Chapter 22: Fragile Opportunities

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Welcome to the Deep Dive, where we take the source material you're curious about and explore its most fascinating corners.

Glad to be here.

Today, we're venturing into a really pivotal period of the Cold War.

We're looking at a specific chapter called Fragile Opportunities from Michael Beschloss's The Crisis Years,

Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 -1963.

That's right.

And this chapter, it really gets to the heart of that constantly shifting relationship between Kennedy and Khrushchev, specifically in the later part of Kennedy's presidency.

Yeah, it's a time filled with, well, the echoes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but also new challenges, both domestic and international, for both leaders.

Exactly.

Fragile opportunities, as the title suggests, moments of potential progress alongside persistent dangers.

And the listener who suggested this source wanted us to really focus on, you know, Kennedy's political strategies, the U .S.-Soviet dynamic, diplomatic moves, those big crises, Berlin, Vietnam, Cuba, they always loom large.

And Beschloss's analysis, too, how he interprets these events.

Right.

So our goal is to give you a clear, detailed picture of this

crucial time.

OK, let's dive in.

Where does Beschloss start?

Autumn 1963,

Kennedy's domestic standing.

Yeah, he kicks off by noting Kennedy's popularity had dipped.

It was down to 59%.

Now, that's still pretty high, but it was a significant drop from the peak after the Bay of Pigs.

And a lot of that decline, according to Gallup polls mentioned in the chapter, was linked to his push for civil rights.

That's what the polling suggested, yeah.

A segment of the public felt he was pushing integration too fast.

It really highlights how domestic issues directly impacted his overall political capital.

Absolutely.

And he was already deep in thought about the 64 election, wasn't he?

Initially worried about Rockefeller.

He was, yeah.

He apparently thought Rockefeller might have beaten him in 60.

But Rockefeller's remarriage caused him some political problems.

So Kennedy's focus then shifted.

To George Romney, the governor of Michigan.

Yeah.

Why Romney?

What was the concern there?

Well, Kennedy and his team saw Romney as this potentially very strong candidate, successful businessman, fresh face, seemed almost, as Kennedy apparently put it, too good to be true.

Appealing to moderates, maybe independents.

Exactly.

That was the fear, that he could unite different wings of the Republican party.

But the chapter makes it pretty clear Kennedy actually wanted to run against Barry Goldwater.

He's quoted saying something like, give me good old Barry.

I'd never have to leave this oval office.

Right.

That says a lot, doesn't it?

Kennedy and his advisors, including Robert Kennedy,

they felt Goldwater's conservatism would alienate too many voters.

They thought he might even self -destruct politically.

So the strategy was almost to subtly boost Goldwater while downplaying Romney to get the opponent they preferred.

It seems that way based on Beschloss's account.

They thought Goldwater was the easier path to reelection.

And winning big wasn't just about office.

He wanted a mandate, right?

A strong majority in Congress to push his agenda, especially on improving Soviet relations after the test ban treaty.

Precisely.

That was key.

He saw a landslide as necessary for those bigger foreign policy goals.

Okay.

So alongside the election strategy, he's also thinking about his team, personnel changes.

The conversation with Dean Rusk is quite revealing.

Yes.

Rusk brings up their initial understanding that he might only serve one term, mainly for financial reasons.

He offered to step down if Kennedy needed a change for the election.

But Kennedy shut that down pretty quickly.

He did.

Told Rusk not to mention it again, praised his value, his guts, especially during tough times like the missile crisis.

Kennedy clearly valued Rusk's loyalty and steadiness.

But even so, Kennedy was apparently musing about a second term shuffle, moving McNamara from defense to state.

What was the thinking there?

It's interesting.

The idea, as Beschloss presents it, was that McNamara's firm grip at defense was vital in the first term for controlling the military.

But in the second term, maybe moving him to state could centralize control over diplomacy itself.

A different kind of control.

Meanwhile, Avril Harriman, fresh off the test ban success, thought he was in the running for secretary of state.

Apparently so, yes.

He felt he'd earned it after that diplomatic win.

And then there's Robert Kennedy.

