Chapter 21: The Spirit of Moscow

Welcome to Last Minute Lecture.

This free chapter overview is designed to help students review and understand key concepts.

These summaries supplement not replaced the original textbook and may not be redistributed or resold.

For complete coverage, always consult the official text.

1963.

A year where the Cold War chessboard saw some fascinating shifts, particularly in the Michael Beschloss's The Crisis Years.

Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 -1963.

Right, this chapter really gets into a critical juncture.

You've got Kennedy's efforts to shore up alliances in Europe,

playing out against this backdrop of serious movement and some pretty big sticking points in nuclear arms control.

And Beschloss also brings in that very human element.

Exactly, the personal and political vulnerabilities that could have just derailed everything.

Beschloss masterfully weaves together Kennedy's big European tour, the sort of dawning hope for a limited nuclear test ban treaty and these underlying issues, scandals, potential security breaches that were kind of swirling beneath the surface.

So our mission in this deep dive is to really pull out the core of this complex period.

We want to understand the key events, the strategies, the diplomatic back and forth and those ever -present crises.

And the historical context too, plus Beschloss's own take on it all, drawing from a whole range of sources.

Okay, so where does Beschloss kick things off in this intricate dance?

He starts with Kennedy's European trip.

June, July 63.

And look, this wasn't just shaking hands and photo ops, Kennedy had some very specific goals.

Strengthening the Western alliance, creating more freedom of action for the U .S.

And right away, the first stop or lack thereof, really Paris,

de Gaulle.

That immediately signals the complexities, doesn't it?

It really does.

Beschloss makes it clear de Gaulle was deeply suspicious of any detente with Khrushchev.

He saw this potential test ban treaty as a direct threat to France getting its own bomb.

Which underscores that point early on.

Even with your closest allies,

national interests can diverge pretty sharply.

Precisely.

And the diplomatic signaling was, well, quite something.

Olin, the U .S.

ambassador, sort of handset possible U .S.

help with France's nuclear program if they join the test ban.

And de Gaulle's response.

Basically puts it off.

Delays any proposed visit to Washington.

Bullen, as Beschloss reads it, saw this as just stalling.

Buying time for France's nuclear development.

So right there, you see the limits of U .S.

influence.

Okay.

Then the trip moves to Germany and the whole atmosphere changes,

dramatically.

Yeah.

Beschloss notes Kennedy's own memories flooding back Germany in 1939.

Very different place.

And Adenauer's welcome, it subtly reminds Kennedy of his American university speech.

Kind of a gentle warning, maybe.

Don't forget us if you're making deals with Moscow.

A delicate balance, for sure.

Yeah.

But the public reaction in West Germany.

Wow.

The enthusiasm was just off the charts.

Those Kennedy, Kennedy chants.

Beschloss quartz Tyler observing it went beyond just policy.

It was this deeper connection.

Kennedy noticed the flags were maybe a bit staged.

He did, yeah.

But he also saw that funny sign in Wiesbaden.

Do you all the high stakes?

And the meeting with Kohler, the U .S.

ambassador just back from Moscow, that gives us a key insight into Khrushchev's mindset.

Right.

Kohler reports Khrushchev seems genuinely ready for a test ban.

Partly maybe to justify the split with China, promote his whole peaceful coexistence thing.

Which is fascinating when you contrast it, as Beschloss does, with Phyllis Kohler's perspective, the difference between Kennedy's almost godlike public image and the private whispers about his personal life.

Then West Berlin, another huge emotional moment.

Clay, General Clay, warned about risks.

The tensions were still sky high.

But Kennedy went, and the reception.

It was the 15th anniversary of the airlift, too.

Extraordinary.

Mantester's description of the crowd's just massive.

So supportive.

It really comes alive.

But even Adenauer, amidst it all, voices that worry could another Hitler rise.

And that leads straight into probably the most famous line of the whole trip.

Ich bin ein Berliner.

