Chapter 14: “Your President Has Made a Very Bad Mistake”

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As 1962 dawned, you had this really strange contrast, didn't you?

Moscow celebrating New Year's Khrushchev talking piece.

But underneath, yeah, there was this definite sense of unease.

Washington certainly picked up on it.

Something felt off.

It's fascinating how that public optimism clashed with the the whispers, the feeling that maybe Khrushchev wasn't quite as secure as he seemed.

Exactly.

Even his New Year's toast apparently lacked that usual Khrushchev spark, which for him was noticeable.

It really tells you how hard it was to read the Soviet system then.

Totally opaque.

And that feeling that something was wrong, it just grew in early January.

So today we're diving deep into a key chapter of Michael Beschloss's The Crisis Years.

It's the one titled Your President Has Made a Very Bad Mistake.

Right.

And our mission really is to unpack that complex mix of personalities, the anxieties, the political heat, and crucially, the miscalculations that shaped those first months of 62 for both Kennedy and Khrushchev.

Because looking back, you see, it wasn't smooth sailing diplomacy.

Beschloss does a great job using, well, historical analysis, diplomatic cables, contemporary reports.

To show just how fragile things were, you really get a sense of the immense pressure both leaders were facing.

It's a much more nuanced picture than you might think.

Okay, let's start with Khrushchev then.

The picture coming out of Moscow was, well, unstable seems like the word.

Definitely.

Beyond the official flu story, you had rumors flying serious illness, maybe even resignation.

His speech in Minsk didn't help.

He mentioned retirement age.

Yeah.

And the difficulty of being out of work.

It just fueled the fire.

And the rumors got pretty wild, didn't they?

Beschloss mentioned stories of him being punched, stabbed.

Even arson at his dacha.

Incredible stuff.

The fact that Soviet foreign ministry actually had to come out and deny it all, call them lies.

That tells you how seriously the West was taking these rumors.

It highlights that constant guessing just how stable was the Soviet leadership.

Washington was trying hard to figure it out.

Chip Bolin, the old Soviet hand, he urged caution, right?

Said Khrushchev wouldn't have left Moscow if he was really in trouble.

But John McConnie, the new CIA director, had a slightly different take.

He thought, okay, Khrushchev probably wasn't about to be ousted immediately, but he was constantly juggling internal politics.

His colleagues weren't Stalin era puppets.

They had their own clout, their own agendas.

And this internal pressure connects to the bigger picture, like the Sino -Soviet split.

Absolutely.

McConnie thought there was maybe a 50 -50 chance of a total break between Moscow and Beijing, which was huge.

And Ambassador Thompson's advice was crucial there, wasn't it?

Don't try to exploit the split.

Right.

Because it might just push Khrushchev back towards China.

It shows that delicate balancing act the U .S.

was performing.

It wasn't just a simple bipolar world anymore.

And you had figures like Jordi Bolshakov, this sort of back channel guy.

Yeah.

He admitted to Ben Bradley that things were seriously difficult with China, Albania.

His argument was interesting.

The West could live with Khrushchev, but his successor, maybe not so much.

Exactly.

So his solution, or his pitch, was progress on Berlin.

He argued that giving Khrushchev a win there would strengthen him against the hardliners, the firebrands back home who hated peaceful coexistence.

So using a foreign policy issue to shore up domestic standing, it shows how tangled those things were, even in the Soviet system.

Definitely.

And Khrushchev needed showing up domestically.

His big plans for agriculture, consumer goods, you know, communism by 1980.

They weren't going well.

Not at all.

The Virgin Land's harvest was the worst in five years.

People wanted better living standards, food, housing, cars, not just more rockets.

So there was a gap between his promises and the reality people were living.

His tough talk on Berlin hadn't delivered anything tangible either.

And fundamentally, his authority was being questioned internally.

It's that classic problem for authoritarian leaders, isn't it?

Keeping legitimacy when the promises don't pan out.

Plus the irony denouncing Stalin's cult of personality.

While building his own.

You had that documentary, R.

Nikita Sergeyevich, the fictionalized book about him as a minor.

