Chapter 4: Novosibirsk

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Okay, let's unpack this.

Imagine January 30th, 1961.

A young president, John F.

Kennedy, is walking down the center aisle of the House for his first State of the Union address.

An observer, Hugh Seide, notes he's trying to look as solemn as a 43 -year -old man can look, but like, well, he's not quite successful.

You get that immediate picture, right?

The new guy trying to project the gravitas of the office, but maybe his natural energy or, you know, youth is just bubbling up a bit.

Exactly, but then he gets to the podium and the message he delivers is anything but lighthearted.

Now, this deep dive is built entirely from one source, chapter four of the Crisis Years, and it lays out how Kennedy declared this moment an hour of national peril and national opportunity.

Yeah, saying that before his term ended, the nation would have to test anew whether a nation organized and governed such as ours can endure.

Pretty heavy stuff right out of the gate.

And that's the striking thing, isn't it?

The immediate tonal shift from the Eisenhower era.

Eisenhower's final message, what, just 18 days before, was much more reassuring.

Definitely.

Suddenly, in Kennedy's framing, America's domestic challenges seemed almost small compared to the pressures from abroad.

Absolutely.

He paints this picture of relentless pressure from, you know, the Soviet Union and China.

He highlights global hot spots like Asia under Communist China.

The Congo, brutally torn by civil strife, he said.

And Cuba, where communist agents have established a base only 90 miles from our shores.

He's really laying it on thick.

And he picked this up, didn't he?

Announcing a reappraisal of our entire defense strategy, talking about accelerating the Polaris submarine program.

And ordering new transport planes for, you know, quick crisis response.

This is a very different sound coming from the White House.

Right.

A much sharper edge.

And here's where this chapter gets really interesting.

Kennedy starts jabbing his hand in the air, apparently reading from phrases he'd actually scrawled onto the text itself.

Oh, like what?

Things like, each day the crises multiply.

Each day their solution grows more difficult.

Each day we draw nearer the hour of maximum danger.

Wow.

Hour of maximum danger.

That's a loaded phrase.

It is, he added.

The tide of events has been running out and time has not been our friend.

And that phrase, hour of maximum danger,

it has a specific history, right?

Tied to those early Cold War fears about a Soviet surprise attack.

Exactly.

By using it, Kennedy is deliberately evoking that sense of urgent, maybe even existential threat.

So for anyone who just heard Eisenhower's, you know, relatively calm valedictory, this State of the Union must have felt like a sudden jolt.

The chapter notes this kind of apocalyptic tone hadn't really been heard for maybe a decade.

But what's fascinating, and this is a crucial insight from the source material, is that Kennedy was apparently far less alarmist in private.

Really?

How so?

Well, he just spent 10 days reviewing intelligence.

He knew the Soviets and Chinese weren't exactly a united front, that the Soviet military buildup wasn't quite as frantic as maybe feared.

And that Khrushchev had actually sent more conciliatory signals since the election.

Except, of course, for that one speech.

The Wars of Liberation speech, yeah.

That was the big exception.

But generally, the private intelligence picture was less grim than the public speech suggested.

So why the public alarm then?

What was the calculation?

The chapter points to several domestic political drivers.

Kennedy needed to justify his campaign charges that Eisenhower had been too complacent, you know?

Makes sense.

Plus, he had that very slim victory margin.

Exactly.

He needed to build national support for his upcoming programs and rallying Americans behind a narrative of shared crisis.

Well, that's a politically effective move.

And it fit the persona he was trying to cultivate,

right?

Campaigning on a time for greatness, embracing that sort of Churchillian penchant for stirring rhetoric.

Right.

It was about rousing what he saw as a complacent public and signaling that his administration would demand more sacrifice instead of more security.

A very different message.

He probably knew, too, especially remembering the McCarthy -era anxieties, that it was politically safer to seem overly tough rather than too soft on communism.

For sure.

Without Eisenhower's huge personal popularity, he needed to shield himself from potential accusations of being, you know, too intellectual or weak when dealing with the Soviets.

The chapter notes there's little evidence.

Kennedy gave a ton of thought to how the speech would actually land in Moscow beyond being a sort of general response to that Wars of Liberation doctrine.

Yeah, he hadn't yet had those deep dives with his experts on overall Soviet policy, but he certainly understood, I mean, he had to understand, that this harsh portrayal wouldn't make future negotiations any easier.

Which brings us directly to Khrushchev.

How did he perceive this opening salvo?

Well, he felt, perhaps with some justification, that he had extended conciliatory gestures, praising Kennedy publicly, sending signals through diplomats like Menshikov.

