Chapter 23: Now Peace Is Up to You

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Welcome to The Deep Dive.

Today we're really getting into a critical moment in history.

We're looking at the final chapter and the epilogue of Michael Beschloss's The Crisis Years, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 -1963.

That's right.

Our goal here is to explore Beschloss's take on what happened right after President Kennedy's assassination.

You know, the transition to LBJ and how that whole U .S.-Soviet dynamic started to shift.

We'll be leaning heavily on Beschloss's work.

It's such a heavy period, isn't it?

Beschloss does an amazing job showing just how the shockwave spread globally after November 63.

He really does.

And what's really compelling is how he captures that feeling of total uncertainty and, well, how the power balance between the U .S.

and the Soviets had to be immediately recalculated.

Okay, so let's set the stage first.

Beschloss talks about this intense hatred Kennedy faced in Texas leading up to the trip.

This wasn't just a standard fundraising tour, was it?

No, not at all.

Beschloss really lays out the deep divisions in the Texas Democratic Party.

You had Governor Connolly and Senator Yarborough.

Well, they weren't exactly

And Kennedy was partly there to try and, you know, smooth things over before the 64 election, but the atmosphere was tense.

Johnson himself remembered Adlai Stevenson getting spat on previously, so it puts the whole trip in a different light.

It was risky.

And then Beschloss shows us Kennedy's last weekend.

It feels almost normal, doesn't it?

Relaxing with Torbert McDonald seeing a Polaris missile test.

Yeah, watching the Bears -Packers game, the movie Tom Jones.

Such a stark contrast.

It really is.

Beschloss gives us these glimpses of Palm Beach, the reading list from Bundy.

It's everything from German military thought to Brzezinski, ball on developing countries, Yemen, Indonesia.

Quite the range.

And then these very human moments.

It just drives home the life that was cut short, you know, the future that just vanished.

But it wasn't all relaxation.

Beschloss makes it clear Kennedy was really worried about this Texas trip, the infighting.

He almost wished he didn't have to go.

Oh, definitely.

There was a real sense of unease.

That conversation Beschloss details with smathers, where Kennedy was practically looking for an excuse, any emergency to get out of it.

Yeah, that says a lot.

He knew the politics were volatile, the personalities clashing, and then you have those comments,

almost pomminitions.

The nut country remark.

Exactly.

And thinking about assassination possibilities the night before, if it had rained, it suggests he was very aware of the danger.

So then Dallas.

Beschloss mentions that full -page ad in the Dallas Morning News attacking Kennedy and Jacqueline feeling sick that morning.

It all just feels so heavy with foreshadowing.

That ad really captured the extreme feelings, the polarization.

Beschloss uses it to show just how charged things were.

And Jacqueline's feeling.

It adds that deeply personal element, amplifying the sense of dread, doesn't it?

It does.

Okay, assassination itself.

The reactions were immediate,

global.

Beschloss walks us through the key players.

Let's start with the US side.

Johnson, RFK, Rusk, General Taylor.

What were their first thoughts?

It's a real mix Beschloss captures.

Johnson, stuck at Parkland, immediately fearing a wider plot, a conspiracy.

You can feel the uncertainty.

Understand.

Robert Kennedy, just sheer shock and grief back at Hickory Hill.

For him, an era was just over.

And the security implications.

Right.

Dean Rusk, on the cabinet plane, his mind goes straight to nuclear command.

Who's in charge?

That's terrifying.

And General Taylor.

Taylor's worry Johnson hasn't even been briefed on the nuclear satchel, the football.

It highlights that critical need for continuity of power, especially with the nuclear trigger.

What about the Soviets?

Gromyko, Khrushchev,

what was the reaction there?

Disbelief, fear.

Beschloss really stresses the impact.

Gromyko's talk with Kennedy.

Khrushchev was apparently genuinely upset, emotional, but also terrified they'd get blamed.

So they went on alert.

Yes.

The Soviet military was put on readiness.

