Chapter 16: He's the One Playing God

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Today we're doing a deep dive into, well, a truly pivotal moment in modern history, the initial days of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

And we're using just one specific source for this, a chapter from the book The Crisis Years, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 -1963.

You gave us this chapter because you want to understand exactly what was happening behind the scenes right there in the White House, minute by minute, during those first crucial hours and days after that shocking discovery.

So our mission here is to guide you through this really dense, but honestly essential material.

We'll lay out the key events as they unfolded, the intense strategies being argued over, the raw human drama, the diplomatic back and forward, all based only on the details in this chapter.

We'll pull out the key figures, the dates, the immediate implications they were facing according to the source.

Okay, let's jump into that pressure cooker.

All right, let's unpack this right at the beginning for the White House team.

The source drops us right in.

Tuesday, October 16th around noon, cabinet room, President Kennedy is there, his key advisors all around him, and the atmosphere.

It's not just described in words.

The source mentions hidden mics recording everything.

Yeah.

And Kennedy even calls in a photographer, Cecil Stoughton, right away.

He knows this is history happening.

It's pretty telling, isn't it?

It really is.

It signals that even as they're grappling with this unbelievable threat, there's this sense of, wow, this is a turning point.

The source describes Kennedy as clipped, very tense, his usual sort of light touch,

gone.

Completely gone.

And what's causing the tension?

Propped up on an easel, these aerial photos, just two days old.

Photos showing MRBM sites, medium range ballistic missiles being built in Cuba.

And these weren't just like defensive things.

This could hit major US cities.

Exactly.

This is the moment the threat becomes, well, terrifyingly concrete.

And those initial reactions are fascinating.

Charles Boland, their Soviet expert, he immediately thinks it's Khrushchev.

Almost purely a Khrushchev venture, is the phrase used.

And Kennedy himself.

The source says he's absolutely determined these missiles will leave Cuba.

Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, who'd known since the night before, apparently he expresses disbelief the Soviets could carry this far, but knows instantly they cannot sit still.

They have to So the key takeaway there is, from hour one, offensive missiles in Cuba.

Completely unacceptable to them.

Totally unacceptable.

Which leads directly to the next terrifying question.

How?

How do they get them out?

And Rusk, he lays out the two stark options right there in that first meeting.

Yeah, he cuts straight to it.

One, the quick strike, just go in and take them out.

The other, to alert our allies and Mr.

Khrushchev that there is an serious crisis.

And he's blunt about the stakes.

This situation could well lead to general war.

So they knew the potential for catastrophe right from the get go.

Absolutely.

No illusions there.

Rusk also brings up this interesting side idea he'd apparently been thinking about trying to maybe split Castro from the Soviets.

Right.

Using a covert channel.

Telling Castro he's being victimized.

Maybe link it to that recent New York Times story about a possible Soviet trade Cuba for Berlin.

And urge him to break clearly with the Soviet Union.

It shows they were thinking politically too, not just militarily.

Looking for any angle.

Definitely.

But Rusk also flags a huge constraint.

The US isn't acting in a vacuum.

Their actions affect 42 allies in confrontation in many places.

It ups the risks of direct action significantly.

Anything they do in Cuba sends ripples everywhere.

That global context, it leads straight into the assessment of that quick strike option which McNamara delivers.

What did the military guys say about taking out those sites?

Well McNamara lays out the brutal facts according to the source.

A strike has to happen before the missiles are operational.

Because if they can fire, even one getting through means almost certain to be chaos in part of the East Coast.

And it wasn't a simple strike, was it?

No, not at all.

It had to hit the missile site, sure.

But also hidden planes, maybe even nuclear storage spots.

They had to assume the planes had warheads, or at least high explosive potential.

And the human cost?

The estimate was stark.

Maybe two to three thousand Cuban casualties.

Just from the airstrike.

And how fast could they do it?

The Joint Chiefs wanted days to prepare, ideally.

But if pushed, maybe a matter of hours.

But crucially, McNamara says an airstrike would almost certainly lead to preparing for an invasion.

That means mobilizing forces, maybe declaring a national emergency.

So the quick strike wasn't quick or clean at all.

It was complex, deadly, and carried huge escalation risks right from the start.

Exactly.

And the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Maxwell Taylor, he adds that after a strike, they'd need a naval blockade to stop more weapons coming in.

Plus, reinforce Guantanamo, evacuate dependence.

And the invasion decision.

That would depend on how the strike went.

Taylor called invasion the hardest question.

Warning about getting stuck in that deep mud in Cuba.

Rusk then pulls them back to the kind of the core fear, right?

Beyond tactics.

Yeah, he says something really stark.

The critical question isn't if you stop one missile.

Because if they shoot those missiles, we are in general nuclear war.

He points out Khrushchev doesn't actually need Cuba for that anyway.

And McNamara adds another terrifying layer.

Accidental war.

Right.

Worrying about someone, a Cuban, a local Soviet commander, getting their thumb on the nuclear trigger without Moscow's direct control.

They just didn't know how tight Soviet command and control was in Cuba.