Even releasing those RB -47 flyers just before the inauguration.

He thought he was making an effort.

Right.

And operating, as the author puts it, under an eternal assumption that American leaders were telepathic enough to read his mind, he likely believed Kennedy knew that Wars of Liberation speech was largely performative.

Aimed more at Beijing than Washington, perhaps,

to shore up his revolutionary credentials.

That seems to be the assumption.

So from Khrushchev's perspective, Kennedy's fire and brimstone State of the Union looked less like genuine alarm.

And more like a deliberate effort to undermine his attempts to show his own domestic rivals that negotiation with the West could actually work.

Exactly.

It felt like an intentional slap in the face, as the source suggests.

And you see this reflected pretty quickly in the Soviet press, right?

As Vestia dropped its polite tone toward Kennedy almost immediately.

Yeah.

Complaining his address evoked irksome echoes of the Cold War.

The atmosphere was already chilling, just days in.

And the immediate actions taken by U .S.

didn't exactly help matters, did they?

Not at all.

Just two days after the speech, February 1st, the U .S.

conducts the first test launch of the Minuteman ICBM.

And the press coverage highlighted its potential for rapid deployment.

Which, in the Kremlin, these land -based missiles, potentially in hardened silos, looked like they had first -strike capability.

So this test, coming so quickly after the State of the Union, well,

it added to their unease.

On top of that, rumors started swirling about the U .S.

planning to transfer ownership of Jupiter missiles in Turkey, potentially giving the Turks access to atomic weapons.

And the chapter emphasizes how this immediately triggered those ancient Russian and Soviet anxieties about encirclement and threats right on their border.

Deep -seated fears.

The Soviet ambassador in Ankara even demanded an explanation from the Turkish foreign minister on February 3rd.

Things were moving fast.

Then comes February 6th, a really pivotal moment.

Robert McNamara, the new Secretary of Defense, holds his first background briefing for reporters.

And he gets asked about the missile gap, the thing Kennedy hammered so effectively during the campaign.

And McNamara, based on his review of the classified intelligence, gives his remarkably candid reply.

Just says it straight out.

There is no missile gap.

Boom.

Just like that.

The chapter gives the specifics.

The U .S.

and USSR had roughly the same small number of operational ICBMs at that moment.

But what McNamara didn't reveal, and this is crucial, was the highly classified detail that the U .S.

had a massive 20 to 1 advantage in nuclear warheads overall.

6 ,000 versus maybe 300.

Right.

So the missile numbers were comparable, but the destructive power wasn't even close.

McNamara, according to the source, realized almost instantly he'd made a terrible mistake.

He apparently said later, they broke the damn door down.

And the Washington Evening Star was blunt.

McNamara declares no missile gap.

Republicans naturally sense blood in the water.

Yeah, they were jokingly suggesting rerunning the election.

Kennedy's reaction was understandably swift anger, but mostly focused on the political embarrassment.

Having campaigned so hard on an issue that his own defense secretary just, well, debunked.

Right.

At a press conference, he tried to walk it back, saying it was premature to reach a judgment.

Later in the cabinet room, he apparently asked sarcastically, whoever believed in the missile gap?

A bit late for that.

But the political fallout, embarrassing as it was, was probably less significant than the consequence for U .S.-Soviet relations, wouldn't you say?

Absolutely.

McNamara's honesty, you know, accidentally blew up Eisenhower's quiet strategy.

Which was not to publicly refute Khrushchev's missile boasts, right?

Right.

To avoid backing him into a corner.

Exactly.

Eisenhower didn't want to force Khrushchev to

accelerate his missile program just to save face internationally and domestically.

But McNamara, just by telling the truth, as he saw it from the intel, did exactly that.

He called Khrushchev's bluff publicly.

And Khrushchev, who tended to see U .S.

actions as part of a deliberate centralized strategy, interpreted this whole sequence of events.

Let's recap.

The summit rebuffs before inauguration, the Karst Sea incident with the plane, the State of the Union's tone, the defense review, the Minuteman test, the Jupiter rumors in Turkey, and now McNamara basically saying the missile gap was fake.

All within 17 days of Kennedy taking office.

Khrushchev didn't see this as, you know, the chaotic start of a new administration finding its feet.

No.

He saw it as a coordinated launch of a deliberately harsh new American strategy.

A campaign, almost.

And that perception gap, fueled by a lack of prior understanding of Kennedy and compounded by these rapid fire events, is just a crucial takeaway from this period.

Khrushchev misread Kennedy's domestically driven rhetoric and the administration's early stumbles as intentional antagonism.

