Chapter 3: Our Clue to the Soviet Union

Welcome to Last Minute Lecture.

This free chapter overview is designed to help students review and understand key concepts.

These summaries supplement not replaced the original textbook and may not be redistributed or resold.

For complete coverage, always consult the official text.

Okay, let's dive in.

We're talking early 1961.

John F.

Kennedy, he's just about to become president.

Yeah, and waiting for him is maybe the biggest challenge of the Cold War.

Nikita Khrushchev.

That relationship, it's going to define so much.

And what's fascinating, we're digging into today, is how it all starts before Kennedy even takes the oath.

The first signals, the feelers trying to size each other up.

Exactly.

We're using a chapter from Michael Beschloss's book, The Crisis Years, as our roadmap here.

It's really packed with detail in those first few weeks.

It really is.

Beschloss gives us this incredible window into Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 to 63.

So our mission today, get right into those initial interactions.

What messages were sent?

How did they land?

And crucially, where did things maybe get, you know, misread?

Because those early interpretations, they could set the whole tone, couldn't they, for everything that came after.

Definitely.

It's about the personalities, the pressures, the sheer difficulty of talking across that huge ideological divide.

And it really kicks off with

Bolin, the veteran Soviet hand.

Absolutely.

Harvard, Russian -led, foreign service since 34.

He was even FDR's translator at Yalta,

knew his stuff.

But he had a rough go under Eisenhower, especially with Secretary of State Dulles.

Oh, yeah.

McCarthy -era accusations, you know, that ugly record of great betrayal stuff about Yalta.

Dulles actively avoided him, wouldn't even be photographed with him.

Seriously, avoided him.

Yeah.

And barred him from cabinet meetings when Bolin came back from Moscow in 56.

Eisenhower backed him initially, but later apparently told Senate leaders, no more Bolins, just too much political heat.

Wow.

So Dulles eventually pushes him out as Moscow ambassador in 57.

Pushed him out.

The official reason given was kind of bizarre, something about Bolin wanting to take up writing.

Yeah.

Which Bolin said was nonsense.

So he ends up where?

Manila.

Less prestigious post.

And he was pretty bitter about it.

You can tell from his sharp reply to Dulles asking for his views from Manila, something like he couldn't comment from this great distance.

Ouch.

But then Dulles dies,

Christian Herter takes over state.

And Herter brings Bolin back, counselor on Soviet affairs.

Cleverly, it didn't need Senate confirmation, so no repeat of the earlier political fights.

And right away, the president -elect, Kennedy, he reaches out.

Almost immediately.

Needs Bolin's drafting a reply to a message from Khrushchev.

Okay, makes sense.

Use the expert.

But here's the thing.

Bolin, even though Kennedy asked him, still technically had to clear it through channels.

Channels?

Meaning?

The outgoing Eisenhower administration.

He actually had to get Eisenhower's okay to help the president -elect respond to Khrushchev.

That's incredible.

Shows the bureaucratic tangle Kennedy was walking into.

Right.

And Bolin was up front with Kennedy on the phone.

Said he had the foggiest notion what Kennedy's approach to the Soviets would be.

So he asks Kennedy directly.

Yep.

Do you want a great gesture or should we play it cool?

In Kennedy.

Chooses play it cool.

So Bolin drafts this really short one -sentence reply.

Just one sentence.

Kennedy thought it was a bit too blunt, apparently, so he added a couple more sentences himself just to make it sound a bit more, you know, courteous.

In this message, Kennedy uses it publicly.

Reads the finished wire the very next morning at a press conference.

Hind his armory.

And he makes a point of emphasizing peace as a fundamental goal.

His first real signal to Moscow.

While this is happening, the Soviets aren't just waiting around, are they?

Not at all.

Their ambassador in D .C., Mikhail Menchikov, he'd been busy even before the election.

Hosting dinners, right.

He was known for that.

Famous for it.

Chicken Kiev was supposedly his signature dish.

He'd have senators, officials like Justice Douglas even balling over, trying to figure out who the next president might be and what they'd be like.

Menchikov had this reputation, though, didn't he, for telling Khrushchev what he thought he wanted to hear?