Even the New York Times poked fun at a novel portraying him as a hero.

It shows that contradiction in his leadership.

Rejecting Stalinism, but using some of the same tools.

And internationally, things weren't great for him either.

The Sino -Soviet split shattered the image of a united communist front.

Albania defied Moscow.

And Cuba, the only real gain since he took power, wasn't exactly a Soviet master plan.

It just sort of happened.

Llewellyn Thompson's advice when he was back in Washington really summed it up, didn't it?

Wasn't it about whether Khrushchev was good for the U .S.?

No, it was pragmatic.

He was probably the most normal leader they could expect.

Even with his dangerous Berlin policies, any successor might be much harder to deal with, less predictable.

So a stable, difficult Khrushchev was maybe the best bet for maintaining some kind of coexistence, despite everything.

It was a complex calculation for the U .S.

Recognizing his flaws, but also the dangers of who might come next.

Okay, so let's flip over to Kennedy.

He had his own set of frustrations, right?

Especially concerning Dean Rusk, his Secretary of State.

Yeah, this part of Beschloss's account is really revealing.

Kennedy kept up appearances publicly, but privately.

He had some pretty sharp words for Rusk.

He did.

He complained to Theodore White that Rusk, well, he never gives me anything to chew on.

He wanted more intellectual sparring, I think.

He compared him unfavorably to Acheson, though acknowledging Acheson could be difficult.

Right.

He saw Rusk as calm, wise, thoughtful, but ultimately, and this is a killer line, an excellent secretary if you're not interested in foreign affairs, but I am.

Ouch.

It really highlights Kennedy's own hand -on approach to foreign policy.

He felt he was basically doing the job himself.

He even talked about Dick Goodwin's role at state.

His job was to needle them every minute.

That's not standard operating procedure, is it?

Shows Kennedy's impatience.

And this wasn't new, was it?

His doubts about Rusk went back to the Bay of Pigs.

Oh yeah.

He supposedly asked, how do you fire a secretary of state who does nothing good or bad?

He felt Rusk just presented options, never really pushed for one course.

He told Hilsman he was generally unhappy, but felt stuck.

It was a persistent issue.

And you have to imagine how that felt for Rusk.

Beschloss calls him a proud and sensitive man.

Even with his public loyalty, that kind of private presidential criticism must have stung.

It points to a real disconnect and expectations, maybe.

Well, Beschloss credits Rusk with strengths, expression, good congressional relations,

willingness to deliver bad news.

But Kennedy wanted something else.

Informality, originality, aggression, the kind of energy he saw in Bundy or McNamara.

Exactly.

And it wasn't just JFK.

Robert Kennedy was also very critical.

He felt Rusk didn't follow up, didn't initiate ideas, that everything came from the White House.

Pretty much.

RFK saw Rusk as defending the State Department bureaucracy, not being a true Kennedy man pushing the president's agenda.

Which led to friction,

obviously.

Overappointments, even over how U .S.

companies should operate abroad, which was kind of the Attorney General overstepping, wasn't it?

You could say that.

Arthur Schlesinger's notes really captured that negative view from RFK's circle.

Things like constant fear of inadequacy, colorlessness of mind.

It's harsh.

It paints a picture of Rusk being out of sync with the New Frontier vibe.

And Kennedy seemed to, well, almost encourage the criticism, didn't he?

He talked to O'Donnell about needing someone with more pep.

But he didn't fire him.

O'Donnell's question about getting another Atchison

maybe gave him pause.

Someone who might actively fight him.

Could be.

So publicly, Kennedy would praise Rusk.

Tremendous operations, man.

Even good errand boy.

But then he'd bypass State for the big stuff.

Relying on RFK, McNamara, Bundy, setting up task forces.

And Rusk knew it.

He worried about the informal way things were done in the West Wing.

Meetings without state reps.

White House staff meddling.

His comment about people with no responsibility really shows his frustration.

That kind of internal tension, it must have affected policy coherence, you'd think.

It certainly couldn't have helped.

Okay, let's shift again.