Beschloss details how it came about Robert Kennedy pushing for a German phrase, Bundy doing a quick translation on the plane.

From Civis Romanusum.

Exactly.

And the impact.

Beschloss quotes Vessel, Adenauer's intelligence chief, saying it just electrified the city, cemented Kennedy as their guy, you know, a steadfast ally.

It's interesting, though.

Beschloss points out that while that line became legendary, the speech's actual ending, the part about hope and eventual reunification,

might have had more long term resonance.

That's a really sharp observation.

And Kennedy himself, you know, clearly moved, but still had that self -awareness joking about his German afterwards.

Why such a strong speech there?

Beschloss suggests a few things.

Reassuring West Berliners, definitely.

But maybe also seeing the wall for the first time.

Some guild.

Possibly.

He really denounced the wall offense against history, humanity, separating families.

Though, as Beschloss notes, he was careful to attribute some of that sentiment to Willie Brandt.

And Kennedy didn't actually mention the wall that often publicly after this.

So how did Khrushchev take this?

Just rhetoric?

Pretty much, according to Beschloss, dismissed it as typical Cold War stuff.

Which is interesting, because Kennedy apparently saw his own 1961 speeches differently.

So American diplomats had to do a bit of clarifying afterwards.

Bundy put some softer language in the next speech?

Yeah, smooth things over a little.

But the German adulation, Kennedy clearly loved it, made that note for his successor, half joking.

And the polling data, Bundy had showed Kennedy way more popular in Germany than de Gaulle.

And then a quick stop in Ireland.

More personal.

Definitely.

Bundy apparently wasn't keen, but Kennedy insisted, I am the President of the United States, not you.

Quite the line.

Ah.

And he announced the new ambassador, met cousins.

Sang songs, quoted Joyce to the Irish parliament.

It shows that personal connection side again.

Then England.

And the mood shifts again, dramatically, because of the Profumo scandal.

Oh yeah.

McMillan was really reeling.

Beschloss outlines the whole affair, the lies, the security concerns, the public outcry.

Kennedy was worried, understandably, about getting dragged into it.

So he shortened the visit, changed the venue.

Right.

Met McMillan at Birchgrove instead of Checkers.

McMillan felt snubbed, wrote about in his diary.

Kennedy had earlier expressed surprise.

The CIA seemed unaware of Profumo's risky behavior.

And Bruce's eyes -only cable just confirmed how wild the gossip was.

It really shows how domestic scandals could spill over into top -level international relations.

Absolutely.

Then finally, Italy.

Met the new pope, Paul VI, Italian leaders.

And then, Kennedy asked for a quiet night.

Lake Como, Rockefeller villa.

And Beschloss raises the question,

was he alone?

He does.

Doesn't state it outright, but it's a clear foreshadowing.

That interception of private conduct and national security.

Which brings us right to… The Susie Chang -Profumo connection and Robert Kennedy's scramble.

Yeah, this is where it gets really hairy.

That New York Journal American story, linking a high -profile American politician to Susie Chang, who was tied to Keillor and Rice Davies from the Profumo mess.

The press immediately thought.

The president.

They did.

Robert Kennedy swung into action, taped interview with the source, refused to name the second one, got the FBI involved investigating Keillor and Rice Davies in New York.

Did they find a link?

No direct evidence connecting them to Kennedy's penthouse was found, but the fear of a U .S.

Profumo scandal.

That was huge for RFK.

Beschloss emphasizes Robert Kennedy's worry that Profumo had opened the floodgates, made leaders' private lives fair game, and the vulnerability to blackmail.

Exactly.

And this leads straight into Beschloss' analysis of Kennedy's own sexual behavior, and the, frankly, massive security risks involved.

He doesn't list everything, but asks that core question.

How did this impact his leadership?

His diplomacy?

Right.

Kennedy knew sexual compromise was an espionage tactic.

He wasn't naive about that.

The potential damage of any affairs came out, especially if someone had Soviet block ties.