He wanted the job, too.

He expressed interest, yes.

And President Kennedy knew it could definitely boost RFK's chances for a presidential run in 68.

He acknowledged that privately.

But the whole dynasty issue was a concern.

A major concern.

The public perception, the accusations of too much family power, that gave him pause.

Definitely in the short term.

But by the fall of 63, he was talking more openly about Robert's 68 prospects.

He asked Charles Bartlett what he thought.

Yeah, Bartlett recalled Kennedy seemed a bit apprehensive about a potential Kennedy versus LBJ fight for the nomination in 68.

Not something he relished.

And there was maybe a feeling Robert was pushing too hard.

Charles Spaulding suggested the president felt RFK was perhaps overly ambitious, maybe a bit too aggressive in pursuing his political goals.

Okay, now here's a real curveball Beschloss throws in.

Kennedy apparently discussed with Philip Graham of the Washington Post the idea of McNamara running for president in 68.

That one does seem surprising, right?

McNamara, a Republican, no real election experience.

So what was the logic?

Kennedy apparently admired McNamara's competence, his administrative focus, his incorruptibility.

He thought those are key qualities for a president.

And maybe McNamara could be a bridge, a one -term president perhaps with RFK as VP, paving the way for Robert later.

That's one interpretation Beschloss suggests.

Robert Kennedy himself later said the missile crisis really show his brother how crucial strong executive leadership was, and they saw that in McNamara.

But not everyone in the inner circle bought it.

Definitely not.

Tip O'Donnell, a loyal Democrat, thought the idea was heresy.

He doubted Kennedy was serious about handing power to a Republican newcomer.

O'Donnell felt Kennedy was starting to see some flaws in McNamara's political judgment by late 63 anyway.

Right.

Okay, let's shift gears.

Another major thing happening that fall was the Soviet grain purchase.

This sounds like it started from a place of real need for the Soviets.

Absolutely.

A terrible harvest in the Soviet Union due to drought.

Khrushchev basically told the Presidium it's either risk starvation, like under Stalin, or buy grain from the West.

A stark choice.

So agriculture secretary Freeman tells the cabinet the Soviets are interested,

and George Bundy lays out the potential upsides for the US.

Yeah, Bundy argued selling wheat wouldn't actually dent the US surplus much, but it would create jobs farming, shipping, help the balance of payments, and cut down on those huge grain storage costs.

Plus, other Western countries were already trading grain with the Soviets.

Right.

He made that point too.

It wasn't unprecedented.

So there was support.

Sell non -military goods.

Sounds reasonable.

But politically, it was tricky.

Worries about ethnic voters in 64.

Big worries.

O'Donnell and O 'Brien, Kennedy's political guys, were very concerned.

They thought German Americans, Polish Americans, Irish Catholics groups with strong anti -communist feelings would react badly.

And O'Donnell even pushed Kennedy to talk to Lyndon Johnson about it, knowing Johnson would probably oppose it?

Yes.

Despite their sometimes tense relationship,

O'Donnell wanted Johnson on the record, maybe.

And Johnson being Johnson played it cagey in public.

Very cagey.

Didn't want to take a public stance that could hurt his VP chances.

But privately, he told O'Donnell he thought the sale would be the worst political mistake Kennedy could make.

Freeman mentioned Kennedy himself was very nervous about the politics.

And there was a legal hurdle too, a congressional amendment from the Berlin Crisis era.

Right.

That amendment basically banned subsidized sales to unfriendly nations.

Robert Kennedy apparently said, just ignore it.

He reportedly did, but the president was reluctant.

Didn't want to look like he was bending rules to help the Soviets.

So they needed a deal to get Congress and the unions on board.

The solution involved American ships.

That was the key compromise.

Worked out with Mansfield and Humphrey, all the grain had to be shipped on U .S.

flag vessels.

Surprisingly, the Soviet ambassador, Desurdin, agreed.

But then the whole thing almost fell apart because U .S.

shipping was so expensive.

Exactly.

The Soviets hadn't factored in much higher costs of American freight.

It made the wheat almost unaffordable.

