Chapter 13: “Dear Mr. President” and “Dear Mr. Chairman”

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1961.

Think about the sheer weight of that year in the Cold War.

It wasn't just about ideologies clashing, it was really about two individuals, Kennedy and Khrushchev, navigating a world just teetering on the brink.

Absolutely, a really dangerous time.

Today, we're diving deep into a crucial period, dissecting their private exchanges and the white -knuckle pension that gripped Berlin.

Exactly.

This is a moment where personal diplomacy,

strategic calculation, and the very real threat of nuclear war all intertwined.

Our exploration today draws heavily from Beschloss's The Crisis Years, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 -1963, giving us a detailed look.

An indispensable source for this era.

Our goal is pretty straightforward, to really get a handle on how their personal communications played out against this backdrop of public posturing and the ever -treasant nuclear threat.

Let's kick things off at the beginning of this pivotal chapter with a, well, a rather clandestine delivery.

Indeed.

It's autumn 1961,

and Khrushchev starts this highly unusual communication.

It's a lengthy 26 -page private letter addressed directly to Kennedy.

26 pages.

Wow.

And the way it's delivered speaks volumes.

It's given to Georgi Bolshakov, who's sort of operating outside normal diplomatic channels.

Not the ambassador.

Remarkably, no.

Even the Soviet ambassador, Menshikov, is kept completely in the dark.

Only Bolshakov and foreign minister Gromyko know about this direct channel.

That level of secrecy, I mean, it just screams urgency, doesn't it?

Bypassing his own ambassador is a huge move.

It really is.

And the letter's journey to Kennedy, who was in Newport at the time, it's almost like something out of a spy novel.

So how did it actually get to him?

Well, Bolshakov gives it to Salinger, Kennedy's press secretary.

Salinger immediately calls Kennedy in Newport.

Kennedy tells him, get this to Rusk urgently, then bring it to me.

So Rusk sees it first.

Yes.

But Rusk is initially cautious, doesn't give an immediate analysis.

He takes it to Washington, then sends it back to Salinger in New York via courier.

Okay.

Then Salinger flies to Newport and hands it directly to the president.

All that effort, you know, just underscores the gravity.

A real bureaucratic relay race.

So after all that cloak and dagger stuff, what did Khrushchev actually say in this super confidential letter?

What were the main points?

Well, it starts surprisingly personally.

Khrushchev's writing from his vacation spot in Petsunda even mentions his family, but he quickly pivots to Berlin.

Yes, to his core concern.

What he sees as Kennedy's increasingly belligerent statements about Berlin, he thinks this is fueling a dangerous cycle of militant actions on both sides.

So he's worried about spiraling tensions, miscalculation,

the usual Cold War fears amplified.

What else?

He says he believes they can reach negotiated settlements on Laos and crucially on Berlin, but only if both sides approach it with genuine good faith.

Good faith.

That's always the tricky part, isn't it?

Always.

And then he uses this really powerful metaphor, Noah's Ark.

He likens the post -war world to the Ark.

Despite their huge differences, you know, the clean and the unclean, both the U .S.

and the Soviet Union have this overriding need for shared survival.

That's a striking image.

Shared destiny, despite being, well, enemies.

It highlights that need to avoid global catastrophe.

Did he propose a way to He did.

He suggests setting up a purely informal, totally private channel of correspondence, just between the two of them.

Why?

To bypass the usual red tape.

Exactly.

To get around the slow, politically charged bureaucracies in both Washington and Moscow, avoid the need for public propaganda statements, and just talk candidly, leader to leader.

Makes sense.

Less posturing.

And he even gives Kennedy an out.

He says, if you don't like this idea, just ignore the letter.

I promise complete secrecy.

It really shows how much Khrushchev wanted this direct, unfiltered line.

It's fascinating.

And Beshlas digs into why Khrushchev might have chosen this unusual personal route, right?

Absolutely.

Beshlas points to several key things.

First, Khrushchev really distrusted his own foreign policy people, especially Rusk and Gromyko.

He maybe felt they weren't conveying his views accurately.

Or had their own agendas.

Possibly.

Plus, earlier attempts using intermediaries like Pearson or Sulzberger hadn't really worked out.

He wanted serious engagement this time.

So, go straight to the top.

Right.

And Beshlas also suggests Khrushchev wanted to build a personal rapport with Kennedy.

Maybe for leverage back home in the Kremlin.

How so?

Well, having a secret line to the U .S.

President could strengthen his hand against critics, show he was indispensable, and maybe give Kennedy a personal stake in keeping Khrushchev in power.

Interesting internal politics angle.

Plus, the 22nd Party Congress was coming up.

Khrushchev might have wanted to gauge Kennedy's private thinking before potentially facing some harsh anti -American rhetoric domestically.

And the secrecy itself.

Why so adamant?

Well, Beshlas points out that Eisenhower had similar exchanges with Khrushchev, but they often leaked, which Eisenhower regretted.

And Khrushchev apparently hated the idea of his messages getting filtered through State Department cover notes, potentially framed in a more confrontational way.

So, using Bolshakov bypassed all that.

It also implied a level of trust he hadn't shown Eisenhower.

So, Kennedy gets this letter.

What's his reaction?

Must have seen opportunities, but also huge risks.

Definitely.

Kennedy liked the idea of a direct line.

He'd even advocated for it publicly.

And he probably saw it as a chance to maybe delay or even cool down the Berlin situation.

At the dangers.

Oh, absolutely.

A really negative reply on Berlin could provoke Khrushchev, but a really positive one.

