Chapter 20: The Peace Speech

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Welcome to the Deep Dive.

Today we're tackling a really crucial chapter in Cold War history.

It's Topter 20 from Michael Beschloss's The Crisis Years, Kennedy and Khrushchev 1963.

We're basically giving you the inside track on the first half of 1963.

It's a fragile time right after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The world's still kind of holding its breath.

Exactly.

January to June 63, that's our window.

And we're going deep into how Kennedy and Khrushchev were interacting,

their letters, the back and forth on the nuclear test ban, what was happening with Cuba, which was still a major issue.

And importantly, the pressures both guys were under

It really sets the scene for understanding that delicate balance, that tightrope walk of the Cold War during this specific phase.

Absolutely.

It was high stakes diplomacy constantly shattered by the nuclear threat.

Okay, let's jump straight into those nuclear test ban negotiations.

Beschloss really highlights that for Kennedy, a treaty just between the US and the Soviets.

Well, it didn't seem like enough.

Yeah, his main concern, it seems, was stopping other countries from getting the bomb,

especially China.

That changes the perspective, doesn't it?

It wasn't only about the US and USSR.

Not at all.

He was thinking long term global proliferation.

That Chinese angle was fundamental to his whole approach.

It wasn't just about slowing their arms race.

And then Khrushchev writes that letter January 9th.

You can feel he's still pretty ticked off about the whole verification confusion from before.

Oh, definitely.

Still stinging from that.

But what's interesting is his offer, saying maybe they could move Soviet ground stations if they got a say in where US stations were put.

It feels like a step, maybe a conditional one, but still.

It's a gesture, for sure.

Shows maybe some willingness to find common ground, even with all that mistrust about verification, making sure the other side was actually playing by the rules.

But the CIA wasn't buying it.

Well, the assessment then kind of poured cold water on it.

They thought Khrushchev wasn't likely to budge much on the really sticky point on -site inspections.

Maybe he felt stronger after Kennedy's election win.

Right.

Which leads us to Kennedy's own moves.

He puts off some underground tests in Nevada, supposedly to help the talks, but Beschloss says Kennedy had already decided six on -site inspections was his absolute floor rock bottom.

He even told someone the whole fight with Congress over a treaty wasn't worth it unless it actually stopped nuclear spread, especially to China.

He had a very clear line.

He did.

So it's diplomacy on the surface, but underneath this firm position driven by the China worry.

Then William Foster, the US negotiator, he offers Kuznetsov seven inspections if the Soviets accepted US procedures.

Always that push and pull, trying to find some leverage.

Exactly.

It's this intricate dance.

And meanwhile, the US ambassador in Moscow, Kolor, he feels completely out of the loop.

Complaining to Rusk, he's got no idea what's happening with the test ban talks.

Rusk's response is basically, stay out of it.

Just say nice things.

Pretty blunt.

It shows how tightly controlled these talks were right inside the White House.

Yeah.

And Beschloss' description of Kolor, this cautious guy knowing he's sitting at nuclear target number one, it makes it very real.

It really underscores the secrecy, the compartmentalization.

Rusk and Kennedy kept a tight grip on this.

But then things go south in February.

Khrushchev just breaks off the talks.

Sites the China issue again.

Seems like his hands were tied.

Maybe internal politics, maybe the whole difficult relationship with Beijing.

The China factor again, looming large.

It was a huge hurdle.

He's trying to talk to the West, but also keep some solidarity with China, who hated the idea of a test ban they weren't part of.

A real balancing act.

The Kennedy and Macmillan, the British PM, they don't give up.

They send this joint letter to Khrushchev.

Right.

Saying, look, the gap isn't that big.

You say three inspections, we say seven.

Let's send some high level people to sort it out.

Plastic diplomacy, trying to get things moving again.

Absolutely.

Putting the ball back in Khrushchev's court.

And Khrushchev, he sounds totally fed up, felt bamboozled on inspections, but he agrees to see the envoys.

Which is key.

Despite the frustration, the door isn't completely shut.

And Beschloss mentions Dobrynin, hinting later that maybe five or six inspections, framed differently, might have worked earlier.

Ah, the what ifs.

Makes you wonder about those missed chances.

Doesn't it?

How misperceptions, small gaps, can become huge roadblocks.

Dobrynin's hindsight suggests maybe a different approach could have broken the logjam.

Communication is everything.