Kennedy and Sorensen apparently joked about some Soviet official just nodding it through without checking the price tag.

Huh.

So how did they fix it?

The solution was to sell them a lot of hard durum wheat.

The U .S.

had a huge surplus of that specific type, which meant it came with a large government subsidy.

That subsidy basically offset the high shipping costs.

So it worked out in the end.

But Freeman's comment that politics almost jammed it up really sums it up.

Lots of hurdles.

Domestic and international, yeah.

Yeah.

It was complicated.

Okay.

Let's talk Berlin.

Always a flash point.

What was the situation like in the fall of 63?

Well, Rusk met Grameko in New York in early October.

Rusk called Berlin their number one point of confrontation.

But he also admitted tensions were way down compared to the missile crisis period.

And things had actually stabilized a bit.

Less of immigration from East Germany, more trade between West and East Germany.

Somewhat, yeah.

Beschloss notes those points.

But Grameko was still hammering the usual Soviet complaints.

West Germany blocking a final peace treaty.

And Rusk's response.

He pushed back, saying the U .S.

wasn't just doing West Germany's bidding.

He acknowledged the U .S.

wanted a treaty, too.

But there just wasn't an obvious path forward right then.

His approach seemed to be let's let time work on this, especially with Adenauer stepping down in West Germany.

Let's not force another crisis.

So things were relatively quiet in Berlin for most of 63 after Cuba.

But that changed in the fall.

Why?

Khrushchev was feeling domestic pressure.

Hardliners could accuse him of going soft on Berlin, especially after the test ban treaty and now buying American wheat.

He needed to look tough.

Which led to renewed harassment on the access routes.

That's the likely reason, yes.

Petty stuff, but deliberate.

Stopping U .S.

convoys for long periods over minor details.

A Soviet jet buzzing a U .S.

plane.

Sending signals, basically.

OK, so that's the tense backdrop for Grameko's visit to the White House on October 10th.

His first time seeing Kennedy face to face since the missile crisis.

How did that meeting go?

Surprisingly well, according to Beschloss.

Kennedy seemed relaxed.

Greed Grameko warmly.

They actually talked about building on the test ban.

Like what?

Things like safeguards against surprise attack, banning underground tests, maybe even banning bombs in space.

Kennedy even floated the idea of a joint U .S.

Soviet moon mission again.

Wow.

But Grameko stuck to the standard Soviets group, too.

More trade, German peace treaty, non -aggression pact.

Oh, yes.

Those are still on the table from their side.

And Kennedy, did he offer anything concrete?

He mentioned planning to flatten the defense budget increase, suggesting the Soviets could do the same, though he admitted inspection was still the big hurdle.

He also told Grameko the U .S.

planned troop reductions in Europe in 64 and hoped the Soviets would reciprocate.

Any common ground?

They both praised Kennedy's American university speech and agreed preventing a direct clash was paramount.

They acknowledged the positive step of Soviet troops leaving Cuba, though issues remained.

And both wanted to avoid more incidents on the Berlin routes.

OK, so the White House meeting sounds cautiously positive.

Then there was a dinner at the Soviet embassy.

Right.

And that's where Rusk made a really interesting proposal.

He suggested they mutually destroy all their B -47 bombers and the Soviet equivalent, the Badgers.

Why those specific planes?

Because, Rusk argued,

it was something verifiable.

Both sides knew roughly how many the other had.

And these planes were maybe getting a bit old anyway.

It would be a concrete step towards nonproliferation.

He even made an economic argument, think of the money saved could go to education in developing countries instead.

How did Grameko react?

He countered by saying they should focus on rockets, missiles.

Rusk agreed all delivery systems needed discussion eventually, but bombers were a good verifiable place to start.

Did they discuss anything else significant?

The usual stuff came up.

Grameko complained about U .S.

bases overseas.

Rusk kind of cleverly suggested Grameko ask his own defense minister how many U .S.

bases had actually closed since 48.

Implying the number was significant.

Exactly.

Grameko also brought up nuclear -free zones.