Khrushchev might leak that to allies like France or West Germany to so distrust, make it look like Kennedy was dealing behind their backs.

A real tightrope walk.

Leak potential either way.

Exactly.

Even sharing his reply with Western allies risked leaks that could kill the channel.

So, he didn't rush.

What did he do?

He dictated a memo, told Bundy and Sorensen to do a really careful analysis of Khrushchev's letter.

Beshlas quotes Chip Boland calling Kennedy's eventual reply potentially the most important letter the president will ever write.

That shows the weight they put on it.

Wow.

OK, so after this first secret contact, Kennedy's trying to figure out where Khrushchev really stands, right?

Especially on Berlin.

He talks to Sulzberger around this time.

Yes.

Just days after getting the letter, he meets with C .L.

Sulzberger of the New York Times.

He thanks Sulzberger for passing along the idea of informal contacts earlier, a subtle nod to Khrushchev's message without revealing the letter.

Clever.

He mentions reviewing the old 1959 Western peace plan for Germany,

admitting it wasn't serious.

Then he tells Sulzberger that Khrushchev seemed much softer on Berlin lately, recognizing the U .S.

prestige involved.

A big shift from Vienna.

So he's testing the waters, seeing if the private message matches any public shift, maybe subtly signaling back through the press.

It seems likely.

He also reflected on the Vienna summit with Sulzberger.

What were his takeaways from that first meeting?

Kennedy said Vienna was useful for me in judging this man.

He felt future talks wouldn't be for real negotiation, just for finalizing deals already made.

He also noted Khrushchev's rough -tough image actually gave him an advantage.

Any politeness seemed like a bigger concession.

He even compared him to Joe McCarthy and Jimmy Hoffa.

A pretty cynical take, but maybe realistic.

Kennedy clearly saw Khrushchev as a shrewd operator.

What about Kennedy's own view of the Berlin situation then?

Was he thinking war?

He told Sulzberger he thought the American people were ready to go to the brink of war over Berlin, though chances for peace were not yet too good.

He kept saying if we pushed the button, showing he knew the nuclear stakes.

He seemed confident he'd convince Khrushchev of U .S.

resolve.

Yes, despite concerns from people like Senator Margaret Chase Smith, Kennedy believed we have convinced Khrushchev on that.

A very confident statement about deterrence.

And on Laos?

Did he buy Khrushchev's optimism there?

Not at all.

Sulzberger mentioned Khrushchev predicting improvement in Laos.

Kennedy just dismissed it at the line Khrushchev was putting out, saying Khrushchev actually expected Laos to soon fall into his lap.

He saw Southeast Asia as much trickier, more ambiguous than Berlin.

Right, different strategic pictures.

So while this secret channel is opening up, the formal diplomacy continues.

Gromyko visits the White House in early October.

First big talk since Vienna.

What was the mood?

Well, just a week before, Gromyko had told Rusk that Moscow wouldn't insist on a German peace treaty by the end of 61.

Kennedy saw this as a potential thaw.

And Kennedy knew Gromyko from way back.

The U .N.

founding.

Found him polite initially.

Yes, the early days.

But Beshlas and others paint a much more complex picture of Gromyko, don't they?

This long -serving Soviet figure.

Oh, definitely.

Beshlas calls him incredibly durable, self -effacing, almost an enigma.

Resilient like Talleyrand, inscrutable like a character from Tolstoy.

Famously noncommittal, asked about breakfast, he'd just say,

perhaps.

Others noted his impatience, his chilling coldness, even a macabre sense of humor.

His own daughter said he was totally isolated from ordinary Moscow life, a man who'd built impenetrable walls personally and professionally.

And his background, how did he rise so fast?

Beshlas covers that, and it's, well, pretty revealing about the Soviet system.

Very.

Semi -peasant, semi -worker background.

Joined the party, studied marks that are rapid rise during Stalin's purges.

The purges basically gutted the diplomatic corps, creating openings.

Right, Litvinov out, Molotov in.

Gromyko benefited from that brutal turnover.

Exactly.

He navigated those dangerous waters, served in Washington during the war, impressed Stalin, got brought back to Moscow, became a key player.

Especially at the UN, where he earned some less than flattering nicknames.

Oh, yeah.

Mr.

Nyet.

Grim Grom.

His use of the veto, his walkouts, became legendary symbols of Soviet opposition in the West.

And then he transitions from Stalin to Khrushchev.

Remarkable adaptability, Beshlas says his relationship with Khrushchev was, well, strained.

Very strained.

Khrushchev apparently teased him publicly, called him an arid bureaucrat, questioned his ideology.

Gromyko stayed silent, but must have resented it.

He even copied Khrushchev's desk pounding at the UN, but reportedly hated doing it.

His personal life sounds austere, too.

Bare office, impersonal flat.

Chess with his wife, reading archives, private film screenings with his own commentary.

A life dedicated to the state, but with this deep reserve.

Beshlas stresses his top priority was just political survival, avoided domestic issues.

He wasn't maybe a true believer like Khrushchev, but a fierce defender of the system.

Saw America through a very critical lens, all about profit.

And his relationship with Khrushchev.

Mutual suspicion.

Deep suspicion.

Khrushchev worried about Gromyko's loyalty to the Old Guard, knew he was cozying up to Brezhnev.

Plus, their personalities clashed.

Khrushchev the gambler, Gromyko the cautious bureaucrat.

A bit like Kennedy and Rusk, maybe.

Leaders using personal channels, RFK, Edzube.

Interesting parallel.

And Gromyko and Rusk apparently shared a kind of professional empathy.