It shows how fragile things were, how easily misunderstandings could happen.

And the fact the CIA couldn't initially find Khrushchev, that just added fuel to the conspiracy theories already starting.

An investigation into Oswald started right away, his Soviet links.

But Beschloss includes the well in Thompson's view.

Yeah, Thompson, who knew the Soviets well, his assessment was crucial.

He argued they just wouldn't assassinate a head of state.

It wasn't in their strategic interest too dangerous a precedent.

That's an important counterpoint to the immediate speculation.

Definitely.

It brings in that element of rational statecraft, even in a crisis.

Castro's reaction is also interesting.

Denying involvement, worried about U .S.

retaliation.

Well, yeah.

Beschloss points out Castro quickly denied everything publicly.

He was likely scared U .S.

would use Oswald's known pro -Castro feelings as an excuse to finally move against Cuba, which, given the history, made perfect sense.

Absolutely.

Meanwhile, LBJ is sworn in on Air Force One, gets back to DC, meets with Bundy Ball McNamara immediately.

Beschloss shows him feeling the weight, maybe even inadequate compared to Kennedy.

That swearing in on the plane, it's such an iconic image of continuity, isn't it?

It really is.

And Beschloss showing Johnson immediately engaging, but also expressing his grief, his awareness of stepping into huge shoes.

It really sets the scene for the challenges ahead.

The global reaction was huge.

Beschloss mentions West Berlin mourning, De Gaulle's comments, McMillan's memories,

even reactions in Peking.

What does that range tell us?

It just shows Kennedy's massive global footprint.

Beschloss cleverly contrasts the real grief in places like West Berlin, a Cold War symbol, with, well, more calculated or even pleased reactions elsewhere, like from Madame Nu or in Peking.

It highlights the complexity, the different ways Kennedy was seen.

Khrushchev reached out pretty quickly through Ambassador Kohler, didn't he?

Saying they weren't involved, offering condolences.

Yes, and followed up with letters, Khrushchev to Johnson, Gromyko to Rusk.

Beschloss stresses Khrushchev felt a real need to assert Soviet innocence.

And they both talked about continuing to talk.

They did.

It was a vital sign, keeping communication open in that incredibly tense moment.

Both sides seemed keen to avoid things escalating further after the shock.

Beschloss also includes those more personal gestures.

Ordinary Russians expressing sympathy.

Mikoyan coming to the funeral, even though he was ill.

Nina Khrushchev signing the condolence book.

Right.

What do those details add?

I think Beschloss includes them to show that beneath the Cold War politics, there was a shared humanity, a sense of loss that crossed borders.

Mikoyan's presence, especially given his health, was quite a powerful gesture.

Back in the U .S., Johnson quickly confirms the commitment to Vietnam,

and then Oswald is shot.

That must have complicated things hugely.

Oh, massively.

Johnson's signaling continuity on Vietnam was one thing, but Oswald being killed, as Beschloss notes, was seen internationally as, well, a disaster.

It just fed suspicion.

And proved to weigh in?

Yeah, with their interpretation hinting at some deeper cover -up.

It just added another layer of distrust to an already murky situation.

Beschloss mentions the deep mourning in Moscow that Henry Brandon reported on.

And Mikoyan's brief chat with Johnson at the State Department.

Small moments, but what do they suggest?

Brandon's reporting counters any idea of Soviet glee.

And that quick Johnson -Mikoyan interaction.

Beschloss seems to hint it was the start of a more formal, maybe cooler relationship than the personal one Kennedy and Khrushchev had developed.

Which leads to that Oval Office meeting between Johnson and Mikoyan.

Johnson says he'll stick with Kennedy's Cuba policy, keep up the suspicious, according to Beschloss.

Despite Johnson's assurances, the Kremlin, especially Khrushchev's advisors, just didn't trust him.

They saw him as, you know, this oily Texan, maybe more hawkish.

That personal connection Kennedy had was missing?

Exactly.

A huge difference.

And you see that distrust in Khrushchev's first big letter to Johnson, right?

