Chapter 2: He’s Younger Than My Own Son

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Think about the razor's edge of history for a moment.

The 1960 U .S.

presidential election was one of those times, wasn't it?

Absolutely.

So incredibly close.

You had this really tight race between Kennedy and Nixon.

But when you start digging a little deeper, you realize the Soviet Union and Nikita Khrushchev were almost like a third unspoken contender.

Their presence just looming large.

Right.

A huge shadow over everything.

We're going to plunge into a specific chapter today titled, He's Younger Than My Own Son, to really understand how this global dynamic shaped that pivotal election.

That title itself is fascinating, isn't it?

It immediately highlights the personal element in this massive geopolitical struggle.

It really does.

It sets up this contrast between the established Soviet leader and the young American hopeful, which is crucial for understanding the author's analysis of the period.

Absolutely.

Our mission in this deep dive is to unpack the complex relationship between Kennedy and Khrushchev as the 1960 election unfolded against the backdrop of the Cold War.

We'll be extracting the core events, the strategic political moves,

the diplomatic currents flowing beneath the surface, and of course, Beshlas's insightful perspective on all of it, based solely on this chapter.

OK, let's get into it.

OK, let's unpack this.

One of the early significant moments was Khrushchev's very public visit to the US in 1959, a first for a Soviet premier.

What struck you as most important about that trip?

Well, what's fascinating here is just the sheer novelty of it.

I mean, for the leader of the Soviet Union to tour America, New York, Los Angeles,

even places like Des Moines.

Right.

Middle America.

Yeah, it was a major, major event.

And of course, the culmination was his private time with Eisenhower at Camp David.

Camp David, yeah.

It signaled a potential, however fragile, shift in the Cold War dynamic, a moment of direct engagement at the highest level.

And right in the middle of all this, Kennedy, then a relatively new senator, felt it was crucial to attend a Senate Foreign Relations Committee tea with Khrushchev in September 59.

He even cut short a trip to Ohio.

Why do you think that brief encounter was so important for him at that moment, especially with polls showing him trailing Nixon after the kitchen debate?

Well, if we connect this to the bigger picture of a presidential campaign,

the optics,

the optics of being seen engaging with the leader of your nation's primary adversary were incredibly valuable.

Sure.

Projecting competence.

Exactly.

It allowed Kennedy to project an image of being knowledgeable and capable on foreign policy, a crucial area during the Cold War.

Plus the fact that Hubert Humphrey had received significant positive attention for his meeting with Khrushchev the previous year in Moscow.

That likely also played a role.

Kennedy envied that a bit.

Right.

Humphrey got headlines.

It's interesting, though, because earlier in 59, Kennedy seemed much less interested in engaging with the Soviets.

Oh, yeah.

When Ambassador Mikhail Menshikov, you know, smiling Mike, tried to meet with potential presidential candidates, Kennedy apparently gave him a very brief and, well, cool reception.

What might have shifted his perspective by September?

That's a good question.

It raises an important point about the evolution of Kennedy's strategy, maybe.

Initially,

perhaps he felt that appearing too eager to engage with the Soviets could be politically damaging given the strong anti -communist sentiment.

Made sense at the time.

But as the campaign progressed and Khrushchev's visit garnered so much attention,

Kennedy likely recognized the need to demonstrate his own ability to handle this critical relationship.

You know, maybe that earlier dismissive treatment of Menshikov gave way to a more strategic calculation as the presidential race intensified.

So at this Senate tea on September 16th, 1959, Kennedy, being junior, mostly observed as seasoned senators like Fulbright and Nixon questioned Khrushchev on everything.

American military bases abroad, outer space, Soviet subversions, censorship.

The big topics.

Right.

But he was taking notes.

What do those brief notes tell us about his initial impressions of Khrushchev?

What stands out in those notes, the tan suit, French cuffs, short, stocky, is Kennedy's eye for detail is almost like anthropological observation of this powerful figure.