So even a successful strike had these massive inherent risks of things spiraling totally out of control.

Unintended catastrophic escalation was a real possibility they saw immediately.

This talk about military options, it seems to bring Kennedy back to the basic question.

Why would Khrushchev do this now?

He asks.

Must be some major reason.

Maybe they're not satisfied with their ICBMs.

And Taylor agrees.

He sees these missiles as supplementing the Soviet Union's rather defective ICBM system.

You know, the big ones that fly from Russia itself.

Kennedy then flags a practical issue for a blockade.

What about submarines delivering missiles?

McNamara's response is basically policy is to take them out the moment they come in.

Plus constant open surveillance.

Keep watching.

Hit anything that shows up.

Rusk then shares the thinking of CIA Director John McHoney, who was away but had briefed them.

McHoney's view.

McHoney believed Khrushchev knew the U .S.

had substantial nuclear superiority.

But also that Americans didn't live under the same kind of fear of Soviet weapons that Khrushchev felt about American ones placed near the USSR.

McHoney's theory then, was that maybe Khrushchev wanted the U .S.

to learn about living under medium -range missiles to sort of balance that political psychological factor.

Make the U .S.

feel vulnerable too.

Exactly.

Rusk also connects it to Berlin again.

Is Khrushchev being rational about Berlin?

Maybe trying to bargain Berlin and Cuba against each other?

Or using Cuba as cover, an umbrella for a move on Berlin like Suez and Hungary back in 56.

But despite these theories, Rusk admits he's kind of back -old.

He says he doesn't really see the rationality, unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cuba to the U .S.

Right.

The immediate why was still murky, adding another layer of uncertainty to everything.

The conversation then turns to allies and, crucially, secrecy.

Douglas Dillon warns, based on Eisenhower -era stuff, that telling NATO or the OAS before a strike could backfire, it might make the Russians dig in.

His idea was maybe quick action plus a back -off.

But Bundy raises the opposite concern about allies.

Yeah, the noise they'd get.

Allies saying, hey, we live with Soviet missiles nearby, why can't you?

And especially German fears about the U .S.

risking Berlin over Cuba.

Rusk counters Dillon's point, though.

He worries a quick strike leaves allies exposed without the slightest consultation or warning.

It's a terrible bind, isn't it?

Warn allies and you warn the Soviets, losing surprise.

Strike without warning and you alienate allies, looking reckless.

Kennedy really struggles with this.

He says warning allies is like warning everybody.

You can't announce an attack days ahead.

The Soviets could just arm the missiles and dare you?

Then what?

Threaten nuclear war.

The bottom line becomes,

whatever they do, secrecy is paramount.

It has to be the tightest secret.

They even talk about how long they can keep the lid on.

McNamara guesses maybe a week before it leaks politically.

Rusk is way more pessimistic.

He thinks Thursday or Friday, just days.

Yeah, and Kennedy's worry.

Leaks could bitch it up, totally derail things.

The pressure of secrecy in D .C.

must have been intense.

As the airstrike debate continues, we get that glimpse into Robert Kennedy's reaction, the note to Sorensen.

I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor.

Yeah, the source points out that's maybe an abuse of history.

Big difference between Pearl Harbor and striking an offensive base built after True, but RFK does voice a direct warning to the group about the strike's fallout.

He does.

He says it will kill an awful lot of people and bring an awful lot of heat.

He thinks the Russians would feel almost incumbent to retaliate somewhere else.

He specifically mentions Turkey or Iran.

The president asks about the impact on Cubans themselves.

Taylor predicts great confusion and panic.

McNamara adds there's a real possibility you'd have to invade just to prevent a slaughter of free Cubans if a U .S.

strike sparked an anti -Castro uprising.

Bundy argues for making the strike as small and clear -cut as possible.

Keep it focused.

Kennedy seems to agree on hitting airfields to limit reprisals, assuming the Soviets would use conventional bombs, not nukes.

He asks why start nuclear war under that sort of half -assed way.

At this point on Tuesday, the source suggests Kennedy is leaning heavily towards the strike.

He says, I don't think we've got much time.

Maybe you just have to take him out because that's what we're going to do anyway.

Yeah, he starts ticking off the steps.

Number one, take out these missiles.

Then number two, general airstrike.

And the third,

the general invasion.

His first impulse seems to be we have to do number one, fast.

But Bundy gently pulls back, right?

Yes, he asks.

You want to be clear, Mr.

President, whether we have definitely decided against a political track?

A subtle but important check.

Now, the source chapter includes analysis from Beschloss about this first day, and it's, well, pretty critical of Kennedy's surprise.

Right.

Beschloss argues it wasn't for lack of warnings.

He lists prior warnings from Khrushchev, Senate briefings, a Rostam memo, and especially CIA Director McHoney warning repeatedly in August and September 62.

McHoney had apparently even said he'd put missiles in Cuba if he were Khrushchev.

So why was Kennedy surprised, according to Beschloss?

Beschloss suggests Kennedy bought into consent his view that Khrushchev was much too sensible for such a direct challenge.