Let's look at the early U .S.-Soviet interactions and, well,

the misunderstandings that cropped up.

Right.

Starting with Thompson's replacement in Moscow.

The Soviets were very specific about what they wanted.

They were.

Bolshakov made it clear.

No boring diplomats.

They wanted a prominent political new frontier type.

Someone obviously close to Kennedy.

They kept mentioning Robert Kennedy.

They did.

To Bradley, to Wintel.

They really admired RFK.

It shows how much Khrushchev personally invested in that ambassadorial link.

He thought a big name would boost his prestige.

It shows how personalized diplomacy was at the top level back then.

Absolutely.

And they were pushing for other connections too.

Bolshakov talked to Salinger about Kennedy -Khrushchev TV exchanges.

And floated Robert Kennedy visiting Moscow.

Maybe with Khrushchev's son -in -law, Ed Subay, who's coming to Washington.

Right, trying to build those direct channels.

But Kennedy played it cautiously.

He invited the Ed Subays for lunch, but said no to RFK's Moscow trip.

Yeah, wary of the press, misinterpretations, probably pushed back from state.

It shows the tightrope he was walking.

And then the Ed Subay lunch invitation leaked to the Times.

And Bolshakov's reaction when RFK couldn't make the Moscow trip, calling it a direct affront to the Soviet Union?

Quite dramatic.

It really shows how much Khrushchev had pinned his hopes on that visit.

A definite diplomatic stumble early on.

The lunch itself, though, had some interesting moments.

Ed Subay asking point blank about a US invasion of Cuba.

And Kennedy denying it.

That foreshadows so much, doesn't it?

It does.

And little Caroline Kennedy showing off the Russian doll Khrushchev gave her, right next to a crucifix, a powerful, if accidental, symbol of the divide.

But maybe the most significant fallout from that visit was Castro's interpretation.

Ah, yes.

Castro later said Ed Subay reported Kennedy basically warned the Soviets off Cuba, said more Soviet influence was intolerable, and mentioned the US staying out of Hungary in 1956.

And Castro took that to mean Kennedy was telling the Soviets,

don't interfere when we invade Cuba.

He actually said that report started everything leading up to the missile crisis.

It's incredible how a comment, maybe misinterpreted, could have such huge consequences.

A chilling example of miscommunication.

Yeah.

Okay, let's move to disarmament efforts.

Another area full of tension.

Well, you had Macmillan, the British PM, pushing for a joint effort with Kennedy and Khrushchev on arms control.

Seemed promising initially.

But Kennedy was skeptical from the start.

Deeply skeptical.

The Soviets were still testing nuclear weapons.

He was worried about the balance of power shifting, especially with Soviet work on anti -missile systems.

He felt the US couldn't just stop testing unilaterally.

Exactly.

He made it clear.

The US would start its own tests unless there was real progress on Berlin or disarmament.

It really shows that action -reaction cycle of the arms race.

Still, the exchange letters, Kennedy, Macmillan, Khrushchev.

Khrushchev proposed a big summit in Geneva.

But Kennedy wanted to start slower,

with foreign ministers first.

A different approach.

And Khrushchev didn't like that.

His response was pretty sharp, wasn't it?

Yeah.

Quite chagrined, as Beschloss puts it.

Accused the US and UK of just using disarmament as a gesture to hide their plans to resume testing.

And that grim analogy about Hemingway cleaning his shotgun.

A stark reminder of the dangers they were all dealing with really highlights the deep mistrust.

Kennedy tried one last time through Rusk, linking disarmament and a test ban to progress on Berlin.

But then he went on TV and announced the US would resume testing in April if there was no test ban treaty.

That really upped the ante.

Though he privately told Bradley he won't call it off if Berlin talks improved, or Soviet tests weren't impressive.

Right, suggesting some flexibility behind the scenes.

But the public announcement was out there.

And the Soviet reaction was quick.

Bolshakov told Salinger they were canceling the TV exchanges.

Directly blaming Kennedy's testing decision.

Salinger was furious.

It shows how easily one issue could derail progress elsewhere.

