Chapter 6: A Big Kick

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Welcome to the Deep Dive.

Today we're tackling, well, a truly pivotal and frankly, a rather disastrous moment in the Cold War, the immediate fallout from the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Yeah, it's a critical moment.

We're focusing on chapter six of the crisis years, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 and 1963.

And really our mission here is to get beyond just the headlines, you know, to understand the real repercussions of this failed operation as Beshlaw lays it all out.

Right.

This chapter is just crucial because it shows not only the immediate shock waves, but also, you know, those underlying tensions and miscalculations that really set the stage for the early Kennedy -Khrushchev relationship.

Absolutely.

And Beshlaw does just an exceptional job weaving together all these different threads, speeches, letters, news reports to give us this really full picture.

He really does.

And he sets the scene so dramatically.

The initial airstrike, it's Sunday, April 16th.

And almost instantly, Castro is there at the burial for the Cuban airmen killed, pointing the finger directly at the U .S.

and the CIA.

And you had 10 ,000 Cubans chanting guerra, guerra, war, war.

I mean, incredibly volatile.

Exactly.

And Castro uses that precise moment to publicly declare his revolution socialist for the very first time.

Which is fascinating because even that early, Beshlaw's hints that Moscow, or Khrushchev at least, saw that announcement with a kind of tactical concern.

Right.

He apparently felt it didn't make much sense tactically.

Like maybe it would alienate people who might otherwise have just sympathized with Cuba against an invasion.

It sort of flags a key point, doesn't it?

These kinds of interventions, especially when you're relying on exile groups with their own agendas, they almost never go to plan.

Like Suez.

Exactly.

Anthony Eden's private comparison to his own Suez disaster really speaks volumes.

Here's a seasoned leader recognizing those pitfalls, especially with exile forces.

So fast forward to Monday morning.

President Kennedy, he already gets it.

The situation is looking dire.

He actually pulls Robert Kennedy out of a speech he was giving in Virginia.

Tells him, I don't think it's going as well as it should.

And Beshlaw's makes a point that Robert had only recently gotten the full detailed briefing on the invasion plans.

So now, with everything falling apart, the president needs that absolute unwavering loyalty.

It really shows how much Kennedy leaned on his brother in those intense moments.

And Robert's limited involvement beforehand, well, it maybe suggests a kind of compartmentalization in the planning.

Could be, which might have hindered a really robust assessment of the risks involved.

Possibly.

So as things get worse, Kennedy reluctantly gives the okay for the Navy to move closer to Cuba.

He says something like, he'd rather be called an aggressor than a bum, but you can tell his hopes aren't high.

No.

And Robert Kennedy admits privately,

I think we've made a hell of a mistake.

Wow.

And he tells his press aide grimly to start praying for those fellas on the beach.

Just sets this mood of impending disaster, doesn't it?

That admission from Robert Kennedy is, yeah, it's powerful.

It captures that immediate gut feeling of failure and the human cost that was already becoming so clear, so tragically clear.

Okay, let's turn to Khrishchev's direct response.

Beshlaw details how on Tuesday, April 18th, Khrishchev's message to Kennedy gets broadcast over radio Moscow,

a full 45 minutes before the U .S.

Chargé d 'affaires even officially receives it.

I mean, talk about a deliberate diplomatic slap in the face.

Oh, absolutely.

That timing was a message in itself.

Khrishchev was signaling his strong disapproval and, you know, making it clear this was going to be a very public issue on the world stage.

And the message itself, pretty forceful.

Very.

Khrishchev warns the invasion is fraught with danger to world peace.

He reminds Kennedy about their recent talks, you know, supposedly about improving relations.

Right, questioning Kennedy's pledge against military intervention.

And the ominous part,

the Soviet Union would provide Cuba with all necessary assistance to repel the attack.

That phrase, all necessary assistance, it was deliberately ambiguous, wasn't it?

Echoed past Soviet talk, but definitely raised serious concerns in Washington about, you know, how far would they go, potential escalation?

Exactly.

While not explicitly threatening direct military action, it certainly left that door wide open.

Kennedy had to consider a whole range of possible Soviet responses.

And the reaction inside the Soviet Union was immediate, too.

Beschloss describes thousands of students, workers protesting at the U .S.

Embassy in Moscow.

Yeah, throwing ball bearings, ink, chanting anti -American slogans.

It almost sounds like theater.

Well, Beschloss even includes that anecdote about the African students who didn't realize it was kind of a staged pageant.

Right.

It's a fascinating little glimpse into how how some Soviet public displays might have been managed or at least perceived.

It is.

And the different reactions maybe hint at cultural differences in political expression and how the Soviets control dissent, at least outwardly.

And it wasn't just Moscow, right?

Beschloss documents this whole wave of anti -American demonstrations erupting across the globe.

Yeah.