He maybe underestimated how U .S.

talk of nuclear superiority made Khrushchev feel cornered, assumed Khrushchev saw things like McNamara did, that superiority didn't matter much with assured destruction.

And he gave McHoney's warnings short shrift.

Beschloss also argues that Kennedy's September warning against defensive weapons was maybe more about domestic politics, showing Republicans he That's the argument.

It was issued quickly, maybe based on RFK warning of a major political problem, without fully realizing the missiles might already be on the way.

He was closing the barn door after the cows were out, because he was so certain Khrushchev would not dream of doing it.

Wow.

So political calculation and maybe overconfidence helped create the crisis.

That's what Beschloss implies.

He argues if the warning came earlier, maybe Khrushchev wouldn't have gone through with it.

By September, Khrushchev was locked in, couldn't back down without looking weak Castro might expose him.

So the warning locked Kennedy into action, risking nuclear war partly over domestic politics and misplaced certainty.

And Kennedy's later comment about impeachment if he hadn't acted, that really drives home the domestic pressure.

It does.

I would have been impeached.

Powerful stuff.

Okay, shifting slightly.

Tuesday afternoon, Kennedy is also reviewing cables from Ambassador Kohler in Moscow.

What's happening there?

It's another piece of this crazy puzzle.

Khrushchev is giving Kohler all these assurances, saying he's anxious not to do anything that will embarrass the president during the campaign.

No new moves on Berlin until after the US election.

Still talking about a UN visit, meeting JFK in November.

But then Khrushchev throws in a curveball.

Yeah, he surprises Kohler by complaining about the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy.

Kohler wasn't briefed on this.

Washington saw it as extraneous.

But the source points out Khrushchev almost certainly knew those Jupiters were set to be transferred to Turkish command in just six days, October 22nd.

This brings up the whole context of those US missiles near the USSR.

Right.

The Thors and Jupiters deployed after Sputnik caused panic.

Eisenhower himself had worried back in 59 about putting missiles so close using that Cuba or Mexico analogy.

And they were getting obsolete anyway with ICBMs and Polaris subs coming online.

The Jupiters were seen as vulnerable.

Yeah, Rusk heard they were like targets for a BB gun.

Maybe unreliable.

Congress worried about US control.

Kennedy reviewed it in 61, but was told not to withdraw them after the Vienna summit.

It'd look weak.

He even joked about Turks wanting the American payrolls.

The British got rid of their Thors.

Kennedy thought about pulling the Jupiters, but needed NATO buy -in.

And the source says basically, neither the Pentagon nor the State Department had gotten on with the diplomacy.

Beschloss suggests JFK didn't know about that upcoming October 22nd transfer ceremony to the Turks.

He thought US control of the warheads was the main thing.

But Khrushchev might not have known the warheads stayed under US control, maybe worry about local commanders, and really wanted those Jupiters gone.

So a key insight here is this reciprocal missile presence, maybe downplayed by the US, was a huge deal for Khrushchev and likely a factor in his Cuba gamble.

Seems very likely, based on this account.

Okay, back to the White House.

Tuesday evening, 6 .30 pm, the group meets again.

General Carter, McConey's deputy, gives an intel update.

The latest recon shows sites for 16 to 24 missiles.

Still, no evidence whatsoever of warheads.

But that doesn't mean they aren't there.

Launchers could be ready in two weeks, maybe one site much sooner.

They could fire on very little notice.

The timeline felt incredibly short.

Rusk brings up his Castro idea again.

Maybe Castro would break with Moscow if he knew he were in deadly jeopardy.

Admits it's a long shot, one chance in a hundred.

But still wants to message both Castro and Khrushchev.

Rusk also hammers home the political fallout of a strike.

Maximum communist reaction in Latin America.

Maybe six governments overthrown.

Soviets almost certainly take some kind of action somewhere.

Risk of US isolation.

Alliances crumbling without consultation.

But McNamara pushes back hard against talking before acting.

Yeah, he says any pre -strike talks almost stop subsequent military action.

And then he introduces that third way, the middle option, a blockade against offensive weapons entering Cuba in the future, plus constant surveillance.

The quarantine idea emerges.

Exactly.

But McNamara keeps warning.

Direct military action will lead to a Soviet military response.

Someplace.

He also raises that specter of an anti -Castro uprising, forcing a US invasion, maybe worse than the Bay of Pigs.

He's really trying to pump the brakes on the strike.

Kennedy weighs the blockade.

He sees the political, plus revealing the missiles puts the onus on the Soviets.

But we lose all the advantages of our strike.

Surprise is gone.

He doubts messages will work.

Khrushchev ignored the September warning and initiated the danger, really, hasn't he?

The tape catches that muffled comment about Khrushchev.

Maybe he's the one playing God.

Russ calls Khrushchev's assurances to Kohler completely hypocritical.

McNamara keeps stressing the speed.

Missiles getting operational quickly.

Russ commits their assessment of Khrushchev might be utterly wrong.

He says, we've never really believed that Khrushchev would take on a general nuclear war over Cuba.

And Kennedy agrees.

