Chapter 15: No One Will Be Able Even to Run

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Okay, let's dive in.

Have you ever thought about the strange dance between global powers?

Picture this.

The king of swing, Benny Goodman, playing jazz in Moscow while completely unseen, the world was quietly inching towards nuclear confrontation.

It's quite a contrast, isn't it?

That fascinating tense mix of, you know, cultural exchange and simmering danger.

That's the world we're stepping into today.

We're taking a deep dive into a specific piece of source material you've shared with us.

Chapter 15 from Michael Beschloss's sightful book, The Crisis Years, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 -1963.

That's right.

The chapter is titled, No One Will Be Able Even to Run.

And it covers a really critical, arguably overlooked period in mid -1962.

Exactly.

This wasn't, you know, the full blown crisis moment yet, but it was the time when Kennedy and Khrushchev were juggling so much these lingering issues like Laos and Berlin, the pressure of nuclear testing talks.

Oh, while their own personal dynamics and, well, domestic pressures back home were constantly influencing their decision.

Absolutely.

The seeds of something much, much bigger were definitely being sown in secret.

So our mission today, pulling from the notes and articles you've given us, is really to unpack this chapter.

We want to identify the most important events, the key players involved, understand their strategies.

And crucially, look at the signals that were being sent and maybe more importantly, the signals that were missed, leading right up to that pivotal moment the chapter builds towards.

Yeah, it's essentially a story of high stakes poker where miscalculation could be just catastrophic.

Couldn't agree more.

And speaking of strange mixes, let's start with that image I mentioned.

According to the source, late May 62,

Khrushchev actually attended a Benny Goodman concert in Moscow.

Can you even imagine that scene?

It's quite the mental picture, yeah.

He went with the U .S.

Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson and his wife, Jane.

And the source tells us Khrushchev initially dismissed jazz as, well, decadent.

Right.

He apparently said, I just came to drink beer.

I don't understand this music.

But then when the vocalist Joya Sherrell came out, something shifted.

The source says Khrushchev was so taken by her, he actually led the chairing.

But he still left at intermission.

He told Jane Thompson it was a little too much.

But then came that surprising permission.

No matter.

Let them enjoy it.

Although, you know, his son -in -law later remembered Khrushchev still privately thought jazz was an invention of uncultured people.

So public concession, maybe, but not a private conversion.

It seems like it.

But what's really interesting is how this small moment kind of rippled outwards.

The source notes that jazz just mushroomed all over the city after that concert.

Yeah, it felt like a wonderful finale for the Thompsons, right?

Their time in Moscow was ending.

Exactly.

And Kennedy saw this as potentially a diplomatic signal.

He wrote Khrushchev, didn't he?

Expressing appreciation for attending the concert, for the hospitality to Pierre Salinger, his press secretary.

He saw it as, in part, a friendly gesture toward him personally.

It just highlights how these tiny, almost personal moments were scrutinized for meaning within that larger, really tense diplomatic environment.

Especially with Rusk and Dubrinin trying to keep those Berlin talks going.

And Kennedy publicly saying he had confidence in Dubrinin.

Yeah, it's a reminder that even at the height of the Cold War, personal interactions, however brief, could be seen as these significant cues.

Definitely.

Okay, now let's shift gears dramatically because that brief moment of cultural thaw was, well, quickly overshadowed.

The source highlights a renewed crisis in Laos heating up again in the spring of 62.

Yes, the communist pathetic Laos resumed their offensive despite these ongoing negotiations for a neutral government.

Dean Rusk's private assessment, according to the source, was that the Chinese were messing things up in the background.

And Kennedy had warned Ed Zubei about Southeast Asia before, hadn't he, back in January?

He had.

Warned him that if communists kept pushing there, things would get more difficult.

But here's a fascinating layer of complexity, the source reveals.

Kennedy had privately decided to disengage from Laos because of the risks, the logistical problems.

Yet publicly, he denied this completely.

To maintain leverage in the Geneva negotiations,

Sorensen's quote later really captured it.

Kennedy combined bluff with real determination.

That's quite the balancing act.

And the rhetoric, it just ratcheted up quickly.

In a Saturday evening post -interview, Kennedy issued this public threat, hinting, you know, at the potential use of nuclear weapons if the US felt pushed too hard to intervene in Laos.

Wow.

So by early May, the situation worsened.

It did.

The path to Laos broke the ceasefire, driving towards Thailand.

The diplomatic exchanges became much more urgent.

Rusk asked Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister, to use his influence to rein in the path to Laos.

And George Ball, he challenged Dobrynin directly, right, on Khrushchev's Vienna pledge about Laos.

Yeah.

Demanding the Soviets control their allies, Safonovong.

Dobrynin, of course, fired back, demanding the U .S.

control their side, the Baun -Um -Nosevin clique.

It was very back and forth.

So Kennedy considered a show of force, sending the Seventh Fleet.

He did.

But even within the military, there was caution.

General Decker made this comment, the source describes as verging on insulin, worrying they'd look silly again after backing down in Laos before.

