Chapter 12: I Want to Get Off

Welcome to Last Minute Lecture.

This free chapter overview is designed to help students review and understand key concepts.

These summaries supplement not replaced the original textbook and may not be redistributed or resold.

For complete coverage, always consult the official text.

Okay, let's dive in.

August 1961.

The Cold War, well, it just suddenly ratchets up, doesn't it?

It really does.

News breaks.

The Soviet Union is shattering the nuclear test moratorium and President Kennedy's immediate sort of gut level reaction, according to Beschloss's the crisis years, was just stark.

Fucked again.

Yeah.

And Beschloss really emphasizes this wasn't just geopolitics as usual for Kennedy.

It felt deeply personal, a betrayal.

Right.

Because Khrushchev had looked him in the eye in Vienna, hadn't he?

And then apparently assured McCloy just weeks before saying the Soviets wouldn't test first.

Exactly.

Beschloss argues this might have been Kennedy's strongest emotional reaction to any Soviet move during his presidency.

It wasn't just a diplomatic setback.

It felt like a real breach of trust, however fragile that trust might have been to begin with.

And you have to remember the pressure Kennedy was already under, right?

He'd been pushing back against calls at home to restart American testing.

Significant pressure, public opinion, Eisenhower chiming in, the Joint Chiefs, they were all pushing him.

Eisenhower even planned for Nixon to restart tests if he'd won, wanting Kennedy to have a free hand.

So it put Kennedy in this incredibly difficult spot.

He knew the strategic need, didn't he?

Not to fall behind.

Absolutely.

He'd written to McMillan just before this, worried about not knowing what the Soviets were learning without a test ban treaty, without verification.

But he also knew the global fallout, literally and figuratively, of resuming atmospheric tests, the damage to relations.

He seemed genuinely invested in getting that test ban.

He was.

He'd sent Ambassador Dean back to Geneva with a new concession, trying to break the deadlock right before Khrushchev just pulled the rug out.

So against that backdrop, Khrushchev drops this bombshell.

What does Beshlov say was driving Khrushchev's decision?

What were the forces at play?

Well, but Beshlov paints a picture of several things converging.

First, Khrushchev felt this real need to reassert Soviet power on the

West.

Second,

Berlin, always Berlin, his big goal getting Western recognition of East Germany, Soviet dominance over all Berlin that hadn't happened.

So the wall, the wall stopped the refugees.

Yeah.

Yeah.

That was his minimum objective.

But Beshlov's quotes an aide, Berlatsky, saying Khrushchev demanded much, but was ultimately satisfied with what he received, suggesting it was a compromise.

A kind of consolation prize then.

But how did testing fit into that Berlin calculation?

Khrushchev probably saw it as a way to negotiate on Berlin from a stronger position, or at least a position that looked stronger.

Yeah.

Sergey Khrushchev remembered his father knew military force wouldn't solve Berlin, but the Soviet generals, they still hope to show force might work.

And Khrushchev himself.

He worried, apparently, that being willing to negotiate on Berlin might look like Soviet nuclear inferiority, especially to the Third World.

So resuming tests, maybe hinting at these huge hydrogen bombs that was meant to erase those doubts, intimidate the West perhaps into giving ground on Berlin.

Beshlov also tells this incredible story about a secret Kremlin meeting in July with the nuclear scientists.

Even Sakharov spoke up against testing.

That's a fascinating glimpse into Khrushchev's thinking.

Sakharov was worried, deeply worried about wrecking the test ban talks about world peace.

He even argued technically testing might help the U .S.

more.

And Khrushchev's reaction?

Fury.

Beshlov described him just shutting Sakharov down.

He didn't want scientific opinions on his politics.

He used that trained Zitomir analogy, basically accusing Sakharov of having a hidden agenda, trying to derail things.

So he was focused purely on the political message.

Exactly.

The sheer number of tests, that visible display of power.

And he really resented being challenged, especially by a

It also shows his view of Kennedy young, inexperienced, maybe couldn't deliver, even if they agreed on something.

So the public announcement comes Monday, August 28th.

Kennedy's reeling.

What were the immediate next steps, the internal discussions?

Well, first, just that raw fury and disappointment Beshlov's details.

Bundy, Sorensen, they later said it was a really painful moment for Kennedy.

Even Drew Pearson, who'd spoken to Khrushchev, saw how upset Kennedy was and warned the Soviets about the US reaction.

And Kennedy made a public statement.

He did, condemning it as hypocrisy, saying it ramped up the danger of a thermonuclear holocaust.