They certainly have been wrong about what he's trying to do, acknowledges not many of us thought he'd put MRBMs in Cuba, though Bundy and Carter pipe up that McConnie did predict it.

A moment of, like, collective admission.

They seriously misread their opponent.

Definitely.

Which leads Bundy to finally ask that huge question the source flags as the most fundamental issue.

Right.

What is the strategic impact?

How gravely does this change the strategic balance?

It took them almost a full day of talks to directly ask that.

McNamara's personal view.

Not at all.

Doesn't change the fundamental nuclear balance.

But the military view.

Taylor defends it.

Taylor says they're a rather important adjunct in reinforcement.

Psychologically, it makes Americans feel much less secure.

That pistol pointed at the head situation.

Dylan and Nitsi apparently agreed with the military, saw it as a major step toward nuclear parity.

Hugely effective from Cuba, making almost the whole U .S.

vulnerable.

So a real split on whether the missiles actually change the game or just the perception.

Exactly.

Kennedy worries about operational missiles again.

If they're ready, maybe you don't want to knock them out.

Too much of a gamble.

He leans back towards McNamara's view.

Doesn't make any difference if you get blown up by an ICBM or 190 miles away.

Geography doesn't mean that much.

He even regrets the Bay of Pigs failure, saying it shows that the Bay of Pigs was really right, implying success there would have prevented this.

Robert Kennedy looks ahead, worrying about Castro using the missiles as leverage later, especially in South America.

You move troops, we're going to fire these missiles.

Edwin Martin from state sees it less militarily, more psychologically.

The U .S.

sat back and let him do it to us.

And Kennedy picks up on that.

He agrees the political and psychological impact is huge.

He references his own September warning.

Last month, I said we weren't going to allow it.

When we said we're not going to and then they go ahead and do it and we do nothing, then our risks increase.

This is a political struggle as much as military.

So even if the military balance wasn't fundamentally altered, the political reality and U .S.

credibility were definitely on the line.

That seems key.

That's a crucial insight, yes.

So as they refine options, Kennedy seems to ditch the Castro message idea.

Don't think the message to Castro has got much in it.

He suggests maybe announcing the missiles publicly 24 hours ahead of our doing something, a kind of notification.

But McNamara jumps on that immediately.

No warning.

Missiles could be readied in that window.

Huge danger to the East Coast.

If you are going to strike, you shouldn't make an announcement.

Kennedy then considers the scale of a strike.

He prefers just hitting the missile bases much more defensible, explicable, politically satisfactory than a general strike on cities or airports, which is a much more major operation with bigger worldwide risks.

Bundy agrees.

The missile -based strike is like punishment fits the crime, doing only what they'd warned they'd have to do.

Kennedy keeps circling back to the why.

Why put missiles there if they did not increase very much their strategic strength?

He notes Khrushchev being cautious on Berlin.

George Ball wonders if the planned Nov NY visit was meant to reveal the missiles and offer a trade for Berlin.

Bundy doubts Khrushchev would give Castro actual nuclear warheads.

Kennedy then makes that comparison to U .S.

missiles in Turkey, calls the Cuba situation goddamn dangerous, like the U .S.

putting missiles there.

And someone points out, well, we did, Mr.

President.

Right.

Kennedy's response is telling.

That was five years ago.

Different period then.

Still seemingly unaware of that imminent Oktoin 22nd Jupiter transfer.

The hypocrisy, even if unintended, is striking.

They speculate maybe Soviet generals pushed Khrushchev.

Robert Kennedy throws out that dangerous suggestion about provoking something via Guantanamo.

Sink the main again or something.

The source rightly calls that out.

Using a flimsy pretext would totally undermine the U .S.

case.

Then Kennedy remembers he's supposed to meet Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister, in two days.

What should he do?

Say anything.

Give an ultimatum.

Just ignore it for now.

He points out Dobryden, the ambassador, had assured them they were not going to put these weapons there.

So Dobryden is either lying or doesn't know.

Bundy bets Dobryden didn't know.

Kennedy floats the idea of RFK telling Dobryden the U .S.

would have to take action if missiles were found.

Maybe make them reconsider.

He's baffled by the Soviet boldness, calling it the most direct challenge since the Berlin blockade.

Notes Soviets back down elsewhere wonders if he should have warned sooner.

And then Bundy makes that courageous counterpoint.

We have to be clear, Mr.

President, that they made this decision in all probability before you made your statements.

McNamara agrees.

They likely decided before the September warning.

Bundy reads the actual Sept 11th P .S.

statement denying any need for missiles outside the USSR.

Kennedy is just baffled by the sheer documented deception.

The source then offers Beschloss's critique of this first day.

McNamara argues forcefully it's not a military problem.

This is a political problem.

Contrasting the warning act with the strike, kill them.

He pushes the blockade alternative.

But George Ball retorts that for Americans, action means military action, period.

McNamara keeps asking about consequences.

Castro, Khrushchev's reaction, Berlin.

Gilpatrick suggests studying U .S.

vulnerabilities worldwide.

McNamara warns if Khrushchev hits Berlin, the risk of disaster would go way up.