Rusk said the U .S.

wasn't necessarily opposed, but only if all countries in the zone agreed freely.

He pointed to Cuba and Egypt as potential roadblocks.

And then Rusk brought up Israel?

Yes, quite delicately.

He hinted that perhaps something could be worked out regarding Israel and the Middle East.

Beschloss reads this as a possible, very subtle invitation for the Soviets to maybe cooperate on preventing Israel from getting nuclear weapons.

Like Harriman had tried with China earlier.

Similar idea, yeah.

Trying to find common ground on proliferation, even with adversaries.

Which leads us directly to the Israeli nuclear program itself.

Right.

A very sensitive topic.

Israel was building the Demona reactor.

In the Negev Desert, starting in the late 50s.

In Ben Gurion, the prime minister was deliberately vague about its purpose.

This made a lot of people, including Kennedy, suspicious.

Kennedy was more skeptical about Israel than some others in his administration.

Yes.

Beschloss points that out.

Kennedy apparently had a longstanding suspicion, unlike figures like Adlai Stevenson or Hubert Humphrey, who were generally more sympathetic.

He even admired Stevenson for resisting pro -Israel pressure during the Suez crisis years earlier.

Right.

And there's that comment quoted about Kennedy finding Israelis tougher than American Jews, which, well, reveals a certain perspective.

In 6162, Kennedy tried a quiet plan about Palestinian refugees.

He did.

To facilitate emigration, maybe ease tensions.

He had Meyer Feldman, who was Jewish, try to get Israeli buy -in, but it didn't work.

And Beschloss suggests Kennedy held back from putting heavy public pressure on Israel before the 64 election because of campaign contributions.

That's the implication.

Yes, the political reality of needing support from Jewish donors played a role.

But preventing Israel from getting the bomb was still a huge priority for him.

Absolutely critical.

Israel made a statement in 6162 saying they wouldn't be the first to introduce nukes to the region, but that wording left a lot of wiggle room.

They could still build them quickly if they felt threatened.

So Kennedy pushed for inspections of Demona.

Yes.

Through Feldman again.

They reached a secret deal.

The U .S.

would give Israel Hawk anti -aircraft missiles.

This was the first major U .S.

military aid package to Israel in return for allowing some American inspections at Demona.

How was the missile sale justified?

As a response to Soviet arms going to Egypt.

So framed within that Cold War context.

But by the fall of 63, Kennedy wasn't satisfied with the inspections.

No, he was getting irritated, felt the access wasn't sufficient, that the U .S.

couldn't really be sure what was happening at Demona.

Bundy later recalled this intense focus on the Israeli program seemed to fade after Kennedy's death.

Suggesting maybe a second term Kennedy would have pushed much harder on Israeli denuclearization.

It certainly raises that possibility, a potentially major policy direction that never happened.

Okay, let's pivot to another escalating crisis, Vietnam.

Khrushchev had a pretty grim warning for Rusk back in August 63.

He did.

Compare the U .S.

situation directly to the French failure in Indokina.

Said the U .S.

might last longer but would ultimately have to leave too.

Yet Kennedy was focusing more on Vietnam, not less.

Even rereading Khrushchev's old Wars of Liberation speech.

Right.

He saw Vietnam as a test case for that kind of conflict.

And he was also increasingly worried about China getting nuclear weapons and what that meant for the region.

This led to things like the Strategic Hamlets program.

Even though the Soviets were talking peace, Rusk knew they were still supplying North Vietnam.

Privately, yes.

As early as March 62, Rusk acknowledged ongoing Soviet support, though he also wondered if Moscow was maybe losing some control over Hanoi.

John Kenneth Gelbraith, ambassador to India, urged Kennedy to stay out of a ground war.

He did.

Sent a letter advising against combat commitment.

Gelbraith also thought maybe the Soviets weren't actually trying to cause trouble there, perhaps underestimating their involvement.

And Kennedy himself told Harriman he wanted a way out but didn't see an opportunity yet.

Right.

He agreed they should seize any chance to reduce involvement, but felt that moment hadn't arrived.

Laos was tangled up in this too.