And then you had Eisenhower weighing in publicly?

Yeah.

Telling reporters us was the way we lost China, which was politically damaging for Kennedy.

Kennedy had to ask CIA Director McHoney to get him back onto the track.

Did Eisenhower come around?

Eventually, yeah.

He agreed to support a limited response, suggesting reinforcing Falmy's forces near the 17th parallel.

So the show of force went ahead.

It did.

Seventh Fleet dispatched May 12th.

U .S., U .K., Australian, New Zealand troops moved into Thailand after Thailand was, well, quietly persuaded to request aid.

How did the Soviets react to that military move?

Was it loud?

That's what's interesting, according to the source.

Ambassador Thompson cabled back that it was highly significant that Khrushchev didn't publicly complain about the troop movements.

Really?

Why would that be?

Thompson speculated, you know, maybe the Soviets were almost encouraging us to show the path at Laos were dangerous, or perhaps suggesting the path at Laos were out of control, maybe egged on by the Chinese.

So a complex signal, potentially.

Very.

Thompson's advice was for the U .S.

to assure the Soviets they'd also put the bite on Falmy, basically pressure their own allies, too.

Even without a public complaint, though, Khrushchev wasn't happy privately.

No, he told a Western diplomat Kennedy was playing a reckless game,

and Robert Kennedy, he bypassed Rusk's drafted letter, sent a message via Bolshakov saying the president felt double -crossed over Laos.

So how did it get resolved, then?

The resolution came through Bolshakov, who delivered a personal message from Khrushchev.

No more armed action, it would be resolved peacefully.

Robert Kennedy was reportedly pleased.

And the U .S.

agreed to work with Suvarno Foma, the neutralist leader.

If the Soviets worked with their side, yes.

This led to a coalition government finally forming on June 12th.

So on the surface, it looked like a win, a diplomatic success.

It looked like it.

Khrushchev cabled Kennedy, seeing it as a turning point, confirmation of their Vienna understanding.

Kennedy agreed.

And there was a formal agreement later.

About six weeks later in Geneva, the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos.

Bolshakov reported Khrushchev was very pleased, but still unhappy about Western troops in Thailand, hoping they'd withdraw.

Did they?

Robert Kennedy assured him the pullout would start in 10 days, which apparently meant a great deal to Khrushchev.

But as the source points out, this wasn't the end of the story.

The settlement didn't hold, did it?

Not at all.

The Pathet Lao withdrew from the coalition.

The North Vietnamese kept using the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos to support the insurgency in South Vietnam.

And Kennedy's response?

He stepped up CIA covert action.

So this whole Lao Chin episode, it really serves as a stark example highlighted in the chapter of just how difficult it was to get stable settlements in these proxy conflicts.

Too many players, too many agendas.

A messy situation, for sure.

Now, completely separate from Laos and Berlin, this highly secret development was unfolding.

The source reveals that in early July, Raul Castro and Major Aragonese traveled to Moscow.

A crucial mission.

Yes, and they were successful.

They persuaded Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Malinovsky, the absolute top tier to bring nuclear missiles to Cuba.

And this wasn't just a handshake deal.

It was formalized within a secret Soviet -Cuban military accord.

Can you tell us about the pact itself?

The source mentions details.

It was quite specific.

Trafficked by Raul Castro and Marshal Malinovsky.

Included clauses about the Soviet Air Force respecting Cuban sovereignty, a five -year term, one year's notice for termination.

And crucially, that Soviet installations would become Cuban property if terminated.

Exactly.

But there was a really significant point of disagreement, according to the source.

The Cubans, they wanted a public announcement of the pact, the missiles, everything.

They felt it was in both countries' rights.

But Khrushchev refused.

Absolutely refused.

Aragonese recalled Khrushchev wanted to buy time.

He genuinely seemed to believe the missile deployment would be discovered by the U .S.

Which seems incredibly optimistic looking back.

Doesn't it?

The Cubans were much more realistic.

They insisted on the immense risk.

If the missiles were found before they were combat ready, they fully expected a preemptive U .S.

attack.

What was Khrushchev's reply to that?

He basically said he'd still defend them.

And he'd send a letter to Kennedy.

That was his answer.

So what was the final agreement on announcing it?

They agreed the pact took effect immediately upon initialing.

But the public signing an announcement.

That was planned for Khrushchev's intended triumphant visit to Cuba in November.

Importantly, after the missiles were installed and operational, Castro even drafted his own preface for that future moment.

So right from the very beginning of this missile plan, the source shows us these layers of secrecy, this fundamental disagreement over transparency, and the immense acknowledged risk involved.

It absolutely sets the stage for the deception that would follow.

It's baked in from the start.

Let's just pause the tension for a tiny moment here.

Another small human detail from the source.

July 4th.

Khrushchev is at Spasso House, the U .S.

ambassador's residence in Moscow, for the Independence Day party.

Right.

And he's toasting Kennedy, even reportedly joking with Benny Goodman again, saying, I don't like Goodman music.

I just like good music.