Strong words.

Then he called in the National Security Council on the 31st.

What was the mood in that room, according to Beshlov?

Gloomy.

That's the word Beshlov uses.

Robert Kennedy was apparently very pessimistic.

Lyndon Johnson, always the politician, advised letting Khrushchev take the heat for a bit.

You know, don't react too fast.

What about Rusk, State Department?

Rusk suggested a middle path,

announced preparations for US testing,

but don't actually order it yet.

Avoid looking indecisive.

But then Ed Murrow, head of USIA.

The propaganda angle.

Exactly.

Murrow argued the Soviet move was a huge propaganda gift, showing Soviet duplicity.

He said hinting at US tests would just throw that gift away.

But Kennedy did eventually decide to resume US testing

underground initially.

What pushed him over the edge?

Beshlov points to Kennedy's reading of Khrushchev.

He figured the Soviets thought they'd gain more by looking tough and mean.

And Kennedy was genuinely worried that Khrushchev, feeling bolstered by the test, might push harder on Berlin.

Like challenging air access.

That was a major fear.

It fed into his approval of McNamara's proposal about Allied planes needing permission before engaging ground targets.

And then that exchange with Robert Kennedy.

The get off the planet line.

Yeah.

Robert saying I want to get off, get off the planet.

It just shows the incredible weight, the shared fear of nuclear war.

It echoed Bolin's earlier feeling that 1961 was the most dangerous year yet.

This really seems like a moment where Robert Kennedy's influence crystallizes, doesn't it?

Especially on foreign policy.

Beshlov makes that case strongly.

Oh, absolutely.

Beshlov tracks it carefully.

After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, JFK leaned on his brother more and more.

Remember, he'd had reservations about making him attorney general nepotism fears.

But he came to rely on him.

Totally.

Lem Billings, their friend, said Kennedy realized family members were the only ones you could count on when the stakes were that high.

And LBJ definitely saw it.

Robert was first in, first out.

The guy whose judgment the president trusted most.

Beshlov also contrasts their upbringings.

How might that have shaped them differently?

It's interesting.

He suggests maybe JFK, growing up as the family rose in wealth and status, had this slight insecurity, always needing to prove himself.

Jackie called it his immigrant side.

Whereas Robert.

Robert was born into it.

Massive wealth, privilege.

Beshlov argues this maybe gave him more psychological freedom to be, well, tougher, less conventional, less worried about what people thought.

Robert Lowell's comment, my, he's unassimilated, kind of captures that.

And Robert's views on communism, Beshlov says they changed quite a bit over time.

They did.

He started out echoing his father's isolationism, critiquing Yalta from the right.

But that trip to the Soviet Union in 55 with Justice Douglas seems key.

What happened there?

Well, apparently he carried a Bible everywhere, was pretty confrontational at first.

But Douglas thought the trip humanized the Russians for him, showed them they wanted peace, too.

Douglas even thought it helped undo McCarthyism in Robert's mind.

But he stayed wary.

Oh, definitely.

He always wanted concrete actions from Moscow, reciprocity.

He wasn't naive.

And Beshlov connects Robert's time as attorney general going after organized crime to his foreign policy role.

How so?

It shows his core approach, right?

Results driven, willing to challenge powerful interests, totally loyal to his brother's goals.

He brought that same intensity and directness to foreign policy advice.

Even dealing with Soviets directly.

Yeah, like the back channel talks with Georgi Bolshakov, a known KGB agent.

He seemed pragmatic about it.

Almost non -ideological if it served the president's purpose.

But then, fiercely anti -Castro, for example.

Beshlov really stresses Robert operated purely from JFK's perspective, an unfiltered channel, a sounding board.

And Robert saw the Soviet testing as outrageous.

Completely.

And an opportunity, he thought, for the US to really hammer home the moral high ground.

He even floated ideas about citizen diplomacy, getting different groups talking directly, maybe bypassing some of the stiff official channels.

Okay, so September 1st, the first actual Soviet test since they broke the moratorium.

What's the reaction inside the White House then?

And what about DeGaul?

Beshlov says the pressure on Kennedy ramped up immediately.

Resume US testing now.

Cisher, McCloy, Seaborg, they were pushing hard.

But others held back.

Yeah, Weisner, Murrow, Bundy, Schlesinger.

They wanted to stick with condemnation first.

Kennedy himself was hesitant to jump straight to testing.

And DeGaul's advice?

Stand firm.

Don't rush into talks.

He saw the testing is just another step in their military buildup.