Initially, yeah.

Things like the U .S.

being on the brink of revolution.

But Khrushchev had actually visited the U .S.

in 59, saw it for himself, and started taking Menchikov's more optimistic reports with a grain of salt.

I read his own staff called him Nash Durak.

Our fool, yeah.

That's the story.

So after Kennedy wins,

the Soviet feelers get more direct.

Menchikov talking to Adlai Stevenson.

Right.

Telling Stevenson that Khrushchev had high hopes for agreements, especially on a nuclear test ban.

But stressing, importantly, the need for private channels.

Avoid the old accusations playing out in public.

Then there was that meeting between Alexander Kornichev and Avril Harriman.

Kornichev, Ukrainian writer and Central Committee member.

He asks Harriman point blank,

will Kennedy be like FDR?

How will Kennedy and Khrushchev get along?

And Harriman's reply.

Said Kennedy wasn't interested in just scoring points in debate,

implying, you know, substance over style.

Then Menchikov takes it up a notch with Harriman again, reads a direct message.

From Khrushchev himself.

Basically saying, look, we'll overlook the campaign talk, let's get back to warmer relations.

Harriman's response was pretty practical, though.

Very pragmatic.

He says, okay, if you're serious, show us.

Stop complaining about the U -2 and release the RB -47 flyers.

Those were the guys from the reconnaissance plane shot down back in July 60, right?

Exactly.

That demand sets the stage for another key early interaction.

Walt Rostow and Jerome Wiesner going to Moscow.

They were there for a disarmament meeting anyway.

Right.

Just after the election.

But it turned into a chance to sound out the Soviets more broadly.

Kornichev had actually already messaged Rostow earlier, telling him to take disarmament seriously before certain forces in Moscow made peace impossible.

Suggesting internal opposition even then.

Definitely.

And in Moscow,

Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov basically asked them straight out, what can we do to help the new administration?

That's quite an opening.

It was.

Rostow and Wiesner had a list grafted with Ambassador Thompson back in Moscow.

The U .S.

Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson.

Right.

And their list was pretty clear.

Free the RB -47 pilots, but do it without Kennedy having to ask or bargain.

Ease off on Berlin.

Be very generous with on -site inspections for a test ban treaty.

Rostow also gave a warning, didn't he?

Yeah, that the U .S.

can't work on a two -track policy very well.

Meaning, you can't have a Berlin crisis and serious arms talks at the same time.

One prevents the other.

And what did the Soviets want in return?

Their message was consistent.

Take disarmament negotiations seriously.

Rostow tried to paint a picture of Kennedy for them, too.

Tried to describe him as a man of tangible action.

Said any summit needed to be well prepared, deal with very concrete business.

He even made suggestions about the optics of a summit.

Yeah, kind of amusingly.

Said if the RB -47 guys were freed and a test ban was ready, a summit in New York should be melodramatically different from Khrushchev's U .N.

visit.

Maybe top hat and this was pointed wearing shoes.

A reference to the shoe -banging incident?

Must have been.

But the Soviets pushed back, too.

Asked how Kennedy planned defense budget increases squared with arms control talk.

Rostow's explanation.

Aimed at reducing fears of surprise attacks, showing the U .S.

had no first -strike plans.

But Kuznetsov shot back a warning.

If Kennedy goes ahead with defense hikes, the Soviets are not going to sit still.

So Rostow's report back to Kennedy was

very mixed.

Soviets might be ready on arms control, but still rigid on Berlin.

And they were definitely going to give us hell in the underdeveloped areas, gave Kennedy an early kind of blurry snapshot.

Okay, so you've got these feelers going back and forth, these mixed messages.

And meanwhile, Khrushchev is pushing really hard for a summit, even before the inauguration.

Unusually hard.

Menshikov hosts Robert Kennedy,

praises JFK, blames mid -level U .S.

officials for past issues.

Standard stuff, maybe?

But then Menshikov goes further.

Proposes a secret, informal go -between before Inauguration Day.

And Harriman says no.

Harriman holds the line.

Says no substantive talks until Kennedy meets his team, sets his policy.