Kennedy was angry, too, initially.

But Thompson advised a milder joint announcement of a postponement?

Yes.

Which helped cool things down slightly.

But the damage was done.

Interestingly, Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy, while publicly harsh, had a personal touch.

It did.

He said the government had to speak harshly, but he still liked Kennedy personally, and the TV exchange would happen eventually.

It shows that weird mix of animosity and maybe grudging respect.

But Khrushchev took a hit domestically around then, didn't he?

The Central Committee blocked his plan to shift money from defense to agriculture.

Big time.

It forced unpopular price hikes on food and goods, led to public discontent, even some nostalgia for Stalin's time, supposedly.

It weakened Khrushchev politically.

So while they're dealing with these huge global issues, both leaders are also fighting battles on their home fronts.

That definitely affects their decision -making.

Okay, Berlin.

That stalemate just dragged on, didn't it?

It really did.

Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister, just kept repeating the same hard line to Thompson.

No international control of the autobahn, Soviet troops, and West Berlin.

Totally unacceptable for the West.

Rusk was just hoping talks could keep the status quo, even without progress.

Seems that way.

Just keep talking to

There were some minor flare -ups, like harassing planes going to Berlin.

Yeah, but a quiet U .S.

complaint stopped that.

The fundamental problem remained, though.

Kennedy wrote to Khrushchev in March, trying again, complaining about the harassment, saying their interests didn't have to clash over Berlin.

But Khrushchev's reply was dismissive.

That two goats on a narrow bridge analogy.

No real opening.

He offered to discuss an

commission.

But only if the West pulled troops out, made West Berlin a demilitarized city, and recognized East Germany.

Exactly.

Total non -starters for Kennedy and the Allies.

They weren't going to concede West Berlin or formally accept Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe.

So Thompson's assessment was basically, things are maybe less dangerous than before, but surprises are always possible.

Pretty much.

A cautious view, reflecting the ongoing tension and unpredictability.

Amidst all that, though, Kennedy made that interesting proposal about space cooperation.

Yeah.

Right after John Glenn's flight.

Joint tracking stations, weather satellites, communications, even joint missions to the moon or Mars, eventually.

Sounded ambitious.

The idea was to share the huge costs and risks, right?

That was a pragmatic argument.

But Khrushchev only agreed to medium -level talks.

It resulted in very limited cooperation, some weather data exchange, a minor comms test.

And he explicitly linked bigger space cooperation to progress on disarmament.

He did.

Showing how interconnected everything was in his mind.

Even space couldn't bridge the Cold War divide.

Seems like it.

Okay, let's touch on some of the domestic stuff and other diplomatic moves happening in the U .S.

around this time.

Right.

Beschloss includes some lighter moments, which is nice.

Jackie Kennedy worrying about her horse Sardar during her trip.

And the president sending that funny reassuring cable humanizes them a bit.

Then there's the more serious stuff, Hoover telling Kennedy about Judith Campbell and her connection to Giancana, though that relationship apparently ended soon after.

And Kennedy's California trip visiting the nuclear labs, Vandenberg,

that exchange with General Power about the Minuteman missiles.

A reminder of the constant military focus.

But also moments of levity, like Kennedy riding a toy car at the Lawfords, tweaking his brother Teddy's campaign poster.

Visiting Eisenhower and Marilyn Monroe in Palm Springs.

Quite a mix of encounters.

Diplomatically, the big news was Anatoly Dobrynin arriving as the new Soviet ambassador.

Khrushchev recommended him personally.

And the previous ambassador, Menshikov, was moved somewhere less important.

Exactly.

Signal to shift.

Thompson saw Dobrynin as part of a new generation, someone who might relate better to Kennedy's team.

Bolshakov was initially keen to work with him.

Yes, but Dobrynin apparently wasn't so keen on Bolshakov.

He wanted to be the channel between the leaders.

Shows the internal rivalries, even on their side.

Interesting.

OK, back to the big strategic picture.

The resumption of nuclear testing.

After Rusk got nowhere with Gromyko on a test ban, Gromyko insisting on zero inspections, Kennedy felt he had to move forward.