It really set a tense stage for everything that followed.

Sensing this tense atmosphere and maybe realizing he needed a deeper understanding, Kennedy made a pretty smart move.

He convened his top Soviet experts in early February.

Getting the old hands involved.

Yeah.

He even wired Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow to come home immediately.

Explicitly stating it was both to get your advice and demonstrate highest level confidence in you.

Thompson's reaction back in Moscow is quite telling, isn't it?

He felt

most incompetent in the face of the enormous problems we have with these people.

He wrote to a friend calling it a critical year.

His journey home sounds dramatic, too.

Air Force plane, then a train, arriving in Washington in a blinding night storm.

He even joked they were on the wrong end of a cultural exchange, given how mild the Moscow winter had apparently been that year.

Before leaving Moscow, Thompson sent Kennedy these extensive tutorial telegrams.

Apparently, he was delighted that Kennedy, unlike Eisenhower, who preferred short briefs, would actually read his long analyses.

That must have been refreshing for an ambassador.

What was his main message?

Thompson told the president that the recent events were forcing a decision on our basic policy toward the Soviet Union.

He assumed Kennedy was open to accommodation, but warned against illusions about quick results.

And crucially, he argued that not pursuing accommodation risked dividing the West, alienating the developing world, and potentially leading to war.

High stakes.

He offered some key insights into Khrushchev and the Soviet system, too.

Saw Khrushchev as dominant, but maybe vulnerable.

And stressed that Soviet leaders held this almost religious faith in world communism, which drove their actions.

But he also noted that our own policies can influence how they pursued those goals.

And the core challenge.

As Thompson put it so simply, we both look at the same set of facts and see different things.

That really sums up the perception gap, driving so much of the tension, doesn't it?

Perfectly.

Despite the challenges, though, Thompson did see some glimmers of hope.

Glee believed the Soviet people's desire for peace and a better life created constant pressure toward accommodation.

And he thought Khrushchev genuinely wanted reduced tension, maybe shift resources to consumer goods, to make the USSR an economic model.

Right.

Even if the ultimate goal was still global communism.

Right.

He believed the Soviet leadership had basically concluded a major war was no longer an acceptable means of achieving their aims.

He also mentioned the ideological competition with China, right?

Seeing a strong strain of nationalism in the Soviets.

Yeah.

He hoped that if Khrushchev offered tranquility, an eventual complete break between the Soviet and Chinese communists was actually possible.

He described the Soviets as becoming bourgeois very rapidly, calling it our one hope of the future.

Fascinating perspective.

And this method of seeking advice was different for Kennedy compared to Eisenhower.

Yeah.

Eisenhower had a more formal system, competing policy papers and all that.

Kennedy, fresh from the Senate, favored a more disorderly approach, as one aide put it, more free flowing discussion.

Which led to that February 11th meeting, the free form school session to chart our future relations.

Exactly.

And look who was there.

Vice President Johnson,

McNamara, Bundy, Ambassador Thompson, plus the three legendary former ambassadors to Moscow,

Averill Harriman, George Kennan, and Charles Boland.

Quite a room.

Wow.

So Kennedy just opens it up.

Pretty much.

His first question.

Now tell me about Russia.

His role throughout was mostly to listen, interrupting only to stimulate or clarify points.

Rusk, the new Secretary of State, was there too.

He was apparently surprised Kennedy wanted to look at everything from the beginning, the ground up.

And Vice President Johnson.

The source notes he said virtually nothing during the entire meeting.

Interesting.

What were the key takeaways from the experts?

Well, Kennan felt Khrushchev faced considerable opposition from Stalinists, that control was more collective.

Thompson agreed, but thought Khrushchev's main threat came from unusually grave difficulties, especially in agriculture.

Bad harvests.

Yeah, two really disastrous years, Thompson said, with the prospect of another bad one looming.

He also mentioned that economic growth had created a population with growing appetites now that the worst terror was gone.

He cited a community meeting where people were pounding the table and screaming and yelling and demanding.

What about the military picture?

Thompson thought the Pentagon tended to overestimate Soviet conventional strength.

He and Boland agreed Moscow was acting bolder, maybe due to growing faith in their military particularly missiles.

Kennan offered a slightly different take.

Yeah, Kennan argued Soviet leaders didn't rely solely on military power.

They expected to win through other forces, with the military mainly there to protect the inevitable forces of history.

And Khrushchev's immediate goals.

They saw him wanting to gain time for economic successes, needing a generally unexplosive period globally, but also needing some specific diplomatic successes in 1961.

And long term worries.

West Germany or China getting nuclear weapons, maybe?