Classic Khrushchev, maybe.

It's such a striking contrast, isn't it?

Because the very next day, July 5th, he writes Kennedy a letter demanding a solution to Berlin.

It wasn't out of the blue, either.

Bolshakov had already warned Robert Kennedy back in June that Berlin was making relations more difficult, creating a situation full of dangerous collision.

Bolshakov had relayed RFK's message that U .S.

leaders were realists on Berlin, but also warned that if the West didn't act, the crisis would just reignite.

And the tension wasn't just letters.

July 17th, there's that incident with plane buzzing in the Berlin air corridor.

Kennedy complained to Dobrynin about it.

So when Khrushchev sent his latest offer for Berlin,

basically, allied troops out, how did Kennedy react?

Complete rejection.

Yeah.

The source describes Kennedy seeing it as getting the U .S.

out without so much as a fig leaf of concealment.

He called it a major retreat, something that would make Europe lose confidence, a major Soviet victory.

Unacceptable.

And Dobrynin pushed back.

He did, quite pointedly.

Asked if Kennedy's position was related to German interests or American interests.

The source notes Kennedy kept his cool, suggested maybe some other structural issues in Berlin they could press the Germans on.

But insisted the allied presence in Berlin was of vital interest to all Western powers.

Absolutely non -negotiable.

Kennedy went on to warn that Soviet tension in Berlin was what had driven Western rearmament, and a new crisis would do the same.

He even hinted at disagreements with allies like France, didn't he, about nukes.

Yes, warning that a new Berlin crisis could only increase the danger of results which the Soviet government would not like, implying maybe more European nukes if things got hotter.

But Dobrynin just stuck to the Soviet line, insisted the Western troops were the source of the danger.

Kennedy countered that the best way to reduce tension was for the Soviets to just accept the troops were a vital Western interest.

Period.

So this constant Berlin back and forth, it's just this persistent backdrop of tension, isn't it, even as all these other things, like Cuba, are unfolding.

Exactly.

And speaking of things unfolding in Washington, the source dedicates significant time to a major figure whose influence was really soaring in the summer of 1962,

Robert Strange McNamara, the Secretary of Defense.

McNamara, yeah, a fascinating character.

From the business world, Ford surrounded himself with these bright young analysts, the whiz kids.

His goals were huge.

Rebuild the nuclear forces, expand conventional forces, firmly establish civilian control over the military.

And his style was memorable.

Oh, absolutely.

The force describes him as intense, always speaking in italics, someone who really runs rather than walks, and who suffered fools badly.

Had a careful relationship with Rusk at State, but was naturally inclined to, you know, fill a power vacuum.

He brought in innovations too, like that annual defense posture statement, laying out the strategy.

Right.

Foy Kohler later regretted Rusk didn't do something similar for State.

Kennedy was apparently quite captivated by McNamara.

Why was that?

Well, here was this self -made big businessman, highly literate, tough, quick -thinking, articulate, competent, seemed incorruptible.

He bridged the gap into the president's inner circle, became close to Robert Kennedy.

The source has those great quotes like Jackie Kennedy on his sex appeal, and RFK saying his sisters wanted to sit next to the computer.

Right.

And the source suggests McNamara was drawn to the Kennedys too, their toughness, rationality, curiosity, athleticism, that growing liberalism.

He was apparently relieved to leave the anti -intellectual, illiberal realm of automobile men.

He went to those Hickory Hills seminars at RFK's place, danced the twist with Jackie.

All noted in the source, his summary.

I like the Kennedys.

Kennedy, in turn, really valued McNamara's managerial skill, his analytical one -two -three method, his directness.

That quote about saying no when he had nothing to say, Kennedy liked that.

Very rare in Washington, apparently.

The source connects McNamara's rise to Kennedy's own view of problems, seeing them as administrative, technical issues solvable by smart people, not just political fights over outdated slogans.

But there were warnings about him too, weren't there?

O'Donnell predicting trouble because of his lack of political experience.

Yes, and Kennedy's own private comment after McNamara's slip -up on Canadian missiles, everyone ought to run for office.

To understand the reality, journalist Joseph Alsop was particularly exasperated.

What was Alsop's issue?

He hated McNamara's probabilistic talk about nuclear war odds, his political instincts,

called it a lot of garbage, noted large gaps in his experience in dealing with Congress and the public, thinking support would just be automatic.

So McNamara's passion was imposing rational procedures, data analysis, to reduce error in defense policy.

Virtue, exactitude, weakness.

A potential lack of understanding of the emotional, irrational side of things.

Leaders like Khrushchev or even opponents like the Vietnamese.

This brings us to a really significant point in the chapter.

The source details this major policy shift McNamara was pondering.

Counterforce strategy.

Right.

Instead of just targeting Soviet cities' countervalue, this strategy would focus on hitting Soviet bomber bases and missile sites first.

And the idea was this would reassure European allies, like De Gaulle, reducing their desire for their own nukes.

Exactly.

He outlined it in a speech in Chicago.

But there were critiques internally.