It was enormous.

And the risk of blackmail influencing foreign policy.

Terrifying.

Beschloss' bottom line is pretty stark.

Kennedy made no systematic effort to vet these women for security risks.

The French ambassador, Alfand, apparently found the lack of precaution surprising.

Yeah.

In a supposedly Puritan country, Beschloss floats hypotheticals like Sam Giancana potentially having leverage.

And he reminds us of real cases, like Dijon in France, where Soviet intelligence did exactly this kind of thing.

What about the Secret Service?

Limited in what they could or would do in this area,

Rusk's comment about not being Kennedy's chaperone kind of sums up the attitude.

But Kennedy knew the risks.

Thompson told him about the warnings given to Marines in Moscow.

To give this context, Beschloss goes back to the Inga Arvad affair in the early 40s.

And Arvad's background is troubling, to say the least.

Married, rumored mistress of a Nazi sympathizer, photographed with Hitler, anti -Semitic remarks.

And the FBI was watching her as a possible spy while she was with Kennedy?

Heavily.

Her file details it, including their time in Charleston.

Beschloss sees this as showing Kennedy's political cynicism even back then.

His letters to her seem almost dismissive of the danger.

It almost ended his naval career, didn't it?

It did.

Joe Kennedy had to pull strings to get him transferred to the Pacific.

JFK later privately called it being shagged out of town.

Hoover apparently regretted not doing more later.

And Beschloss argues this whole episode maybe reinforced Kennedy's sense of impunity.

Yeah, that he could get away with it.

That maybe payoffs and threats could keep things quiet.

He seemed to believe the press wouldn't touch his private life unless it affected his job performance like that beach photo incident.

And his views on privacy for leaders, the Lenin anecdote.

Suggests he believed in a separation.

Beschloss talks about Kennedy enjoying defying rules, the gambling pool story about the Lincoln bedroom, Billings said he lived for the moment.

Kennedy himself apparently said, they can't touch me while I'm alive.

But the stakes as president were infinitely higher.

Absolutely.

The potential for exploitation by enemies, by organized crime, by hostile intelligence services.

It was immense.

Which brings us to Ellen Romich.

1963.

Right in the middle of everything else.

Exactly.

East German refugee married to a West German airman hostess at Bobby Baker's Quorum Club.

Moved in circles that included Capitol Hill, embassies, the executive branch,

allegedly the president, and even someone from the Soviet embassy.

That's the dangerous mix right there.

For sure.

Her name dropping, her spending.

It triggered an FBI look.

Robert Kennedy's reaction.

Immediate.

Get her out of the country.

Now.

On security reasons, they were deported pretty fast.

Very fast.

But then the Bobby Baker Senate probe starts digging and the Des Moines register runs a story.

Senator Williams starts asking questions.

The Romich issue resurfaces.

So RFK had to contain it again.

Right.

Sends an aid duffy to West Germany to try and keep her quiet.

Gets the Bonn government to issue a statement downplaying any East German links.

And crucially asks Hoover for help in stopping a full Senate investigation.

Another debt to Hoover.

Exactly.

And Beschloss says the FBI confiscated photos potentially linking Romich to the president.

Then Kennedy tries to spin Ben Bradley, feeding him stories about Hoover having dirt on senators, downplaying his own link to Baker and Romich.

Classic damage control.

Robert Kennedy's later public version tried to minimize it all, too.

Yeah.

Downplayed White House involvement.

Claims some women lied.

Asserted they had it under control.

But Beschloss's analysis of what could have happened if it blew up, it's chilling.

Forced resignation.

Poisoning U .S.

politics.

Accusations of Soviet blackmail influencing Cold War policy.

All of it.

It could have completely derailed any chance of improving relations with the Soviets.

A massive potential crisis.

Narrowly averted.

Okay.

Amidst all that, we have the limited treaty negotiations moving forward.

A totally different track, but happening concurrently.

Right.