Diệm, South Vietnam's president, resisted the Laos Neutrality Agreement at first.

Yeah, he was worried he would neutralize Vietnam too.

Kennedy had to give him a private assurance to get him to sign the Geneva Agreement on Laos in 62.

But the agreement didn't hold.

North Vietnam kept infiltrating South Vietnam through Laos.

Exactly.

Khrushchev either couldn't or wouldn't stop Hanoi.

Harriman complained the deal was broken almost immediately.

After the missile crisis, Walt Rostow even suggested using America's strength and position to force compliance in Laos.

By early 63, the CIA was calling Vietnam a slowly escalating stalemate.

Not exactly optimistic.

And General Wheeler was reporting that political limits on hitting communist sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia were hurting the war effort.

He wanted covert action against North Vietnam.

Which Bundy cautiously supported.

Yes, and the Joint Chiefs ordered these non -attributable raids, hit -and -run operations by South Vietnamese forces, but with US aid, training, and intel.

Plausible deniability was the goal.

Rusk later called the failed Laos Accord a bitter disappointment, blaming Khrushchev's lack of control.

It reinforced the administration's view that communist promises couldn't be trusted.

So by June 63, Rusk and McNamara were proposing escalating pressure on North Vietnam, maybe even leading to direct military action.

Yes, Kennedy approved the initial stages.

This included using US air power and special forces to support anti -communist groups in Laos.

But at the same time, the situation inside South Vietnam was falling apart.

Diem's government was losing support fast.

Authoritarianism, corruption, nepotism.

And his brother Niu and Madame Niu were incredibly unpopular.

Deeply unpopular.

Then came the Buddhist crisis in May 63.

Government bans on Buddhist flags, crackdowns on protests, monks dying, that shocking self -immolation.

And Madame Niu's horrific barbecue comment.

Which just poured fuel on the fire.

Rusk was worried about the optics of Catholic minority persecuting the Buddhist majority.

And Kennedy, being Catholic, knew the domestic political dangers too.

He was asking his aides how things got so bad.

And then came the surprising move.

Appointing Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., his old political rival, as ambassador to Saigon.

That stunned Kennedy's inner circle.

Kennedy apparently joked it was irresistible to put Lodge into that hopeless mess.

But the Diem regime just dug in deeper.

Niu warned about US appeasement after the test ban.

Diem declared martial law, then the pagoda raids.

Thousands of monks arrested.

That was the breaking point for Harriman.

He concluded the US just couldn't support Diem and Niu anymore.

Which led directly to that crucial August 24th cable.

The one authorizing Lodge to explore a coup.

Drafted largely by Harriman and Roger Hilsman.

The message was clear.

Niu had to go.

And if Diem wouldn't remove him, Diem himself might have to go too.

Lodge was told to contact potential coup leaders.

But the cable was sent very quickly, without everyone signing off.

Rusk, McNamara, McConey weren't consulted initially.

Right, it was rushed.

Supposedly before Niu could consolidate power.

Kennedy, who was away, approved it after getting assurances from Ball and Gilpatrick.

Which led to a huge blow up back in Washington on Monday morning.

Oh yeah, McNamara, McConey, General Taylor, they were furious, felt they'd been bypassed.

Taylor even accused an anti -Diem group in the State Department of exploiting the situation.

But the cable wasn't withdrawn.

No,

it stood.

But it definitely strained Harriman's relationship with Kennedy.

Despite the recent test band success.

Then things got even messier with that Voice of America broadcast threatening aid cuts.

Lodge was furious about that.

Livid.

He argued it destroyed any element of surprise for a potential coup.

So the National Security Council meeting after that must have been tense.

Extremely.

State argued for backing a coup.

Former Ambassador Nolting warned against abandoning an ally.

Harriman sharply criticized Nolting.

Kennedy himself said his government was coming apart.

Robert Kennedy later reflected on Dieb's corruption.

But also the deep problems with the U .S.

orchestrating coups.

Then General Taylor sent a cable expressing second thoughts about the coup.

Which angered Kennedy.

Infuriated him, yeah.

Felt like Taylor was undermining policy.