Warsaw, Cairo, Tokyo, New Delhi, China, and all across Latin America, Recife, Mexico City saw intense protests.

It really underscores the global fallout.

The damage to America's image was significant.

Immense.

These weren't just isolated incidents.

It showed how much the Cuban revolution resonated, you know, as a symbol of anti -colonialism and how vulnerable the U .S.

looked.

Yeah.

The U .S., trying to champion freedom and democracy, suddenly finds itself accused of, well, imperialistic overreach.

Big blowback.

Definitely.

So back in Washington, Kennedy reads Khrushchev's message during his Tuesday breakfast with congressional leaders.

He apparently voices some skepticism about Khrushchev actually sending volunteers, but he makes it crystal clear the U .S.

wouldn't tolerate a major Soviet military presence in Cuba.

OK.

But what's really striking, and Beschloss points this out, is Kennedy's deliberate silence on Berlin during that meeting.

Ah, OK.

That's significant.

That silence just screams anxiety, doesn't it?

Right.

He knew how incredibly sensitive Berlin was, the ultimate Cold War flashpoint.

He saw the real risk that Khrushchev could exploit any perceived U .S.

weakness or preoccupation with Cuba by making a move on West Berlin.

Exactly.

He understood the domino effect, how these global hot spots were all connected.

The risk of a much wider conflict was very real in his mind.

And Beschloss argues Kennedy privately read Khrushchev's message exactly that way as a veiled threat against Berlin if the U .S.

pushed further in Cuba.

Which forced an agonizing choice.

Totally.

He ends up prioritizing essentially global stability, avoiding that Berlin confrontation over the success of the Cuban invasion itself, even knowing the terrible cost for the captured exiles.

It's a defining moment for him, isn't it?

Shows the immense weight of balancing this crisis against potentially catastrophic global consequences, a pragmatic, though obviously deeply painful calculation in the nuclear age.

Later that Tuesday morning, Kennedy gets this really stark assessment from a George Bundy, just laying out how fast things were deteriorating in Cuba.

Yeah, what did it say?

Basically, Cuban forces, much stronger than expected, popular support for the exiles, practically nonexistent.

The tactical position was precarious.

Tanks had already overwhelmed one of the key beachheads.

And crucially, no escape route to the mountains.

Exactly.

That escape plan was a key assumption, and it just wasn't viable.

Bundy's note paints this picture of total collapse happening way faster than anyone predicted.

The mention of tanks really highlights how unprepared they were for the Cuban military's actual strength.

So what did Bundy recommend?

Anything?

Well, he suggested very limited further air support, basically Navy cover for the few remaining B -26s.

But even then, he acknowledged the probability of defeat was incredibly high.

No real hope for escape.

Desperate measures.

He even floated this like last -ditch idea.

The U .S.

using neutrally painted planes to take out Castro's Air Force, a sort of middle ground option.

Wow.

That really shows the desperation, trying to salvage something without overt,

direct U .S.

military action.

But it also hints at that willingness to use deniable operations, which kind of got them into this mess in the first place.

Yeah, the irony.

Then over lunch with James Reston of the New York Times, Kennedy tries to spin it, downplay the defeat, calls it an incident, not a disaster.

Trying to manage the public perception.

Right.

He even gives this cynical definition of prestige, basically saying, yeah, the U .S.

might get kicked in the ass for a bit, but it wouldn't affect the main business.

That public minimizing is understandable.

But as Beshlos shows,

his private feelings were way more intense.

That blunt, kicked in the ass comment probably reveals more of his real frustration and anger.

For sure.

Beshlos does note that internally, Robert Kennedy, Johnson, McNamara, Bolin,

they mostly agreed Khrushchev probably wouldn't risk a major war over Cuba.

Based on geography, strategic importance compared to Berlin, maybe?

Probably.

But still, that all -necessary assistance phrase in Khrushchev's message, it definitely caused significant unease.

They might have underestimated Khrushchev's willingness to exploit the situation for propaganda, maybe gain some strategic leverage.

Yeah, exploit that perceived American vulnerability.

So that evening, Tuesday evening, Secretary of State Rusk meets with the Soviet ambassador, Menshikov.

Rusk delivers Kennedy's formal reply.

What was the gist?

It refutes Khrushchev's misapprehension,

emphasizes Cuban resistance, denies direct U .S.

military intervention, but includes a firm warning against any outside force getting involved.

Setting a red light.

And Kennedy includes this pointed question.

Was Khrushchev just using Cuba as a pretext to stir up trouble elsewhere?

Still focused on Berlin and other potential hotspots, trying to project strength while denying direct involvement.

Exactly.

And his question about Cuba being a pretext really shows that continued suspicion about Khrushchev's bigger game plan.

Always worried about Berlin.

Okay.

Then we get to the really crucial late night meeting.