Beschloss's overall take on day one.

Pretty critical.

He says the record doesn't quite support the superbly in command narrative.

Little discipline from JFK besides questions.

That central strategic question wasn't even asked until late evening by Bundy.

He argues the whole day rested on JFK's assumption they were certainly going to take out these missiles, despite JFK's own view that geography didn't matter much for nuclear war.

McNamara was confident the missiles didn't really change the military balance.

So why did JFK feel forced to act?

Beschloss says it wasn't the Monroe Doctrine, which JFK privately thought outdated.

It was Khrushchev's secrecy and deception after giving assurances.

That made it different from NATO missiles near the USSR.

Beschloss concludes JFK erred by ignoring Makony and making that unambiguous September pledge, locking himself in.

A vaguer warning might have allowed debate, explaining the missiles weren't a huge military threat like Eisenhower post -Sputnik.

Risky politically, maybe lose elections, but preferable to risking nuclear war over missiles that didn't fundamentally change the strategic reality, in JFK McNamara's view.

A fateful miscalculation.

He felt he couldn't back down without being impeached.

Okay, day two.

Wednesday, October 17th.

Kennedy tries to keep up appearances, meets the German foreign minister, goes swimming, visits church for a national day of prayer.

And the night before, he'd brought Adlai Stevenson, the UN ambassador, into the loop.

Stevenson immediately recalls Khrushchev complaining back in 58 about US bases in Turkey and Greece, asking how the US would like bases in Mexico or Cuba.

That context shapes Stevenson's thinking.

So on Wednesday, Stevenson sends Kennedy that handwritten note, basically saying, if we have bases in Turkey, they have a right to bases in Cuba, right?

An attack on Cuba justifies an attack on NATO bases.

He insists missile bases anywhere should be negotiable before the US acts.

Kennedy's reaction, showing the note to Sorensen and asking, tell me which side he's on,

is, well, revealing of their strained relationship.

To balance Stevenson's perceived softness, he calls in hardliners.

Acheson, McCloy, Lovett forms the crisis council, the XCOM.

Acheson brings that hardline dem view and Berlin experience.

Bolin, about to leave for France, advises against a strike, inevitably lead to war, and favors a private message to Khrushchev allowing a graceful exit.

But he still leaves for France to avoid suspicion.

Kennedy himself has to fly off for a campaign trip in Connecticut.

Can't cancel without raising alarms.

Privately tells aides, the campaign is over.

We've lost anyway.

But keeps up a brave face publicly.

While he's gone, the XCOM gathers secretly in Ball's windowless State Department room.

The core group plus VP, Stevenson, Dillon, McConey's Deputy Carter.

Beschloss notes Kennedy was better at managing this crisis than avoiding it.

The XCOM was diverse, more so than under Ike.

Beschloss paints two actions.

The Achesonians, Acheson, Nitsi, McConey, Dillon, from the era of US nuclear monopoly, believing US power forces Khrushchev's hand.

And the McNamara faction, McNamara, RFK, Sorensen, from the era of mutual vulnerability, seeing a strike as too risky, favoring calibrated response like Berlin 61.

This tension shapes the debate.

They keep arguing about the strategic balance.

Dillon, McConey, Nitsi, the Chiefs feel the missiles do significantly increase the threat.

But the majority, citing the McNamara, feel they do not at all.

Kennedy's view evolves.

Initially agrees with McNamara.

Geography doesn't matter.

Later reflects the key thing is they would have appeared to change the balance and appearances contribute to reality.

And the source adds that maybe the Soviets only had 20 ICBMs then, not the 50 the US thought.

So Cuba missiles could have nearly quadrupled the direct threat.

The perception was perhaps more dangerous than the understood

Looking at XCOM dynamics, Rusk tries to moderate, keep things from moving too far or too fast.

McNamara tries to control his own take charge instincts.

Robert Kennedy becomes really central, especially with JFK gone.

Provides constant, almost prosecutorial challenge to assumptions, cutting through ideology, vital in avoiding Bay of Pigs style groupthink.

Plus everyone knew little brother was watching Keeping Tabs for the President, a fascinating insight into White House And there was that shocking early idea on Wednesdays.

Handle it like the U -2 spy plane incident?

Yeah, pretend it didn't happen.

Call the missiles a mistake.

Bomb them quietly.

Assume the Soviets wouldn't dare complain.

The source says most of the group favored this course initially until they realized a strike was a major effort.

Sorensen lists the options being kicked around.

Political action then strike.

Strike with no warning.

Political action then blockade.

Full invasion.

Lots of uncertainty too.

Who controls the triggers?

Where would Soviets retaliate?

What about the Bay of Pigs prisoners?

That evening, RFK suggests JFK let XCOM meet without him present.

To encourage freer debate, stop people just guessing what the President wanted and falling into line.

Kennedy's amazed the secret is holding.

Jokes about leaks, then gets angry when Sorensen teases him about telling a columnist.

The secrecy pressure was immense.

Thursday, October 18th, JFK calls XCOM back.

Sorensen reports Rusk still favors a surgical strike without warning.