So this complex, inscrutable figure comes to the White House.

How did the actual meeting with Kennedy go?

Kennedy was outwardly cordial, showed him the view.

But the meeting itself.

Mostly Gromyko reading a prepared Soviet position paper on Berlin for an hour.

Monotonous.

Anything you in it?

Kennedy didn't think so.

But he watched Gromyko, smoked a cigar, and sensed maybe a resignation to the status quo on Berlin, for now.

He noted a slight softening, but still no acceptable proposal.

And the old idea of internationalizing West Berlin came up again.

Of course.

Gromyko proposed it again, internationalized West Berlin for vague access guarantees.

Kennedy shot it down immediately, called it trading an apple for an orchard, told Gromyko to talk to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow, try to find a real basis for settlement.

Right.

And then there was that odd moment with the Russian fable, the swan, the pike, and the crab.

Ah, yes.

Gromyko pushed the Soviet Troika idea, three -part leadership for Berlin.

Kennedy was ready.

He picked up a book of Krylov's fables, read the one about the swan, pike, and crab, trying to pull a cart together and getting nowhere.

A subtle dig at the Troika idea.

Exactly.

His way of showing how deadlock works.

But Gromyko apparently missed the point, focused on the characters being animals.

Kennedy then gave him two nice leather -bound copies of the book as gifts for him and Khrushchev.

A bit of ironic diplomacy.

Did it work?

Probably not.

What was Kennedy's private take on Gromyko afterward?

Much blunter.

He told Walter Lippmann later that evening he got nowhere, called Gromyko the most wooden man you'll ever have to deal with, and agreed with Lippmann's negative view, I don't like him.

And that conversation leaked?

Beschloss notes it did, probably to project Kennedy's toughness.

Interestingly, McMillan in London also felt the Russians were looking for a way out on Berlin after Gromyko visited him.

So after this unproductive Gromyko meeting, Kennedy finally replies to Khrushchev's big personal letter.

Back at Hyannisport, right?

He put a lot of thought into this reply.

He did.

Weekend of October 14th.

Drafted it himself, using input from Sorensen and Bundy.

He went for a cordial, hopeful tone.

Dear Mr.

Chairman.

Personal touches about family.

Hyannisport.

Aiming for a frank, realistic exchange.

Did he embrace the private channel idea?

Yes.

He welcomed it as a valuable supplement to formal diplomacy.

But he added a key caveat.

He'd be showing the letters to Secretary Rusk.

Ah, covering his bases.

Right.

He stressed they probably wouldn't convert each other ideologically, but their private talks could at least be free of the usual Cold War rhetoric, even while public debates raged on.

And did he mention the Noah's Ark metaphor?

He did.

He embraced it, stressed their shared need to prevent annihilation, their special obligation as leaders.

He agreed neither was responsible for the Berlin mess initially, but they were responsible for finding a peaceful solution now.

Smart framing.

But he didn't just agree, right?

He had to address the sticking points.

Absolutely.

He agreed where he could, sometimes rephrasing things slightly.

But on stationing Soviet troops in West Berlin,

totally unambiguous rejection.

Said it was unacceptable to the U .S.

and its allies.

Firm line.

How did he wrap it up?

Warm wishes to Khrushchev's family.

Sincere hope for real progress towards peace through their letters and other channels.

Reiterated, it was their greatest shared responsibility and opportunity.

A very carefully balanced message.

And Khrushchev's reaction.

Positive enough for the letters to continue.

Apparently so.

The secret correspondence kept going.

Bundy famously called them the pen pal letters.

And the secrecy continued.

Clandestine meetings.

Oh yeah.

Soviet embassy guys would arrange these secret meetings with Bobby Kennedy, Sorensen, or Selinger.

Inconstiguous places, often at night, exchanging sealed manila envelopes.

Real Cold War stuff.

But amidst these secret talks, the public tensions didn't exactly disappear, did they?

Khrushchev's big speech at the 22nd Party Congress in October.

That threw fuel on the fire.

Absolutely.

A six -hour marathon speech.

He made a quick dismissive reference to Kennedy's Apple for an Orchard line on Berlin.

But mostly it was a show of strength.

Bragging about the nuclear tests.

Big time.

The 50 -megaton, the planned 100 -megaton, though he added they wouldn't actually test the big one because it might break windows.

Right.

Convenient excuse.

Then this pious statement about never using the bombs first.

A bit rich, given the context.

The White House condemned the 50 -megaton test.

Right.

The fallout risk.

They did.

But it was another part of Khrushchev's speech that really got Kennedy's attention.

The bit about the shifting power balance in Berlin.

Ah.

The claim that socialism was now stronger than imperialism.

Exactly.

He declared the forces of socialism were now stronger, and he doubled down on Berlin.

The German peace treaty must and will be signed.

West Berlin becomes a free, demilitarized city.

Using the nuclear tests as leverage.

Trying to intimidate the West into conceding on Berlin.

That's how it was read.

A calculated display of power.

And just the week before, Kennedy had been grilled at a press conference about US resolve on Berlin.

He detailed the US buildup, but deliberately avoided direct strength comparisons.

So Khrushchev's speech put him in a tough spot.

A very tough spot.

If Kennedy let those claims of Soviet superiority stand, especially after the huge bomb tests,

any Berlin negotiation could look like weakness.

Like caving to pressure.

Allies might get nervous.

Republicans at home would pounce.

He couldn't appear weak.

Which sets the stage for even more tension.

More assertive posturing.

And isn't this around the time of that infamous Ted Dealey incident at the White House?

Oh yes.