That was definitely on the list.

They also agreed Khrushchev was opportunistically taking advantage of situations in places like Laos, the Congo and Cuba, which might have made the Soviets perhaps overconfident.

Did Thompson push his view that Khrushchev was the best bet?

He did.

He reiterated his preference for Khrushchev as the most pragmatic Soviet leader, making the country more normal, again linking this to the hope of a widening split with China as the Soviets became more bourgeois.

Did the idea of a summit come up, a face -to -face meeting?

It did.

Khrushchev had been publicly floating the idea of flying to the UN General Assembly in March.

How did the ambassadors feel about that?

They all endorsed the idea of an informal get acquainted meeting, but strongly advised against a full summit with actual bargaining.

Bolin especially dreaded a repeat of Khrushchev's 1960 UN performance, banging his shoe and all that.

He said Khrushchev would be incapable of resisting a rostrum.

So how to handle it?

They advised Kennedy to move quickly if he wanted to head off a potentially disruptive UN visit.

Bolin suggested just calling a UN meeting unproductive.

Harriman thought a better excuse was saying he needed to consult European leaders first.

How did Kennedy wrap up this intense session?

He asked the essential question, what the United States should do.

And Thompson had a powerful reply, framed in language that really resonated with Kennedy's own campaign themes.

What did he say?

Things like, make our own system work, maintain the unity of the West, find ways of placing ourselves in new and effective relations to the great forces of nationalism and anti -colonialism, change our image before the world so it becomes plain that we and not the Soviet Union stand for the future.

Wow.

Connecting domestic strength and global image.

Powerful stuff.

Later, Bolin reflected on it, telling Thompson he'd never met a president who wanted to know so much.

He was apparently genuinely startled by the contrast between Kennedy's open, questioning private style and the hardline public rhetoric of the State of the Union.

But he still had reservations.

Bolin felt the U .S.

and USSR were these great and powerful nations that absolutely had to find some basis to avoid, you know, blowing each other up.

His worry, though, was that Kennedy privately underestimated the depth of Khrushchev's commitment to dynamic world communism, a lingering concern.

A week after that big meeting, on a Saturday morning, the Council reconvened, this time specifically to discuss asking for a meeting with Khrushchev.

And sitting on Kennedy's right this time was the man he'd chosen as his Secretary of State, Dean Rusk.

And Rusk's view on an early summit, the source says he was appalled.

Appalled.

It stemmed from his perspective as a career diplomat.

He'd even written an article in 1960 questioning the wisdom of high -stakes leader -to -leader meetings.

He asked, Picture two men sitting down together.

Is it wise to gamble so heavily?

For Rusk, diplomacy needed careful prep,

precision, not necessarily the improvisational risk of a summit.

That fits with how the chapter describes him more comfortable on the inside, prioritizing process over personality.

Taking George Marshall as his role model, believing public business should not be influenced by personal considerations, a private, dour man from Georgia.

His preference for discretion sounds intense,

ending the practice of listening in on presidential calls, telling Hoover he'd resign if his phone was tapped.

Yeah, and preferring not to use the phone for grave subjects, which the chapter notes handicapped him with a president like Kennedy who liked using the phone.

He also apparently destroyed many records later, believing some things that history does not deserve to know.

He'd risen fast under Truman, but didn't really know Kennedy well before December 1960, right?

Right, lacked a personal relationship, lacked a strong political base of his own.

He knew Kennedy wouldn't hesitate to fire him if he became a liability.

The chapter gives some fascinating background on how Rusk even got the job.

Kennedy initially preferred Fulbright.

He did, but Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State, dismissed Fulbright as a dilettante.

Acheson suggested others, but Kennedy wanted a Democrat and intended to run foreign policy himself anyway.

So Acheson suggests Rusk, a name Kennedy barely knew.

Exactly.

Acheson recommended him highly strong and loyal, though with the caveat that being a good number two doesn't guarantee success as number one.

Then Kennedy talks to Robert Lovett, another respected figure.

Right.

Lovett declines the job himself due to health, but he asks Kennedy that crucial question.

Do you want a Secretary of State or do you really want an Undersecretary?

And Kennedy laughs and says, Well, I guess I want an Undersecretary.

Lovett immediately replies that Dean Rusk would be perfect.

Rusk himself, meanwhile, was working at the Rockefeller Foundation, maybe discreetly campaigning a bit.

Seems so.

Wrote Kennedy some advice, arranged a meeting for him.

When the offer came via Shriver, Rusk seemed genuinely surprised.

Their initial breakfast meeting was apparently a bit awkward.