Makes sense.

But Menshikov keeps pushing.

Even talks to the press.

Off the record to Harrison Salisbury, The New York Times.

Says time is of the essence.

Need to meet before those who would not like to see agreement have had a chance to act.

Basically hinting at internal opposition on both sides.

He even suggested Palm Beach, where Kennedy was.

Yeah.

Salisbury's reply was pretty dry.

But it takes two to make that possible.

It really is unprecedented, a Soviet leader badgering a president -elect like that.

What was driving it?

Well, Beschloss argues that a huge piece of this puzzle, mostly hidden from the West at the time, was the Sino -Soviet split.

The breakdown of that alliance.

This is critical context.

Absolutely massive.

The day after Kennedy's election, this huge meeting of 81 Communist parties starts in Moscow.

Publicly.

All smiles.

Unity.

A behind the scenes.

Total chaos.

Death.

These supposedly unshakable alliance with China was falling apart.

Mao was racing for nukes, challenging Khrushchev for leadership of the whole movement.

Khrushchev had issues with China before this, hadn't he?

Oh yeah.

Complaining back in 55 about China's population, their constant demands for aid, felt like they were parasites, saying they suck our blood like leeches.

And Mao's views on nuclear war terrified him.

Completely.

Mao telling him in 57 that losing 300 million Chinese in a nuclear war was basically no big deal.

So what?

War is war.

Just make more babies.

Khrushchev thought Mao was a lunatic on a throne.

So the tensions escalate.

Dramatically.

Khrushchev reneges on giving China an atomic bomb sample in 59.

Then after Khrushchev meets Eisenhower at Camp David, Mao accuses him of selling out to the west.

And the U -2 incident played into this.

The Chinese used it perfectly.

See, Khrushchev gets duped by the Americans.

Then at a secret meeting in Bucharest June 60, the Chinese denounce Khrushchev right to his face.

His response.

Furious.

In August 60, he pulls all 12 ,000 Soviet advisors out of China.

Huge blow to their economy and military.

But he wanted to keep this split secret from the west?

Desperately.

The illusion of leading a monolithic, billion -strong communist bloc was vital for his bargaining power with the U .S.

That 81 party meeting.

It was mostly about maintaining that facade.

Even while they were fighting internally?

Viciously.

Khrushchev called Mao a megalomaniac warmonger.

He even made that incredibly dark crack about the Chinese having Stalin's cadaver confident at all since Mao still revered Stalin.

But they reached some kind of compromise.

A very fragile compromise.

China's sort of conceited war wasn't absolutely inevitable.

Khrushchev pledged more political warfare in the Third World.

Then they put out a statement of unity.

So Khrushchev's push for a summit.

It's tied into this.

Massively.

He needed a win with Kennedy.

Something positive.

Fast.

To strengthen his hand against Mao and his own critics within the communist world.

Which brings us to his domestic situation.

He wasn't as secure as he looked, was he?

Far from it.

We see him as this dictator, but he'd survived that anti -party coup attempt in 57.

And the U -2 affair hurt him badly at home.

Really weakened him.

Rivals like Kozlov and Syslov were gaining ground, criticizing his plans for troop cuts, he's dealing with imperialists, he's alienating China.

Adam Ulam, the historian, thought the only reason he survived the summer of 60 was that his rivals feared appearing to give into the Chinese if they ousted him then.

So his whole domestic platform, more butter, fewer guns, depended on calming things down with the U .S.

Fundamentally.

And his break with China, too.

He needed results progress on Berlin,

a test ban, easing the arms race, and he needed them quickly to justify his policies and shut down his opponents.

He was afraid time wasn't on his side.

Definitely.

Delaying a summit gave the U .S.

time to confirm its missile advantage, maybe figure out the full extent of the Sino -Soviet split.

A long confrontation would force him to ditch his popular domestic plans, maybe even lose his job to hardliners backed by the military and the Chinese.

He seemed to believe in personal diplomacy.

Absolutely.

Only the tops could decide, was his thinking.

He wanted to meet Kennedy, gain a fix on this young, unknown quantity.