The remark about vodka and rocket launches hints at a certain skepticism or perhaps amusement at Khrushchev's pronouncements.

It suggests he was trying to size up the man as much as understand his policies.

And then when they were introduced, Khrushchev, seemingly aware of the political landscape, told Kennedy he looked too young to be a senator.

Ah, yeah.

And that he had heard Kennedy had a great future.

Kennedy later told Mike Mansfield that seeing Khrushchev in the flesh was vital.

Why that emphasis on a personal encounter?

Well, for someone aspiring to lead nation during such a tense period, understanding your adversary on a personal level is well, invaluable.

It goes beyond reading reports and diplomatic cables.

More than just paper.

Exactly.

Seeing his demeanor, his mannerisms, even his sense of humor, as Kennedy noted later, provides a different kind of intelligence, a gut feeling about the person you might have to negotiate with on matters of global survival.

And Khrushchev, in his own recollections, even said he liked Kennedy's face, finding him sometimes stern but often smiling.

And a Soviet diplomat, Georgi Kornienko, apparently gave Khrushchev a positive early assessment of Kennedy.

There's a lighter note, too, with Fulbright sending Kennedy his autographed place card, joking about it, helping him after the revolution.

It highlights the underlying tension even in a seemingly civil encounter, doesn't it?

Absolutely.

It's a perfect encapsulation of the Cold War anxieties lurking just beneath the surface of these diplomatic exchanges.

Even in jest, the fear of Soviet influence and internal upheaval was present.

Later that evening, Kennedy spoke to the Ohio Bankers Association, sharing his impressions of Khrushchev's inferiority complex, his humor, his energy, and his prediction of a communist future.

But Kennedy countered firmly.

I don't believe it.

I believe his children can be free, but it depends on us.

What's the core insight here about Kennedy's approach?

The key takeaway here is Kennedy positioning himself as a staunch defender of freedom and American values in direct opposition to Soviet ideology.

Right, drawing a clear line.

Even in sharing Khrushchev's views, he immediately offers a powerful rebuttal, signaling his own resolve and his belief in American exceptionalism and the enduring power of freedom.

Now, let's shift gears a bit.

Let's talk about what shaped Kennedy's own views on the

The chapter makes it clear that his upbringing, especially his father Joseph Kennedy's diplomatic career, played a significant role.

How did that early exposure influence his understanding of global affairs?

Oh, massively.

Joseph Kennedy's ambassadorship to the UK, coupled with his earlier business dealings in Europe, it immersed his children in international politics from a really young age.

Not your average childhood?

Not at all.

The dinner table discussions, the foreign trips, even assigning them tasks at the embassy, it all fostered a deep awareness of global dynamics, far beyond what most young Americans would have experienced then.

And his siblings also had firsthand encounters with the Soviet Union.

His older brother, Joe Jr., visited in 34 and was apparently quite enthusiastic, even debating their father about it.

Right, came back impressed apparently.

Right.

And in 36, Rose and Kathleen Kennedy visited Moscow.

What were their impressions and how might those have informed Jack's understanding?

Well, their accounts offered a more sort of ground level view.

Rose noted the suppression of religion and the presence of the secret police, but she also acknowledged the improvements in living standards for the masses compared to the czarist era.

A mixed picture.

Exactly.

And Kathleen's impressions would have added another layer to this complex picture.

These personal stories, even with their contradictions, would have provided a more nuanced understanding of the Soviet reality beyond just the official pronouncements.

Kennedy himself also engaged with the Soviet Union through reading, particularly John Gunther's Inside Europe, which discussed Stalin's purges, but also Soviet progress and maybe a focus on peace.

What was Kennedy's immediate reaction to this broader picture?

His journal entry at the time, Facism Sick is the thing for Germany and Italy, Communism for Russia and Democracy for America and England.

It reveals a somewhat simplistic, maybe compartmentalized view of global ideologies back then.

Kind of neat boxes.