General Clay resigning from Berlin around then maybe signaled a slight easing of tension there, freeing Kennedy up.

Perhaps.

A cautious optimism on Berlin, maybe?

So the first U .S.

atmospheric tests since 1958 happened over Christmas Island on April 25th.

The start of Operation Dominic.

A big series of tests.

Yeah, about 40 tests over six months.

Less total yield than recent Soviet tests, but a clear signal of U .S.

resolve.

Life magazine's description of the blast sounds incredible.

Terrifying.

And the Soviets were watching closely.

Sakharov mentioned their intelligence efforts to figure out what the U .S.

was testing.

Right.

And remember, back in February, McNamara had briefed the Senate privately on U .S.

nuclear superiority.

The SAC bombers on alert, hardened ICBMs, the Polaris subs.

Exactly.

That info wasn't public then, but the intention was definitely for it to filter through to allies and especially to Khrushchev.

To impress upon him U .S.

strength, deter any rash moves on Berlin, and negotiate from strength.

That was the logic.

The administration believed they'd already convinced Khrushchev that Kennedy would use over Berlin if necessary.

So giving him the hard facts about the consequences was meant to reinforce that deterrent.

It's that chilling logic of nuclear deterrence again.

It is.

Kennedy usually let McNamara make the public statements about U .S.

superiority, trying not to sound too alarming.

But then came that interview with Stewart Alsop in March 62.

Where Kennedy himself raised the possibility of a U .S.

first strike.

Under extreme circumstances, like an attack on Western Europe.

Yes.

A significant shift in his public rhetoric.

Alsop's article in the Saturday Evening Post then reported, Kennedy had quietly discarded the no first use idea, might have to take the initiative.

And that quote somehow got past the usual White House checks.

Apparently.

Its impact was huge, especially in Moscow.

The Kremlin reacted strongly.

Military alert, Pravda accusing Kennedy of claiming a right to strike first.

Exactly.

That statement, on top of earlier boasts of U .S.

superiority, must have made Khrushchev wonder.

Was the Pentagon pushing for a first strike, especially while the U .S.

had nuclear dominance?

Though Khrushchev probably didn't think Kennedy was actually planning an unprovoked attack.

Likely not.

But Kennedy's public posturing, even if maybe aimed elsewhere,

badly hurt Khrushchev politically.

It exposed Soviet weakness and showed his previous efforts weren't enough.

This really sets the stage for Cuba.

A really critical moment.

And speaking of signals, let's look at Salinger's meeting with Khrushchev in May 62.

That seemed quite eventful.

Oh it was.

Salinger gets to Moscow and suddenly gets invited to Khrushchev's Dasha for several days.

Very unusual.

Beschloss describes it vividly.

The chilly boat trip, skeet shooting, the long walk in the woods.

Khrushchev talking farming.

Stolen.

Typical folksy Khrushchev trying to build rapport.

He touched briefly on Adenauer and Berlin, but didn't commit to much.

But then the mood shifted dramatically.

After dessert.

That's the Dr.

Jekyll turning to Mr.

Hyde moment Beschloss describes.

Khrushchev lit into Salinger about Kennedy's first strike comments.

Said the president made a very bad mistake.

He even sarcastically asked if Alsop was the new secretary of state.

He did.

Shows how deeply those remarks had registered and angered him.

And he wouldn't accept Salinger's attempts to clarify U .S.

policy.

Just took Kennedy's words literally.

Exactly.

And then threatened that if the Soviets signed a German peace treaty, they would adopt a first -use policy to defend East Germany.

A direct nuclear threat.

Wow.

But then he also shared that state secret about the Berlin Pank standoff.

Claiming he ordered the Soviet tanks back first.

Yeah.

A surprising bit of seeming candor.

And took credit again for ordering the wall built.

Gives you a glimpse into his self -perception.

Later, in a more private chat, he returned to the nuclear issue.

Still concerned.

But also called Kennedy a big statesman.

Said he wanted friendship.

Albeit between rival systems.