It's after a White House reception Tuesday night in the cabinet room.

Beschloss paints this vivid picture.

The map of Cuba, magnetic ships showing positions, key advisors still in their formal wear.

Tense atmosphere, I imagine.

Extremely.

Richard Bissell from the CIA is still passionately arguing the whole thing could be saved if they just commit jets from the carrier Essex.

Admiral Arley Burke, the chief of naval operations, is even more direct.

What did Burke say?

He apparently offered to take two jets himself and shoot down the enemy aircraft and just fly them right off the carrier.

Wow.

Direct.

But Kennedy holds firm.

Absolutely no direct U .S.

military involvement, no American pilots firing on Cubans.

You can feel the tension there.

The CIA and some military guys pushing for more.

Kennedy resisting that final escalation.

Burke apparently gets exasperated, blurts out, hell, Mr.

President, we are involved.

Captures that frustration perfectly.

The feeling that Kennedy's stance was becoming unrealistic.

In the end, Kennedy agrees to this very limited compromise.

Right.

A one hour air cover mission, six jets from the Essex.

Just one hour.

Yeah.

And rules were incredibly strict, only to protect the brigade's supply flights and their B -26 escorts.

No initiating attacks, just defensive cover.

Highly restrictive.

Probably too little too late.

Seems like it.

Even Rusk reminds him about his earlier public pledge of no direct U .S.

involvement.

And Kennedy's reply is just grim.

He raises his hand to his nose, indicating the water line, and says, we're already into it up to here.

Acknowledging reality.

He knew how deep the U .S.

was in, despite the public denials.

The emotional toll was immense.

Ken O'Donnell, one of his aides, thought Kennedy was practically on the verge of tears.

Robert Kennedy was clearly distraught, muttering, we've got to do something.

He embraced his brother afterward.

Yeah, saying, they can't do this to you.

That protective instinct really comes through.

And Beschloss describes Kennedy taking this long, solitary walk on the south grounds late into the night.

Just a powerful image of his internal turmoil.

The weight of it all.

The personal burden on him and inner circle must have been immense.

So Wednesday, April 19th, that brings the inevitable final blow.

The end game.

Remember that limited air cover?

The Navy jets arrived too early.

Critical timing mistake.

Oh no.

So without proper air defense, the brigade supply flights, which they desperately needed, they get driven off, two B -26s are shot down.

And the exiles on the beach, completely demoralized, start surrendering en masse.

Just devastating.

The final numbers.

Tragic.

114 dead, 1189 captured.

That timing error on the air support, it just underscores the chaos, the miscommunication that plagued the whole operation.

And those numbers, they just bring home the scale of the defeat.

When Kennedy got the news, he apparently just retreated to the family quarters, clearly haunted by the fate of those captured men.

Jacqueline Kennedy saw him nearly in tears.

A rare display of emotion for him, publicly at least.

And Rose Kennedy's diary entry from that time, Beschloss includes that it's just poignant, captures the family's distress.

Joe Kennedy saying he was dying trying to keep Jack's spirits up.

Jacqueline recounting how the president felt so profoundly misinformed, misled by the CIA and others involved in the planning.

Those personal accounts really hit hard.

The human cost, the personal anguish Kennedy felt facing this massive failure.

The weight of responsibility was clearly crushing.

Meanwhile, back in the cabinet room, Robert Kennedy is described as visibly furious, just demanding action.

He rejects inaction, saying it makes them look like paper tigers in Moscow.

Understandable.

That anger, that frustration within the administration, wanting to project strength after such a public humiliation.

Intense pressure not to look weak to the Soviets.

He challenges everyone there, find a way to respond.

But Walt Rostow tries to counsel calm strategic thinking, urges them to pause and think.

Says there'll be other chances to show resolve, mentioning Berlin, Southeast Asia specifically.

Trying to look at the bigger picture.

But Robert Kennedy wasn't really hearing it then.

He writes this memo, which Beschloss calls prophetic, warning in stark terms about the possibility of Soviet missile bases ending up in Cuba.

Really?

He foresaw that.

Apparently so.

And he aggressively proposes options.

Invasion, blockade, OAS action, even suggests fabricating a trigger like mega tax on Guantanamo as justification.

Wow.

That memo shows a real understanding of potential escalation and a clear desire for a forceful, proactive American response.

His consideration of such drastic steps highlights the urgency they felt.

And yet, amidst all this crisis, the Kennedy still had to attend a scheduled state dinner at the Greek embassy.

Life goes on, even at the highest levels.

Surreal.

Jacqueline later told Lem Billings the gift was underwhelming, and she tried to make up for it with one of her own snuff boxes.

It's just this weird glimpse into the continuation of formal duties during intense turmoil.

That jarring juxtaposition of the personal and the official.

After the dinner back in the cabinet room, the mood is just palpably somber.