He basically told Kennedy, through Bolin, you're the leader of the West.

The responsibility is huge.

Show resolve.

So Kennedy and McMillan tried one last diplomatic play, proposing an atmospheric test ban without inspection.

That seems like a big concession.

It was huge.

Dropping the inspection demand was a major shift.

They sent the note off.

And the Soviet response?

The very next day, September 2nd, while Kennedy's out sailing, boom, another Soviet test.

How did Kennedy take that?

His reaction, as Beshlov quotes it, was visceral.

They'd kick me in the nuts.

I couldn't get away with it.

Just pure frustration.

He felt deliberately provoked, backed into a corner.

And the neutral nations didn't help?

Nope.

Meeting in Belgrade, they refused to condemn the Soviets, which just isolated the US and its allies even more.

Then a day later, a third Soviet test.

That was the tipping point for Kennedy.

That was it.

Patience gone.

He ordered the resumption of US testing, but, and this is key underground only, trying to limit the fallout politically and environmentally.

He felt he had no choice.

Pretty much.

He said as much.

The Soviets ignored the proposal, kept testing.

What else could he do?

And he figured they were delaying Berlin talks deliberately, using the tests to scare the world to death first.

There was also this difference between Kennedy and Adlai Stevenson at the UN about the propaganda war, right?

Yeah.

Stevenson felt the US was winning the propaganda battle.

Kennedy just wasn't buying it.

Why not?

He basically asked, where's the global outrage?

He pointed out Khrushchev's string of moves.

Sputnik, Cuba, the wall, now the tests, it all projected Soviet strength, Soviet initiative.

It made the West look reactive, defensive.

Beshlov's captures the anxiety at the time, too, through Bundy and Reston.

Definitely.

Bundy called it sustained and anxiety, that constant worry about escalation.

He connected it to Robert Lowell's poem, Fall 1961, those lines about talking our extinction to death, haunting stuff.

And Reston.

After talking to Kennedy, Reston wrote about the president's frustration, just feeling unable to have a rational discussion with Khrushchev about Berlin, like they were talking past each other.

Then Khrushchev uses C .L.

Sulzberger, the journalist, as a channel to Kennedy, proposing another summit.

Right.

Khrushchev tells Sulzberger he wants another meeting, says Vienna was just feeling each other out.

But he also repeats that dig about Kennedy being too young, lacking the authority to solve Berlin.

Interesting.

And the Soviets edited the transcript later.

Yeah, they softened some of it, downplayed the link between a summit and actual progress on disarmament, or Berlin, and eased off the talk about the 100 -megaton bomb test, maybe trying to seem a little less threatening on paper.

And wasn't there a secret message, too, through Sulzberger?

More clandestine.

Yes.

Besides the main message, Khrushchev asked Sulzberger to secretly tell Kennedy he wanted informal contacts to work on Berlin.

Find a way, maybe based on a peace treaty, that kept West Berlin free, but didn't hurt U .S.

prestige.

And he didn't trust Rusk.

Apparently not.

Saw him as too close to the Rockefellers, an obstacle.

Which put Sulzberger in a really awkward spot, told not to tell the State Department, but he felt he had to tell Ambassador Thompson anyway.

How did Kennedy react to all this?

Bishla says Kennedy found it all hard to figure out.

What was Khrushchev really after with these mixed signals?

Meanwhile, the military side.

General Lemnitzer briefs Kennedy on September 13th about Soviet nuclear capabilities.

What was the bottom line?

Based on new satellite intel, Lemnitzer said the Soviets could hit Western Europe hard, but their ICBM threat to the U .S.

homeland was more limited then.

Still serious, mind you, but limited.

So the U .S.

still had superiority.

Vast nuclear superiority, Lemnitzer called it.

But, and this is crucial, not invulnerability,

millions of Americans could still die in a Soviet first strike.

And Lemnitzer also warned about a U .S.

first strike.

Yeah, he pointed out the imbalance of terror would be even worse, potentially catastrophic, if the U .S.

launched a bolt out of the blue attack without provocation.

Something the Soviets constantly feared.

Let's shift to the U .N.

Kennedy was clearly fed up with the neutral nations over the Soviet tests.

Visibly annoyed, yes.

Frustrated they wouldn't condemn Moscow.

He even floated this wild idea moving the U .N.

headquarters to West Berlin.

Wow.

As a statement.

Exactly.

A powerful symbol.

Keep the focus on Berlin's vulnerability.

But Stevenson shot it down, argued it could backfire, make the U .N.

a hostage.