Yeah, it suggests he was trying to categorize and understand these systems within their specific national contexts.

He even took a Russian history course at Harvard, though his B - grade suggests it wasn't exactly his primary focus.

Later, in 1939, he worked at the American embassy in Paris and then traveled to the Soviet Union himself.

His personal impressions then seem quite negative.

Why the stark contrast with some of the earlier family accounts?

Well, his 1939 trip coincided with a particularly repressive period in the Soviet Union.

His description of it as crude, backward, hopelessly bureaucratic reflects a first -hand encounter with the realities of the Stalinist regime.

Okay.

And his recommendation of Alice Leon Moe's critical book, Blind Date with Mars, further underscores this negative assessment.

Yet Chip and Avis Bolin, who were experienced diplomats in Moscow at the time, remembered Kennedy as having charm and a quick mind and being open -minded about the Soviet Union, a quality they found unusual then.

How do we reconcile these differing views?

It's possible that Kennedy's private assessment was more nuanced than his

public pronouncements, or maybe his initial negative impressions were tempered by further observation and reflection later.

The Bolin's perspective suggests an intellectual curiosity and a willingness to engage with different viewpoints, even if he ultimately held critical opinions.

It's also noted he didn't anticipate the immediate outbreak of WWII, even with Germany's moves on Danzig.

Interesting.

Even after the war, his early Cold War rhetoric as a congressman was quite hawkish, wasn't it?

Criticizing Roosevelt's handling of Eastern Europe at Yalta.

Yes, very much so.

But the chapter argues his views evolved.

What were some of the key factors that led to this shift?

Well, travel and his growing political ambitions were certainly significant factors.

His 1951 trip to Western Europe led him to question the likelihood of a Red Army invasion, and his conversation with Eisenhower about the Kremlin's motivations, was it ideology or just raw power, seems to have been influential.

By the time he was in the Senate, especially on the Foreign Relations Committee from 1957, his focus shifted towards a more active engagement with global issues.

You see that in his stance on Algerian independence and his call for promoting diversity within the Soviet bloc.

The Democratic Party itself had different factions on how to approach the Soviets, right?

The Acheson hardliners versus others like Stevenson, Bowles, Harriman, who wanted more engagement.

How did Kennedy try to navigate this divide?

He tried to strike a balance, really, using strong Cold War language to appeal to a broad electorate, while also signaling a willingness to explore diplomatic avenues.

His praise for Kennan's ideas on East -West talks is an example of this kind of nuanced approach.

Walking a fine line.

Exactly.

However, a private taped conversation from July 1959 reveals his underlying pessimism about fundamentally improving relations.

He was grappling with the core motivations of the Soviet Union, what he called a motive force, and he seemed to believe that national independence was the real magic power against Soviet expansion.

Now let's talk about the spirit of Camp David.

Khrushchev's seemingly productive meetings with Eisenhower led to a temporary thaw in relations.

What was the Republican hope surrounding this?

Well, the Republicans, particularly Vice President Nixon, hoped that this apparent easing of tensions, this spirit of Camp David would be seen as a diplomatic success under their leadership.

Good for the election.

Right, and thus boost their chances in the upcoming 1960 election.

It looked like progress.

Kennedy was publicly skeptical, wasn't he?

At the University of Rochester, he dismissed the idea that Khrushchev had abandoned his belief in communism's eventual triumph.

What was the core of his criticism?

Kennedy's skepticism really stemmed from his belief that the fundamental ideological differences and competing national interests between the U .S.

and the Soviet Union remained unchanged.

Same old struggle, basically.

Pretty much.

He saw the spirit of Camp David as a temporary lull, maybe even a tactic, rather than a genuine shift in Soviet goals.

Then came the dramatic U -2 incident in May 1960, an American spy plane shot down over Soviet territory.

A major crisis.

How did this event derail the already fragile detente?

Oh, the U -2 incident was a massive blow, completely shattered the goodwill such as it was.