Lodge fired back strongly, saying there was no respectable turning back, The war couldn't be won with Diem and the generals needed to act fast.

Kennedy's response to Lodge tried to thread a needle.

Acknowledge the risks but prioritize success.

Pretty much.

He warned failure would be disastrous.

But changing course was better than failing altogether.

He authorized Lodge to contact the coup leaders directly.

But General Harkins, the U .S.

military commander, found the Vietnamese generals distrustful.

Yes.

They didn't believe the U .S.

was really behind it.

Thought the coup idea was dead.

And then LBJ jumps in at an NSC meeting.

Unexpectedly, yeah.

Recalled his past support for Diem urged just focusing on winning the war.

Seemingly siding with Diem.

But Beschloss notes Johnson's influence on foreign policy was already shrinking by then.

People were wondering about a spot on the 64 ticket.

Was Robert Kennedy starting to probe more deeply about whether the war could actually be won with Diem?

It seems so.

Perhaps of the president's urging.

He was asking McNamara and others tough questions.

Then came the conflicting reports from Krulak and Mendenhall after their trip to Vietnam.

Just highlighting the confusion.

Total confusion and division.

Lodge recommended cutting some aid to encourage a coup.

Kennedy worried that might push Diem towards making peace with Hanoi.

So Kennedy opted for gradual pressure instead.

Try to force Diem to remove new and reform.

That was the plan decided upon.

Escalate pressure slowly.

Which led to the McNamara -Taylor mission to deliver that warning directly to Diem.

They told him his political deficiencies were hurting the war effort.

Diem, predictably, blamed the U .S.

press, called the Buddhists immature, and even claimed he had a dossier on Americans plotting against him.

Their report back to Kennedy in early October basically said military progress was real, but Diem and New were jeopardizing it.

Exactly.

They recommended more aid cuts and keeping the U .S.

stance cryptic.

They predicted this would lead to either Diem reforming or a coup.

And Kennedy made the whole NSE sign on to this plan, trying to get everyone on the same page.

Yes, seeking unity after all the infighting.

Meanwhile, General Bigman was talking to the CIA's Lusine Konin, asking for assurance the U .S.

wouldn't stop a coup.

Right.

He wanted to know the U .S.

wouldn't interfere.

Washington's reply to Lodge was carefully crafted.

We don't want to stimulate a coup, but we won't thwart one, and we'd support a capable new government.

Then came the reports about assassination plans.

Min planning to kill New and another brother, Nugo Dinkin.

Yes.

The CIA station chief reported that to Director McCoon.

McCoon's response was that the U .S.

couldn't approve or support assassination, but also couldn't prevent everything they heard about.

His communication on this seems deliberately vague.

Very murky territory.

Then on October 29th, Lodge cables that a coup is imminent.

Kennedy gets nervous.

Very nervous about failure.

He told Lodge to discourage it, unless success looked highly likely.

Lodge basically replied it was too late to stop it.

Pretty much.

Said the U .S.

didn't have the power to delay it, and the plotters were acting selflessly.

Bundy pushed back hard, saying the U .S.

did have influence, he told Lodge.

Reject appeals for intervention, mediate if it stalls, offer asylum if it fails, but otherwise let a responsible coup proceed.

So the coup starts November 1st.

Lodge meets Diem one last time.

Diem actually acknowledges a coup might happen.

Surprisingly, yes.

Meanwhile, Cohn delivers cash and supplies to the coup HQ.

General Min gives Coney that chilling warning.

If we fail, you're going with us.

The coup unfolds quickly.

Key locations taken.

Diem calls Lodge.

Yes, asking for the U .S.

position.

Lodge was non -committal, just offered help for Diem's physical safety.

Diem and Niu escape the palace, but are caught later after being denied asylum by Taiwan.

That's right.

The coup leaders ask for a U .S.

plane to fly them out, but that was denied too much direct implication.

And then they were assassinated.

Both Diem and Niu, killed by the coup plotters.

How did Kennedy take the news?

He was in the Situation Room watching it unfold.