Diplomats, military, blockade folks oppose that.

Wallin's message urges letter to Khrushchev first.

And then Llewellyn Thompson, the Soviet expert, gives that really powerful warning.

Yeah, that an airstrike killing thousands of Russians could trigger counteraction.

Maybe Turkey, maybe Berlin, leading eventually, if not immediately, in nuclear war.

He stresses Khrushchev needs time to reflect.

Advisors need time to counsel him.

The source says Kennedy was much affected by this.

Understanding the adversary's likely reaction, avoiding cornering him, was critical.

The escalation scenarios were terrifying.

Strike Turkey, hit Soviet bases, lose Berlin.

In World War III, Sorensen is drafting contingency speeches, a post -strike address,

reluctantly ordered, attack and destroy, linking it to defending liberty everywhere, particularly Berlin urging calm.

He also drafts that airtight letter to Khrushchev.

Basically an ultimatum.

We have to act, but we'll hold off if you assure removal now.

Offers a meeting, discusses Turkey -Italy bases as in no way comparable.

But Sorensen himself finds it an ultimatum which no great power could accept.

Sending a messenger to wait.

Ridiculous.

Shows how hard it was to blend diplomacy with imminent military threat.

Thursday afternoon, Thompson warns a blockade isn't guaranteed to work.

Ships might not turn back.

U .S.

might have to shoot first.

Rusk suggests that if missiles are still being built by Tuesday, tell allies forces coming, warn Soviets not to retaliate.

Then that dramatic line, if we don't do this, we go down with a whimper.

Maybe it's better to go down with a bang.

Kennedy meets Acheson, who's impatient with XCOM, repetitive, leaderless, prefers Truman's style.

Dismisses JFK's Pearl Harbor analogy as just repeating RFK's cliches.

Tension between the methodical process and the old guard's desire for action.

Then the big meeting.

Gromyko arrives, 5 p .m.

Thursday.

Rusk and Thompson advise JFK, don't show him the photos, don't demand removal yet.

It gives Khrushchev the initiative while U .S.

policy is still fluid.

Thompson's analogy.

Telling your wife you know she's cheating changes everything.

Be ready.

Bundy advises.

Listen, if Gromyko raises missiles, cut him off if he threatens.

Gromyko comes in, repeats the usual lines on Berlin.

Kennedy gives the usual U .S.

lines.

They talk vaguely about a November summit.

Then Gromyko brings up Cuba.

But amazingly, he doesn't reveal the missiles.

No.

He complains about the U .S.

anti -Cuba campaign.

Exile piracy.

Worries about a blockade.

Says it could lead to great misfortunes.

USSR won't be a mere spectator.

Calls Cuba a baby facing a giant.

No threat.

And then he gives that instructed statement.

Reading from notes.

Claims Soviet aid is by no means offensive.

Purely defensive.

If it were otherwise, the Soviet government would never become involved.

A flat -out lie.

Delivered face to face.

Kennedy's response is amazing.

He calmly sends for and reads his own September warning about offensive weapons.

Rusk sees the Soviet interpreter Blanche.

Gromyko keeps a poker face.

Kennedy later tells O'Donnell he was dying to confront him.

Says Guamtu claimed it.

Had never injured Khrushchev's mind.

Kennedy calls it incredible to sit there and watch the lies.

This direct deception seems to really harden Kennedy's resolve.

Gromyko's later defense was weak sauce, right?

Said he didn't lie because JFK didn't ask about nuclear missiles.

Pretty much.

Claimed weapons were defensive.

Small quantity.

Would never threaten anyone.

Said he was told to encourage quiet diplomacy if JFK complained.

A real exercise in semantics.

As Gromyko leaves, Kennedy reminds him of Vienna big powers must avoid confrontation calls.

Cuba events.

Inexplicable.

Gromyko thinks Kennedy seemed nervous.

Afterwards, Kennedy regrets not being more direct.

May be worried about looking timid.

Rusk Thompson assure him he did right, not showing his hand.

Kennedy also cools on the Nov Summit idea.

Imagines Khrushchev brandishing missiles.

Thompson tells Dobrin and the summit is off.

Robert Lovett finds Kennedy fuming at Gromyko's lies.

Lovett recommends the blockade.

Gradual pressure.

Look ridiculous if we grabbed a sledgehammer to kill a fly.

Easy to escalate, hard to deescalate.

This chat seems to strongly push the Kennedys towards blockade.

That night, while Rusk hosts Gromyko for dinner, and Khrushchev later bizarrely claims Rusk was drunk, XCOM meets downstairs.

Consensus shifts to blockade a quarantine.

McNamara argues it keeps options open.

Stravo.

11 for quarantine, 6 for strike.

The tide is turned.

But back in the maybe unravels a bit.

Shows he's still weighing it.

He asks Sorensen for the speech draft for Monday, ready sooner if needed.

The leak deadline looms.

Friday, October 19th.

More pressure.

Before JFK leaves for another campaign leg, Rusk, Bundy, and the Joint Chiefs tell him they now endorse the airstrike.