The Dallas Morning News publisher directly challenging Kennedy, calling him weak, practically demanding he threaten nuclear war.

It really shows the kind of hawkish pressure Kennedy was under domestically.

An extraordinary moment.

Kennedy's angry but measured reply, emphasizing the complexities.

It's a stark reminder of the pressures.

And while this public pressure cooker is on, there's the secret reality of the actual nuclear balance.

Which wasn't what people thought, right?

The CIA estimates on Soviet ICBMs were changing.

They were, dramatically.

Early in 61, based partly on Pankowski's intelligence, estimates were higher.

But by September, a revised assessment came out.

General Lemnitzer estimated the Soviets had maybe only 10 to 25 operational ICBMs.

Only 10 to 25.

And none in hardened silos, apparently cumbersome to launch.

The intelligence showed the Soviet ICBM force, feared as a first strike weapon, was actually much smaller and less capable than thought.

And getting more vulnerable to US spy satellites.

So the missile gap was actually in America's favor.

This huge revelation must have given Kennedy a massive strategic headache.

Reveal it.

How?

It was a real dilemma.

Beschloss details the agonizing.

Revealing Soviet inferiority risked provoking Khrushchev into a massive crash program to catch up.

But not revealing it.

Meant letting Khrushchev keep bluffing, potentially emboldening him on Berlin or elsewhere.

Kennedy decided the illusion was more dangerous.

He wanted the truth out, but didn't want to seem overly aggressive saying it himself.

Which leads us straight to Roswell Gilpatrick's big speech in October 61.

Who was Gilpatrick and how did this speech come together?

Gilpatrick was McNamara's deputy secretary of defense.

A Wall Street lawyer, seen as more outgoing than McNamara, maybe more relatable to the business council audience he was addressing.

Well regarded in the Kennedy circle, even friendly with Jackie.

So a trusted figure to deliver a sensitive message.

Exactly.

The speech was carefully crafted by Kennedy, Bundy, Rusk, McNamara.

The main goal.

Implicitly but clearly reveal America's overwhelming nuclear superiority to the Soviets and the world.

And the specific aims were broader than just informing Moscow, right?

Oh yes.

Multiple goals.

One, deter any Soviet moves on Berlin by showing U .S.

strength.

Two, nudge West Germany and NATO allies to build up their conventional forces, rely less solely on the U .S.

nuclear umbrella.

Three, reassure the American public about U .S.

defenses, especially after the Soviet tests and Berlin tensions.

A carefully calibrated message for multiple audiences.

And the speech itself,

pretty blunt.

Remarkably detailed and forceful.

Gilpatrick laid out the U .S.

arsenal.

Hundreds of long -range bombers, the growing Polaris submarine fleet, land -based ICBMs, tens of thousands of delivery vehicles, multiple warheads.

Leaving no doubt about U .S.

power.

He stressed a Soviet surprise attack was virtually impossible due to U .S.

deployment and protection.

Highlighted America's robust second strike capability.

The ability to hit back massively even after being hit first.

Said it was at least as big as the entire Soviet first strike potential.

The message.

We're confident you won't start a nuclear war.

Wow.

Pulling no punches.

Did he mention China?

A subtle jab, yeah.

Alluded to the Sino -Soviet split.

Undermining the idea of a unified communist bloc.

And the administration reinforced this message afterwards.

They did.

Rusk McNamara made statements.

Classified briefings went to allies even though suspected of having Soviet moles to make sure the message got through everywhere.

Kennedy himself publicly stated the U .S.

was second to none.

What was the reaction?

Mixed.

Predictably.

Eisenhower agreed with projecting strength.

Others, like former Secretary Herter, criticized past democratic rhetoric.

But Beschloss's analysis focuses on the consequences.

He argues while it boosted Kennedy domestically and reassured allies, it was incredibly provocative.

It undermined Khrushchev's entire public image.

Because Khrushchev's whole strategy, domestically and internationally, rested on this bluff of nuclear parity or even superiority.

Exactly.

The Patrick speech exposed it as a fallacy.

Potentially huge fallout.

Third World Nations rethinking alignment.

China gaining ammo against Khrushchev.

Rivals in the Kremlin questioning his leadership.

And Khrushchev himself might fear a U .S.

first strike now that the U .S.

knew its advantage.

That's a key point Beschloss makes.

The speech, meant to stabilize through strength, might have actually sown deep instability and fear in Moscow.

Khrushchev's immediate reaction seems to confirm that.

Approving another big nuclear test just two days later.

A very telling move.

A 30 -megaton blast.

Yeah.

A clear signal.

We still have massive destructive power, even if fewer missiles.

And then Defense Minister Malinovsky's fiery speech at the party congress.

Even clearer.

Malinovsky angrily denounced Gilpatrick's petty speech and threats.

Insisted Soviet nuclear might was undeniable.

Multi -megaton warheads could hit anywhere.

Warned Western Europe specifically.

A very belitos response.

Beschloss thinks this bluster might have temporarily soothed some nerves in Moscow.

But the underlying damage to Khrushchev's position was done.

And it pressured him to do something spectacular.

Precisely.

Beschloss argues it pushed Khrushchev towards needing a dramatic move to restore his image.

And that pressure, in a way, played out almost immediately in Berlin at Checkpoint Charlie.

Right.

The tank standoff.

How did that ignite?

The day after Gilpatrick's speech, Alan Leitner, the top U .S.

civilian official in West Berlin, tries to cross into East Berlin.

He's stopped by East German VOPOs, refuses to show his passport, insists on seeing a Soviet official since the U .S.

didn't recognize GDR authority over East Berlin.