Shows the pressure he was under.

Definitely.

Beschloss recounts Kennedy privately, saying he'd trade the U .N.

to avoid nuclear war over Berlin.

Just highlights the stakes.

Kennedy also tried sending messages through journalists like James Wechsler.

Right.

Using Wechsler's column to signal to Khrushchev, look, I'm open to series talks, Germany, maybe even China, but don't mistake conciliation for weakness.

I won't be humiliated.

There are lines.

Especially the dignity of free men in West Berlin.

Then the tragedy of Dijk Hammarskjöld's death.

Why was Kennedy so concerned about that, specifically regarding Khrushchev?

He immediately worried Khrushchev would seize the moment to push harder for his plan for the U .N.

leadership.

Placing the secretary general with three people.

Yeah.

One West, one Soviet bloc, one neutral.

It would give the Soviets a veto inside the U .N.

leadership, basically paralyzing it, making it much harder to deal with crises like Berlin.

And Rusk was trying to meet with Gromyko at the U .N.

How did that go?

A bit tricky at first.

Gromyko seemed to be avoiding him.

But Bolin helped arrange a lunch.

Rusk hammered home that Soviet threats over Berlin were killing any chance for real talks.

Reaffirmed the U .S.

commitment to West Berlin's freedom.

And Gromyko's response.

He called war over Berlin unthinkable and unnecessary.

Bolin saw that as maybe, just maybe, a sign of some flexibility down the road.

There was also that slightly awkward moment with the Troika cigarettes Gromyko gave Rusk.

A little bit of human awkwardness amidst the tension.

Exactly.

So Kennedy heads off to prepare his big U .N.

speech.

And Salinger has a secret meeting with Karmalov.

Yes.

Karmalov tells Salinger that Khrushchev is willing to meet soon, willing to consider U .S.

ideas on Berlin.

But he also warned them don't make the U .N.

speech sound like that July 25th warlike ultimatum.

How did Kennedy take that message?

Salinger related.

Kennedy apparently saw it as positive, maybe hinting the Soviets weren't totally rigid on the East German regime.

He decided to reply informally via Salinger and didn't change his speech significantly.

Okay, the U .N.

speech itself.

Beschloss really flags this as a major moment.

What were the key themes?

Kennedy prepped intensely, even reading it aloud for feedback.

The speech was this powerful plea to end war.

Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind.

He challenged the Soviets to a peace race.

And on Berlin.

Firm commitment to West Berlin's freedom and access, but also acknowledging legitimate Soviet security interests.

He ended with that stark image of avoiding a flaming funeral pyre.

Beschloss knows Kennedy wrote deep, slow on his copy for that part.

And Robert Kennedy added a warning just before.

Yeah, on Meet the Press, Robert warned that the president would use nuclear weapons if Khrushchev miscalculated over Berlin, upping the stakes publicly.

So after the speech, more secret communication.

Yes.

While Kennedy was away, Bundy sent him special intelligence, hinting he had a further squeeze coming on Berlin.

Then Bolshakov calls Salinger urgently.

They meet secretly at the Carlisle Hotel.

And Bolshakov has.

A written personal message from Khrushchev for President Kennedy.

The back channel was very much active.

So let's wrap this up.

We've really walked through this critical period, August -September 61, as detailed in Beschloss's The Crisis Years, right after Khrushchev shattered the test moratorium.

We definitely have.

Covered Kennedy's shock, that sense of betrayal,

Khrushchev's complex motives, Berlin projecting power.

The debates inside the White House.

Robert Kennedy's rising influence.

Right.

The constant nuclear threat.

The diplomatic dances at the UN and through secret channels.

The messages back and forth.

Exactly.

Seeing how Kennedy, Khrushchev, Robert Kennedy, Rusk, Gromyko, how they all navigated this incredibly dangerous time.

It really underscores how close things felt, how high the stakes were.

The world genuinely seemed on the brink.

It's a chilling reminder, isn't it, of the Cold War's fragility and the immense burden on those leaders.

So a final thought for you, the listener.

Think about the ripples from this period.

How did these weeks shape the rest of the Cold War?

And what lessons from this specific crisis year, as Bowling called it, might still apply today in our own complex world dealing with nuclear dangers and international tensions?

We have now covered all the key events, political strategies, diplomatic exchanges, crises, historical context, and Beschloss's analysis of this pivotal chapter in The Crisis Years, focusing on the immediate aftermath of Khrushchev's announcement of resumed nuclear testing in August -September 1961.