Beschloss calls it condescending.

Like a lecture.

Yeah, it wasn't the kind of peer -to -peer exchange Kennedy and Khrushchev had fallen into.

It had this tone of, well, Khrushchev trying to school Johnson on world affairs.

Johnson was apparently quite disappointed.

Johnson's reply, though, was interesting.

He wants peace, but broadens the definition of force to include things like subversion, sending arms secretly.

That was a key shift, Beschloss points out.

Johnson was drawing a line signaling he might have less tolerance for Soviet proxy activities than Kennedy did.

It was firmer than Khrushchev might have expected.

But there was still some movement.

McNamara suggests cutting fissile material production.

Johnson announces it, and Khrushchev reciprocates.

Yeah, that tit -for -tat reduction on nuclear materials.

Beschloss highlights that as a sign that, even with the tension, arms control dialogue wasn't completely dead.

It offered a little bit of hope.

But Johnson turned down an early summit with Khrushchev.

Why?

Domestic priorities.

Beschloss explains Johnson was focused on getting Kennedy's tax cut and, crucially, the civil rights bill through Congress.

That came first.

How would Khrushchev have seen that?

Probably reinforced his view of Johnson as less interested in that personal high -level diplomacy that Kennedy had engaged in.

Maybe even saw it as a bit of a snub.

Then the Cuba issue flares up again.

Beschloss says Johnson was shown evidence, Cuban arms caches, Venezuelan coup plans, and he

Right, Cuba was always simmering.

Beschloss shows Johnson, like Kennedy before him, saw Castro's activities in Latin America as a major problem, a barrier to better U .S.-Soviet relations.

McCoyan just denied it all, of course.

And Venezuela wanted a blockade.

Johnson didn't go that far, did he?

No, he opted for diplomacy through the OAS, the Organization of American States.

Beschloss suggests Johnson didn't want another high -stakes Cuba crisis right at the start of his presidency.

He played it more cautiously there.

And he wasn't interested in the feelers Atwood was putting out about talking to Castro.

Apparently not.

Which, as Beschloss notes, was a definite shift from Kennedy, who had at least been exploring that possibility, however tentatively.

Which brings up that counterfactual Beschloss mentions Fitzgerald believing Castro would have been ousted if Kennedy had lived.

Yeah, Beschloss includes that to really underline how seriously the Kennedy team took the Castro threat.

It implies Kennedy likely would have kept pushing, maybe aggressively, for regime change in Cuba.

Okay, let's shift fully to Vietnam.

McNamara recommends more aid in March 64.

Things are getting worse there.

Definitely.

Beschloss uses McNamara's report to show the situation deteriorating rapidly after Diệm's assassination.

Political chaos in Saigon, Viet Cong getting stronger.

It all built the case for deeper U .S.

involvement.

And then the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

Beschloss lays out the confusion, the conflicting reports, Commander Herrick's own doubts.

Yet Johnson orders bombing and gets the resolution.

A massive turning point.

It really was.

Beschloss carefully details the ambiguity.

Was there really a second attack on the Maddox?

Herrick wasn't sure.

But Johnson saw an opportunity, didn't he?

Seems like it.

He used it to get that sweeping congressional authorization, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which basically gave him a blank check for the war.

A hugely consequential decision based on, well, uncertain information.

Interestingly, Beschloss says Khrushchev was privately telling Hanoi to negotiate, not try to force a military takeover of the south.

Right.

That suggests the Soviets at that point anyway were wary of the conflict escalating too much.

They saw the dangers maybe more clearly than Johnson did at that moment.

And then there's the big what -if about Kennedy and Vietnam.

Beschloss discusses the idea that Kennedy planned to withdraw after the 64 election, but also the political risks.

That's the perennial debate, isn't it?

Beschloss presents both sides the hints of a withdrawal plan, but also the huge political fear of being the president who lost Vietnam.

Rusk later said it would have been almost impossible politically for Kennedy to pull out in 65 anyway.