Rusk felt communication was difficult, though he stressed loyalty to the president was key.

Right.

Kennedy still leaned towards Fulbright initially, but Robert Kennedy strongly opposed him over civil rights and other issues.

After considering David Bruce, RFK apparently concluded Rusk was the least of three evils.

So Kennedy calls Rusk with the formal offer.

Rusk responds cautiously.

Yeah, says he needs to talk about it.

Kennedy insists he come down to Palm Beach.

They walk on the beach.

And Rusk mentions wiring Harriman during the convention telling him to support Stevenson.

And Kennedy just laughs.

Apparently so.

Rusk also mentioned his tight finances could only serve one term, Kennedy understood.

Then came the announcement, with Kennedy maybe being a bit too candid telling reporters Rusk was the best man available.

Rusk flew north, still feeling uncertain.

And Kennedy later admitted he had to make appointments quickly, but would know who he really wanted after a year in office.

So back to that summit decision meeting.

Despite Rusk's professional caution about an early summit.

Kennedy was drawn to the idea anyway.

As Rusk later put it, Kennedy felt if he could just sit down with Khrushchev, maybe something worthwhile would come out of it.

That chemistry of being president overriding the secretary's advice.

Thompson's view also carried weight.

He believed Khrushchev was affected by personal relationships, that Kennedy has got to know this man.

And Kennedy himself was just intensely curious.

Baldwin felt he really felt he had to find out for himself.

So the decision was made, Kennedy told his aide, Ken O'Donnell, I think we'll go and see Khrushchev, adding he needed to show him we can be just as tough, let him see who he's dealing with.

Okay, decision made, summit is on, at least in principle.

Right.

So on February 21st, Kennedy starts working on his first substantial letter to Khrushchev.

Thompson drafts one page, Kennedy thinks it's too brief.

Kennedy adds a note himself.

Yeah, something about being interested in harmonious relations despite the different systems.

Then Ted Sorensen finishes the draft, described as a gentle and opening ploy.

What did the final letter say?

It was two pages, sent via Thompson, who carried Kennedy's full confidence.

It acknowledged the short time he'd had, stressed the importance of the manner of approaching disagreements, hoped to meet personally before too long for an informal exchange, depending on the situation.

Thompson would fill him in more.

And it ended on a positive note.

Yeah, Kennedy's saying he intended to do everything I can toward developing a more harmonious relationship.

But while this is happening in Washington,

Khrushchev is out on that long farming tour, and then gets hit by that series of harsh signals from Kennedy's first couple of weeks.

Right.

The State of the Union, the Defense Review, McNamara's missile gap comment.

And then Saturday, February 11th, the same day Kennedy's meeting his experts, Khrushchev is suddenly recalled to Moscow.

Why?

The analysis in the source suggests his rivals likely convened a surprise presidium meeting, demanding a tougher response to what they saw as this new American militants.

And the shift in Khrushchev's tone was pretty immediate.

Very.

February 17th, he suddenly escalates the Berlin issue with a tough message to West Germany.

A week later, at that farming conference in Moscow, he drops the moderate talk and launches into this boastful hymn to Soviet nuclear weapons and ICBMs.

He's basically saying U .S.

overseas bases were now useless because Soviet rockets could reach America.

Exactly.

Though the chapter notes this was also the first time the Soviet marshals publicly admitted their ICBMs were merely sufficient, not superior, kind of implicitly acknowledging McNamara's point.

Adding fuel to the fire was the Congo crisis, wasn't it?

Lumumba's murder on February 13th.

Yeah, that deeply angered Khrushchev.

He publicly blamed Western colonialists and the U .N.

Secretary General Hammerskjöld.

Threatened intervention.

And demanded Hammerskjöld be replaced by that Troika system, one Western, one Soviet, one neutral leader for the U .N., each with a veto.

A non -starter for the West.

Before Thompson left for Moscow with Kennedy's letter, Kennedy specifically told him to convey hope that Congo differences wouldn't be a serious obstacle to relations.

But Khrushchev was clearly dug in.

Absolutely.

Thompson gets back to Moscow on February 27th with Kennedy's carefully crafted letter.

And the next morning, in what the chapter calls a calculated insult, Khrushchev just resumes his farming tour without even receiving the letter from Thompson.

Ouch.

Sending a clear message.

And while on tour, he keeps up the tough talk, doubling down on missile boasts, saying they had enough weapons to wipe aggressors from the face of the earth.

Thompson keeps trying, though.

Pushing for a meeting.

He does.

A week later, Gromyko finally tells Thompson to fly thousands of miles east to Novosibirsk, a usually closed city, where Khrushchev was.