And Khrushchev's speech on July 2nd is a huge moment.

Praises Kennedy's American University speech.

Offers a limited ban atmosphere space underwater.

Drops the demand for an underground moratorium.

Withdraws the offer of on -site inspections.

Using that colorful harem analogy.

Ah, yes.

Thompson thought Khrushchev was probably giving in to his own military on inspections.

But the shared worry about China getting the bomb, as Kazan noted, was a big factor too.

And Mikoyan's comments.

Khrushchev snubbing the Chinese.

The Sino -Soviet split was becoming very real.

Very.

Khrushchev's chat with Spock in Kyiv, the railroad bolt analogy for Berlin, shows his strategic thinking willing to push.

Spock wisely warned him not to link Berlin to the test ban talks.

McMillan was also pushing hard for a limited ban, right?

Even without inspections.

Yeah, called it a very big prize.

Saw the potential impact on France, Germany, China, added momentum.

Kennedy's instructions for Harriman, the negotiator, were laser -focused on China.

Absolutely.

Preventing China getting nukes was paramount.

Kennedy was apparently willing to tolerate some Soviet cheating if a ban stopped China.

Malraux's warning about China really stuck with him.

And by 63, China wasn't relying on Soviet help as much, so the US started thinking radical thoughts.

Very radical.

Asking the Soviets to withdraw their nuclear umbrella from China.

Maybe trading Taiwan or German reunification.

Thompson even mentioned a possible Soviet warning strike or preemptive attack on Chinese nuclear sites.

The State Department talked about joint US -USSR action.

Bombing Lopnore.

Sabotage.

Yeah, Rostov's memo talked about duty to history.

Wild stuff.

But Thompson knew talking to Khrushchev about China would be incredibly tough, Kennedy told Harriman.

Push hard on China.

Harriman had the idea of using the MLF, the Multilateral Force, as a bargaining chip.

He did.

Kennedy's view on the MLF had shifted after Cuba, so he was open to it.

Willing to trade it or use the political capital from his German trip to get a deal.

Meanwhile, Macmillan, dealing with Profumo, wanted a summit right after signing.

Big time.

Needed a political win.

Wanted Britain back at the top table.

Kennedy was open if it sealed the deal, but worried about French and German reactions and the optics.

He wanted any summit carefully stage managed for US opinion, recalling Wilson and the League of Nations.

So Harriman arrives in Moscow July 15th.

Optimistic.

Optimistic.

Initially, yes.

Gromyko leading the Soviet side was seen as good.

Khrushchev opens with, why don't we sign it now and let the experts work out the details?

Classic Harriman's blank pad gesture.

Nice touch.

Kennedy's letter to Khrushchev stressed hope for a comprehensive ban, acknowledged the disagreement, promised no spying,

but Khrushchev wouldn't budge on inspections.

Cheese in the room.

The mouse will take it.

His draft tree included France.

Surprisingly, yes.

Harriman and Hailsham immediately pushed back.

No way to golf signs now.

Harriman raises China again.

Khrushchev dismisses it years away.

Then Khrushchev pushes his non -aggression packed idea.

Which the Soviets had wanted for ages.

Right.

Harriman stalled, need allied consultation, worries about Berlin access.

Khrushchev accused West Germany of blocking Kennedy.

And Kennedy was micromanaging Harriman.

Totally.

No summaries, blow -by -blow reports via the secret ban channel.

Kennedy agreed on excluding France initially, still worried sick about China, told Harriman.

Stress the danger of smaller nuclear forces in CHIKOM hands.

Find out what Khrushchev thinks about limiting them.

Okay, formal talk start.

Spiritanovka Palace.

Harriman knew the building from WWII.

Pushed for stronger language on self -defense nuclear use.

Debated peaceful nuclear explosions, Gromiko worried about proliferation loopholes.

Withdrawal clause was a big fight.

Huge.

Gromiko hated it.

Harriman knew the Senate wouldn't ratify without it, especially with China looming.