Standard procedure challenge, but tense timing.

Very.

Leitner calls General Lucius Clay, Kennedy's tough representative in Berlin.

And Clay escalates things.

Chromatically.

Clay orders armed U .S.

military police to escort Leitner's car straight into East Berlin.

No inspection.

A very visible act of defiance.

How did Khrushchev likely read that coming right after Gilpatrick's speech?

Beschloss suggests Khrushchev probably saw it as linked, as increased American aggression, unaware it was mostly Clay acting on his own authority.

Kennedy himself was reportedly annoyed, quipping he didn't send him over there to go to the opera.

So the situation spirals.

Rapidly.

East Germany, with Soviet backing, announces allied military personnel now need to show ID.

Clay sees this as unacceptable, pushes Kennedy for a stronger response.

Which leads to?

Banks.

First, U .S.

MPs, then army jeeps with battle -ready troops, cross into East Berlin deliberately showing no ID.

Then the big move.

U .S.

tanks and armored personnel carriers take up positions right at the boundary, escorting civilian cars in.

A direct military challenge.

Soviet response.

Ten Soviet tanks roll up, face the American tanks, a hundred yards apart.

The first time U .S.

and Soviet tanks faced off like this, the U .S.

commander on the scene was terrified of an accidental shot starting World War III.

Unbelievable tension.

Kennedy calls Clay.

He does.

More Soviet tanks arrive.

Clay reports they're just matching the U .S.

buildup.

Tank for every tank, says it shows they don't intend to do anything.

Then he gives Kennedy that incredibly blunt line when Kennedy expresses relief.

We're worrying about those of you people in Washington.

Wow.

Shows the disconnect, the pressure on the ground.

How did it de -escalate?

Kennedy, secretly, uses the back channel.

Robert Kennedy tells Bolshakov the U .S.

wants Soviet tanks withdrawn in 24 hours.

There are later Soviet accounts, like from Valentin Felin, suggesting the U .S.

hinted at flexibility on the broader Berlin issue if the tanks pulled back immediately.

Khrushchev's reaction.

Reportedly calm, despite his generals being nervous.

He supposedly said the Americans were looking for a way out.

Let's give them one.

So the Soviets pulled back first.

Yes.

Soviet tanks withdrew.

U .S.

tanks followed soon after, a possible face -saving concession.

American civilians were asked to avoid East Berlin for a bit, but Felin later claimed Soviet intelligence thought the U .S.

had orders to destroy the wall.

Suspected Clay.

Yes, those lingering suspicions highlight just how dangerous that standoff was, how easily miscalculation could have led to catastrophe.

So as checkpoint Charlie cools down, Khrushchev is still dealing with the Party of Congress back home and the fallout from the Gilpatrick speech.

Right.

His big ambitions for the Congress becoming the heir to Lenin, architect of communism by 1980, were kind of derailed.

He tried to regain momentum by pushing de -Stalinization again.

Removing Stalin's body from the mausoleum, renaming cities.

Exactly, trying to shift focus.

But the Berlin crisis itself,

barely mentioned after his opening speech, the demand for a U .N.

troika for Berlin quietly dropped.

They even accepted Yuthant as U .N.

secretary general without much fuss.

Interesting.

So a bit of a climb down, maybe?

What did Khrushchev say publicly after the Congress?

He said Moscow wouldn't wait indefinitely on Berlin, but also admitted it wasn't a good time to push too hard, talked about improving relations with West Germany, Beschloss thinks maybe just buying time, probing for Western divisions.

And the back channel, Bolshakov talking to RFK?

Yeah, Bolshakov told Robert Kennedy about the Kennedy -izing of the Soviet government, Khrushchev appointing younger guys.

RFK apparently found that amusing.

The pen pal letters continued, too.

Two more from Khrushchev.

Soft on Berlin, soft on Southeast Asia.

Bundy figured the Berlin letter was just pre -negotiation posturing.

Boland advised Kennedy to wait before replying.

Did Kennedy reply eventually?

He replied to the Southeast Asia letter.

Acknowledged the communication difficulties between their systems, but stressed the search for common ground for peace.

Talked about a possible Laos agreement, U .S.

lack of ambition there, support for a coalition government, but also criticized Prince Sophanovong's lack of engagement.

And Khrushchev had criticized U .S.

support for Diem in South Vietnam.

Yes, and dismissed U .S.

complaints about North Vietnamese actions, which brings Vietnam more into focus.

Beschloss notes a shift in U .S.

thinking after the Bay of Pigs, right?

Right.

Away from compromising in Laos, towards showing resolve in Vietnam.

Yes, a definite shift.

The administration felt it needed to project strength after the Cuba fiasco.

Robert Kennedy advised standing firm in Vietnam.

LBJ visited Diem, pledged more U .S.

support.

Kennedy himself told Rest in after Vienna that Vietnam was the place to make U .S.

power credible.

And Walt Roscoe had this theory about Khrushchev's strategy.

Pressure here, compromise there.

Applied it to Vietnam.

Roscoe saw a pattern.

Khrushchev creates pressure, like Berlin, then offers a compromise that actually shifts things his way.

He predicted Khrushchev would do the same in Vietnam, offer reduced guerrilla activity for Vietnamese neutrality, which Roscoe thought would lead to a communist takeover.

So Roscoe advocated retaliation.

He suggested warning Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi that further escalation against Diem could bring direct retaliation against North Vietnam itself.

Meanwhile, the situation in South Vietnam was actually getting worse.

Viet Cong winning.