Robert Kennedy urges everyone pick ourselves up.

But he voices this deep concern that now no one in government will be willing to take risks against communism.

Fear of paralysis setting in.

Yeah.

Chester Bowles observes this growing consensus to get tough with Castro.

Some are even advocating sending U .S.

troops, though Rusk strongly objects.

The fundamental debate about intervention.

And Robert Kennedy apparently has this slight flare -up with Lyndon Johnson over who actually supported the Cuban project initially.

Ah, the search for accountability begins.

These internal discussions show the shifting dynamics, the finger pointing, and definitely the emergence of a more hawkish view on Cuba.

So now, President Kennedy has to face the public again, this time addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors, ASNE.

And for this crucial speech, he turns to Ted Sorensen.

His key speechwriter and advisor.

Exactly.

Beschloss gives a really good sketch of Sorensen.

His intellectual liberalism, his absolutely vital role in crafting Kennedy's image, his speeches.

There's that anecdote about Sorensen seeing Kennedy almost as his work of art.

He was instrumental in developing that distinctive Kennedy speaking style.

Their working relationship was incredibly close.

Sorensen was committed to portraying Kennedy as strong,

thoughtful, decisive.

Sorensen was involved in all the campaigns, served as special counsel, focused on speeches and policy.

And in a late night chat preparing this ASNE speech, Kennedy lays out his goals for Sorensen.

What were they?

He needed to head off demands for immediate retaliation against Cuba.

He needed to reassure allies questioning US resolve.

And crucially, he needed to stop communist leaders, especially Khrushchev, from seeing Bay of Pigs as proof of American weakness.

And he was still worried about Berlin.

Deeply.

He confided that fear to Sorensen -Khrushchev using Cuba as a pretext to move on Berlin.

Beschloss even recounts Sorensen finding Kennedy late that night, just reading alone in a White House corridor.

A poignant image.

That conversation really shows Kennedy's strategic thinking behind the speech project's strength.

Manage the Berlin situation carefully.

The pressure must have been immense.

Thursday morning, Sorensen finds Kennedy depressed and lonely, regretting the damage to US -Soviet relations just as test ban talks were supposed to restart.

But Kennedy pulls himself together, goes to the Statler Hilton.

Delivers the speech.

He does.

And it's forceful.

He asserts the limits of US restraint.

He pointedly brings up the Soviet crackdown in Budapest, a direct counter to any lectures on intervention.

Turning the tables.

That got a reaction.

Huge applause from the editors.

He talks about the global struggle against communist subversion, mentions Cuba and South Vietnam, reaffirms his determination for the survival of the American system.

A carefully crafted message.

Regain the narrative, project resolve, warn the Soviets.

Exactly.

Cuban exile leaders in Miami were reportedly encouraged by the tough talk.

But Soviet Ambassador Menshikov pointedly canceled a breakfast he had scheduled with Adlai Stevenson.

Sending a signal.

Robert Kennedy thought the speech was very effective.

Richard Goodwin noted a vague threat of future action against Cuba.

Kennedy apparently told Goodwin he specifically wanted to avoid the US looking like a paper tiger.

That balancing act again.

Reassure allies.

Project a credible threat.

The mixed reactions show how hard that is.

His focus on not appearing weak really underscores the pressure to restore America's standing.

But criticism was already starting to surface.

Senator Barry Goldwater called the whole thing a source of apprehension and shame.

General Loris Norstad, NATO commander, went even further, called it the worst American defeat since the War of 1812.

Ouch.

Strong words.

And Beshlas makes an interesting point here.

While the speech let Kennedy vent and warn Khrushchev, his continued focus on communist insurgency might show he hadn't fully grasped a key lesson of the Bay of Pigs.

That Castro's power wasn't just about Soviet subversion.

It stemmed from a genuine popular revolution within Cuba.

His regime was resilient because of that popularity, not just because Moscow backed him.

A crucial distinction.

An Ambassador Thompson in Moscow cabled something similar.

Right?

Yeah.

Llewellyn Thompson sent a cable saying the Soviets were mainly exploiting existing crises, not actively initiating them everywhere.

Provides a counterpoint to that monolithic communist threat idea.

These criticisms highlight the damage to Kennedy's credibility and the debate over what lessons should be learned.

The Soviet poet Yevgeny Yeftyshenko captured the Cuban feeling powerfully in a poem about a mother grieving her son killed defending the island.

A stark reminder of the human cost and the Cuban sense of vulnerability.

Offers that important Cuban perspective, underscores the real human consequences.

Then at his Friday press conference, Kennedy just shuts down questions on Cuba, says pursuing it serves no useful national purpose.

Trying to move on.

Sander Wanneker pushes him, asks about getting the real facts, and Kennedy delivers that famous line, victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan.