Beschloss writes, based on Forrestal's account, that Kennedy was deeply shaken, pale, saddened by the murders.

Forrestal felt it had a real personal and moral impact, maybe made Kennedy question the advice he'd been getting on Vietnam.

A heavy moment.

Okay, let's switch to Cuba.

Soviet troops were still an issue in the fall of 63.

Still there, yes.

Joseph Alsop reported Khrushchev told Harriman they'd all leave eventually, supposedly because they hated the climate.

But the State Department publicly denied any promise beyond a substantial number leaving.

Kennedy was cautious in his public statements about it.

Very cautious.

And his aide, Gordon Chase, warned against sounding too optimistic.

But behind the scenes, covert ops against Castro were still being approved.

Yes, the special group greenlit more operations.

And there was that meeting where the CIA's Desmond Fitzgerald,

posing as RFK's representative, met with Rolando Cubella, a malayche.

Promising full U .S.

backing for a coup against Castro.

That's what Cubella was reportedly promised.

Support weapons the works.

Then Hurricane Flora hits Cuba.

Castro blames the CIA.

Uses it to accuse the CIA of stepping up activities.

Around the same time, the French journalist, Jean Daniel, is about to interview Castro.

He meets Kennedy first.

What did Kennedy tell Daniel?

He said he'd initially approved of Castro's fight against Batista.

But Castro, then aligned with the Soviets, brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.

Kennedy defended the economic blockade, said it had to continue as long as Castro tried to subvert Latin America.

But there were back channels opening up, too, through Lisa Howard, Major Vallejo.

Yes, indirect feelers.

Bundy told William Atwood at State to find out more about Castro's intentions before committing to actual talks.

Atwood contacted Vallejo, Castro's physician, and they planned for Cuba's U .N.

Ambassador Lechuga to discuss an agenda.

And Kennedy's speech in Miami to the Inter -American Press Association was that part of this.

Trying to open a door?

It seems so.

By blaming external powers, meaning the Soviets, for the U .S.-Cuba split, he was hinting things could change if that Soviet influence lessened.

After that speech, Bundy gave Atwood more instructions for a potential Castro meeting agenda, but said it all depended on Kennedy getting back from Texas.

Which, of course, he never did.

Before we get to that, though, tensions flared up again over Berlin in early November.

Yes, suddenly the Soviets started harassing Allied traffic again, ground and air.

Rusk urgently called Ambassador Kohler back to Moscow.

There was a long delay of an Anglo -American convoy.

A very lengthy, deliberate delay.

And Khrushchev gave this really harsh speech for the Bolshevik Revolution anniversary, warning the U .S.

off Cuba, listing all the disputes with the West.

Kohler couldn't believe how quickly the atmosphere had soured after the test ban.

He was shocked.

He suspected the harassment and the rhetoric were mostly for Khrushchev's hard -line domestic audience, worried about the thaw.

Kohler even confronted Khrushchev directly about the spirit of Moscow.

How did Khrushchev respond?

Seemed a bit taken aback.

He made a toast to peace later.

But then told some American businessmen the Audubon incident was just a nerve test.

He got really defensive about East Germans killed at the wall, and about U .S.

civil rights issues, and complained again about slow U .S.-Soviet trade.

And right in the middle of this renewed tension, Professor Barghorn gets arrested in Moscow.

Frederick Barghorn from Yale, a well -known Soviet studies expert,

arrested by the KGB, accused of spying.

He had past embassy connections, but wasn't a spy.

No, definitely not.

He was a legitimate scholar.

Ambassador Kohler figured it was probably retaliation for the FBI arresting a Soviet agent in New York.

Maybe the KGB wanted someone to trade.

Or maybe they were working off old, inaccurate files on Barghorn.

Kennedy was furious.

Livid.

Demanded immediate confirmation Barghorn was clean.

Helms at CIA confirmed it.

Bundy told Kohler to retaliate by canceling Soviet visas.

Kohler warned the Soviets could still make the spy charge look plausible internally.

Yeah, for their own people.

Kohler met top Soviet officials Zorin and Smirnovsky, stressing Kennedy's serious concern demanding Barghorn's release.