An aide reportedly said it accepted too much from the whiz kids, arguing that targeting missiles after an enemy launch was basically talking about first strike capability.

And here's the critical insight from the source.

This strategic talk for McNamara plus Kennedy talking about taking the initiative.

How did Khrushchev interpret that?

Not just a strategy.

He saw it as evidence the U .S.

was seriously considering a preemptive nuclear attack.

Wow.

So it deepened his anxieties, made him desperate.

Exactly.

Desperate to refute the perception of U .S.

nuclear superiority that McNamara's whole approach seemed to imply.

So his public reaction wasn't just random bluster.

It was a direct response.

Precisely.

The source describes his July 11th speech at that Moscow peace congress called U .S.

leaders not realistic for claiming a shifted balance of forces, calling it dangerous.

And he boasted about Soviet dominance, even claimed a new anti -missile missile.

Yeah, one that could supposedly hit a fly in outer space, even though the source says it was likely primitive.

He attacked McNamara's counterforce idea as monstrous, permeated with hatred, and twisted Kennedy's initiative talk into hurry up and start the war now.

And he kept going, telling visiting American editors about it.

Warning, those who threaten us will get back everything they're planning for us.

It created this dangerous feedback loop, as the source highlights.

U .S.

strategic thinking feeds Soviet anxiety, which fuels Khrushchev's bluster, which maybe fuels his own risk -taking.

Exactly.

Convincing him he needed something dramatic, like the Cuba missile deployment, to restore the perceived balance.

Meanwhile, back in Washington, a more mundane issue, finding a new ambassador to Moscow to replace Thompson.

Yeah, the source mentions possibilities.

Robert Kennedy ruled out.

Jacqueline suggested astronaut John Glenn, most controlled person.

John Kenneth Albreith.

Trial balloon shot down by Republicans crying socialist.

Kennedy apparently decided he needed someone who speaks Russian.

The Foreign Service pushed hard for Foy Kohler.

And Robert Kennedy really disliked Kohler.

Gave him the creeps, wasn't the kind of person who could really get anything done.

Kohler was the type of career bureaucrat that Kennedy's weren't keen on.

His background, lack of social grace, private worries about Kennedy's personal life, all noted.

So why did Kohler get it?

Charles Bartlett recalled Kennedy concluding that sending outsiders to serious posts meant they'd just get screwed by the Foreign Service.

So Kohler, the insider, won.

How did the Soviets react?

Bolshakov.

Complained over lunch with a journalist.

Kohler was no new frontiersman.

Reiterated, Khrushchev wanted a known friend of the president.

Bolshakov went on home leave then.

Yeah, reported talking with Dobrinin, agreeing Kennedy seemed to want accommodation.

Sounded out the journalist about Kennedy sending a message to a disarmament meeting.

Warned signing the captive nation's weak proclamation might affect talks on Berlin.

And there was that small, maybe ominous hint from Nina Khrushchev.

To Jane Thompson, yes.

Saying it was very important that you do not change ambassadors at this time.

Knowing what we know now about the missile plan,

quite suggestive.

In Thompson's final meeting with Khrushchev, what was the tone?

Khrushchev insisted he wanted Berlin settled.

Coexistence.

Good relations.

Partly because of China.

Expressed genuine fear the U .S.

military might seize control and really let go on Berlin.

Told Thompson to tell Kennedy this.

Thompson's report home noted Khrushchev seemed under pressure domestically.

Yeah.

Lack of a general pattern.

Facing spending cuts.

Price raises.

Even a riot.

This fed into Walt Rostow's analysis back in Washington.

That Khrushchev at bay memo.

Exactly.

Rostow concluded Khrushchev was stalled everywhere.

Berlin, Congo, A .C., Asia, Cuba isolated.

Pressure from allies.

Economy hurting.

And Rostow's prediction was chilling.

That Khrushchev must be looking for a quick success.

To boost power, redress the military balance cheaply, gain leverage on Berlin, divert resources.

Rostow's conclusion.

The U .S.

might see the greatest act of risk taking since the war.

Wow.

And Dean Acheson shared that feeling with his snake charmer analogy.

Yeah, describing the situation like an Indian snake charmer with dangerous snakes warning, someday one of these snakes will wake up and no one will be able even to run.

And that's the chapter title.

Underscoring the incredible precariousness.

Precisely.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev's August seemed relaxed.

Black Sea vacation.

Brief return for a cosmonaut welcome.

Maybe stage for prestige.

Announcement of a possible fall unius trip.

And the source connects that potential trip to the secret missile plan, right?

Announce them at the UN, bargain with Kennedy, then fly to Havana.

That seems to be the speculation.

A grand, risky diplomatic play built on the secret deployment.

Other diplomatic signals were deceptive too, like Dobrinin talking about nonproliferation.

Yes, telling Rusk they might be willing to discuss preventing nuclear transfer.

Chinese documents later confirmed Soviets told Peking about this, and Peking warned them off.

So using diplomatic channels as cover, potentially.