But he does publicly take responsibility.

Classic damage control.

Though Beschloss notes the clumsy White House efforts behind the scenes to kind of shift blame towards the Joint Chiefs and the CIA.

Some insiders knew it was absurd though.

The internal recriminations, the search for scapegoats.

Kennedy himself, privately, was critical of his inherited advisors.

Compared delays on Cuba to Guatemala,

made a wry comment about Rusk.

So publicly taking responsibility, privately pointing fingers.

Pretty much.

Back in the Oval Office, he's already talking about Bay of Pigs in the past tense to LBJ and Arthur Schlesinger.

Says, we got a big kick in the ass and we deserved it, but maybe we'll learn something from it.

Trying to frame it as a learning experience, showing resilience.

A pragmatic way to try and extract something positive from a disaster.

Sure.

Saturday, Kennedy gets Khrushchev's formal reply to his earlier message.

Beschloss calls it a significant warning.

Kennedy's on a highly dangerous road.

Khrushchev rejects any Soviet duty to defend rebels against a sovereign government like Cuba.

Denies Soviet bases there too.

Flatly denies any Soviet bases.

And then he flips it, accuses the US of threats along Soviet borders, specifically mentioning US missiles in Turkey.

Drawing that parallel again.

Exactly.

He reiterates that world peace is interconnected.

You can't start fires elsewhere while trying to put one out.

Khrushchev is clearly reinforcing his condemnation.

But crucially, drawing that direct parallel between US interests in its sphere and Soviet interests in Cuba, hinting at tit for tat.

A critical moment, suggesting US actions against Cuba could bring repercussions for US allies near the USSR.

Kennedy's first reaction, dismisses it as propaganda.

His Soviet experts though, they remind him, Khrushchev often reacts after the immediate danger seems past.

The State Department issues a dismissive reply, refusing to get drawn into an extended debate.

But Beschloss emphasizes the historical importance here.

Hugely important in retrospect.

It was the first clear public statement by the Soviets of these parallel security interests, Cuba for them, mirroring US interests along their border.

A major signal.

But, Beschloss argues, Washington largely overlooked or underestimated it at the time.

A failure to grasp the implications that would have significant consequences later on.

Reflecting privately, Kennedy asks Sorensen that stark question.

How could he have been so stupid to let the invasion happen?

Brutal self -assessment.

Robert Kennedy tries to contextualize it, blames Eisenhower for the initial plan,

highlights the political pressure on JFK not to look weak by canceling it.

Both brothers felt Dulles and Bissell had tied Kennedy's hands with the disposal problem of the trained exiles.

That was a real constraint.

What do you do with him if you cancel?

Exactly.

Kennedy's personal resentment towards Castro ran deep, saw him as an albatross, Beschloss thinks Kennedy might have believed early 61 was his last real chance to act before Soviet support made it too risky.

And Bundy felt Kennedy genuinely wanted the plan to work.

Yeah.

Bundy later felt Kennedy wanted it to succeed and maybe let himself be persuaded the risks were acceptable.

It's this complex mix of political pressure, strategic belief, maybe some overconfidence in the CIA.

The disposal problem really limited his options once things were in motion.

Beschloss really frames Bay of Pigs as a textbook case of the problems with covert ops.

How so?

Lack of scrutiny.

Because the planning group was so small and secret, there wasn't the usual vetting from the press, Congress, even the wider bureaucracy.

And the planners themselves have an incentive to downplay risks when selling it to the president.

Precisely.

Beschloss suggests if Kennedy had brought in more experienced, independent foreign policy experts, he might have avoided disaster.

But ironically, Kennedy had dismantled a lot of Eisenhower's setup for scrutinizing covert projects.

Leaving him reliant on advisors who were maybe newer, potentially biased.

Right.

And then there's Kennedy's own ambivalence.

He wanted to counter communism in the hemisphere, didn't want to look soft, didn't want to inflame Latin America, but was terrified of Soviet retaliation in Berlin.

Trying to thread an impossible needle.

So Beschloss concludes, Kennedy wanted intervention without paying the full price.

The result.

An operation too small to possibly succeed, but way too big to hide U .S.

involvement.

A fatal flaw in the design.

Beschloss also notes, Adenauer's visit might have heightened Kennedy's focus on the Berlin threat.

And the lack of deep consultation with Soviet experts about that Berlin retaliation assumption.

Crucial oversights.

Robert Kennedy later insisted his brother wouldn't have approved it if he'd known the real strength of Castro's forces, or the lack of popular support.

Plus, Kennedy had other misconceptions.

Expecting massive uprisings, thinking the exiles could melt into the mountains, believing the U .S.

role could stay secret.

A whole cascade of flawed assumptions.

Beschloss really paints a multi -layered picture of systemic failures and individual misjudgments.

And the CIA wasn't blameless either.