Harriman threatened to walk.

They found a compromise wording.

Gromiko pushed the non -aggression pact hard again.

Very hard.

Harriman promised a sympathetic report back, which Thompson saw as giving too much away.

The last hurdle.

Signatures from non -recognized states.

East Germany.

China.

Khrushchev thought Harriman was being too rigid.

He did.

Ormsby Gore intervened back in DC.

The solution.

Nations signed in association with recognized depository governments.

Side steps the issue.

Kennedy calls McMillan.

It's worked out.

Go ahead.

McMillan was overjoyed.

So July 25th, they initialed the treaty.

Harriman, Halesham, Gromiko, done.

Harriman joked about Halesham's fancy initial.

Best loss ends those personal Khrushchev -Harriman moments too.

Yeah, the imperialist greeting, the talk of swapping commanders, the track meet, the tears Harriman thought he saw,

adds color.

After the initialing, Khrushchev gives Harriman a bear hug.

And a maladytse.

Well done.

Harriman immediately raises China again.

Kennedy's great concern?

Khrushchev.

Monosyllabic.

Dismissive.

That is your problem.

So Harriman didn't suggest the joint attack.

Nope.

Read the room.

Khrushchev then does that public display in the courtyard, taking Harriman to dinner.

Harriman mentions RFK wanting to visit.

Khrushchev nixes it.

RFK's anti -Soviet speeches.

But Khrushchev praised Harriman later to Kennedy.

He did.

Ormsby Gore reported McMillan's euphoria.

Schlesinger congratulated Harriman.

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the doomsday clock back.

A real sense of achievement.

China's reaction.

Furious.

Absolutely furious.

Denounced it as a Soviet -American plot withdrew delegates.

The Sino -Soviet divorce became public and nasty.

Harriman cabled that the Soviet goal was isolating China.

Khrushchev hoped world pressure might eventually bring China in.

Joked about De Gaulle needing the nuclear umbrella.

Kennedy tried hard to get De Gaulle on board.

Very hard.

Personal letter.

Offer technical info.

Recognize France as a nuclear power under US law.

De Gaulle.

Total rejection.

France would not be diverted.

Dismissed.

Third world signatories.

Rejected the cooperation offer.

Kennedy was furious.

De Gaulle will be remembered for one thing only.

His refusal.

Then Kennedy's televised address.

July 26th.

Reigned it as a shaft of light.

Result of patience and vigilance.

Not the millennium, but an important first step.

Mentioned past crises.

Berlin, Cuba to show resolve.

But stressed hope for collaboration.

Warned about nuclear war devastation.

Aims.

Reduced fallout.

Stopped proliferation.

Called on people to think about a world full of nukes.

Acknowledged dangers remained Cuba, Southeast Asia, Berlin, but ended hopefully.

Quoting that Chinese proverb from Vienna.

After the speech, Harriman brings Khrushchev to Hena's port.

Kennedy had a funny reaction.

He also sent the treaty to Truman.

Got a supportive call and letter back.

Hope for preventing total war.

But Eisenhower was a worry.

Big worry.

Ruskin -McConey went to Gettysburg.

Ike worried about China, France, U .S.

superiority.

The withdrawal clause.

Influenced by Strauss.

Rusk tried to reassure him, but Eisenhower wasn't sold yet.

Kennedy decided against a Moscow summit for the signing.

Right.

Avoid McMillan's pressure.

Bad domestic look.

Sent a bipartisan Senate delegation instead, led by Rusk.

Took some arm twisting to get Dirksen and Hickenlooper on board.

Mansfield worked on Aiken.

Salt and Stahl, Fulbright, Sparkman, Pesterori went too.

Stevenson's presence was debated, but Khrushchev wanted you that, which justified Stevenson going.

Signing in Moscow, August 5th.

Rusk meets Gromikho beforehand.

Discuss Germany.

Terminology.

East versus socialist.