That mix again confrontation and a strange sort of personal connection.

His comment about West Berlin being like a dog needs five legs.

It's pretty dismissive.

And his warning that the key was now in Kennedy's hands because of the first strike talk.

It underlines the mistrust.

But what's really striking is what they didn't talk much about.

Cuba.

Almost total silence on Cuba.

Which is amazing given what we now know is brewing.

Definitely ominous.

Okay, let's focus on Cuba then.

The U .S.

perspective in Spring 62 was getting increasingly worried, wasn't it?

Very much so.

The CIA saw Castro consolidating power, getting more Soviet arms, becoming more anti -American.

The assessment was not encouraging.

And he was actively exporting revolution to Latin America.

Which really alarmed Washington.

His defiant speech on the anniversary of the Bay of Pigs defeat just rubbed salt in the wound.

But internally, Cuba had problems.

Bad economy.

Some guerrilla activity.

Castro suspicious of old -line communists.

Yes, it wasn't all smooth sailing for him.

But crucially, Cuban intelligence was convinced the U .S.

was planning another invasion.

Using all possible means.

A perception fueled by earlier U .S.

rhetoric.

Like Alan Dulles calling Castro a menace who had to be removed.

That kind of talk definitely contributed.

For Kennedy, Castro was deeply personal.

A symbol of Soviet encroachment.

A reminder of the Bay of Pigs failure.

Beschloss notes Kennedy's emotional reaction to Castro.

McNamara even mentioned hysteria in some parts of the administration.

And Robert Kennedy was famously hawkish, demanding the terrors of the earth against Castro.

So the U .S.

pursued that two -track strategy.

Diplomatic isolation via the OAS and the embargo.

And covert action.

Operation Mongoose.

Which was huge.

Led by Lansdale, but really driven by RFK.

Sabotage, raids, propaganda, spying.

A massive effort based out of the JMWave station in Miami.

Aimed at overthrowing Castro by October 62.

Robert Kennedy was intensely involved, pushing the CIA hard.

Though the CIA itself was skeptical that Mongoose alone could spark a revolution.

Because Castro's internal security was too strong.

They were.

But they kept trying other things too.

Including assassination plots.

Like the poison pills.

Still ongoing.

So Castro sees all this, the OAS expulsion, the embargo tightening, Mongoose, U .S.

military exercises nearby.

And he naturally concludes an invasion isn't just possible, it's imminent.

He starts pleading with the Soviets for more help, more defense.

Khrushchev, meanwhile, still had this sort of romantic view of Cuba, didn't he?

Despite maybe being annoyed by Castro's demands and erratic behavior.

Yes.

He saw Cuba as ideologically important.

So he agreed to ramp up economic aid.

And importantly, replaced the Soviet ambassador with someone Castro preferred.

And both Castro and Khrushchev had reasons to play up the invasion threat.

It seems so.

For Castro, it got him more Soviet backing.

For Khrushchev, it maybe helped cement Soviet influence in Cuba.

But it led them both to that fatally incorrect conclusion.

That Kennedy was about to launch a massive invasion.

When, according to Beschloss and McNamara later, Kennedy had no such intention.

Worried about a Soviet reaction in Berlin, didn't want another Hungary.

Exactly.

McNamara was unequivocal later.

No plan to invade Cuba then.

So the critical failure was the Kennedy administration not realizing how their actions looked from Havana and Moscow.

That seems to be Beschloss's point.

McNamara admitted if he'd been in their shoes, he might have thought the same thing.

A huge failure of perspective taking.

And Kennedy's own public statements didn't exactly help clarify things, did they?

Bundy called it his public balancing act.

Right.

Crucially, after the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy never repeated his pre -invasion promise that U .S.

forces wouldn't intervene.

His warnings about communist penetration, defending Guantanamo.

They could easily sound like he was leaving the door open for intervention, even if that wasn't the private calculation.

He privately warned Congress about the risk of Soviet retaliation in Berlin if the U .S.

moved on Cuba.

But publicly, he kept things ambiguous.

Why?

Beschloss suggests it was partly strategic deterrence, partly managing domestic politics.