Dulles later admitted he failed to alert Kennedy to critical problems, like the impossibility of that mountain escape.

He also thought U .S.

hair cover was essential, didn't he?

Absolutely.

An absolute prerequisite, he called it.

Beschloss agreed.

Felt much heavier bombing was needed.

And Dulles assumed Kennedy would ultimately do whatever was necessary if things went bad, like Eisenhower did in Guatemala in 54.

A huge assumption.

Yeah.

Dulles bitterly concluded Kennedy was only ever half -sold on the plan, and was looking for a way out from the start.

It shows this fundamental, fatal disconnect between the CIA's operational mindset and Kennedy's political calculations and risk tolerance.

Expecting Kennedy to act like Eisenhower was a profound, costly misjudgment.

And then, just when you think it can't get more complex, there's track two.

The assassination plot against Castro.

Right.

The parallel, secret CIA plan.

Beschloss apparently saw it as reinforcing the invasion, maybe making it unnecessary if Castro was killed first, or easier if he was destabilized.

Adds a very dark layer to the story.

Beschloss even throws in that bizarre anecdote about Ian Fleming, the James Bond author, giving the CIA weird ideas to ridicule Castro.

Some of which, like making his beard fall out, eerily mirrored things the CIA actually considered.

It underscores the extreme,

ethically dubious measures being contemplated at the highest levels.

Beschloss details the plot's timeline.

J .C.

King's memo.

Bissell's approval.

Dr.

Sidney Gottlieb, the CIA chemist, getting involved.

Sheffield Edwards, meeting Robert Mahieu, the investigator with underworld ties.

And Mahieu recruiting the mobsters.

Giancana Rosselli Traficante.

Exactly.

Giancana reportedly asked for nice and clean poison.

Bissell's chilling rationale for using gangsters.

Ultimate cover.

And the question of who approved it politically lingered.

Yeah, during the 70 Senate hearings, CIA officials insisted it was approved at a high political level in the Eisenhower administration, but never named anyone specific.

Which brings Nixon into the picture.

Potentially.

Beschloss introduces Robert King, a friend of Nixon's, partner of Mahieu.

He recounts cryptic exchanges between Nixon and William Pauley about a problem just south of Miami and West Coast inquiries, possibly code for King or Mahieu.

King later claimed memory loss.

A large blank, yeah.

Denied knowing about the mafia link, then.

Pauley mentioned being in touch with Alan Dulce's people.

And later as president, Nixon showed this extraordinary interest in suppressing CIA files on Cuba.

Erlichman's notes even suggested Nixon was deeply involved.

It raises serious questions about Nixon's prior knowledge even before he was president.

His efforts to suppress the files suggest something to hide.

The idea this could link to Watergate is deeply unsettling.

So the huge question, what did Kennedy know about the assassination plot?

We know poison pills were delivered to Roselli in February 61.

Failed attempts followed.

Did Kennedy delay the invasion, waiting for news of Castro's death?

It's a question Beschloss raises.

Definitive proof of Kennedy's approval is elusive.

Less formal accountability, then.

No written orders.

Key figures like Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Sorensen denied knowing.

Sorensen stressed JFK's moral opposition to assassination.

Though Kennedy could be misleading on sensitive topics.

Right.

Helms suggested people might have lied later.

Bissell thought he'd obliquely briefed Kennedy.

Maybe Kennedy was informed so indirectly he didn't fully grasp it.

McNamara conceded the CIA was disciplined.

Helms believed Kennedy wanted Castro gone.

But the CIA wouldn't act alone.

And Senator Smathers recalled Kennedy asking about public reaction to Castro's death.

Yeah, and Kennedy apparently said the CIA had given him to believe Castro would be dead by invasion time.

Beschloss suggests this could explain why Kennedy approved the risky invasion plan and maybe why he withheld air support after the assassination attempts failed.

Plausible, disturbing, but still debated due to lack of hard evidence.

Then there's the Hoover memo to Robert Kennedy explicitly mentioning Sheffield Edwards contacting Mahieu about using Giancana as a cutout in the CIA's anti -Castro dirty business.

And Bissell had already briefed RFK about potential underworld involvement.

Yet despite the attorney general knowing no record of a Justice Department investigation into this dirty business.

Which is striking given RFK's very public war on organized crime at the same time.

His target list included Giancana, Roselli, Traficante.

Right.

Roselli bitterly complained here he is helping the government and the AG is breaking my balls.

Beschloss touches on that whole complex Kennedy -Mafia -Castro nexus theory.

The idea of a secret 1960 election deal.

Giancana certainly had motive, lost huge casino money when Castro took over.

Beschloss lays out hints of Kennedy campaign links to the underworld contributions influence.

Joseph Kennedy staying at the Calneva Lodge, co -owned by Sinatra and Giancana with reports of gangsters visiting.