Maybe he even thought Kennedy's youth and quick rise meant he'd be easier to influence than old hands like Stalin or Mao engage him before policies got set in stone.

So while Khrushchev is juggling all this in Moscow, Kennedy's down in Palm Beach.

Pretty much through November and December, planning the government, filling jobs, reading intelligence briefs, meeting the press,

but also relaxing,

sunbathing golf films.

Swimming with the Coast Guard watching.

Yeah, he found that amusing.

Wondered if they expected Castro to invade Palm Beach.

He even met Armand Hammer down there.

Bed Bloody Marys on Hammer's yacht, swapped Soviet stories.

Hammer was always involved.

But Kennedy was getting tired of Khrushchev's indirect messages.

Yeah, he asked his friend David Bruce to just ask Menshikov straight up what they wanted.

Menshikov's reply was this strange, unsigned letter, claimed it was just personal thoughts, but still pleaded urgently for talks and a summit.

And in Kennedy's cabinet picks during this time, not what Khrushchev might have hoped for.

Not really.

Disappointing for Khrushchev and actually for a lot of liberal Democrats in the U .S.

too.

Adlai Stevenson, expected Secretary of State.

Gets U .N.

Ambassador instead.

Seen by some as second rate,

Avril Harriman gets Ambassador -at -Large, described as largely decorative.

And the key posts.

State, Defense, Treasury.

Dean Rusk at State.

Robert McNamara at Defense Soviet saw him as tied to cars and weapons.

Douglas Dillon at Treasury Khrushchev apparently felt Dillon couldn't stand us.

Plus, he kept Hoover at the FBI and Alan Dulles at the CIA.

Right.

Dulles, who the Soviet press called the most dangerous man in the world.

Not exactly charming choices from Khrushchev's perspective.

But liberals weren't thrilled either.

Seeing Republicans like McNamara and Dillon in key spots.

No, there was definite frustration there, too.

Okay, fast forward to New Year's Eve, 1960, Moscow.

Big party at the Kremlin.

St.

George's Hall.

Ambassador Thompson couldn't go ulcer, so his wife Jane went.

She sees Khrushchev work in the room, laughing, grinning, showing those famous iron teeth.

But privately, 1960 was bad for him.

A disaster, according to Beschloss.

Glad to see it end.

The U -2 fallout, Mao's challenge, domestic politics.

It was all weighing on him, despite the public confidence.

The Midnight Toast reflected this.

A mix.

Starts with the usual New Year stuff, the New Year will be better still.

But then he pivots right to U .S.

relations.

Says improving them is key.

Hopes for a fresh win with Kennedy.

Blames the U -2 and Eisenhower for the problems.

Wants to turn over a new leaf for peaceful coexistence.

It's both hopeful and strategic messaging.

Back in the U .S., Kennedy's getting advice on how to handle all this.

He talks to George Kennan.

Yeah.

On a flight.

Yeah.

Shows Kennan that unsigned letter from Minshikov.

Kennan's take.

Found it stiffer and more offensive than Minshikov's usual style.

Thought it felt drafted in Khrushchev's office, maybe cleared by others.

More formal than just Minshikov riffing.

Kennan's advice on replying.

Simple.

Don't.

Make no reply before taking office.

Soviets had no right to rush him.

After inauguration, send a private note saying the U .S.

is open to serious talks.

But the burden's on Moscow to prove why a summit's needed, why lower levels won't work.

And crucially,

insist on privacy.

Eisenhower shared way too much.

Stevenson also weighs in.

Calls Kennedy.

Urges Kennedy to find out what Khrushchev really wants.

Suggests sending an emissary maybe himself or Harriman.

Though he notes Harriman talks a lot and is hard of hearing.

Not ideal for secret talks.

Stevenson thought Khrushchev might be easier to deal with.

Yeah, thought it was important to figure out if he genuinely wanted to cool things down or expand the Cold War.

But Kennedy wasn't keen on using Stevenson.

Had no appeal for him.

Still annoying about Stevenson's pre -convention coyness, felt he'd acted like an old woman.

And politically difficult, too, given Kennedy's narrow win.