While all this is happening, Operation Mongoose is still going on in the US.

Remind us what that was.

Mongoose was the big covert action program aimed at undermining and overthrowing Castro, authorized after the Bay of Pigs failed.

Lots of different elements.

And in August, the source says the special group overseeing it was pondering fomenting an anti -Castro uprising by October.

Robert Kennedy pushing.

Yes, but McHoney and General Taylor were cautious.

Insisted the US had to be ready to back an uprising militarily.

Rusk favored creating friction between Castro and Cuban communists.

McNamara worried about exposure.

And the source mentions that controversial 1975 Senate testimony about discussing Castro's liquidation, McNamara's reported comment, RFK's lack of objection.

Contracted with McHoney's later denial and reported opposition to assassination.

It shows how murky that aspect was.

But what is clear is the August 23rd decree.

Yes.

Kennedy approved implementing Mongoose phase B, escalating propaganda,

provocations, economic damage, creating friction, plans to contaminate sugar, sending sabotage teams.

So US covert ops against Cuba while Soviet missiles are secretly heading there.

Talk about wires crossing.

Exactly.

And then August 30th, that U2 flies over Sakhalin Island in the Soviet Far East.

Of course, the Pentagon said.

How did Kennedy and Rusk handle it given the 1960 U2 disaster?

They decided to just tell the truth, plain off course, trying to prevent the Soviets making a great issue of it.

But Khrushchev's reaction with missiles en route was jittery.

Moscow's protest used his kind of language rebirth of bandit practice, provocational act.

He was clearly on edge.

And then the source says the secret cargo starts arriving.

Soviet ships with troops and the first missile element.

The planned deployment, 24 MRBMs, 16 IRBMs, launchers, warheads, missiles,

thousands of troops.

How do they try to hide it?

Elaborate deception.

Troops weren't told the destination, given winter clothes, skis.

Some told only Gibraltar where they were really going.

But there were mistakes.

Made detection possible?

According to Soviet accounts cited, yes.

Marshal Berezov thought it was undetectable, but they sent too many ships.

Looks suspicious.

Any fool could see.

An absolutely Russian mistake, trying to do it too speedily.

And the CIA started seeing signs, unusual crates, ships riding high.

Yes, and reports trickling in from Cuban agents, refugees via JM Wave in Miami.

Something new and different.

Most extensive campaign ever seen.

But here's where John McConney's crucial insight comes in again.

His background engineering atomic energy.

He couldn't understand why build expensive SAM air defense sites.

Unless they were protecting something much more valuable.

Exactly.

Protecting against US spy planes, U -2s.

Why stop U -2s?

Because you're hiding something sensitive.

His conclusion?

Maybe nuclear missiles.

He voiced the suspicion early, wrote a memo.

He did.

But the source says Kennedy initially viewed it through the lens of McConney's known anti -communism.

Maybe alarmist.

August 22nd.

Kennedy.

Rusk.

McNamara's skeptical.

Dadid Khrushchev would take the risk.

But intelligence started confirming parts of it.

Seven days later, August 29th, U -2 finds SAM sites.

Two confirmed.

Six potential.

Substantial Soviet personnel.

Missile boats.

And more reports followed.

McConney's deputy telling a Senate committee.

About a crash program for up to 24 SAM sites.

65 Soviet block ships tracked.

Ten carrying military gear.

While this is building internally, what was Rusk saying publicly?

On September 13th, he told senators the buildup resembled aid to other non -block nations.

Not fundamentally threatening yet, but he drew a very specific public line.

What was the line?

The situation would change if Soviets established their own base, or if there were to be established in Cuba ground -to -ground missiles that would directly threaten the continental United States.

So he publicly defined offensive missiles as the tripwire, based on what he thought wouldn't happen.

Precisely.

Meanwhile, the U .S.

is running military maneuvers codenamed ORTSAC.

Castro spelled backwards.

Which probably just confirmed Castro's fears of invasion.

Likely did.

Reinforcing his desire for the Soviet missiles.

And domestically, this whole Cuba situation was fueling a political firestorm for Kennedy.

Senator Keating started making charges.

In September, yeah.

Republican Kenneth Keating, charging Khrushchev, was installing MRBMs, RBMs, and the administration was covering it up.

Interviews, rumors, bugging allegations.

Other Republicans jumped in.

Nixon.

Goldwater.

Demanding action.

A naval blockade.

Nixon warned Soviet troops were a clear and present danger.

How did Kennedy respond to the pressure?

Got congressional authority to call up 150 ,000 reservists.

But still face public protests, like at Rice University.

Enforced the Monroe Doctrine.

The source emphasizes the political backdrop Kennedy feeling constrained, hoping to avoid losses in the off -year elections.

That new republic jibe, whistle a happy tune so no one will suspect I'm afraid.

The domestic pressure over Cuba was absolutely immense.

It's a huge vulnerability for him heading into November.

Let's dive deeper into McHoney again.

His unique position, why his suspicions stood out.

His relationship with the Kennedys.

Close to Robert Nethell.