Kennedy tells RFK Sorensen get XCOM together.

He's impatient.

A bit disgusted.

People are changing minds again.

Especially Bundy.

RFK, little brother watching, later complaints about Bundy flip -flopping.

Sorensen agrees, not one of Bundy's best weeks.

JFK didn't like it.

Beschloss suggests Kennedy expected loyalty.

Maybe Bundy backing his quarantine lien.

But JFK was also building a record of consulting the Chiefs.

Bundy likely felt obligated to give his real judgment, trusting his relationship with JFK.

Personal dynamics again.

Friday Morning XCOM.

Bundy reports JFK now favors decisive action.

The strike.

Sorensen objects didn't decide Thursday.

RFK insists people should still speak freely.

It's too vital.

The hardliners push again.

Atchison.

Now or never for an airstrike.

Taylor agrees.

McNair says he'll prep, but doesn't favor it.

Then Robert Kennedy makes that argument the source calls crucial.

He says, with maybe a faint smile, it's very difficult for JFK to order a sneak attack.

Not the American way.

Kill thousands without warning.

Better to act, allowing Soviets room to pull back.

The source says Dillon felt this was the real turning point.

Few doubted RFK spoke for his brother, framing it morally, historically a powerful counter to the purely military logic.

Saturday evening Oct 20th.

Things get hotter.

Bundy sees new photos.

Some MRBMs look apparently ready to fire.

Call Chicago.

Situations so hairy, JFK must come home now.

Leaks are spreading.

Salinger denies invasion rumors.

McNamara denies missiles are operational.

The clock is ticking faster.

Sorensen works all night on the speech draft, studying Wilson and FDR war speeches.

And Moscow Kohler has that weird insulting lunch with Kozlov.

In Chicago, JFK cancels, flies back, lands 1 .33 p .m.

Saturday.

See Sorensen's draft, swims with RFK, convenes NSC meeting 2 .3 p .m.

The CIA brief is grim.

Four MRBM sites operational.

Eight hour firing time.

Two IRBM sites spotted.

One may be operational in six weeks.

Bombers, fighters, Sam's also found.

The threat is immediate and bigger than they thought.

RFK offers the stravos.

JFK declines, doesn't want a written record of who is right if he chooses wrong.

McHoney warns if Soviets learn the US knows everything, they might launch preemptively.

Rusk summarizes strike versus quarantine arguments, hands JFK a note endorsing quarantine.

McNamara repeats his core case.

Soviets retaliate somewhere regardless.

Strike kills Soviets, risks losing control, escalation.

Quarantine is the only course compatible with America's leadership.

Suggests getting missiles out might require concessions later.

Turkey -Italy missiles, maybe Guantanamo limits.

Roller counters.

Missiles will get camouflaged soon.

Strike window closing.

Kilpatrick frames it.

Limited action and unlimited action.

Better start limited.

Most seem to agree.

Kennedy's closing thoughts Saturday.

Check one last time if a truly surgical strike is possible.

If not, it's quarantine.

Predicts terrific domestic heat.

Expects a Berlin move anyway.

Says worst course would be to do nothing.

Leaving missiles, let's castrokes, shoot Americans with impunity using prisoners.

Action is needed.

Limited is preferred.

Doing nothing is unacceptable.

The source weaves in a lot about Adlai Stevenson here.

His views, his difficult relationship with JFK helps understand the dynamics.

Stevenson flies in Saturday, wants one last day's effort to avoid a clash.

Then you knows.

Beschloss provides context.

Stevenson, popular dem, UN jaw beneath him, saw JFK as cold and ruthless.

Slept with second all.

Nightmares of world blowing up.

Stark personal toll.

JFK's handling.

Stevenson had a real political base.

Resignation risky.

So JFK consulted him ostentatiously, but undermined him.

Hoped to sideline him in London.

A long and troubled story.

Roots in 56, 60 campaigns.

RFK found Stevenson indecisive.

JFK suspected Stevenson played games, used crude language about him.

Stevenson, shocked by JFK's Irish gutter talk, saw him as tougher and bloodier.

Post -election, Stevenson expected state debt.

Got UN.

Shocked, hurt,

angry.

Ball's assessment is harsh.

Stevenson temperamental.

Dramatizing himself.

Living a phony life at UN.

Surrounded by rich females.

For RFK, also harsh.

Untough.

Didn't face reality.

Wind.

JFK called him a pain in the ass.

Jackie liked him.

JFK couldn't stand him.

Used Jackie's friendship as a distraction.

Stevenson felt slighted.

Resented Kennedy avarice.

JFK, RFK liked to shock him.

Called disarmament propaganda.

Deep friction there.

Even as Stevenson grappled with the stakes.

Saturday meeting, Stevenson proposes.

Include negotiation in the announcement speech.

After missiles gone.

Discuss demilitarization of Cuba.

Soviet bases in Guantanamo.

Consider withdrawing Jupiters.

Linking action to diplomacy up front.

Mixed reaction.

McNamara suggested similar privately, not publicly up front.

Sorensen.

Russia should be in the prisoner's dock, not offer deals.