Hugely difficult.

Kennedy told Walter Lippmann that Stevenson had too many enemies, would be chewed alive as an appeaser or communist sympathizer if he was Secretary of State.

Sending him as a secret envoy that would light up the critics for sure.

So he brushes Stevenson off.

Politely.

Good.

We will have a chance to talk.

I'll see you at the inauguration.

End of that idea.

While all this is swirling, Kennedy's working on his inaugural address in Palm Beach.

Right.

Yellow legal pad, small cigar, overlooking the ocean.

He knew foreign policy was his best bet to unite people after the close election.

Seemed to.

And it matched his own interests.

That famous private remark, who gives a shit about the minimum wage, compared to foreign policy.

So he tells Sorenson to cut the domestic stuff from the speech.

Yeah, he said it was too long anyway.

The final version becomes this powerful blend of warning and outreach.

The pay any price, bear any burden part.

But also the call to begin anew the quest for peace.

Acknowledging the arms burden, the uncertain balance of terror.

And that classic line.

Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.

A perfectly balanced message for that moment.

Strength and willingness to talk.

Inauguration day arrives.

How does the speech land?

Mixed reactions.

Radio Moscow calls at the end of Eisenhower's infamous eight years.

Barry Goldwater apparently loved the tough parts, clapped wildly.

Ambassador Minshikov sat stock still.

Kennedy gets a message from Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

Yeah, a telegram endorsing a fundamental improvement in relations.

Standard diplomatic stuff.

Meanwhile, back at the White House, Jackie Kennedy is apparently exhausted.

Crumples in the balls.

But in Moscow, something unusual happens almost immediately.

Very unusual.

Saturday morning Moscow time, Ambassador Thompson gets a phone call.

From Bin.

Khrushchev himself.

Direct call to the embassy.

He never did that.

And he rarely did formal meetings on weekends.

Broke both protocols.

Shows how eager he was.

So Thompson heads to the Kremlin.

Right away.

Cadillac.

Flag snapping.

Karakul hat.

For this immediate post inauguration meeting.

And Thompson's relationship with Khrushchev.

It was unique, wasn't it?

Really was.

Probably closer than any U .S.

ambassador before.

Khrushchev was super sensitive about how he was treated.

Remember that story about the German ambassador mocking his swimming with an inner tube?

He was furious.

He disliked Boland, too.

Saw him as a class enemy.

Hated Boland's chuckling remarks.

Even claimed he had proof.

Boland spread rumors about him being a drunk.

But Thompson was different.

Much more discreet.

Never wrote memoirs.

Believed leaders wouldn't talk if they thought it'd end up in a book.

Khrushchev seemed to trust him more than Menshikov sometimes.

Used him to check facts.

I wonder if what I'm hearing is true, he'd say.

Thompson style.

The diplomatic Gary Cooper.

Yeah, outwardly shy, workaholic, ulcers.

Lived on milk and crackers.

Came from a poor ranching family.

Washed dishes in college.

He even bonded a bit with Khrushchev over both having herded sheep as kids.

His time in Moscow during WWII earned respect.

Soviets appreciated he stayed during the bombing.

And negotiating that Austrian state treaty nearly 400 meetings gave him huge confidence dealing with Moscow.

His judgment was sharp.

Like during the 56 Hungary crisis.

Just going back to bed when told tanks were near Austria.

Correctly guessed they wouldn't cross.

He almost didn't take the Moscow job after Boland left.

Was reluctant.

Felt maybe he was being difficult.

His wife Jane told him to stop being a prima donna.

He arrived right after Khrushchev beat the anti -party group.

Yeah, in 57.

Notice the skepticism and uneasiness.

Thompson felt he built a relationship the US could exploit because he was always straight with Khrushchev, who seemed to accept what he said.

He was careful not to spoil that.

Relationship improved after Khrushchev consolidated power.

Seemed to flower around 58.

Khrushchev would sometimes scold him publicly, maybe for show, then apologize privately.

Thompson said he scolds me and I scold him.

His wife Jane played a role too.

Could tease Khrushchev, apparently.

Nina Khrushchev, Mrs.