Polls showed opposition to invasion, but bad ratings on his Cuba policy.

A tricky spot for him.

But that ambiguity fed the fears in Moscow and Havana.

Which brings us right to Khrushchev's incredible gamble, believing a U .S.

invasion was coming.

Almost certainly.

And losing Cuba would have been a huge blow to Soviet prestige in Eastern Europe versus China with non -aligned nations.

Plus, Kennedy had exposed Soviet nuclear inferiority, which hit Khrushchev personally, contradicting his whole philosophy linking power and missiles.

And the failure to make progress on Berlin just added to the pressure.

His rivals in the Kremlin, the Chinese, they were all exploiting his frustrations.

Khrushchev had a history of bold gambles, trusting his own nerve.

So facing all this, his instinct was to go even bolder.

Secret missiles in Cuba.

With multiple aims, right.

Protect Castro, yes, but also.

Fix the missile gap on the cheap.

Gain leverage on Berlin.

Impress his critics.

Maybe even force U .S.

bases out of places like Turkey, eventually.

A complex mix.

His talks with Malinowski about the U .S.

missiles in Turkey, his complaints about bases ringing the USSR,

resentment was clearly there.

And his talks with McCoy on about the invasion being inevitable, blaming Kennedy's weakness and CIA pressure.

It all points towards this desperate solution.

The plan.

Sneak the missiles in, announce them after the U .S.

elections in November, but based on flawed assumptions.

Deeply flawed.

Underestimating U .S.

surveillance, thinking Kennedy would wait past the election, assuming Kennedy would just accept it like the Turkish missiles.

Bischloss even suggests Khrushchev might have thought Kennedy would secretly welcome the missiles as a way to stabilize Cuba.

It's possible.

And he thought framing it as purely defensive would win global support,

massively underestimating the impact of the secrecy and deception.

He saw trickery as normal politics, maybe based on Kennedy's past reactions or lack thereof.

McCoy, though, saw the danger, predicted the U .S.

would find out, Castro would object.

But Khrushchev pushed ahead, emphasizing the defense of Cuba publicly and to colleagues.

While the strategic balance was almost certainly a major, if perhaps less spoken, motivation, he was sensitive about Soviet inferiority.

He probably framed it internally as a noble Soviet act defending socialism, helping Cuba, and planned to send troops to guard the sites, too.

He later said the idea came to him in Bulgaria in May 62.

Fear of invasion, plus the idea of deterrence.

He also admitted wanting to equalize the balance of power.

His speeches in Bulgaria hinted at this thinking.

Then he told Gromyko on the plane back to Moscow.

Gromyko was immediately worried about the U .S.

reaction, the political explosion, but relieved.

Khrushchev insisted he didn't want nuclear war.

Khrushchev kept the circle incredibly small to maintain secrecy,

met with his inner group, stressed the thread, the need for action.

Discussed how long an invasion might take, reinforcing the need for a deterrent before it could happen.

Malinovsky, the defense minister, must have had reservations about the cost and risk.

Probably, but Gromyko recalled him giving full support.

Khrushchev just kept repeating his points, postponing detailed discussion, assuring everyone he wouldn't risk war.

Then the next step, send Marshal Berezov to Cuba with a secret letter to Castro.

To see if secret deployment was feasible and sound Castro out.

And the new ambassador, Alexeyev, was brought in.

He actually advised against it.

Thought Castro wouldn't go for it.

Initially, yes.

He thought Castro was focused on internal defense, worried about world opinion.

But the delegation went anyway.

Rashidov, Berezov, Alexeyev, met Fidel and Raul.

Castro was thoughtful at first, consulted his team, then agreed.

Driven by solidarity with the socialist camp, wanting to change the balance of power.

Alexeyev was surprised he agreed so readily.

Castro felt conventional weapons weren't enough.

They had to share the risks the Soviets were taking.

Though Castro later complained, Khrushchev hadn't told him how big the missile gap really was.

So the delegation reported back.

Castro's on board.

Secrecy seems possible.