Robert held him in high regard.

Yet, McHoney maintained his independence.

His persona.

Republican tycoon.

Snob and a Puritan.

Irish Catholic.

Engineering background.

Business success.

Then government under Truman.

AEC chairman.

And his conservative views were well known.

Criticized test ban advocates.

Fought Eisenhower's test ban efforts.

Publicly called it national peril.

Later lamented the Phi Beta Kappa's around Kennedy.

Worried Khrushchev didn't think Kennedy would use nukes over Berlin.

His appointment as CIA director wasn't first choice.

Hired partly for conservative Republican cover.

Reduced CIA autonomy after Bay of Pigs.

Seemed so.

Kennedy was impressed by his missile knowledge.

Saw him as a quiet manager.

McCone quickly asserted control at CIA.

Battled McNamara over intelligence assets.

The source mentions the Bay of Pigs report controversy.

McHoney reportedly destroying copies.

And mongoose starting the month he arrived.

Sign of confidence.

Likely.

And Ray Klein's account that McHoney always disapproved of assassination talk regarding Castro.

But the crucial difference, the source argues, was his fundamental belief compared to other advisors.

Yes.

Unlike Dillon, he didn't develop total faith in Kennedy's crisis leadership.

And unlike most, he believed tiny changes in the nuclear balance mattered immensely.

Militarily and politically.

He thought Khrushchev felt the same.

So it wasn't just anti -communism driving his suspicion.

It was his specific view of nuclear balance.

Exactly.

That core belief made him more receptive to the possibility that the chairman might try to correct his deficiency by sending nuclear missiles into Cuba.

Others saw Sam's thought defense.

McHoney saw Sam's protecting something valuable.

Thought offense.

That's why he saw it when others didn't.

That perspective is so key.

And the source mentions his honeymoon in August 62.

Still working.

Yes.

Mary Theline Pigott honeymoon in France.

But cabling Langley every few days demanding more probing assessment about the Sam's foretelling missiles, asking why put Sam's there unless they were putting something in there to worry us.

Even Robert Kennedy started to worry McHoney might be right.

Made that concession.

Cuba obtaining missiles would create a major political problem here.

Which leads to that crucial September 4th meeting, RFK talking to Dobrinin.

Telling him the president was deeply concerned about the military gear in Cuba.

And Dobrinin gave that now infamous false assurance.

Claiming Khrushchev asked him to assure Kennedy no ground -to -ground missiles or offensive missiles placed in Cuba.

Said Khrushchev would do nothing to disrupt the relationship before the election because he liked the president.

Kennedy's response, persuaded by Robert but skeptical, was to issue that public warning.

Yes.

If the US found offensive ground -to -ground missiles in Cuba, the greatest issues would arise.

And later Bundy and Sorensen saw this specific warning as a strategic misstep.

That's the analysis from the source.

Bundy did it for domestic politics.

Didn't believe Soviets would do anything crazy.

Sorensen.

Kennedy drew the line precisely where he thought the Soviets were not and would not be.

Meaning if they'd known, they might have drawn the line differently.

Higher.

Exactly.

Giving themselves more options.

The consequence, per the source.

A warning too late to stop Khrushchev and so precise that it caused him to forfeit the confrontation once found.

The source even suggests if warned earlier or differently,

history might have been different.

A key analytical point.

It shows how assumptions and politics shaped the warning, which then constrained their options later.

Two days later, September 6th, Dobrynin meets Sorensen.

Another message from Khrushchev.

More reassurance.

Nothing will be undertaken before the American congressional elections that could complicate,

provided there are no actions taken on the other side.

Possible November visit only in the second half.

But Sorensen felt it was hollow and tardy.

Because the Cuba buildup was already happening, already causing turmoil.

The source offers an interpretation of Khrushchev's motive here, not just throwing Kennedy off guard.

But maybe encouraging Kennedy, if missiles were found before November, to explain them away as purely defensive and conceal them from the public until the balloting was done.

Hoping Kennedy would keep it quiet.

Around this time, Stuart Udall visits Khrushchev in Pitsunda.

Khrushchev, genial.

Embroidered shirt, hoping to see Kennedy, inviting him bear hunting,

mixed with threats on Berlin, demanding equality.

Gave Udall gifts for Kennedy.

And Robert Frost, the poet, was with Udall.

Met Khrushchev, too.

Yeah, Frost urged noble rivalry.

Khrushchev warned missiles could blast Europe over Berlin, claimed Kennedy admitted he couldn't sign a German treaty due to conditions at home.

Probably Khrushchev's spin.

And that Tolstoy analogy about being too old.

Right.

U .S.

West Europe too old for love, but still desire.

Frost chuckled, said maybe true for them, not the U .S.

Khrushchev called him soul of a poet.

But the fallout wasn't poetic at all.

Frost misquoted Khrushchev.

At a Moscow press conference,

yeah.

Said Khrushchev called Americans too liberal to fight.

Republicans seized on it.

Kennedy's private reaction.

You can't believe what Frost tells you.

Not very reliable.

