Chapter 1: Almost Midnight

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Welcome to the Deep Dive.

Today, we're going right back, immersing ourselves really, into the moment a huge global crisis started to unfold.

And we're doing that using a fantastic source.

The very first chapter, almost midnight, from Michael Beschloss's The Crisis Years, Kennedy and Khrushchev.

Exactly.

Think of this as, well, your front row seat to those first, almost hidden signs of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

It's all about understanding those initial tremors.

Beschloss really sets the scene, doesn't he?

He drops us right into Sunday, October 14th, 1962, and then what happens immediately after.

Yeah, and it's not just facts.

It's how Beschloss weaves together the history with the feelings and viewpoints of the people actually there.

Right, so our mission, if you like, is to really get a feel for those first critical hours.

The little decisions, the reactions, the things that set the stage for this massive Cold War showdown.

Okay, so let's kick off with that Sunday, October 14th.

Kennedy's out campaigning, right?

Pittsburgh, Niagara Falls, looks like business as usual.

Totally standard political stuff on the surface.

But then Beschloss flags this certain shift of plans.

Kennedy doesn't fly straight back to DC.

Goes to New York City.

Why?

What does Beschloss suggest is going on there?

Well, Beschloss presents this New York stop as kind of the first little hint something unusual might be happening.

It's all very hush -hush.

Right, Adlai Stevenson, the UN ambassador, gets pulled in.

Yeah, flown in by helicopter from Rhinebeck, just an hour with Kennedy at the Carlisle Hotel.

Officially, they talked Cuba, the Congo.

But then Congressman Torbert McDonald joins them for dinner, a Kennedy insider.

Exactly.

That signals it wasn't just routine, you know.

Beschloss implies that even before they had the proof, there was a sense that Cuba needed top -level, very quiet attention.

Okay, interesting.

So while that's happening in New York, Beschloss cuts to a totally different scene, atmosphere -wise, a hidden CIA place near the Capitol.

Yeah, and this is where the actual evidence starts coming together.

CIA photo guys are bent over these fresh U -2 spy plane pictures.

Pictures taken that morning.

That morning, yes, over Western Cuba.

It was a crucial flight, the first really good look they'd had in over a month.

Because there had been rumors, right?

Whispers about Soviet missiles.

Oh, absolutely.

For weeks.

Beschloss notes, intel reports, Cuban exiles.

They were all saying the Soviets were building up something big, maybe even offensive missiles.

Kennedy okayed this U -2 flight, basically, to find out for sure.

Settle the nerves or confirm the fears.

But, as Beschloss writes, Kennedy's own Soviet experts were doubtful.

They didn't think Khrushchev would actually do it.

Yeah, that was the conventional wisdom.

It just seemed like such a massive gamble for Khrushchev, putting nukes 90 miles from Florida, secretly, with Castro involved.

It didn't fit their models of Soviet thinking.

Exactly, it felt too risky, too provocative.

They just couldn't quite believe Khrushchev would go that far.

It sort of defied their understanding of his strategy.

Okay, so fast forward to Monday morning, October 15th.

Kennedy's back, gets to the Oval Office a bit late, feeling tired from the trip.

Right, and Beschloss contrasts this sort of weary start with a seemingly normal routine, reviewing the President's intelligence checklist.

That checklist sounds almost mundane, given what's about to break.

It really is.

Beschloss highlights the informal, almost gossipy stuff in it.

Saudi airspace, squabbles in Laos, the Brazilian President's personal life, the German defense minister's drinking.

So a total disconnect from the Cuba situation brewing.

A massive disconnect.

Beschloss seems to use it to show how unaware the very top levels were, just hours before the news hit.

Life just carrying on as normal while this huge thing is about to explode.

And then Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Ben Bella arrives for a state visit.

Beschloss even mentions Caroline Kennedy watching the Honor Guard.

Yeah, it's a nice little detail.

He uses it to sort of contrast leadership styles, maybe.

Mentions how someone like Charles de Gaulle would have been horrified by Ben Bella chatting with the kids.

So highlighting Kennedy's more informal style.

Maybe that.

Or perhaps hinting at a different set of priorities compared to the old European Guard.

It's a subtle touch.

But while all this diplomatic ceremony is going on, back at that CIA outpost, things are getting intense.

Oh yeah,

this is the moment.

Beschloss describes an analyst looking at the San Cristobal photos and spotting something definite.

Not just suspicions anymore.

No, clear evidence.

A pattern.

Missile tents, special propellant vehicles, the missile transporters themselves, erectors, a launch pad.

It was all there.

And the reaction?

Arthur Lundl, the head of the photo interpretation center.

He knew immediately how big this was.

Beschloss quotes him.

Don't leave this room.

We might be sitting on the biggest story of our time.

Just chilling.

Wow, so how did that news travel up the chain?

Beschloss details that, right?

He does.

Lundl tells Ray Klein, CIA's deputy director for intelligence.