Eisenhower's refusal to apologize to Khrushchev led directly to the collapse of the Paris Summit.

Right, Khrushchev walked out.

The cancellation of Eisenhower's planned trip to the USSR and Khrushchev's declaration that he would only deal with the U .S.

President.

It dramatically heightened tensions and thrust foreign policy, particularly handling the Soviets, right into the center of the presidential campaign.

Kennedy, campaigning in Oregon, offered a cautious critique, faulting both Khrushchev and Eisenhower.

But then, in a Q &A, he made a comment about a possible apology, which he quickly had to walk back to just expressing regrets.

What was the fallout from this moment?

Uh -oh.

Yeah, that initial remark was politically costly.

Republicans immediately seized on it.

Senator Hugh Scott accused him of appeasement, echoing the charges leveled against his father.

Lyndon Johnson used it against him.

The White House staff were calling him the candidate of the Kremlin.

Nixon himself labeled Kennedy's comment as naive.

This incident really threatened to undermine Kennedy's efforts to project an image of strength in dealing with the Soviets.

Could have cost him the nomination if it happened earlier, the author suggests.

So how did Kennedy attempt to regain ground after this perceived misstep?

He proposed a 12 -point plan on the Senate floor in June 1960, calling for increased defense spending.

What was the underlying message he was trying to convey?

The core message was one of strength and resolve.

Kennedy was trying to demonstrate that he understood the Soviet threat and was committed to countering it with increased military capabilities.

He argued that neither a conciliatory nor a purely tough stance had worked with Khrushchev and that a stronger American defense posture was necessary.

And this came against a backdrop of escalating global tensions throughout that summer, right?

Absolutely.

You had Castro's actions in Cuba heating up, anti -American riots in Tokyo,

Soviet involvement in the Congo crisis, the Soviets walking out of disarmament talks, the shooting down of an American RB -47 reconnaissance plane, and then the show trial of the U -2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers.

It was a tense summer.

And those tensions were indeed escalating.

Then Khrushchev himself appeared at the UN in September, banging his shoe, adding to the drama.

How did all of this frame the 1960 election?

Well, these international crises amplified the sense of danger and uncertainty, didn't they?

It made the question of who is best equipped to lead the nation in this precarious environment a central theme of the election.

Who often theatrical presence at the UN further personalized the challenge the next president would face.

Nixon, of course, emphasized his experience, particularly his past interactions with Khrushchev while painting Kennedy as inexperienced.

But the chapter points out that Nixon's actual influence on Eisenhower's foreign policy was somewhat limited.

What's the crucial distinction there?

Right.

While Nixon had certainly met with Khrushchev and played a public role in foreign policy discussions,

the ultimate decision -making authority rested firmly with President Eisenhower.

Ike was in charge.

Definitely.

So Nixon's claims of extensive experience needed to be viewed in that context.

Similarly, while Kennedy had a strong intellectual grasp of foreign affairs, he lacked the direct experience of high level diplomacy and executive leadership.

Arthur Schlesinger Jr.

defended Kennedy's foreign policy acumen and Kennedy himself went on the offensive, didn't he?

Portraying Nixon's experience as one of retreat, defeat and weakness.

He did.

He fought back hard on that.

Despite this public stance, what were Kennedy's private concerns regarding the soft on communism attacks?

Privately, Kennedy was deeply concerned that Nixon's strategy of tainting him as soft on communism could resonate with voters.

Walt Rostow specifically warned him about this line of attack.

A potent charge back then.

Very potent.

Nixon's campaign actively tried to paint Kennedy as a dangerous choice who would appease the Soviets, surrender to communism.

This pressure led Kennedy to adopt increasingly strong anti -communist rhetoric during the fall campaign, culminating in speeches like the one in Salt Lake City.

Did his advisors think he had successfully countered this damaging narrative by that point?