Shows how easily communication derailed.

The Soviets weren't just using personal channels for deception, but public denials, too.

Absolutely.

September 11th, TA responds to Kennedy's warning.

Firm denial.

Soviet missiles so powerful, no need to locate elsewhere.

Armaments in Cuba designed exclusively for defensive purposes.

Flat out denial.

Kennedy reiterates his warning September 13th, more specific.

U .S.

would do whatever must be done if buildup threatened security, Cuba exported aggression, or became an offensive military base of significant capacity.

Raising the stakes publicly.

Khrushchev sent a private threat too.

Via Austria.

Against a blockade.

Soviet Union would fight.

Kazan gave it to Kennedy.

More rude noises.

Bundy advised.

Fairly tough talk back.

Meanwhile, the ships kept arriving.

Omsk, September 8th.

First MRBMs.

Poltava, September 15th.

Second shipment.

Construction starts.

But Washington largely unaware of the offensive nature.

Why wasn't U .S.

intelligence faster?

Limited U -2 flights.

Weather delays.

Satellites not focused on Cuba.

Exactly.

That September 5th flight found nothing new.

Than a 9 -day weather delay.

Comor asking for more flights.

And that U -2 shot down over China raised concerns about Cuba overflights.

Suggested caution needed.

With similar SAMs going up in Cuba.

Each Cuba U -2 needed Kennedy's personal help.

So limited flights, bad weather, satellite gaps, plus noisy intel from agents.

A mixed bag from Jamwave.

One agent saw a missile segment but report delayed.

Hundreds of other reports were rumors, errors.

Later CIA post -mortem found only six accurate reports out of over 200 before discovery.

Rusk noted SAM sightings confused people.

This fed into the official CIA estimate.

Yes.

September 19th special estimate to Kennedy.

Odds of offensive missiles in Cuba low.

Reasons.

Khrushchev knew the U .S.

reaction.

Passed false alarms.

Expert belief Soviets kept nukes on home soil.

And this directly contradicted McCona's suspicions.

Totally.

McCona was reportedly furious.

Demanded it be revoked because it ignored the bargaining power missiles gave Khrushchev McCona's whole point.

He failed.

The source notes him writing Nixon wishing him luck.

Castro announces the Marial Fishing Port September 25th cover story.

Republicans charge it could be a sub base.

And the test ban talks.

Sources used for deception.

Khrushchev kept corresponding with Kennedy.

Holding out hope for a test ban.

Partly to throw Kennedy off guard.

Kennedy later compared it to the Japanese negotiators pre Pearl Harbor.

Yet talks seemed to progress.

USC drafts.

Khrushchev willing.

Octo four for limited ban of France included.

Kennedy replied octo eight within striking distance.

Target yan one.

Khrushchev agreed octo ten to target date.

Maybe expecting to discuss it in November after revealing the missiles.

Deception layered on diplomacy.

Seems likely.

This brings us back to Bolshakov returning from home leave.

Called in by Khrushchev's and McCoyan.

Given a very specific message for Kennedy.

Khrushchev's words.

Be a Bolshakov.

Tell Kennedy he's a man of his word.

Can be relied on.

Not pleased by US Reservists call up.

USSR only doing what absolutely obliged in Cuba.

Castro sent only defensive weapons.

And McCoyan added something.

Tell president Soviets sending Castro only short range missiles to be used against airplanes.

A spectacular lie or careful wording.

The source analyzes it.

Maybe chosen carefully to stick to literal truth.

Khrushchev only defensive weapons given to Castro.

Anti aircraft missiles are short range.

While ignoring the MRBMs under Soviet control.

But Khrushchev knew it was fundamentally misleading.

Source says certainly knew.

It was a message Kennedy would see as a deliberate lie.

Maybe thought Kennedy would tolerate it.

Having gotten away with deceiving Kennedy before.

Or maybe the risk of a bold faced lie was worth the chance it might delay things.

More likely the source suggests.

Throw Americans off.

Encourage Kennedy to defer crisis until after November elections.

Calculated risk.

Bold deception.

And that small detail.

State's draft thank you for Khrushchev's gifts rejected.

Kennedy sends nothing.

Mistrust creeping in.

Definitely.

While this is central, the source touches on the Bay of Pigs prisoner exchange too.

Ongoing effort via James Donovan.

Castro demanding bulldozers.

Kennedy willing to deal.

Committee formed.

Yes, but complications.

Bulldozers for military use.

Committee offers tractors.

Public outcry.

Trading in human lives.

Communist ransom.

Committee disbands.

After a show trial, ransom goes up to 62 million dollars.

Robert Kennedy uses leverage to prevent executions.

Donovan prepping for October trip to see Castro.

Bundy asks Helms, via RFK Carter, to tell Donovan.

Layers of negotiation.

Even as the big crisis looms.

As we approach discovery, Rusk's theory persists.

Cuba is a diversion from Berlin.

Yes, Rusk still believed that.

Kennedy sent for Pentagon Berlin plans again.

Sorensen felt Berlin could become very alive.