Quite the journey.

Snowstorm in Moscow.

Long flight.

Arriving at night, staying in the city's only hotel.

Dobrynin, who was then a counselor, met him, offered to help translate the letter quickly, promising not to show Khrushchev beforehand.

Thompson even helped smooth the English version.

Where did they finally meet?

At a dacha near Academy City,

this science town Khrushchev had ordered built.

The chapter gives these glimpses of Khrushchev being in a foul mood right before Thompson arrived.

Apparently had a tantrum over an architectural model, fired a geneticist.

Sounds like he was under pressure.

Definitely.

The meeting itself?

Big bodyguard, upstairs room, and Khrushchev looking extremely tired.

So much so, it shocked even the Soviets.

And he finally reads Kennedy's letter, now 15 days old.

His reaction?

Measured.

It could serve as a good beginning.

He was inclined to say yes to a meeting, calling it useful to become acquainted, remembering his brief 1959 chat with Kennedy.

Did they discuss logistics?

Timing?

Thompson proposed early May, maybe Vienna or Stockholm, tying it to Kennedy's planned European trip.

Khrushchev seemed okay with that.

Preferred Vienna said he knew about these transatlantic flights.

What about the Congo?

Was that still a hot topic?

Very tense.

Khrushchev blamed Hammerskjold personally for Lumumba's murder, called Shum a Belgian stooge, vowed to oppose the UN with all its means, repeated the crooked demand, said the US does not support popular movements anymore.

Thompson just tried to stay calm?

Yeah, replied.

The US also had UN frustrations.

The Cold War needed to stay out of Africa.

Congo wasn't a vital US interest?

Trying to lower the temperature?

Did they talk about the nuclear test ban?

They did.

Thompson said Kennedy was committed to a vigorous effort at the Geneva talks, resuming soon, seeing it as a bellwether of détente.

Khrushchev's response?

Still lukewarm?

Yeah, basically said they hadn't tested in two years and weren't suffering.

Testing wasn't the main issue.

Disarmament was.

Thompson insisted the test ban had to be the first step.

And Khrushchev brought up France.

Right.

Said the USSR would agree if France signed.

Thompson pushed about China.

Khrushchev used France as the current turtle, but said any agreement must be universal, meaning France and China would eventually have to sign.

So Thompson reported back that Soviet interests seemed low, using France as an excuse.

Pretty much.

Less interest than before.

Lunch followed Dekuski, soup, beefsteak, chicken.

Khrushchev took pills, drank little, shared a story about his father and smoking.

And he toasts?

Persovka.

But interestingly, Khrushchev didn't toast the young Kennedy's health, saying he didn't need such wishes.

He did express hope to invite the Kennedys to the USSR some day, but the time was not yet ripe.

Did he give a firm answer on the summit timing?

Not yet.

Said he was heading further east, back in Moscow late March.

Made me give an answer then.

So Thompson flies back to Moscow.

Met by reporters, famously tells them, I shall always be an optimist.

But his cables back to Washington were more cautious.

What did he report?

That Khrushchev was obviously pleased with the summit proposal itself, seeing it as having moderated Kennedy's perceived hard line.

Big butt.

Yeah.

The hopeful spirit from earlier signals was almost gone.

No sign of movement on Congo, enthusiasm for the test span was ebbing, and Thompson hadn't even been able to bring up the US military increases, which he knew were causing them serious preoccupation.

So a mixed picture at best from Novosibirsk.

Definitely.

Meanwhile, while Thompson was out there, other signals were coming through back channels in Washington.

March 20th, Alexander Fomen, the KGB resident, has lunch with Robert Estabrook, a Washington Post editor with Kennedy admin connections.

Fomen.

He was part of Khrushchev's 1959 US tour, right?

Known quantity.

Yeah.

The chapter also nights another Soviet diplomat, Smirnovsky, had been cultivating journalist Charles Bartlett, a close Kennedy friend, during the campaign.

Bartlett felt the Soviets were hungering for a better relationship.

Hoover even warned Kennedy about Bartlett having lots of Russian friends.

He did.

Bartlett just said it was part of the newspaper business, his interest in peace.

There's a great anecdote about an NSC meeting where these press contacts were reported, and Kennedy apparently gave an acid laugh saying, our sources are getting better all the time, shows he was aware of these informal channels.

What messages did Fomen relay to Estabrook specifically?

Soviet disappointment.

The US hadn't reciprocated the RB -47 release, but pleased by some minor trade suggestion.

Said the upcoming UN session wouldn't be significant.

Anything on Laos.

Yeah.