K, hugged Jane when she gave her some English toasting cups.

They both saw his mood swings either way up here or way down there.

Thompson's cables captured this personal side.

Yeah, anecdotes like the Caucasus bear hunt in 59.

Khrushchev complaining about all the eating and drinking.

And that New Year's Eve 1960 party.

The nuclear target list.

Took the Thompsons aside, pushed the booze at us.

Listed bombs for France, Germany, Britain.

Wouldn't say how many for the US.

That a secret.

Pretty chilling moment.

In the weekend, dacha visits.

That was unprecedented.

First Americans invited for a whole weekend.

Stalin's old dining room.

Kids were there, grandkids.

Khrushchev with Thompson's daughter Sherry on his lap.

Showing off horses from Arab leaders, the Shah.

Named one Khan Khan after the movie he aided.

Called his grandson the intellectual for not wanting to ride.

Jane Thompson noticed the secret police crudely replanting flowers she brought.

A little reminder of the reality, even there.

McCoyan's comment, if Stalin could only see us now.

Singing, drinking rituals.

Kozlov forcing vodka on the junior officer.

Khrushchev laughing when the officer complained about Russian grammar.

That's what I've been telling my people.

The Thompson girl saying, I like vodka.

Too fragile.

Momentary silence, then Khrushchev apparently roared with laughter.

And all through this Thompson scribbling notes, stuffing them in his pajama pockets.

Later visits, Khrushchev showed off his corn.

Defended the Soviet system.

Told his version of Stalin's death pupil, but wanted him dead.

Invaluable insights for Thompson.

But even this relationship couldn't survive the U -2.

Ultimately, no.

Four months after that warm Dasha visit, the plane goes down.

Khrushchev publicly defends Thompson.

Privately asked him to get me off it.

Help him manage the fallout.

But couldn't save things.

And by September 60, Khrushchev was publicly berating Thompson.

Stamping his foot, demanding apologies.

The pressure on him was immense.

Okay, so back to that Saturday meeting, January 21st, 61.

Thompson sees Khrushchev looks tired.

Tired.

Horse.

Thompson knew he'd just been through some tough internal fights.

Khrushchev had read the inaugural.

Yep.

Saw constructive things.

Said he'd print the full text.

Adding with a chuckle.

If they will agree.

Then Khrushchev reads the official message.

The RB -47 release offer.

The two surviving airmen?

But with conditions.

Right.

U .S.

should endorse a statement implying violation.

Promise no more flights.

No propaganda use of the airmen.

Otherwise, Khrushchev warns they'll go on trial.

Thompson's reply.

Careful.

As he had no instructions yet.

Appreciated the gesture.

But pointed out the RB -47 wasn't quite like the U -2.

And the condition sounded like demanding a confession.

Which might seem ungrateful.

Khrushchev waves it off.

Basically, yeah.

Each side is welcome to maintain its own view.

Even felt sorry for Thompson having had to defend Eisenhower's policies.

Thompson pushes back, though, on the broader issues.

Says he feels he was a poor ambassador due to misunderstandings.

Tells Khrushchev plainly.

What worries the West is Moscow's desire to dominate its use of force like in Hungary.

Khrushchev counters.

Accuses the U .S.

of policing the world.

Laos.

Congo.

Yep.

Proposes disbanding both blocs.

Soviets pulling troops from Eastern Europe.

Thompson sees that as just tactical.

Says the USSR would still be monolithic.

Argues the Soviet people might support their system.

But not most other communist countries.

Needs proof they could actually change if they wanted to.

Khrushchev invokes Hitler's mistake in voting Russia.

Says if Hitler had been wise, he would have been not Hitler but Stalin.

Then drops it.

No point belaboring.

Asks Thompson if he's staying on as ambassador.

Khrushchev says he doesn't know.

Khrushchev jokes they'll give him their vote, but doubts it would help.

Sends regards to Kennedy and others.

So back in D .C.

Saturday morning, Kennedy's first full day.

Wakes up in the Lincoln bedroom.

Meets Truman's symbolic passing of the Cold War torch.

Has that slightly awkward moment seeing Jackie with Dr.