Dilla -McConney.

Concessions legitimize Khrushchev.

Give him victory.

Kennedy's response.

Can't give up Guantanamo now.

Suggests US is frightened.

Willing to discuss Turkey -Italy if Soviets raise it later.

But no bargains over our bases.

Stevenson presses.

Kennedy holds firm.

No bargains.

After RFK complains to JFK, Stevenson not strong enough.

Gets someone else.

JFK defends him.

Went too far on Guantanamo.

But showed courage, risking being called a peizer.

Stevenson's poignant line.

Maybe we need a coward in the room when we were talking about nuclear war.

Finally, Sunday, October 21st.

The decision day.

Washington looks handsome.

JFK gives XCOM breakfast.

McNamara recalls a poll.

Group now favors airstrike again, 9 to 7.

Still divided.

After mass, JFK grills Generals Taylor and Sweeney on the strike.

The killer assessment.

Best they can do is destroy 90 % of known missiles.

With maybe 18 unknown, that could leave 21 untouched.

And it requires hundreds of sorties, leading almost inevitably to a full -scale invasion.

The surgical strike is effectively ruled out by the military's own numbers.

RFK arrives.

Suggests, starting with quarantine, play for the breaks.

McConnie agrees.

If quarantine fails, then escalate to strike invasion.

Provides a sequence.

And Kennedy agrees.

The decision is quarantine.

Rusclater said they didn't think Khrushchev would nuke them.

But we couldn't know it.

Could be a long crisis.

RFK expects a very, very difficult winter.

Decision made.

Outcome uncertain.

Beschloss analyzes.

Kennedy bought.

Six days of quiet deliberation.

Learned from Berlin not to rush.

Time was fortuitous.

An earlier decision likely would have been the strike.

Kennedy benefited from secrecy, controlling the narrative.

Knew revealing a clumsily risk global backlash.

Took care the story didn't break in a way that undermined support.

Beschloss' key point.

Six days of quiet deliberation were a gift that no American president will probably ever enjoy again.

Modern media would likely break the story in hours.

Yeah.

In today's world, that noisy furor would make a moderate path like quarantine much harder.

Allies demanding inaction.

Hawks demanding strikes.

Questions about hiding info.

The speed of information fundamentally changes crisis management.

Sunday afternoon.

Decision made.

NSC meets to prepare.

Rusk reports the huge diplomatic effort.

Letters to 43 governments.

You know ass resolutions.

Quarantine proclamation.

Embassy security.

Admiral Anderson vows, Mr.

President, the Navy will not let you down.

They discuss evacuation.

Mount weather.

Rusk thought it psychologically silly.

Kennedy reminded to tell his wife.

And the source gives those insights into Jacqueline Kennedy.

Her influence often hidden.

Saw her role as distraction, but red cables engaged with policy indirectly.

Approached things aesthetically.

Saw JFK as a historical hero.

Connected him to Henry V.

Brought style to the White House.

A contrast to his earlier life.

Joe Kennedy pushed for the marriage.

She invested JFK's career with romance.

Initially feared being a political liability, but her popularity grew.

Boosted his image.

Marriage had tensions.

His affairs.

Her dislike of politics.

Spending disagreements.

Often traveled alone.

Had sharp views on people.

JFK valued her aesthetic judgment.

Her language has helped diplomacy.

Abu Simbel projects showed her initiative.

Beyond culture, McNamara felt JFK consulted her on many issues.

Clifton.

She wouldn't advise his staff.

She would advise him.

Ormsby Gore heard her push for normalizing Soviet relations.

She had real, if private, influence.

That Sunday walk in the Rose Garden after the quarantine decision, JFK calls her out.

Spalding suggests he was sharing the possible horror.

A moment of profound connection under immense pressure.

And her reaction to the shelter question.

JFK asks if she wants to go to Mount Weather.

Her reply, with that unerring sense of both history and drama.

If war starts, she wants to be with him in the Oval Office.

A powerful human moment amidst the strategic calculations.

So after days of intense debate, weighing military force against political maneuver, strategy, escalation risk, allies, domestic politics fueled by uncertainty, deception, exhaustion, and complex human dynamics, the decision on Sunday, October 21, according to this chapter, was set.

Quarantine first.

This chapter gives an incredible detailed look inside that pressure cooker.

It shows how these huge decisions mix cold strategy with human factors, past experiences, and the sheer weight of responsibility.

Yeah, what really stands out is just how messy it is, isn't it?

It's not clean lines on a map.

It's personalities, misreadings, fears, political pressures, ethical dilemmas, all swirling together.

The source makes it clear these history -changing decisions are forged in that human crucible.

Absolutely.

And here's that final thought to leave you with, drawing from Beschloss's analysis in the source.

Think about our world now.

Hyper -connected, instant information everywhere.

How differently might a crisis like this unfold today without those six days of relative quiet Kennedy managed to preserve?

Could a measured step -by -step response like the quarantine even survive the immediate global spotlight and political storm?

Something to ponder.

And that concludes our deep dive into this chapter of the crisis years.