And Klein's reaction, quoted by Beschloss, is basically, oh boy, the excrement is really gonna collide with the ventilation system now.

He knew the impact.

Instantly.

But interestingly, Klein doesn't call Kennedy directly.

He calls McGeorge Bundy the national security advisor, maybe feeling the weight of delivering that news.

And Bundy's at a dinner party when he gets the call.

Yeah, but he gets the gravity straight away.

Beschloss says Bundy realized they were maybe closer to nuclear war than ever before.

But he doesn't tell Kennedy that night.

Correct.

And this is a huge decision.

Bundy holds off.

Why?

What was the thinking there?

Beschloss outlines Bundy's reasoning.

Kennedy was tired.

He had guests, including diplomats and a reporter.

Other key people were scattered.

Bundy felt secrecy was paramount.

And while his quote is something like, a quiet evening and a night of sleep were the best preparation you could have.

A controversial decision, looking back.

Definitely.

The implications of waiting, even those few hours.

It's something historians really examine.

So Tuesday morning, October 16th, Bundy goes to Kennedy's bedroom.

He tells him.

Yes, and Beschloss paints Kennedy's first reaction

as anger,

a sense of personal betrayal.

Khrushchev can't do this to me.

That's the quote, like a line had been crossed personally, but then almost immediately resolve kicks in.

One way or another, the missiles have to go.

Right, immediate determination.

But underneath, Beschloss notes was this unspoken horror, knowing what bombing those sites could actually mean, the catastrophic potential.

So what does Kennedy do first?

He takes charge,

takes a bath, gets dressed quickly, tells Bundy to set up an emergency top secret meeting in the cabinet room, staff.

And calls his brother.

Immediately calls Bobby Kennedy, tells him they're in great trouble.

And Bobby was actually meeting with Richard Helms from the CIA already.

Yeah, a pre -scheduled meeting.

Supposedly about a Soviet defector, but Beschloss makes it clear that Cuba was already on both their minds.

And Bobby asks Helms directly.

Says a mess around.

Dick, is it true they found Russian missiles in Cuba?

And Helms just confirms it.

Yes, Bob, they have.

And then they had another meeting scheduled about covert stuff in Cuba.

Right, the special group augmented, the committee dealing with Operation Mongoose, the anti -Castro operations.

So they had to go to that meeting pretending nothing was wrong.

Exactly.

That was crucial, according to Beschloss.

Maintain the facade.

Don't let on, they know about the missiles.

Don't spook the Soviets.

Don't cause a panic.

Beschloss gives some background on Mongoose then.

What was it?

Basically this huge CIA covert oppa to get rid of Castro.

Destabilize, undermine the works.

The largest ever, he says.

Yeah, paramilitary raids, spying, economic sabotage, even assassination plots with the mafia, which is pretty wild.

But it wasn't working.

Largely failing, according to Helms' assessment reported by Beschloss.

And you have to think, that context, the failure of these covert methods must have been in Kennedy's mind as he's facing this direct missile threat.

So back in that special group meeting, Bobby Kennedy had to act.

He had to put on a show.

Beschloss says he actually feigned to being angry about Mongoose not working well enough.

Complained about the botched effort.

All to hide the real crisis.

A remarkable bit of acting under pressure, as Beschloss portrays it.

Afterwards, Kennedy finally sees the photos himself and Beschloss gives us that raw reaction.

Shit, shit, shit, the shock was real.

Kennedy then gets Sorensen to check his past statements about missiles in Cuba.

Yeah, he wanted to know what he'd said publicly before.

And Sorensen found something important.

Which was?

That before July 1962, Kennedy hadn't specifically warned against offensive missiles in Cuba.

He talked about Soviet buildup, defensive arms,

but hadn't drawn that clear red line on offensive ones publicly.

And by July, the Soviets were probably already moving them in.

Beschloss suggests they were likely well underway.

So that lack of a clear prior warning became a factor in how they decided to respond later.

And people around Kennedy who didn't know yet, they could tell something was wrong.

Oh yeah, Beschloss describes aides noticing him being agitated, restless, nervous, dick kicks.

David Powers said he looked like someone had just told him the house is on fire.

Even Salinger, the press secretary, noticed but got the reason wrong.

Yeah, Salinger thought Kennedy was just annoyed about the Ben Bella meeting.

Shows how tightly held the secret was initially.

Speaking of Ben Bella, his next move didn't help perceptions, did it?

Not at all.

Right after the White House, Beschloss notes he flies to Havana, stands with Castro, and they jointly demand the US give up Guantanamo Bay.

Ouch.

Yeah, Beschloss suggests this just confirmed Kennedy's rather negative view of some non -aligned leaders, saw them as playing games, maybe hostile.

Okay, then the big meeting, the secret one in the cabinet room, who was there?

The key players,

Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Bobby Kennedy, others,

and Beschloss reveals something really significant.

The tape recorder.

Yes, Kennedy had secretly installed a taping system.