So the envoy idea moves forward, agreed for late June, early July.

But Khrushchev wanted more, didn't he?

A summit with Kennedy, or at least Russ coming over?

Yeah, he seemed to feel a high level visit was needed.

Fulman had suggested it earlier, Gromyko pointed out he'd been to the White House.

Khrushchev likely saw it as showing real seriousness from both sides.

Maybe break the deadlock person to person.

But Kennedy wasn't ready for that.

Didn't want Russ involved just yet.

Apparently not.

He wanted to keep that initial envoy mission focused.

Okay, let's switch gears.

Cuba.

Another constant worry for Kennedy during this time.

He was concerned people were getting too complacent, thinking the Soviets were gone after 62.

Right.

He knew Khrushchev hadn't just given up on world communism.

The missile crisis removed the offensive missiles, sure, but it didn't magically fix the Soviet presence or Castro's alignment.

Kennedy was trying to manage expectations.

Beschloss gives us Kennedy's worry list.

Berlin, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, NATO.

Just shows how many fires were burning.

A stark reminder.

And Cuba was still very much on that list.

Especially with Soviet troops still there.

Kennedy thought around 17 ,000.

But the real number was much higher.

Beschloss says closer to 37 ,000.

That intelligence gap itself is interesting.

How reliable was the info they had?

Definitely raises questions.

And this discrepancy, it shows the challenge of just knowing what's happening on the ground.

Kennedy publicly downplayed the military threat, probably to avoid panic while privately pushing for withdrawal.

Exactly.

He'd asked Khrushchev back in November to pull out four regiments.

Khrushchev promised.

In due course.

Very vague.

A source of tension, clearly.

And Beschloss tells that story about Kennedy talking to Bradley.

Oh yeah, that's revealing.

Admitting how hard it was politically to acknowledge Khrushchev's point, comparing Soviet troops in Cuba to U .S.

troops in Turkey.

It shows how tuned in Kennedy was to domestic politics.

He might have privately seen the parallel, but saying it out loud,

political dynamite back home.

So his focus kind of shifts, right?

Less about the immediate military danger, more the political headache of Soviet troops staying.

The CIA even thought they might be restraining Castro in some ways.

But still, Bobby Kennedy and Russ kept telling Dobrynin the U .S.

was worried about Cuba becoming this Soviet fortress in the Americas.

The concern was Cuba becoming a permanent Soviet base, projecting influence, supporting revolutions nearby.

Precisely.

Then Dobrynin promises in February more trips will leave, several thousand.

And Kennedy announces in mid -March another 4 ,000 are gone.

He even predicts Cuba will be politically unimportant by 64.

Which, looking back, seems a bit hopeful.

Very optimistic, yeah.

The basic alliance, the strategic value of Cuba to Moscow, that didn't just evaporate.

Then Hanson Baldwin's piece hits the New York Times.

Claims way more Soviet troops are still there than the administration admits.

And Kennedy goes ballistic.

Yeah.

Furious.

The CIA denies any senior people leaked it.

Shows how sensitive that troop number was, and suggests some people inside the government maybe wanted to keep the pressure on.

Probably felt the administration was sugarcoating this situation.

And of course, the Republicans jumped all over it.

Bush, Keating, Goldwater, Nixon,

all demanding Kennedy do more about Cuba.

It was still potent politically.

Oh, absolutely.

Keating sent out his line, I'll eat my hat if the offensive weapons were gone.

And McNamara saying he didn't own one, it got theatrical.

Even Eisenhower was worried about Cuba becoming a real military threat.

The pressure was constant.

Adopt a tougher line.

So what does Kennedy do?

Even while playing down the troop issue publicly, in June he approves more covert action against Cuba.

Sabotage, things like that.

Trying to pressure Castro,

limit his reach in Latin America.

It's that two -track approach again.

Public, calm, private action.

A classic Cold War playbook.

Diplomatic talk, public statements, and covert ops all at once.

Trying to undermine Castro, basically.

Destabilize the regime, reduce his ability to stir things up elsewhere.

But while the US is doing that, Khrushchev is doing the opposite.

He's doubling down on Castro.

Big time.

Castro gets this huge welcome in Moscow, stays for 40 days, gets more sugar subsidies,

backing against the old guard Cuban communists.

So the Soviet commitment was strong.

The CIA predicted they'd keep troops there as a deterrent and keep pushing subversion in Latin America.