Khrushchev joked about Kennedy being called a socialist.

Fulbright remembered Khrushchev's earlier tea with the committee.

Khrushchev apparently rid Stevenson about the missile crisis.

Then the ceremony Gershwin speeches toasts.

Rusk -Gromikho home sign.

Khrushchev declares the spirit of Moscow.

Afterwards, Rusk talks non -aggression pact again.

Yeah.

Khrushchev had compared it to mineral water.

Rusk compared it to Kellogg brand.

U .S.

hoped for budget cuts if other deals followed.

Ready to discuss Germany -Berlin access.

Didn't get anywhere with Dobrin in later.

Rusk suggested a fresh look at the U .N.

Then the trip to Khrushchev's place in Pitsunda.

The swimming warning.

The pool.

The badminton game.

All that.

Khrushchev won badminton.

Then private chat under the tree.

Khrushchev asks why the U .S.

is so stubborn on Berlin.

Rusk improvises.

Mr.

Khrushchev, you've just got to assume the Americans are goddamn fools.

Wow.

Then the news of Patrick Kennedy's death arrives.

Just after the delegation left, Khrushchev sent condolences via Rusk.

Beschloss notes Kennedy's feelings about family wanting children.

McMillan sent sympathies, too.

A very sad personal note amidst the diplomacy.

But the treaties still had to get through the Senate.

A huge fight loomed.

Massive.

Kennedy feared the Southern Democrat -Republican coalition.

Charges of a secret deal.

McNamara met the chiefs, privately addressed their feels about cheating, detection, readiness, underground testing.

LeMay wanted to split China and Russia.

Mail was reportedly running heavily against the treaty.

Kennedy was willing to lose re -election over it.

That's what Beschloss suggests.

He figured 15 senators would oppose anything he proposed.

Thought it would lose if voted on then.

McNamara argued before the Senate that the U .S.

would lose its lead if testing continued.

Conservative argument, yeah.

Kennedy argued we didn't need more megaton bombs or atmospheric tests for anti -missile work, and Soviet cheating couldn't erase the U .S.

lead.

He was furious with McCone for sending CIA people to brief senators against the treaty, talking up Soviet cheating during the moratorium.

That release sheet of McCone was already bad since Cuba.

Right.

RFK saw him as a Trojan horse.

Bundy was fed up, too.

Edward Teller led the opposition.

Called it the Treaty of Moscow.

Argued for high -altitude tests for anti -missile defense.

Pointed to Soviet 1962 tests.

Warned of being at dictator's mercy.

Demanded reservations.

Arthur Dean warned renegotiation was impossible.

Hickenlooper wanted the Kennedy -Khrushchev letters.

Rusk offered to show leaders privately.

Smathers worried Khrushchev would walk.

Russell opposed it on cheating safeguards.

Bundy thought about using Johnson with Russell, but Kennedy didn't want to empower LBJ.

The Foreign Relations Committee recommended it, though.

Only one dissenter.

Long.

Goldwater demanded Soviet withdrawal from Cuba first.

Kennedy flatly denied secret deals at a press conference.

Now Beschloss brings up the Sherman Adams scandal as possible leverage over Eisenhower.

It's a controversial point, but Beschloss lays it out.

Justice investigated Adams taking gifts from Goldfein.

IRS initially recommended prosecution.

Questions about RFK's motives, but subordinates advised against it.

Did Kennedy subtly use this against Eisenhower?

Reports say Ike asked Kennedy to spare Adams.

RFK denied political motives later.

But Bobby Baker claimed Ike told Dirksen to back the treaty in exchange for dropping the Adams issue.

Cryptic letters between Ike and Dirksen seemed to support Baker's story.

Dirksen played hard to get publicly.

Very much so.

Smathers had his theories.

Kennedy recalled Dirksen's Marshall Plan speeches.

Baker says Kennedy called Dirksen they did some horse trading.