Kennedy addressed it publicly, too, at his last press conference.

Affirmed Barghorn's innocence, said it was damaging relations.

Kohler then snubbed a Soviet diplomatic event by sending only a junior officer.

And shortly after that, Gromyko announces Barghorn is being expelled.

Yes, saying Khrushchev personally decided it because of Kennedy's concern.

But it came with strings attached.

The expectation the U .S.

would release the Soviet agent arrested in New York and a warning not to publicly defend Barghorn's actions.

So Barghorn was released.

He was.

Came home safely.

Was there more to the story behind the arrest?

Nosenko's defection account.

Yuri Nosenko, the later defector, claimed the KGB had planned to grab an American hostage for exchange,

that a KGB guy named Gribanov targeted Barghorn specifically.

Nosenko also claimed Brezhnev didn't know Barghorn had a connection to Kennedy and that Khrushchev was shocked and angry when he found out how strongly Kennedy reacted.

Interesting.

So after the release, the U .S.

kept it low key.

Stossel advised Bundy just to welcome him back, avoid escalating things.

Kennedy sent a private thank you to Khrushchev via Dobrynin for intervening.

Dobrynin apparently was surprised by how big a deal the U .S.

made of it.

Okay.

One last crucial piece from this chapter.

The unsent letter.

This ended the private Kennedy -Khrushchev correspondence.

Inadvertently, yes.

Khrushchev had sent a letter in early October, after the test ban, suggesting they tackle other ripe issues.

The State Department drafted a positive reply.

Optimistic, but cautious about fragility.

Kennedy approved it.

But it never got sent.

Never sent.

A clerical error.

A bureaucratic slip -up in the State Department.

And, incredibly,

Bundy didn't find out until December 63, after Kennedy was gone.

So Kennedy died never knowing his reply hadn't reached Khrushchev.

What might Khrushchev have thought?

Getting no reply?

That's the worrying part.

He might have seen it as a snub.

A deliberate silence.

Maybe a sign the U .S.

wasn't serious about improving relations after all.

Given the Cold War paranoia and Khrushchev's own political pressures, he wasn't likely to reach out again first.

So that crucial private channel just ended?

Because of a mistake?

A potentially huge consequence from a small error.

It highlights the fragility Beschloss talks about.

So wrapping up Beschloss' analysis here.

He really paints Kennedy as juggling domestic politics and foreign policy constantly.

Absolutely.

That tension is always there.

And the detente itself, the improved relationship, was so incredibly fragile.

Vulnerable to domestic pressures on both sides.

Vulnerable to miscommunications, like the unsent letter.

And meanwhile, Vietnam and the Middle East are just getting more dangerous, more complex.

Right.

The chapter really foreshadows future problems.

The end notes Beschloss includes also add a lot of nuanced different perspectives on Rusk's future, add an hour, disagreements about Diem, Harriman's role, the long -term impact of Kennedy's Cubist statements.

It shows how many different currents were flowing.

So as we finish this deep dive into fragile opportunities, the main takeaways seem to be Kennedy's domestic concerns always shaping his foreign policy moves.

That incredibly delicate U .S.

Soviet dance with steps forward and backward and these escalating crises in Vietnam and the Middle East.

Exactly.

Those fragile opportunities for better relations were real.

But so many things could and did undermine them.

Bureaucratic errors, political calculations, the sheer weight of the Cold War context.

We've aimed to give you a really thorough look at the key events, the strategies, the diplomacy, the crises, the history, and Beschloss's analysis within this specific chapter.

It's a complex but vital snapshot of that time.

It really is.

And it leaves you wondering, doesn't it, that final thought?

How different might things have been?

If that Kennedy -Khrushchev private line hadn't been broken, if the approach to Vietnam or the Israeli nuclear issue had gone differently in those crucial months, it really underscores how much history can turn on specific moments, decisions, and even accidents.

We've covered the key events, political strategies, diplomatic exchanges, crises, historical context, and Beschloss's analysis within this chapter of the crisis years, providing a comprehensive understanding of this pivotal period.