Khrushchev greenlights it, playing the reveal for November 6th, after the U .S.

elections.

Castro symbolically went back to the Sierra Maestra, emboldened.

Khrushchev dismissed McCoyan's warnings, the secrecy preventing wider advice.

What did Khrushchev expect Kennedy's reaction to be?

Pretend ignorance till after the election.

A slow NATO response.

Deterrence via the Berlin threat.

Possibly all of the above.

And he genuinely seemed to think he had the right to put missiles there, just like the U .S.

did in Turkey or Italy.

Gromyko recalled Dulles justifying U .S.

bases the same way.

Maybe he thought Kennedy would react like he did to the Berlin Wall protest, but ultimately accepted to avoid war.

That seems plausible.

He also recalled Senator Fulbright seeming okay with the Berlin border closure.

Maybe thinking Fulbright represented Kennedy's view on Cuba, too.

A misreading, perhaps.

And crucially, the U .S.

hadn't issued a clear formal warning against offensive missiles in Cuba as late as May 62.

A potentially huge missed signal.

So Beschloss concludes, Khrushchev felt some relief having devised this plan, but was still angry at the U .S.

for exposing Soviet weakness and hinting at first strike.

That final quote from his memoirs is, chilling wanting to give America a little of their own medicine because they had never suffered war at home.

It really captures the emotion and resentment driving him.

Okay, as we wrap up, let's quickly cover some of those end notes Beschloss provides for extra context.

Right.

Things like speculation on the Lunita story source.

Goodwin moving to state.

Kennedy eventually calling Rusk Dean.

Which Mrs.

Kennedy thought was very significant.

Also, Rusk's consistent framing of his professional distance from JFK and the bad blood between Rusk and Schlesinger Jr.

The poorly kept records in the Kennedy White House.

Kazin becoming Bundy's deputy.

The potential confusion in Castro's memory between Azzu Bay and Vienna.

Kennedy not wanting to use the Nevada test site.

The U .S.

not canceling the April tests as a goodwill gesture.

More on Jackie's horse.

Minshikov's positive farewell note about Kennedy despite everything.

Khrushchev endorsing Dobrynin as a confidential channel.

The British scientist worries about high altitude tests affecting the Van Allen belts, which turned out to be right.

Rumors of Soviet decoys.

The cables reassuring Adenauer during Salinger's Moscow trip.

Eisenhower's reaction to Castro embracing the Kremlin.

The sheer number of Kennedy -era covert ops.

Thompson sensing Soviet unease about Cuba going full Marxist.

Gromyko still disbelieving McNamara in 1989 about no invasion plan.

Kennedy denying invasion plans to Azzu Bay privately.

The parallel some drew between Cuba and Vietnam may be delaying action until after re -election.

The huge cost of the missile operation suggesting it was more than just a bargaining chip.

Mikoyan's son criticizing Biryuzov's intelligence.

The CIA cost estimate.

The crucial Soviet orders.

Use missiles only in response to attack.

Only with Moscow's command.

And finally, Arbatov criticizing the closed Soviet decision -making.

Okay.

So summarizing this whole period, early 62,

Khrushchev under immense pressure.

Kennedy managing his team critically.

Tensions soaring over Cuba and Berlin, leading to Khrushchev's massive gamble with the missiles.

And the thread running through it all, as Bushlaw shows so well, is misperception,

miscalculation, and the unpredictable role of the leader's own personalities and relationship.

It really makes you think, doesn't it?

How might things have gone differently if Kennedy and Khrushchev had managed, somehow, to build more trust or communicate more clearly?

What if they'd truly understood the pressures the other was under?

Or perhaps, what lessons does this period hold for today about the catastrophic danger of misreading an adversary's intentions, especially when nuclear weapons are in the mix?

That's something definitely worth pondering.

And that concludes our deep dive into this absolutely critical chapter from the crisis years.

We've covered Beschloss's analysis, the key events, the strategies, the crises, the context, the implications, the whole chapter.

We hope this has given you a richer understanding of this pivotal moment that set the stage for the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War.

Until next time, keep diving deep.