It shows he knew right from the start how historic this was, he wanted a record.

And Lindahl and another CIA expert, Gray Beal, they presented the photo evidence.

They did, laid it all out.

Beschloss gives snippets of the dialogue, pointing out the medium -range ballistic missile site, the camps.

How did they know it was that type of missile?

Primarily by its length, visible in the photos.

They stressed the site wasn't operational yet, but the gear was there.

Still some uncertainty on the exact timeline for readiness.

Okay, so while this intense meeting is unfolding in DC, Beschloss shifts us again, Moscow.

Right.

Ambassador Foy Kohler is having his first formal meeting with Khrushchev at the Kremlin.

What's Khrushchev like?

Beschloss describes him looking pretty relaxed, just back from vacation on the Black Sea.

He even notes it was a post -Stalin thing for Soviet leaders to take long breaks away from Moscow.

A slight change.

And does Kohler ask about Cuba?

About the rumors?

He does.

And Khrushchev, according to Beschloss, just flat out denies everything.

Denies missiles.

Completely.

Complains about US spy planes buzzing Soviet ships going to Cuba, sure.

But insists,

absolutely no offensive weapons intended for Cuba.

Says the new port is just for fishing.

Did he try to justify anything?

He did bring up the US Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Iran.

Sort of a you do it to deflection.

But still maintained he wasn't putting offensive stuff in Cuba.

He even acknowledged Castro's talk about the port caused Kennedy political trouble and suggested they talk after the US elections.

Wow.

So, meant did Kohler report back to Washington?

This is just incredible.

Kohler's cable.

Beschloss highlights.

Completely misread Khrushchev.

He called him charming.

Extremely amiable.

Said the conversation was very reassuring.

Reassuring while Kennedy is looking at photos of missiles.

The disconnect is staggering.

Beschloss really points up the irony, the danger of that misinterpretation based on Khrushchev's deception.

Back in Washington, Kennedy meets with some journalists off the record that afternoon.

How's he holding up?

Visibly stressed, according to Beschloss.

Distracted, intense.

Talked about the survival of our country.

Avoiding the third, perhaps the last war.

Even recited some verse about a bullfighter about facing danger alone.

The pressure is showing.

Clearly.

And it continued that evening at a dinner party at the Alsop's place in Georgetown.

What happened there?

Beschloss describes him as deeply preoccupied, kept asking people, you know, what did the Soviets do historically when they were backed into a corner?

Not exactly light dinner conversation.

No.

Mrs.

Alsop, Isaiah Berlin, they both noticed his intense focus, how it kind of disrupted things.

Berlin even wondered if Kennedy felt

this urgency to act.

Beschloss digs into Kennedy's personality here, doesn't he?

He does.

He talks about this contrast, the upbeat image versus a dark vein of sadness and awareness of tragedy, failure, maybe some fatalism from his family, his own health scares.

And since his dark humor too.

Yeah, joking about owing the presidency to Cook County, Illinois.

And this fascination with death, accidents, risk -taking,

reckless driving, dismissing security concerns.

Beschloss suggests this tomorrow we die streak is part of understanding Kennedy.

There was a moment after that dinner, Kennedy returning to the White House.

A really poignant image Beschloss paints.

Kennedy just staring at the empty streets, saying the presidency is the best job in the world if it weren't for the Russians.

Captures the weight he felt right then.

And then Russ shows up with Kohler's cables from Moscow, the reassuring ones.

Yes.

And Kennedy's reaction, pure anger at being lied to so blatantly.

He called Kristofin a moral gangster.

To Bobby, yes.

Said the whole thing was one gigantic fabric of lies.

Beschloss emphasizes this was a moment of realizing they'd perhaps misjudged Khrushchev, maybe even deceive themselves.

And the reality of potential thermonuclear war hit home hard.

So Beschloss wraps up this first chapter, how?

With some really sobering thoughts.

The sheer irony that this crisis, the one everyone feared, seemingly arose from miscalculation, deception,

maybe even accident.

The very things Kennedy worried about.

He mentions Kennedy reading Failsafe.

Yeah, that novel about accidental nuclear war shows how real those fears were.

Beschloss also notes the timing just three years since Kennedy first met Khrushchev under very different circumstances.

And a quick mention of Speaker McCormack just grounding us in the political realities back home.

So just to recap for you listening, we've definitely gone through all of chapter one almost midnight from Beschloss's The Crisis Years.

Absolutely.

We've hit the key events of that Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, October 14th through 16th.

The intelligence coming in, the early political moves, the diplomatic deception, how people reacted initially,

plus Beschloss's context and analysis.

All the main figures and dates from that chapter are covered.

And really the feeling Beschloss leaves you with at the end of almost midnight is that stark contrast, isn't it?

That ordinary Sunday giving way almost instantly to this terrifying reality.

Makes you think about luck, chance, and history, and the incredible pressure on leaders making decisions with, well, potentially world -ending consequences based on incomplete information and a whole lot of uncertainty.