Makes Kennedy's 64 prediction look even more.

Well, unlikely.

It really underscores Cuba's value to the Soviets.

A foothold right in America's backyard.

A symbol.

Let's talk about the domestic pressures on both leaders.

We saw how Kennedy was constantly watching the Republican attacks on his Cuba policy, thinking about re -election.

Definitely.

Domestic politics were always in the background, shaping foreign policy for both Kennedy and Khrushchev.

Kennedy had the anti -Castro pressure.

Khrushchev had his own troubles.

And Khrushchev's situation sounds really shaky after the missile crisis.

Beshlos talks about opposition in Moscow and from China, too.

He seemed weakened.

He was.

And notice, in February, he backs away from confronting China openly.

Starts seeking a meeting, trying to patch things up.

That's a big shift.

Suggests he needed to shore up support within the communist bloc, maybe deflect some criticism.

That seems likely.

And that same month, the Soviets pull out of the test ban talks, which Beshlos notes China wanted.

Right.

And anti -American propaganda ramps up in the Soviet press.

Cold Cables Washington saying,

basically, don't expect progress on testing until Mafau sorts things out with Beijing.

That whole US -Soviet -China triangle, it's always there under the surface, influencing everything.

Absolutely.

Arms control, regional fights, alliances.

It was all connected.

And internally, Khrushchev seems to be backpedaling on de -Stalinization, too, cracking down on avant -garde art and literature.

Yeah, aligning himself with that campaign.

Beshlos even mentions Khrushchev making some disturbing anti -Semitic remarks to writers and artists.

A reminder of the uglier side of things.

It suggests he was feeling pressure from the hardliners, the conservatives in the system, maybe trying to appease them, sacrificing some of his reforms.

And it wasn't just culture.

His economic reforms, decentralization, reigning in the military budget, those got reversed, too.

Key jobs went to guys seen as his opponents.

Beshlos mentions a French Kremlin watcher calling it Khrushchev's surrender.

That's how serious it looked.

A major loss of power.

His re -election campaign in February sounds pretty bleak.

Warning about needing enormous military spending.

Kohler's cable described him as listless and dispirited.

Just paints a picture of a leader really feeling the heat.

Vulnerable.

And then Frol Kozlov emerges, pushing this neo -Stalinist line.

Right.

More military spending, closer ties to China, the opposite of Khrushchev.

Exactly.

Kozlov's platform was gaining steam.

He represented a return to stricter control, a tougher line against the West,

a real alternative for those unhappy with Khrushchev, especially after Cuba.

Serious, Sharon.

Very serious.

Things got so tense that Dobrynin delivers this really harsh message about U .S.

policy to Bobby Kennedy.

Beshlos says it basically wrecked their back -channel relationship.

Yeah, that was a blow.

Those informal lines of communication were important, and now even they were strained.

Khrushchev finally writes to Kennedy privately in April, after three months of silence, talks about Cuba inspections,

then suddenly he's missing from a public appearance with the Presidium.

Fueling all sorts of speculation.

Was there a move against him?

And Pravda announces a central committee meeting for May, supposedly called by Kozlov.

It really looked like Khrushchev might be out.

The signs were definitely pointing towards a power struggle, maybe the end for Khrushchev.

But then Kozlov has a stroke, a near -fatal seizure in early April.

And just like that, Beshlos says he's effectively out of the picture.

A huge unexpected turn.

Talk about drama.

And it removes Khrushchev's biggest rival instantly.

Completely changes the political dynamic in Moscow.

And the shift in Soviet policy towards the U .S.

is almost immediate, right?

Strikingly fast.

Pravda praises Kennedy.

They reprint some conciliatory Lenin document.

It's like night and day.

Suggests Kozlov really was the main obstacle to a softer line.

It strongly suggests his hardline stance was holding things back and his removal opened the door.

Then Norman Kozans goes to see Khrushchev in Pitsunda.

Kennedy had apparently briefed Kozans, told him he thought Khrushchev genuinely felt tricked on the three inspection offer.

Providing that unofficial channel again,

trying to clear the air.

And Khrushchev in that meeting, he vents,

feels misled, even threatens to start testing again, but then offers a fresh start on inspections.

Quite the emotional roller coaster.

It shows the pressure he was under,

anger, resentment, but also still this underlying desire maybe to find a way forward.

And Kennedy's comment afterwards telling Kozans that both he and Khrushchev had hardliners in their own governments they had to deal with.