Fomen pitched an international control commission, a neutral Austrian model government, said it could be a model for many situations.

Pornially mentioned, the Chinese were creating difficulties, and if the US intervened with force, it would fight alone.

And crucially, the test ban.

This was the day before talks resumed.

Right.

Fomen signaled to Estabrook that a compromise on inspections between the US demand for 20 and the Soviet offer of three was possible.

Which makes what happened the very next day, March 21st, in Geneva, so jarring.

Exactly.

The test ban talks resume, and the Soviets immediately unveil a new W, a much harder line, without even waiting for the US offer.

Before we get to that, what was Kennedy's position going in?

He'd supported a test ban for a while, right?

Since his Senate days, yeah.

Influenced by advisors who argued the US was technically ahead and would stay ahead if testing stopped.

His campaign stance was tough, but still favored continuing the voluntary moratorium.

Right.

He spoke forcefully about the urgent need for a ban before weapons spread to maybe 20 countries by the mid -60s.

Called it vital.

So as president, he paused the talks briefly to review the US position.

Yes.

His disarmament advisor, John McCloy, reviewed everything, concluded detection was feasible except for really small underground or space tests.

The key remained on -site inspections.

What did McCloy recommend the US offer?

A minimum of 10 inspections annually, plus potentially up to 10 more for suspicious events.

So 20 total.

Kennedy agreed, even overriding opposition from the Joint Chiefs.

He'd read the 1960 talks transcripts and saw how close they'd actually come before things fell apart.

Why was this so important for Kennedy?

He saw it as potentially unlocking progress on other dangerous issues like Berlin, Laos.

He talked with Ruskin Bundy about the alternative and endless arms race, proliferation to Israel -China.

They felt they had to make a serious effort.

But then, March 21st, the talks resume and the Soviets hit them with a tougher position than before.

Exactly.

The Soviet delegate, Sir Apkin, demanded the control board be chaired by that troika system, again, arguing it was impossible to find a completely neutral person.

Rusk's reaction?

Oddly unacceptable.

It was a major step backward.

Which makes that Fulman signal from the day before really fascinating.

What's going on there?

Good question.

Was the new hard line in Geneva imposed by the Presidium back in February, overruling Khrushchev?

Was Fulman's message about compromise maybe a rogue signal from Khrushchev or his allies, hoping the US would push past the formal position?

Hard to know.

While the test -band talks hit a wall, other crises were heating up.

Laos, especially.

Right.

March 27th, Gromyko and Menshikov meet Kennedy at the White House.

Main topic,

Laos.

Kennedy privately called it the worst mess the Eisenhower administration left me.

What was happening on the ground?

Since December 60, Soviets had been airlifting arms to the Communist Pathet Lao forces, who were now on the offensive against the US -backed government.

Kennedy's experts had told him Western disunity hadn't helped.

Pentagon advice was grim.

Risk of confronting China.

Very.

Sending US troops could mean facing Chinese forces, needing maybe 300 ,000 US troops, allies,

possibly even tactical nukes, which could then lead to Soviet volunteers and nuclear backing.

A nightmare scenario.

Thompson and Boland thought Khrushchev probably wanted to avoid that, but Kennedy needed to show resolve.

That was their take.

So Kennedy ordered a show of force.

Marines to the Thai border, carriers to the region, bases fortified.

He was also getting really interested in guerrilla warfare around this time, reading Mao Guevara.

Trying to counter that war as a liberation doctrine.

Exactly.

But diplomacy was heartbreaking.

Public calls for neutrality didn't stop the path that Lao advanced.

Rusk's pleas to Gromyko failed.

So Kennedy issued that sharp public threat at a news conference.

If these attacks do not stop, those who supported truly neutral Laos will have to consider their response.

Strong words.

And Gromyko reacted fast.

Next day, asked for that urgent meeting.

Brought the message from Khrushchev saying he also wanted a neutral independent Laos.

So the meeting, Oval Office, then Rose Garden, they found common ground on Laos, at least publicly.

They did.

Both sides declared support for peace and neutrality, agreed to work towards a settlement.

Did the talk broaden beyond Laos?

Yeah, Gromyko hoped for genuine friendship.

Kennedy acknowledged the deep differences.

Laos, Africa, Cuba said the core problem was creating an atmosphere to settle issues without bringing the military situation to the brink.

Then the brief Rose Garden interlude with Caroline.

Right.

A little human moment.

When they resumed, Kennedy emphasized his abiding anxiety, the danger of miscalculation.

Mentioned studying WWI origins, how misunderstanding caused conflict.

Trying to connect on that level.

The shared danger.