Travel working on her leg.

That evening he reads Thompson's cables about the RB -47 offer.

And Thompson's advice is to accept the deal despite the conditions.

Monday afternoon, Kennedy discusses it with his team.

Rusk.

McNamara.

Bundy.

Yeah.

Bundy remembered Kennedy being wary.

Is there a trick here?

But they decide to go for it.

They do.

Plan is to announce it at his first press conference on Wednesday.

Rusk cables Compson.

Confirmed no propaganda.

U .S.

flights already stopped since May 60.

Won't resume.

Hope for release before the press conference.

That night, Kennedy seems relaxed.

Dines with the Bartlets.

Yeah, tells Bartlet.

I slipped in Lincoln's bed last night.

Bartlet asks about dreams.

Kennedy jokes.

No, I just jumped in and hung on.

Sees Rostow working late.

Jokes about being a tough boss.

Bartlet felt that was maybe Kennedy's happiest moment.

All things possible.

That's how Bartlet remembered it.

Sorensen agreed he'd finally reach the number one power center.

Moscow follows through.

Prints the inaugural address.

Reduces jamming.

Pravda.

Is Vestia printed?

No comment.

Less VOA jamming.

Moscow media talking up great hopes.

Kuznetsov coordinates the release timing.

Calls Thompson after midnight Tuesday.

Moscow time.

Got Khrushchev on the phone in Kiev.

Airman to be at the embassy 10 a .m.

Wednesday.

And the press nearly scooped it.

David Wise.

Yeah, Herald Tribune reporter.

Got wind of something happening early Wednesday morning D .C.

time.

Called Salinger, Kennedy's press secretary.

Salinger tries to keep a lid on it.

Initially, no comment.

Appeals for secrecy.

Wise gets more info.

Calls back.

Threatens to hold the presses.

Salinger insists publishing would be inimical to the national interest.

Could jeopardize the release.

And Wise held the story.

He and his editors decided not to risk blowing up the first diplomatic breakthrough.

Pretty responsible journalism there.

Wednesday morning, the airmen are delivered to the embassy.

Olmstead and Makhani.

Dressed in Russian gear.

Brief to leave quietly.

Tragically, the body of the pilot killed in the shoot down is also delivered.

Zinc lined coffin.

The other three crew were never accounted for.

Drama even at the airport.

Tires blow out.

On the KLM jet taking them out.

Kennedy only learns they're safely airborne less than an hour before his press conference.

Then the press conference itself.

Big deal.

First live televised one.

Huge deal.

State Department auditorium.

Over 400 reporters.

60 million viewers.

Advisors were nervous, but Kennedy was confident.

He grips the podium.

Announces the release.

Says it removes a serious obstacle.

He greets the airmen personally a few days later.

At Andrews Air Force Base.

Makhani's famous 27 -second kiss with his wife on the tarmac.

Kennedy kind of hangs back, scuffs his shoes, lets him have the moment.

Later teases Makhani about the lipstick.

Salinger keeps refusing interviews.

Citing U .S.-Soviet relations.

How was the release viewed?

Rostow's small, cheap dowry.

Yeah, Rostow saw it as minimal.

Rusk worried Americans would think the Soviets had suddenly gone soft.

And a KGB guy later said they actually expected concessions in return.

And there was that near -miss incident right after.

U .S.

plane near Vise Island.

Yeah, Rakanos's plane strayed close.

Kuznetsov complained privately to Thompson.

Kennedy was apparently furious.

Ordered an investigation.

Shows how easily things could still blow up.

But this time, Khrushchev didn't escalate.

No.

Was it in his interest?

Accepted Kennedy's assurance it wasn't authorized there.

Kept it quiet.

Stayed secret until Beshlos's book.

Kennedy tries other small gestures, too.

Stopped censoring Soviet mail.

Resume aviation talks.

Yeah, tried to create a better atmosphere.

Asked officials like Admiral Broke to tone down anti -Soviet rhetoric.

That backfired a bit.

Burke leaked it.

Burke complied, but then told the New York Times.

Sen.