That's a fascinating moment of empathy almost, recognizing they shared that same struggle against internal opposition to Dutton.

Then Avril Harriman heads to Moscow as Kennedy's special envoy.

Late April, early May.

Beshlos gives us some background on Harriman, his long history with the Soviets, his sometimes tricky relationship with JFK.

Add some color to the mission.

Harriman was experienced maybe a bit unconventional for this.

They talk Laos, Germany, the test ban.

Khrushchev sends mixed signals, but then suggests linking a test ban to settling the German question.

Shows how interconnected these big Cold War issues were in their minds.

Hard to solve one without touching the others.

And amidst all this, Georgi Bolshakov writes to Bobby Kennedy.

Says the Soviets want peace, but they're kind of losing faith in RFK.

Another reminder that even those informal channels weren't simple.

Maybe you're reflecting the strains from the Dabrenin incident.

Which brings us to the big moment.

Kennedy's peace speech at American University, June 10th, 1963.

A pivotal moment.

Beshlos stresses this was very deliberate.

Kennedy wanted to signal sincerity to Moscow, but also prep the American public for a possible test ban treaty.

Sorensen worked on it secretly.

To avoid the bureaucracy watering it down, keep the message pure.

Kennedy signed off on it in Honolulu.

It was strategically crafted, timed perfectly.

Kennedy knew he needed to shift the mood, both at home and internationally, to make progress on arms control possible.

Just before the speech though, Khrushchev sends this grumpy letter questioning Kennedy's sincerity.

Shows that deep mistrust was still there.

Yeah, but the speech itself.

Wow, talking about genuine peace, how nuclear war changed everything, re -examining attitudes about the Soviets, about the Cold War itself, and the urgent need for a test ban.

It was groundbreaking stuff.

A real departure from his earlier rhetoric.

Plus, announcing the US was stopping atmospheric tests unilaterally, and that high -level talks were agreed for Moscow.

It felt like a genuine opening.

Significant shift.

Deliberate and impactful.

Beshlos calls it maybe Kennedy's best speech.

He suggests the change wasn't necessarily Kennedy suddenly seeing the light, but more recognizing the world had changed after Cuba.

He'd shown toughness.

Now he could push for peace without looking weak.

A mix of conviction and smart politics.

Beshlos gives that nuanced view a sincere desire for peace, combined with a practical grasp of the new political reality.

He saw an opening and took it.

And the reaction was huge, wasn't it?

Overwhelmingly positive.

Tons of support of mail in the US.

The Soviets liked it.

Despite jamming one paragraph initially, Khrushchev apparently called it the best speech by a US president since FDR.

Even Bobby Kennedy's intelligence reports showed Khrushchev seemed to be rethinking US intentions.

It clearly made an impact.

A tangible effect.

Definitely.

And that leads us, finally, to the hotline agreement,

June 20, 1963.

Something the US had wanted for ages.

But the communication mess during the missile crisis finally convinced the Soviets, they set up this direct link wire telegraph teleprinter.

The famous test message.

The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog.

A practical step to avoid disaster.

Beshlos points out it was only the second big agreement to come out of all the disarmament talks up to that point.

A crucial step, though.

A reliable channel between leaders in a crisis.

Reducing the risk of miscalculation, of accidental war.

Kennedy saw it as just a start.

Committed to doing more.

So that's our journey through chapter 20 of the crisis years.

We've hit the test ban talks, the Cuba situation, the pressures on Kennedy and Khrushchev, and then the breakthroughs, the peace speech, the hotline.

A really packed six months.

Diplomacy, politics, the nuclear shadow always there.

We tried to give you that detailed summary, hitting the key events, the strategies, the context,

Beshlos's analysis, all of it.

Yeah, covering the key figures, dates, the real world feel of it.

You really see how tangled everything was.

The test ban, Cuba, domestic politics, the China factor, it all connects.

And how much pressure these two leaders were under.

The peace speech and the hotline really do stand out, though.

Maybe small steps, but steps nonetheless towards managing those incredible Cold War danger.

Towards de -escalation, yeah.

So as you think about this deep dive, maybe consider how these events, these decisions from January to June 63, with all their complexities, helped shape where the Cold War went next.

And maybe what lessons are there for dealing with tough international situations today.

A good thought to leave with.

We have now covered the entirety of Chapter 20 of the crisis years.

Until our next deep dive.