Yes, it seems advisors like John Kenneth Galbraith and Chester Bowles believe that Kennedy's more forceful anti -communist pronouncements had effectively neutralized the soft on communism charge.

However, the underlying challenge remained,

convincing voters that the U .S.

was indeed lagging behind the Soviets, as Kennedy kept arguing.

And that brings us squarely to the missile gap issue.

Kennedy claimed the U .S.

was behind the Soviet Union in missiles, economic growth and global influence.

What was the reality behind this missile gap accusation?

Well, the reality, based on highly classified intelligence from those spy flights, was that the United States actually held a significant lead in intercontinental ballistic missiles.

A big lead, in fact.

So the gap was the other way.

Exactly.

But this information was obviously top secret.

Kennedy strategically exploited the perceived gap to argue for increased defense spending and to portray the Eisenhower -Nixon administration as having allowed the U .S.

to fall behind.

It was a powerful campaign issue.

Eisenhower was in a really difficult position then.

He knew the truth but couldn't reveal sensitive intelligence without compromising sources and methods and maybe upsetting a tacit understanding with Khrushchev about overflights.

Right.

His hands were tied publicly.

He and his advisors, like Jerome Weisner, made some indirect attempts to signal the reality to Kennedy, apparently.

How did Kennedy respond to these subtle hints?

Kennedy, frustrated by the lack of full classified briefings, seemed to have largely ignored these indirect signals or maybe didn't trust them.

He persisted in using the missile gap as a key campaign point, understanding its power to alarm voters and fuel his argument for a change in defense policy.

Even CIA Director Alan Dulles' evasive answers didn't deter him.

He also criticized the administration's over -reliance on nuclear weapons, right, and promised a conventional defense buildup.

Yes.

He argued for more flexible response options, a larger conventional military capability.

Kennedy also claimed the Soviet Union had a higher rate of economic growth, contributing to his narrative of American decline.

What was the actual economic picture at the time?

Well, those statistics were somewhat misleading.

The U .S.

was experiencing a recession in 1959, which slowed growth, while the Soviet Union was still in a phase of post -war recovery and reconstruction, which naturally leads to higher percentage growth rates from a lower base.

So, comparing apples and oranges a bit.

Kind of.

But Kennedy's focus on this metric, along with the USIA survey showing a decline in American prestige abroad,

contributed effectively to his campaign theme of America needing to regain its position, needing to be first again.

Now, let's consider the role of specific Cold War hot spots in the election, particularly Cuba, Berlin, and those islands, Quamoy and Matsu.

Cuba, with Castro's rise, was clearly on voters' minds.

How did Kennedy and Nixon address this issue?

Cuba was a huge point of contention.

Kennedy criticized the Republicans pretty strongly for allowing a communist regime, a communist menace, to take root just 90 miles off the coast.

Strong words.

Yeah.

And he called for a quarantine of Cuba and support for anti -Castro forces.

There was even concern within Kennedy's campaign.

Robert Kennedy apparently worried that the Eisenhower administration might stage some kind of pre -election intervention in Cuba to benefit Nixon.

Wow.

Then there was the Goodwin draft incident, where a statement advocating support for anti -Castro fighters was released prematurely, seemingly without Kennedy's final approval.

How did Nixon react to this?

Nixon was reportedly furious.

He seemed to believe Kennedy had been briefed on secret CIA plans to support insurgents.

It was jeopardizing them for political gain.

So he accused him publicly.

Yes.

He publicly criticized Kennedy's idea as irresponsible during the fourth debate, which is ironic because Nixon himself privately supported CIA action against Castro.

It really highlighted the complexities and the potential for political maneuvering around these very sensitive foreign policy issues.

Kennedy later clarified his position, but the reaction was mixed.

Berlin surprisingly didn't feature as prominently in Kennedy's campaign.

Why the relative silence on such a critical Cold War flashpoint?

It seems Adlai Stevenson, the seasoned diplomat and former presidential candidate, advised Kennedy to be cautious.