Diem unpopular.

Definitely deteriorating.

Diem asked for a U .S.

defense treaty.

Kennedy sent the Taylor -Rostow fact -finding mission.

What did they find?

A crisis of confidence in Saigon, partly due to the Laos situation.

Doubts about Diem's ability to win.

They recommended a big increase in U .S.

military commitment, more advisors, reforms.

Taylor even floated sending a U .S.

task force, anticipating combat.

But McNamara and the Joint Chiefs were skeptical that advisors alone would be enough, wanted a bigger commitment.

Much bigger.

They questioned if 8 ,000 advisors were sufficient.

Demanded a pledge to defend South Vietnam with whatever military action was needed, potentially up to 205 ,000 ground troops, if China or North Vietnam intervened directly.

Kennedy must have balked at that number.

He worried about sending combat troops, didn't he?

Deeply worried.

Feared upsetting the fragile Laos ceasefire, getting sucked into a bigger war in Vietnam, he famously compared it to taking a drink, implying addiction and escalation.

But Rusk and McNamara warned about the domino effect.

Losing Vietnam would undermine U .S.

credibility everywhere, especially with Berlin still hot.

That was the argument in their joint memo.

Domino theory, global credibility, domestic political fallout.

So despite his reservations, Kennedy approved sending more military advisors.

But the Joint Chiefs saw that as just step one, still thought combat troops were inevitable if the advisory effort failed.

They viewed it as a phase, said there was no alternative to combat troops if the program didn't work.

Kennedy's private doubts remain strong, though.

His talk with Arthur Kurok, questioning the domino theory, worrying about China.

Yes, he expressed deep skepticism to Kurok about fighting on the Asian mainland, doubted the local populations cared about the Cold War, wondered if it was just civil unrest, questioned the domino theory, worried about China getting nukes eventually, said he wanted to urge Khrushchev to call off the aggressors.

And he did write to Khrushchev about North Vietnam.

He did.

Said North Vietnam was making a determined attempt from without to overthrow South Vietnam, violating the Geneva Accords, asked Khrushchev to persuade Hanoi to stop,

offered a U .S.

commitment not to attack North Vietnam in return,

mentioned his upcoming Western trip.

So while juggling Vietnam, Kennedy's also preparing for potential Berlin talks.

The Western speaking tour was part of that, building public support.

Exactly.

Polls showed the West was more resistant to talks than other regions.

His Seattle speech at the University of Washington laid out the rationale.

Need to work pragmatically even with unfree countries, accept complex negotiations, define vital interests, avoid selling out West Berliners, see talks not as win -lose, but finding solutions.

And bringing Adenauer to Washington was key.

The West German Chancellor was nervous about U .S.-Soviet talks.

Very nervous.

Adenauer and his ambassador were alarmed by the Gromyko -Thompson talks in Moscow.

Kennedy wanted to reassure him and also get West Germany to contribute more to NATO.

So they arranged that special CIA briefing for Adenauer, downplaying Soviet conventional strength.

Yes, refined by Robert Amory, using McNamara's systems analysis, argued Soviet divisions were weaker than NATO's.

But General Lemnitzer complained privately it was too optimistic, shared classified info.

Adenauer's advisor Strauss remains skeptical.

While this is happening, Khrushchev tries to influence things by writing to British labor MPs, outlining his own Berlin settlement plan.

Yes, proposing guaranteed access, recognizing the Oder -Neis line, admitting both Germanies to the UN nuclear free zone, military disengagement, trying to shape the narrative.

So how did the Adenauer talks in Washington go?

Did he agree to U .S.-Soviet discussions?

Reluctantly, yes.

Adenauer agreed to talks as long as Western rights in Berlin were preserved.

He also agreed to gradually increase West Germany's NATO contribution.

And Kennedy made pledges in return.

Firm pledges.

No bargaining on GDR recognition, the Oder -Neis line, or neutralization.

But he refused Adenauer's demand for West Germany to get a share in NATO nuclear decision -making.

Okay.

So amidst all this high -stakes diplomacy, Kennedy agrees to an interview with Alexey Atsube, Khrushchev's son -in -law, editor of Izvestia.

That must have raised eyebrows.

It certainly did.

It came after Salinger complained about lack of Soviet reciprocity for U .S.

journalists.

The lead -up was odd, too.

Atsube complained about Khrushchev at a pre -interview dinner, refused to share questions in advance, and then that bizarre U agent outburst at Salinger in a restaurant.

Never really explained.

Strange.

What did the CIA tell Kennedy about Atsube beforehand?

Painted him as ruthless, supremely confident, wielding unofficial influence, speechwriter, key advisor on U .S.

matters.

Noted his arrogance during Khrushchev's 59 U .S.

trip.

Mixed contempt and admiration for the U .S.

convinced capitalism was doomed.

There was even a story about him breaking a wine bottle to make a point.

Sounds like quite a character.

Soviet foreign ministry officials felt sidelined by him.

Thompson reported they did.

Complained they had no input because Atsube had Khrushchev's ear.

Khrushchev apparently hesitated to give him a formal job because of nepotism concerns.

And Atsube's background.

How did he get so influential?

Beschloss covers this.

Yeah.

Born in Samarkand.

Raised in Moscow.

Wartime service.

Journalism.

Then married.

Khrushchev's daughter, Rada Beschloss, calls it his lucky lottery ticket.

Huh.

That certainly helped his career.

Big time.

Rose through Komsomolskaya Pravda.

Made it look more American.

Though Khrushchev later had second thoughts about that.

Cultivated other powerful figures.