Giancana boasting he stole Illinois for Kennedy.

Though Daley's machine was likely more decisive there.

Probably.

But the affair between JFK and Judith Campbell Exner, who is also Giancana's mistress, facilitated by Sinatra, that's more documented.

White House logs, smathers, saw them together.

Campbell's claims of carrying envelopes between JFK and Giancana in 60 and 61.

Well, the FBI is wired having Giancana.

Hearing him get angry that JFK isn't stopping RFK's investigations.

Exactly.

Verifying Campbell's claims is hard given the secrecy.

Her explanation for silence in her memoir, Fear for Her Life, is chilling.

Beschloss floats the theory.

JFK maintained the relationship to manage the tension between RFK's crackdown and Giancana's threats.

Did Campbell think the envelopes related to the assassination plot?

She speculated.

But Beschloss finds that doubtful logistics were CIA's job.

Giancana mostly wanted to stay out of jail.

Though Giancana might still have pressured Kennedy about the CIA's anti -Castro plans.

It's just this incredibly murky web of connections and agendas.

Troubling stuff.

Raises profound questions about ethical boundaries and unintended consequences.

The Bay of Pigs just had this profound impact on Kennedy personally.

Beschloss describes the initial exhilarating sense of his presidency just dampening.

He apparently threw Time magazine in the fireplace?

Robert Kennedy said he'd never seen his brother so upset.

Robert wrote a memo detailing the president's feeling of damaged standing, domestically and internationally.

Trust eroded within the administration.

Kennedy warned Clark Clifford a second Bay of Pigs would destroy his presidency.

And the irony of his 100th day in office being spent dealing with this fallout.

He told his close friend Lemoine Billings that being president was the most unpleasant job.

And spoke pessimistically about a potentially tragic administration.

Billings' iries are valuable here.

Yeah, Billings recorded Kennedy constantly blaming himself, but also being furious about the Joint Chief's advice.

Kennedy complained to Billings about constant crises.

The far -reaching negative impact of the Cuban mistake on allies.

Charles Spaulding noticed a shift in Kennedy from optimistic to cautious, even suspicious.

The personal and political toll was clearly immense.

It clearly had a lasting impact on his confidence and approach.

Kennedy moved fast to manage the political fallout.

Consulted with Eisenhower, Nixon, Goldwater, Rockefeller.

Kept Dulles on for a while.

Yeah, decided to retain Dulles partly to appease Republicans, Project Unity.

Robert Kennedy privately noted it meant Dulles would take some blame.

Eisenhower, at Camp David, apparently gave Kennedy a blunt lecture about the lack of air cover.

Predicted it would embolden the Soviets, especially regarding Berlin.

Exactly.

Eisenhower stressed these ops have to succeed.

Pledged support against communism in the hemisphere, but doubted public support for direct U .S.

intervention without clear provitation.

Kennedy apparently wasn't too impressed by the lecture privately.

What about Goldwater and Nixon?

Goldwater recounted Kennedy blaming Stevenson's potential U .N.

reaction for holding back air support.

Goldwater strongly disagreed.

Nixon advised finding a proper legal cover, protecting citizens, Guantanamo, and just invading Cuba.

And Kennedy was worried about Khrushchev's cocky mood.

Yeah, and the risk to Berlin.

Nixon apparently gave almost the same reply as Eisenhower -Khrushchev probes weaknesses.

Kennedy briefly considered a congressional study of pre -1961 Cuba policy, but Bundy talked him out of it, probably fearing more criticism.

So consulting widely, trying to project strength and unity, but getting varied advice.

A calculated move to try and depoliticize the immediate aftermath.

Internally, things shifted significantly.

Kennedy grew more distrustful of the CIA, joint chiefs, even parts of state, tightened his personal control over foreign policy.

Brought Sorenson and Robert Kennedy more into foreign affairs.

Specifically asked them to get more involved.

Bundy was deeply affected, reportedly told journalist, I'm guilty, offered to resign.

Kennedy refused, but moved his office to the West Wing basement.

Kissinger apparently encouraged Bundy not to be discouraged.

And the Taylor board was set up to investigate.

Right.

Headed by General Maxwell Taylor, whom Kennedy admired.

To figure out what went wrong, Beschloss describes a grim, tense NSC meeting soon after.

Robert Kennedy apparently exploded in anger at those he felt were ducking responsibility.

A contrast to the president's controlled demeanor.

Yeah.

Beschloss suggests a private alignment of their anger, though.

Rusk, meanwhile, was growing increasingly worried about Soviet offensive missiles potentially going into Cuba.

Ye briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee privately.

Yes.

Warned about the potential for blackmail.

There were internal discussions about a blockade.

Rusk saw it as an act of war, but maybe necessary if missiles were detected.

Foreshadowing the missile crisis.