He told him to avoid making specific promises or pronouncements on Berlin that might prove difficult or embarrassing to uphold later during actual negotiations.

Sound advice, maybe.

Kennedy largely hewded this advice, making only brief, general references to a potential future crisis over Berlin.

However, Kennedy did raise the issue of Kamui and Matsu, those small islands off the coast of China.

He questioned the U .S.

commitment to defend them, which drew immediate Republican criticism.

What was the outcome of this challenge?

The Republican backlash was swift and strong.

They portrayed Kennedy as undermining American resolve, being weak in the face of Communist aggression.

Kennedy subsequently backed away from the issue, stating he was doing so in the interest of bipartisanship, but more likely realizing it was a politically risky stance to take.

OK, let's shift perspective now.

What was Khrushchev's overall view of the American election process and the candidates themselves, according to Beshlos?

Well, Khrushchev viewed the American electoral system with a degree of cynicism, seeing it as largely manipulated by money and power brokers.

However, he also understood realistically that the outcome of the 1960 election would have significant consequences for the Soviet Union and for his own position.

He had initially found some common ground with Eisenhower after Camp David, but the U -2 incident clearly soured that.

Who did he initially favor in the election, and why?

Initially, despite the unrealistic prospect of the American Communist Party candidate Gus Hall winning.

Right, not going to happen.

Khrushchev seemed to lean towards Adly Stevenson, whom he considered more

tolerant and friendly towards the Soviet Union based on past interactions.

There was even a secret, very indirect approach made to Stevenson to gauge how the Soviets could potentially be helpful to his campaign.

Really?

How did Stevenson react?

Stevenson was reportedly indignant, but also cautious.

He rejected the proposition, as Beshlos calls it, but did so carefully.

What were Khrushchev's impressions of Nixon and Kennedy then?

He seemed to have a particularly negative view of Nixon.

Oh, definitely.

Khrushchev viewed Nixon with considerable distrust.

He saw him as a hardliner, an unprincipled careerist, a puppet of anti -Soviet forces, an ally of McCarthy,

basically someone with whom finding common ground would be extremely difficult.

And Kennedy.

Well, he had less direct knowledge of Kennedy, but he was aware of his intelligence, his education, his wealth, and his political skill.

He recognized Kennedy's evolving views and maybe saw some positive signs talk of a nuclear test,

wider contacts, even the regret over the U -2 incident.

But he was also clearly concerned about the strong anti -communist rhetoric, especially on the missile gap.

Soviet press sort of reflected these mixed feelings.

So despite some reservations, Khrushchev ultimately hoped for a better relationship with Kennedy.

What might have led him to that tentative optimism, and what might have made him underestimate the young senator?

Khrushchev likely hoped that a new administration, any new administration, after the U -2 fallout, might offer a fresh start and a potential for different approaches to U .S.-Soviet relations.

Reset, maybe?

Perhaps.

He may have been encouraged by some of Kennedy's earlier remarks, but also the perception within some parts of the Washington establishment that Kennedy was maybe light and insubstantial, along with Kennedy's apparent retreats on Kamui -Matsu in Cuba,

might have led Khrushchev to underestimate him.

Plus, their backgrounds were so different.

Hugely different.

Kennedy's privileged upbringing versus Khrushchev's rise through the rough -and -tumble Soviet system.

Khrushchev might have thought Kennedy would be easier to

hornswoggle, as the author puts it.

Publicly, though, Khrushchev maintained a neutral stance, famously comparing Nixon and Kennedy to two boots of the same pair, and invoking Roosevelt's legacy.

It's fascinating that there were back -channel efforts by supporters of both Nixon and Kennedy to influence Khrushchev.

What were some of these attempts?

Well, Henry Cabot Lodge, Nixon's running mate, met with Khrushchev in early 1960.

He emphasized potential flexibility in U .S.

policy after the election if Nixon won.

I'm sure in Khrushchev he could work with Nixon.