Then became editor of his Vestia.

Made it much more engaging.

Doubled circulation.

But his view of Americans remained negative.

Largely.

Based on a 1955 trip, he saw Americans as exuberant, but with weak, stupid leaders.

Became a fixture on Khrushchev's trips.

Rumors about his personal life, but Khrushchev seemed to approve.

Even enjoyed Atsube boasting about the UN shoe -banging incident.

Beschloss's overall assessment of Atsube is pretty critical.

Sees him as part of the Soviet New Class.

Yes.

Privileged elite.

Dubious mixture of traits.

Fathomlessly cynical.

Embodied a new, perhaps more worldly, but detached generation of Soviet figures.

Okay, so the day before this interview, Robert Kennedy is pushing fallout shelters.

The administration finalizes the decision on 1 ,000 ICBMs, a politically driven number, despite arms race worries.

Then Atsube arrives at Hyannis Port.

Quite a backdrop.

The ICBM decision was complex, balancing, deterrence, politics, arms race fears.

Then Atsube and Bolshakov show up at the Kennedy Cottage.

How did the interview itself go?

What ground did they cover?

Wide -ranging.

Atsube started by mentioning Kennedy's early good intentions.

Kennedy pushed back, saying communist expansion was the great threat.

Atsube complained about US interference, told Kennedy to admit the Cuba mistake.

Kennedy countered on Castro's lack of free elections.

Typical sparring.

What else?

Atsube boasted about Soviet progress.

Kennedy observed Atsube sounded more like a politician than a newspaperman.

Atsube retorted, every Soviet citizen is a politician.

Kennedy then steered it back to Germany.

The horrors of WWII, the Soviet suffering, his own family losses.

Stressed the war was over, they had to prevent another one.

Emphasizing shared responsibility again.

Said neither he nor Khrushchev caused the Berlin situation.

But they had to settle it peacefully for everyone's sake.

Improve living standards.

And Atsube later described that moment walking by the sea afterwards.

Kennedy sharing his jacket.

Reflecting on past leaders failing the current opportunity.

Yes, that poignant moment.

Kennedy lamenting past failures, feeling the weight of the present, the urgency to straighten out the world before it was too late.

A surprisingly personal eclipse.

It's also around this time we learn about Kennedy's secret taping system being installed, right?

In the Oval Office, Cabinet Room, even his bedroom phone.

That's right.

Ordered by Kennedy, installed by the Secret Services Protecting Research Unit, wanted discretion over the Army Signal Corps.

Expanded over time.

Tapes stored by Evelyn Lincoln.

Who knew?

Reportedly, only Lincoln and maybe Ken O'Donnell knew the full extent.

Kennedy joked to Dave Powers about watching his language.

Initial justification was recording U .S.

Soviet understandings, but it was used for hundreds of conversations on everything.

Motivations.

Protecting himself after Bay of Pigs.

Presidential memoirs.

Likely both.

Shielding against political attacks.

Creating a historical record.

But Beschloss also mentions troubling allegations of wiretapping journalists and others, like Robert Amory, Hanson Baldwin, even potentially RFK and Jackie.

It raises serious questions.

Definitely.

So after the Adube interview, what was the immediate reaction?

Kennedy told Salinger his arrogant Russian friend got in as many shots as I did.

Robert Kennedy disliked Adube, called him a tough communist.

Adube made some boastful quip to U .S.

reporters.

Izvestia published the full interview, a first for Soviet readers to see a U .S.

president's views at length.

How did Kennedy's staff see it?

Useful.

Mixed assessment.

Worthwhile for showing peaceful intent, maybe.

But also a propaganda win for Khrushchev.

Projecting openness.

Maybe fueled speculation.

Khrushchev was softening.

Did Kennedy follow up with Khrushchev directly?

Yes.

Another private letter.

Acknowledged the interview, congratulated Khrushchev on the party congress, wished him good health.

But the tone was more formal this time.

What did he say on substance?

Addressed Khrushchev's concerns about an aggressive West Germany.

Countered by highlighting international controls on its military, pointing out East Germany armed first.

Reminded Khrushchev of the Soviet walkout from the Berlin Commission, incorporating East Berlin.

Sticking to the main points on Berlin.

Yes.

Willing to negotiate access rights, but wouldn't renounce existing rights or hand them over to the East German regime.

He also suggested maybe the private letters weren't the best place for such complex issues.

Hoped for better news through other channels.

And Khrushchev's public response.

In that speech to trade unionists.

He alluded to Kennedy's letter.

Said the Soviets wanted genuine talks, but accused the West of just wanting to enhance the occupation regime in Berlin.

Still defiant.

And this is where he first publicly rebutted Gilpatrick's claims.

Yes.

First public pushback.

Reminded everyone of the 50 and 100 megaton bombs, the sort of Damocles over the imperialist aggressors.

Claimed strong ICBM capability.

Complained about Western war hysteria and arms race in response to Soviet Berlin proposals.

So the year ends on a tense note.

Thompson asks Khrushchev for a quiet Christmas.

Yes.

A lighthearted request.

Khrushchev gave a wry, non -committal reply.

Kennedy traveled South America, Bermuda with McMillan, then back to Palm Beach just as his father had a massive stroke.

A difficult end to a difficult year for Kennedy personally and politically.

Robert Kennedy recalled his brother finding 1961 a very mean year.

Felt kicked around by the Russians over Berlin.

Used dark humor to co -presidency would be fantastic, if not for the Russians.

Joked about a book on his first year.

Who would want to read a book about disasters?

Captures the pressure.