Seems like it.

Stressed avoiding the brink, told Gromyko the Soviets shouldn't push the U .S.

where its prestige was involved.

Made it clear the U .S.

wouldn't just watch communists expand in Southeast Asia.

Mentioned Cuba's belligerent attitude, too.

Did Kennedy push the summit idea again?

Repeated his willingness to meet Khrushchev.

Gromyko said the chairman liked the idea, but still no formal reply.

Which brings us back to Khrushchev.

He returns to Moscow, March 24th, exhausted, planning a vacation.

Kennedy's letter proposing a meeting is still sitting there, unanswered formally for weeks now.

Why the delay?

He seemed interested in

The chapter suggests multiple reasons.

Kennedy had already set this tough public tone, maybe meeting too soon rewards that.

Also, the risk of a summit, achieving nothing, could strengthen Khrushchev's hardline enemies in Moscow and Beijing.

But the main reason the chapter highlights.

Khrushchev suspected a U .S.

invasion plan was real, but he didn't think it would happen soon.

Why not?

He thought Kennedy was more cautious, maybe influenced by advisors like Rusk, Bolz, Stevenson known for reluctance to use force.

Would Kennedy really overrule them?

Jeopardize relations?

Even though Soviet and Cuban intelligence were sending increasing evidence of an invasion plan, exiles, training, etc.

Yeah, but according to one defector cited, the more intelligence Khrushchev received, the less he believed it.

Maybe he thought Cuba was exaggerating.

And the KGB chief, Shelopin, defended the intel, but deferred to Khrushchev's political judgment.

Classic intelligence dilemma.

Capability versus intention.

Exactly.

Still, Khrushchev couldn't be certain Kennedy wouldn't act soon.

And the absolute last thing he wanted was to be shaking hands at a summit while U .S.

forces might be overthrowing Castro.

Castro being the leader of the first country, moving toward Soviet communism of its own free will.

Huge symbolic importance.

Immense.

So Khrushchev's nervousness showed in his public silence about Cuba, even as the intelligence mounted.

If the U .S.

did use force, his options were extremely limited.

Short of threatening nuclear war over Cuba, which seemed unthinkable.

Right.

And the chapter concludes right on that cliffhanger.

March 29th, the CIA formally presents Operation Zapata, the Bay of Pigs plan, to Kennedy, and it mentions that separate, darker plot.

The CIA and mafia figures trying to assassinate Castro with poison pills.

Yeah.

It just perfectly sets the stage for the Bay of Pigs crisis, which we know is coming right up and will totally dominate the relationship leading into the eventual summit.

This chapter also connects some interesting dots, doesn't it?

Like the missile gap mess contributing to the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency later in 61.

Good point.

Trying to get more integrated intelligence estimates after that whole fiasco.

And we got those fascinating details about Rusk, his character, how he was chosen, his secrecy, his son lamenting the lack of personal detail in his memoirs.

Plus those glimpses into the murky world of intelligence and politics.

The FBI wiretap catching Fulbright apologizing for a Kennedy speech,

Hoover warning about Bartlett's Russian friends.

It all paints this incredibly vivid picture of the intensity and, frankly, the confusion of those first few months of 1961.

You have Kennedy launching with this tough public stance, partly for domestic reasons, but it gets misread by Khrushchev as deliberate aggression.

And Khrushchev, under pressure at home, initially sends some conciliatory signals, but quickly hardens his own position in response to perceived American belligerence and these escalating crises.

Congo, wows.

We saw Kennedy's unique way of seeking advice, bringing in those experts, trying to understand the Soviet reality, while also navigating the complex process of just building his administration, like picking Rusk.

And all this diplomacy that backchannels the crises playing out under the growing shadow of Cuba, which the chapter argues was really the main thing holding Khrushchev back from agreeing to that summit right away.

Pulling back, what this chapter really gives us is this detailed look at how initial perceptions, domestic politics,

signals intended or misread, and just raw external events converged so quickly to shape the Kennedy -Khrushchev relationship right from the start.

Yeah, it shows leadership on both sides operating under incredible pressure, often with incomplete or conflicting information.

It wasn't neat or tidy at all.

And it makes you think, doesn't it, how much of that initial critical tone was set not just by grand strategy, but by political needs, by misinterpretation, by the sheer chaotic reality of crises popping up daily?

Absolutely.

How might that relationship, arguably the most dangerous of the Cold War, have gone differently if just one key signal hadn't been misread, or if domestic politics hadn't forced such a strong opening hand?

It's a crucial moment to understand, and it definitely leaves you thinking about the ripple effects of those early choices.