty much.

Told Thompson to ask for time, didn't mention Berlin in his first State of the Union or other early speeches.

But Thompson kept warning him this wouldn't work.

Repeatedly.

Warned Khrushchev would likely sign a separate treaty after the West German elections and Soviet Party Congress, leading to a gradual strangulation of Berlin.

Kennedy still didn't engage.

Even told Thompson not to bring it up when they met in Novosibirsk.

Apparently not.

Thompson warned Khrushchev directly in that meeting anyway about U .S.

resolve and a potential arms buildup.

Then cabled D .C.

predicting a Berlin crisis in 61 and urged Kennedy to offer negotiations to give Khrushchev a way out.

But Kennedy seemed to think Khrushchev might just drop it.

Lippmann told that story.

Right.

Kennedy seemed surprisingly dismissive.

But Khrushchev, having backed down once after Ike's vague promises, felt he needed some satisfaction on Berlin to save face.

He likely saw Kennedy's silence as weakness and decided pressure was the only way to get attention.

So Khrushchev needed a win on Berlin for multiple reasons.

Stabilize his empire, score a communist victory, maybe split NATO, reassure his generals.

All of those.

And by May 61, after the Bay of Pigs in Laos, he probably thought Kennedy could be pushed on Berlin.

There's even a suggestion that fear of Soviet retaliation against Berlin influenced Kennedy's actions during the Bay of Pigs itself.

Khrushchev felt he had to be tough in Vienna.

He likely felt immense pressure to appear strong, especially given Kennedy's recent setbacks.

Meanwhile, Kennedy hadn't really focused on Berlin policy yet.

He'd been consumed by other crises.

Dean Acheson gave a very gloony assessment.

The administration publicly rejected any Eisenhower -era concessions.

The U .S.

minister in Berlin, Leitner, advised a very hard line for Vienna.

But Thompson kept advising Kennedy to offer something to avoid war.

Yes.

Bundy summarized the conflicting advice for Kennedy.

Ruskin Bundy suggested JFK should just ask Khrushchev what exactly bothered him about the current Berlin situation.

And through the back channel.

RFK assured Bolshakov the U .S.

was committed to West Berlin.

Exactly.

So you have this mix of public posturing, internal debate, secret assurances, and immense pressure building on both sides as Vienna approaches.

Final days before the trip, Kennedy's at Hyannisport.

Yes, dealing with his dads and patients, a prank in his bedroom.

But also his back pain is getting worse.

He's on crutches more.

And he's thinking about a gift for Khrushchev.

Settles on a replica of the U .S.

Constitution,

old Ironsides.

Symbolizing a young, freedom -loving republic.

Borrowes money from his dad before leaving.

A little humanizing detail, Beschloss includes.

Then his 44th birthday celebration in Boston gives a speech, quotes Garrison.

Khrushchev is heading to Vienna by train, sounding moderate publicly.

Yes, but that private meeting with Thompson at the Ice Capades, that was stark.

What did he say there?

Blunt warning.

Separate peace treaty after the German elections and party congress.

Period.

Predicted great tension.

Maybe even war, if the West interfered.

Very ominous.

Kennedy meets briefly with Ben -Gurion in New York, then off they go.

He and Jackie depart on Air Force One.

Kennedy's deliberately trying to lower public expectations for the summit.

But privately, he still hoped for that test -ban breakthrough, based on Bolshakov's hints.

That seems to be the case.

He saw it as a potential huge win, something to offset Bay of Pigs and Laos, boost his standing.

But RFK later suggested that hope might have been based on misleading information from Bolshakov.

Robert Kennedy did later reflect that they were reasonably hopeful about testing going into Vienna, raising the possibility that they backchannel information wasn't accurate, or perhaps was deliberately misleading.

A final layer of uncertainty heading into the storm.

And that really sets the stage.

We've covered the lead -up, the secret channel, the history, the rising tensions over Berlin, the preparations on both sides, everything leading into that critical Vienna meeting.

Yes.

I think we've hit all the key points from this chapter in Beschloss.

The events, the strategies, the diplomacy, the crises, particularly Laos and Berlin, the historical context, and the analysis.

All the main players, dates, and the real -world stakes are there.

So we leave you with this thought.

Think about how these secret, unofficial lines of communication, like the Bolshakov channel, operate in diplomacy today.

In high -stakes situations, do the potential rewards of such channels, the ability to bypass bureaucracy or send deniable signals, truly outweigh the risks of misunderstanding, manipulation, or breakdown?

It's a fundamental question about the nature of international relations then and now.

Something to definitely mull over.