Absolutely.

The NSC resolved in May to retain the right to intervene in Cuba under certain conditions.

The Taylor board concluded long -term coexistence with Castro was impossible.

Robert Kennedy privately worried the issue was drifting, realizing U .S.

troops might eventually be needed.

Shows Kennedy's determination to learn from the disaster, prevent a repeat, and the growing focus on Cuba.

And what about the Soviet perspective?

The Canadian ambassador came back from Moscow reporting Khrushchev had this newfound self -confidence after Bay of Pigs and Gagarin's spaceflight.

But Beschloss contrasts that with Khrushchev's private awareness of Soviet weaknesses.

Right.

Nuclear inferiority, economic problems.

While Bay of Pigs was a propaganda win, Beschloss argues its bigger effect was disrupting Khrushchev's plans and intensifying the anti -American temper in the Soviet leadership.

They were baffled by Kennedy.

Reportedly perplexed by his oscillating rhetoric, his decision to launch the invasion then failed to support it.

They noted Stevenson stopping the second airstrike, reinforcing an impression of Kennedy as indecisive.

Maybe weak compared to Khrushchev's actions in Hungary.

Plus, Khrushchev was already wary after the U -2 incident with Eisenhower.

Exactly.

He'd hoped Kennedy might be a new Roosevelt, but the perceived inconsistency and the Bay of Pigs failure made him nervous about tying his political future to the young president.

He even made that veiled public jab about Kennedy's father's wealth.

So the Bay of Pigs pushed Khrushchev towards a harder line.

Beschloss concludes,

yes, to protect himself internally from critics, from the Chinese, and to exploit perceived American incompetence and weakness.

A Soviet official in Washington apparently said Kennedy had not stood his test, wasted political credit.

And they likely figured out his fear of a Berlin crisis was key to his restraint in Cuba.

Seems likely.

There was that nine -week delay before Khrushchev responded to Kennedy's summit proposal.

Kennedy was apparently relieved by the delay initially.

Khrushchev finally agreed, Beschloss says, because he thought Kennedy would be defensive, and a summit would delay further U .S.

action against Cuba, giving Castro time to consolidate.

He even had an agent ask the Americans to revive the summit offer.

Apparently so.

It really shows how Bay of Pigs significantly altered the dynamic, eroded trust, and probably emboldened Khrushchev, even as he navigated his own challenges.

As we wrap up, Beschloss touches on a few more points.

He notes the parallel between Castro mocking the U .S.

after Bay of Pigs and Khrushchev's reaction to the U -2 incident.

I like those there.

He mentions Sorensen's strong reaction to an early draft of that Burns biography of Kennedy leading to a strained relationship.

Includes that Sorensen high school quote,

And some lingering mafia connections.

Briefly mentions alleged visitors to Traficante in prison, including Jack Ruby.

President Ford's shock at the CIA Family Jewels report.

The fine line ex -CIA officials walked in Senate hearings about Castro plots their bafflement.

Raises the question if Giancana sought similar pledges from Nixon in 60.

Mentions Hoffa rumors.

Eisenhower's alleged inaction on Hoffa's indictment.

Right.

Eisenhower's disapproval of JFK's ties to Sinatra.

Kennedy's own discretion about personal matters.

Campbell's claim of a secret JFK -Giancana meeting in Chicago, despite official logs.

Humorous letters to billings from school.

And how later presidents use similar justifications for intervention.

Doles' resignation letter.

Kissinger supporting Bundy.

The Duel of the Board wanting more aggressive covert action.

The Stevenson controversy.

It all serves to tie together loose ends, provide broader context, show the lasting impact, and the many unresolved questions around Bay of Pigs.

These final points really underscore that complex web of political, personal, even underworld connections.

Absolutely.

And so we've covered the entirety of Chapter 6 of Beschloss's The Crisis Years.

We've really dug into the immediate aftermath of the Bay of Pigs.

Khrushchev's response, Kennedy's internal struggles and public reactions, the analysis of the failures of that hidden story of the assassination plots and potential mafia links, and the huge impact on Kennedy's presidency and the U .S.-Soviet relationship.

Beschloss's account reveals just layers upon layers.

Historical context, political strategies, diplomatic moves, personal anxieties.

It's all in there.

It really is.

This deep dive into Beschloss's work shows this cascade of misjudgments, miscommunications, and, well, profound unintended consequences.

Yeah, the Bay of Pigs wasn't just a failed military op.

It's a stark lesson, isn't it?

About the limits of American power, the complexities of international relations, the dangers of the Cold War.

It definitely leaves you thinking, you know, what were the long -term consequences for the Cold War's path?

What are the ethical costs of those covert actions?

What if key decisions had gone differently?

So much to consider.

We really hope you'll continue exploring this fascinating, absolutely crucial period in history.