Dirksen finally endorsed it, citing the 1960 GOP platform, reportedly worried about castigation from his party.

Then Eisenhower came out for it, mentioning nuclear war risks.

Was it linked to the Adams case?

Maybe.

Ike later complained privately to LB Jang about Kennedy's DOJ -Ires tactics.

In the end, the Senate passed it.

September 24th.

They did.

Opposition from Southern Democrats and Western Republicans.

Sorensen said Kennedy was deeply satisfied.

A major victory.

What about the aftermath?

Kennedy's conservation tour out west.

Yeah, interesting pivot.

Didn't talk about the test ban much at first.

Praise Mansfield later.

Started framing the Cold War competition differently.

Societal happiness, not just military might.

The Mormon tabernacle speech really contrasted with his earlier rhetoric test ban as a first step from nuclear catastrophe.

Reference Little Big Horn, oddly.

Reporters saw peace becoming a big issue for 64.

Kennedy wanted to keep the momentum going, hope to visit the USSR.

But Beschloss notes the treaty's limits.

Didn't stop all testing.

Right.

Reduced strontium 90, but underground tests continued.

And that lost chance for a comprehensive ban in late 62 looms large.

Khrushchev offered inspections then.

But Kennedy may be wary after Cuba and domestic politics didn't seize it.

Soviet hardliners pushed back by Spring 63.

Similar, Beschloss says, to how the U -2 shot down a comprehensive ban in 1960.

And the chapter ends with this strange little coda.

A possible opening to Cuba.

September 63.

Yeah, really intriguing.

Starts with William Atwood, a U .S.

diplomat bumping into the Cuban U .N.

ambassador Lechuga at a party.

Lechuga hints Castro wanted contact.

Complains about exile raids, like to the American University speech.

Suggests a quiet visit to Havana.

Journalist Lisa Howard was involved, too.

She was convinced Castro wanted to talk, offered to host a meeting.

Atwood memos D .C.

seeking permission for a quiet probe.

Idea.

Neutralizing Cuba on our terms.

Castro unhappy with Soviets.

Embargo biting.

Get Cuba out of the 64 election.

Stevenson reported Kennedy didn't object, though the CIA was still heavily involved.

Robert Kennedy's reaction.

Yeah, poshest.

Very.

Havana visit too risky.

But the general idea worth pursuing.

Told Atwood, stay in touch with Bundy, Chase.

But RFK laid down tough conditions for normalization.

Soviets out.

Break ties with communists.

Stopped subverting Latin America.

Meanwhile, the CIA was still running sabotage ops.

Absolutely.

Bundy reported on it.

CIA speculated about Castro dying.

And disturbingly, the assassination plots resumed.

Exploding seashell plot.

Meeting with this Cuban official, Cubella Am Elsh, who wanted to do an inside job.

And Castro issues a public warning about retaliation.

Right around the same time, at the Brazilian embassy, did he know about the Cubella meeting?

CIA worried.

Chase tried to downplay it.

Just adds another layer of danger and uncertainty to that whole situation.

So wrapping up this incredibly dense chapter 21.

We've covered Kennedy's complex European trip.

The test ban negotiations happening against that backdrop of personal risk.

And this faint, ultimately doomed hint of a Cuba opening.

It really highlights the sheer pressure cooker Kennedy was operating in.

High stakes diplomacy, domestic politics, personal conduct, security risks.

All swirling together constantly.

Which brings us to our final thought for you, the listener.

Given all these pressures, nuclear threat, allies, personal issues, domestic fights,

what do you think was the single biggest obstacle preventing a more lasting peace with the Soviets?

Or a real resolution with Cuba during Kennedy's presidency?

Something to mull over.

That interplay of the personal, the political, the international.

Indeed.

And with that, we can confirm this deep dive has covered the entirety of chapter 21 from Michael Beschloss's The Crisis Years.

Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 -1963.

Hitting the key events, strategies, diplomacy, crises, contacts, and Beschloss's analysis.