Rusk publicly explained why not discussing Cuba buildup with Soviets.

Fear they'd raise US nukes in Turkey or Iran.

Exactly.

Didn't want that debate.

Then October 13th.

Crucial development.

CIA photo interpreters see crates on Soviet ship Kazimov.

Crates resembling those for IL -28 nuclear light bomber.

Seen in Egypt, Indonesia.

Range 600 miles.

Reach Tampa.

Offensive.

Makhani tries.

Fails to reach RFK with this.

But Chester Bowles gets the news.

Most shocking.

Lunches with Dobernan.

Uses the info.

Tells Dobernan, we have reports you are introducing offensive weapons into Cuba.

Menches IL -28s.

Asks if he read warnings.

Don't play around.

Absolute folly.

Grave trouble.

Dobernan's reaction.

Surprised.

Insistent reports untrue.

Looks surprised.

Insisted untrue.

Fully aware how risky.

Bowles.

Maybe ambassador himself.

Deceived by Moscow.

How does the source analyze this exchange's impact?

Dobernan undoubtedly reports back to Khrushchev.

Khrushchev probably assumes Bowles' words carefully worked out with Kennedy.

But why wouldn't Khrushchev see this as a severe warning about the missiles?

That's the puzzle.

Kennedy's warnings mention significant capacity.

IL -28s, while offensive, maybe not that level.

If Khrushchev thought Bowles meant bombers, maybe less alarming.

If he did think missiles, why mild private protests by a second -level diplomat Bowles?

Misinterpretation.

Khrushchev discounting it.

Adds another layer.

And in potential reaction to Dobernan's cable, source speculates Khrushchev ordered work on missile sites sped up.

Evidently ordered his forces to speed up their work.

Even before the SAM defenses were completed.

Acceleration just before discovery.

Meanwhile, Gromyko meets Cuban President Dortico's in New York.

Scribbling notes about missiles?

So worried about eavesdropping, yes.

Intense secrecy.

Then, Sunday afternoon, October 14th, Bundy on ABC's Issues and Answers.

Remarkable statement.

Publicly declared no present evidence nor likelihood of Soviet's Cubans installing major offensive capability.

Downplayed offensive versus defensive.

Current aid like that for neutrals.

Public denial just hours before definitive proof emerges.

Perfect illustration of the public posture based on flawed intelligence.

About to be shattered.

That same evening, Moscow.

Khrushchev hosting farewell dinner for Chinese Ambassador Liu Shao.

Liu Shao told Peking Khrushchev found an ingenious new way to solve Berlin.

First snowflakes.

Toasting unbreakable friendship.

Calm surface.

That same evening, New York.

Kennedy's hasty meeting with Adlai Stevenson.

Private dinner.

Midnight flight to Washington.

Wheels turning separately.

Then the key moment.

The culmination.

The government's best photo interpreters at MPIC spinning through the U -2 film shot that morning over western Cuba.

The next day, October 15th, the call.

Photo analysts alert McConney's executive assistant Walter Elder.

Elder calls McConney, maybe still on honeymoon, maybe just back, delivers the words confirming McConney's lone suspicion launching the crisis.

That which you alone said would happen did.

And with that discovery, the Cuban Missile Crisis truly began.

The world changed in that moment.

So there you have it.

You've just taken a deep dive into this crucial chapter, seeing how the story unfolds from, you know, small moments like a jazz concert and personal notes to high stakes diplomacy, secret pacts, political pressures, mounting intelligence signals.

Many of which, as we saw, were initially dismissed or misinterpreted.

We've explored the layers of duplicity.

Dobrinin's false assurance.

Bolshakov's calculated message.

Khrushchev using test -ban talks as cover.

We've seen the strategic dance that Bluth and Laos, McNamara's counterforce talk, fueling Khrushchev's anxiety.

We've highlighted the conflicting intelligence, the official CIA estimate, versus McConney's persistent informed suspicion grounded in his unique view of nuclear power.

And we touched on that intense domestic political backdrop pressuring Kennedy.

Beschloss's analysis, woven through the chapter, really connects all these disparate threads, doesn't it?

It does, into a coherent narrative.

What this deep dive shows us, I think, is that the discovery wasn't just some random bolt from the blue.

It was the result of overlooked signals, calculated risks, mistakes in concealment.

And crucially, one man, John McConney, trusting his instincts based on his specific background and experience, even when conventional wisdom and official assessments pointed elsewhere.

That chapter title, no one will be able to even to run, circling back to Acheson's snake charmer analogy.

The snakes were indeed waking up.

It was becoming incredibly dangerous.

This deep dive really shows how international relations at the highest levels are this incredibly complex mix.

Grand strategy, personal relationships, domestic politics, bureaucratic dynamics, that constant struggle to figure out truth from deception with incomplete information.

It really makes you think, doesn't it, about the signals we receive in our own lives today.

In the news, online, from people around us.

How do you decide what's real, what might be a bluff, and what could be a dangerous miscalculation hiding right there in plain sight?