Trying to smooth things over.

Right.

And Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson also communicated to Nixon, highlighting Soviet opposition, but suggesting Nixon was still open to negotiation.

On the Democratic side, Avril Harriman, the veteran diplomat with extensive Soviet ties, acted as a link and advised Khrushchev, interestingly, to be tough on both candidates.

And the Eisenhower administration itself was involved in some quiet diplomacy related to the U -2 incident.

What were they trying to achieve and how might it have related to the election?

Yeah, the Eisenhower administration was quietly working behind the scenes to secure the release of the captured U -2 pilot powers and the crew of that RB -47 shot down later.

There was even a Republican appeal made to Soviet Ambassador Menshkov, possibly hinting that a Nixon administration might review Eisenhower's policies towards the Soviet Union more favorably.

A potential reward for releasing the pilots.

It seems that was the implication.

However, Khrushchev ultimately decided not to give Nixon that kind of present by releasing the airmen before the election.

Beshlov suggests this is effectively Khrushchev casting his early ballot against Nixon.

Wow.

Okay, election day.

There was a luncheon at the U .S.

Ambassador's residence, Spaso House, in Moscow.

What were the reactions there to Kennedy's victory?

And what does it tell us about Ambassador Thompson's perspective?

Ambassador Thompson, while publicly maintaining neutrality, seemed personally pleased by Kennedy's victory.

There was applause and cheers when the news came through.

He had a personal connection to the Kennedy family and likely hoped for a more influential role in the new administration, having felt somewhat sidelined by Eisenhower.

Interesting.

But Khrushchev himself had told Thompson something different just before the election.

Yes, apparently Khrushchev had expressed a preference for Nixon just before the vote, telling Thompson he viewed Nixon as more predictable, even though he disliked him.

He seemed apprehensive about Kennedy's youth and his somewhat ambiguous record.

Thompson, by the way, was apparently quite adept at masking his own political leanings, even from Khrushchev himself.

Quite the diplomat.

One of the first things Kennedy did after his victory celebration in Hyannis Port was receive a congratulatory telegram from Khrushchev.

What was the tone of that message and what was Kennedy's immediate reaction?

Khrushchev's telegram expressed hope for a return to the warmer relations of the Roosevelt era and a desire for peaceful coexistence, a hopeful tone on the surface.

And Kennedy.

Kennedy's immediate consultation with Chip Bolin, the Soviet expert, regarding the telegram's tone really underscores his awareness of the critical importance of managing this relationship right from the absolute outset.

He knew it was priority number one.

So as we conclude our deep dive into this chapter, it's really evident that Beschloss meticulously lays out the complex web of personal interactions, political maneuvering, and diplomatic undercurrents that characterized the lead up to the 1960 election.

Absolutely.

The relationship between Kennedy and Khrushchev, even before Kennedy took office, was already fraught with misperceptions and the immense weight of Cold War anxieties.

Beschloss's analysis highlights how domestic political imperatives heavily influence foreign policy considerations and how the evolving perceptions each leader had of the other would shape the tumultuous years that followed.

The anecdotes and personal details he includes really bring this critical period to life for the reader, for you listening.

They really do.

It's not just abstract policy.

It's about these two individuals.

And that leads us to our final thought for you.

Considering Khrushchev's initial misgivings about Kennedy, maybe underestimating him and the various back channel communications,

what do you see as the key unresolved tensions and potential points of conflict that might have foreshadowed the major crises of Kennedy's presidency, like Cuba, Berlin?

Yeah, the seeds were definitely sown there, weren't they?

It certainly provides a crucial context for understanding what was to come just a short time later.

Indeed.

This chapter serves as an essential foundation for comprehending the challenges

and the confrontations that defined the Kennedy -Khrushchev era.

Couldn't agree more.

And with that, we have thoroughly explored the chapter, He's Younger Than My Own Son, from Michael Beschloss's The Crisis Years, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 -1963.