How does Beschloss analyze the end of the year?

Bundy's view.

Bundy argued Kennedy rightly avoided nuclear pushiness after the wall, despite U .S.

confidence.

Praised his calm handling of Checkpoint Charlie, his move towards negotiation.

But Bundy's praise didn't cover the Gilpatrick speech.

Beschloss sees that differently.

Right.

Beschloss views Gilpatrick's speech as a major deliberate break from Eisenhower's more cautious approach.

How did Eisenhower handle things differently, according to Beschloss?

Eisenhower muffled crises, avoided alarming the public, limited conventional buildup, and crucially, didn't directly challenge Khrushchev's nuclear boasts.

Whereas Kennedy,

different instincts.

Beschloss argues Kennedy felt a need to generate alarm for support, counter accusations of being soft may be believed, great crises make great men.

Dismissed warnings about conventional buildup was actually more worried about nuclear escalation than Ike.

Lesher Khrushchev believed his willingness to use nukes.

So the Gilpatrick speech aimed to undermine Khrushchev's standing, reassure allies, disabuse Khrushchev of the missile gap illusion.

Exactly.

Beschloss calls it the most detailed, provocative revelation of U .S.

strategic power ever made publicly up to that time.

But Beschloss concludes it wasn't worth the risk.

His conclusion is stark.

The reasons were understandable,

but not good enough.

He thinks it violated Kennedy's own rule not to corner an opponent.

Kennedy underestimated Khrushchev's reaction.

The humiliation, the potential fear of a first strike, the pressure to build up Soviet forces.

Beschloss argues the speech set forces in motion, compelling Khrushchev to seek a quick fix for the nuclear balance, essentially playing with fire.

A very critical assessment of that decision's consequences.

What about Khrushchev's Berlin crisis overall?

Did it achieve his aims?

Beschloss says largely no.

It didn't force Western submission.

Instead, it unified the West, sparked the U .S.

buildup, solidified West German commitment to NATO, and exposed the Soviet nuclear bluff.

Khrushchev's deadlines became like crying wolf.

Though Bundy noted more White House interest in compromise than was public, even hinting at big concessions.

Yes.

Bundy privately suggested potential concessions on the GDR, Oderneis, a non -aggression pact, showing internal flexibility.

But Beschloss ultimately thinks Khrushchev never really intended war over Berlin.

He concludes Khrushchev never risked it.

Points to precautions like moving troops before the wall, the mix of threats and reassurance, pulling tanks back at Checkpoint Charlie.

He recognized nuclear war over a German treaty was catastrophic.

Sergei Khrushchev and Berlatsky support that view.

Father was relaxed.

Just political games.

Yes.

Those close to Khrushchev saw it more as maneuvering than a prelude to war.

Both leaders exchanged hopeful New Year messages.

But Beschloss' final thought is crucial.

That Khrushchev, stung by Gilpatrick's speech, needed to do something dramatic soon.

To restore his prestige, bargain as an equal, and Cuba was beckoning.

Exactly.

The humiliation created pressure for a bold move in 1962, setting the stage for future, perhaps even more dangerous, crises.

Castro's pleas for help provided an opportunity.

Beschloss also includes a wealth of other contextual details, doesn't he?

Little things that add layers.

Oh, absolutely.

Things like the Eisenhower -Khrushchev letters be more frequent than thought.

Kennedy comparing Khrushchev to Hoffa and McCarthy.

The Stalin -Molotov -Gromikho dynamics.

Grubbiko's long career.

The reaction to Dealey's outburst.

Chau on -lay at the Soviet Congress.

RFK's sometimes tougher recollections.

Rusk on U -Thant.

Kennedy's letter to Diem.

The lucky lottery ticket comment.

Azzoube in Paris.

The ICBM debate specifics.

Assumptions about Kennedy's taping versus Nixon's.

RFK using tapes for his Missile Crisis book.

Alterations in his vestia.

Kennedy's possible Sword of Damocles reference echoing his own speech.

Thompson's Christmas.

Truman alumni in JFK's circle.

Kennedy liking Liddell Hart's advice.

All these details really enrich the picture.

They provide invaluable texture, highlighting the personal, political, and historical currents swirling around the main events.

A really complex tapestry.

So wrapping up this deep dive into a key chapter of Beschloss.

We've traced this incredibly complex web.

Personal interactions between Kennedy and Khrushchev in 61.

Dominated by Berlin.

Shattered by nuclear war.

We saw their secret correspondents playing out against public posturing.

Military moves.

Intense diplomacy.

And we really dug into Beschloss's analysis.

Especially his argument about the Gilpatrick speech.

How revealing U .S.

nuclear superiority, well, maybe logical on some levels,

deeply humiliated Khrushchev and dangerously raised the stakes for 1962.

It's a stark illustration of that perilous balance between communication and brinkmanship in the nuclear age.

The perception of the nuclear balance, how it shifted and was challenged in 61,

profoundly impacted everything.

Which really leads us to a final thought for you, our listeners.

Thinking about the huge risks taken, the outcomes we've discussed.

How effective do you think Kennedy's and Khrushchev's strategies actually were in managing this incredibly volatile time?

With hindsight, could a different approach have yielded a safer outcome?

It's a question historians still debate.

And it holds lessons, I think, for navigating international crises even today.

Especially in a world still dealing with nuclear realities.

Careful crisis management remains absolutely critical.

And with that challenging thought, we confirm we have now fully covered the requested chapter from Michael R.

Beschloss' definitive work, The Crisis Years, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 -1963.

Thanks for joining us for this deep dive.