Thurmond Goldwater jumped on it, denouncing gag -rule diplomacy.

Shows the domestic pressures Kennedy faced.

Lifting the crab meat ban, too.

Minor thing.

Ban was due to slave labor concerns.

Armand Hammer got involved.

Khrushchev denied using slave labor, not since Stalin died.

Kennedy lifted the ban.

But all these small steps, they get overshadowed.

Completely overshadowed by Khrushchev's speech on January 6th.

The secret speech to ideologists.

This becomes huge for Kennedy.

It really does.

In it, Khrushchev boasts.

Capitalism's retreating.

Socialism's advancing.

Soviet missiles are superior.

Third World Revolution is brewing.

He does say World War is unacceptable.

Would destroy civilization.

But he strongly backs wars of national liberation.

Yeah.

Calls them sacred.

Tells communists to exploit new opportunities.

It sounds very aggressive.

It was secret initially, but a version got out just before the inauguration.

Condensed version released two days before.

Eisenhower saw it.

Wasn't too bothered.

Saw it as mostly bluster.

Stuff already known from the 81 party meeting.

Figured Khrushchev was playing to his own hardliners.

Maybe he didn't realize how provocative it would sound to Kennedy.

But Kennedy reacted differently.

Very differently.

Lacked Ike's experience.

His understanding of Soviet internal politics.

He sees these conflicting signals.

Peace overtures.

Than this speech.

For him, the speech is the answer.

It confirms his fears about Soviet intentions.

Their drive for world domination via the developing world.

Ambassador Thompson tried to provide context.

Cabled that it was Khrushchev, the communist and propagandist.

But there are other sides to him.

Yeah.

Thompson warned against taking it too literally.

Called it a declaration of Cold War, if taken that way.

Advised Kennedy to publicly question Khrushchev's intent while still talking peace.

Kennedy didn't take that advice.

Seems not.

He distributed copies to everyone.

Read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest.

McNamara called it a significant event.

And Bischloss really emphasizes this point.

Kennedy, maybe lacking context, maybe needing a clear narrative, seemed to seize on this speech.

Ignored Thompson's nuance.

He called it our clue to the Soviet Union.

That became the lens through which he viewed Khrushchev early on.

Took it as the definitive statement of intent.

And responded accordingly.

In his first State of the Union.

Just 10 days into office, he uses the State of the Union to push back hard.

Responding directly to what he saw as Khrushchev's challenge in that January 6th speech.

So this whole period,

it's incredibly complex.

A new president, a Soviet leader, under immense hidden pressure.

Trying to read each other through layers of mixed signals, internal politics, the massive shadow of the sign of Soviet split.

And Thompson, with his unique access, trying to bridge that gap, may be unsuccessfully.

And Bischloss's point is that Kennedy's focus on that one speech, the January speech, as the ultimate clue, might have really skewed his perception early on.

Yeah, perhaps missing the vulnerability.

The domestic struggles, the China problem that Thompson was hinting at.

It potentially set a confrontational tone right from the start.

It really makes you think about how leaders interpret signals, doesn't it?

Filtered through their own biases, advisors, political needs.

How much did those first reads really shape what came next?

It's a huge question.

How much of the subsequent crises were baked in during these initial weeks and months based on these interpretations?

A lot to consider there.

How those first judgments may be based on incomplete or misinterpreted information can ripple outwards.

That single clue idea is powerful.

So just to recap for everyone, this deep dive has walked us through those critical first interactions between the Kennedy team and Khrushchev right around the transition and inauguration in 1960 -61.

We've hit the key diplomatic moves, the strategies, the hidden context, like the China split and Khrushchev's internal issues, all based on Beschloss's detailed account in the crisis years.

We covered the main players, the sequence of events like Boland's return, the Rostov -Eisner mission, the push for a summit, Thompson's unique role, the RB -47 release, and, critically, the impact of that January speech on Kennedy's thinking.

We aim to give you a full picture of this foundational moment.

Exactly.

We believe we've covered all the significant points in analysis presented by Beschloss for this specific chapter concerning the dawn of the Kennedy -Khrushchev relationship.

Our exploration of this source is complete.