Exactly.

Rusk's point highlights the immense domestic pressure, regardless of Kennedy's private intentions in 63.

The political reality might have trapped him too.

How did Khrushchev see Johnson's handling of Vietnam?

Beschloss says Khrushchev felt Johnson was getting sucked in, maybe saw him as less savvy than Kennedy.

But Khrushchev also admitted he wasn't sure what Kennedy would have done either.

It shows how unclear the path forward looked, even to Moscow.

And eventually the Soviets publicly declared the Vietnam War was hurting U .S.-Soviet relations.

Yeah, that was a clear signal.

Beschloss marks that as a major downturn.

The war became this huge stumbling block poisoning the atmosphere for any kind of detente Johnson might have wanted.

Okay, let's turn to the Soviet side again.

Khrushchev himself was running into trouble at home, wasn't he?

Beschloss talks about growing discontent among his colleagues.

Yes, a whole range of issues.

His personality cult, the fight with China, failures in agriculture, his sometimes erratic decisions.

His position was weakening.

And the loss of the Kennedy relationship mattered internally.

Beschloss suggests it did.

That personal connection, that channel to the U .S.

president, had given Khrushchev a certain indispensability, a shield against his critics.

When Kennedy died, that shield was gone.

He tried that late outreach to West Germany,

Addzube's visit, the rumors about the wall.

Yeah, but that seemed to backfire, too, according to Beschloss.

It alarmed the hardliners.

And then that bizarre Schwerckman incident.

What was that?

Oh, some kind of alleged spy scandal involving a West German businessman.

Beschloss suggests it might have been engineered by Khrushchev's opponents specifically to sabotage his West German policy and make him look bad.

And all culminated in his ouster in October 1964.

Right.

The internal pressures just became too much.

Beschloss marks it as the end of an era, really.

A major shift in Soviet leadership was coming.

Meanwhile, the U .S.

election in 64.

Beschloss argues Kennedy's death and Goldwater being the Republican nominee actually prevented a big foreign policy fight.

Interesting point, isn't it?

Johnson could run as the sensible centrist against Goldwater's more aggressive why not victory platform.

And Johnson even asked Khrushchev to stay out of the election.

Yeah, he wanted to project stability, continuity.

He told Khrushchev that Johnson hoped for a Kennedy like relationship.

How did Khrushchev react to Johnson by then?

Beschloss says Khrushchev actually saw Johnson as clever.

He was relieved Johnson hadn't radically changed Kennedy's policies.

He seemed to expect that Tante would resume after the election, which he assumed Johnson would win easily.

But he had no idea what was brewing against him back home.

None at all.

According to Beschloss, he was completely blindsided.

Beschloss even mentioned Smichasny's account of Brezhnev asking about poisoning Khrushchev or arranging an accident.

It's chilling.

And Sergei Khrushchev, his son, was warned.

Yes, warned there was a plot.

But Khrushchev himself seems to have dismissed it or underestimated the threat.

He even defended his record to the Presidium right before they removed him.

So Johnson wins his landslide.

Khrushchev is out.

The Kennedy -Khrushchev era is definitively over.

Absolutely.

A complete changing of the guard on both sides.

In his wrap up, Beschloss has this powerful assessment.

The Kennedy -Khrushchev years were the closest the world came to nuclear war, but also the start of the biggest arms race.

It's a mixed legacy, isn't it?

Very mixed.

Beschloss gives them credit for navigating the crises, for taking those first steps on arms control like the test ban treaty.

But he doesn't shy away from the darker side, the danger, the massive buildup.

He argues Khrushchev's own goals, improving life for Soviet citizens, were sort of sabotaged by his clinging to imperial ambitions, world communism,

leading to nuclear blackmail.

Right.

And Beschloss contrasts how Eisenhower handled Khrushchev with more poise, maybe, versus Kennedy.

What's the core of that comparison?

He thinks Kennedy was too focused on exposing Soviet weakness.

Sort of.

Beschloss suggests Eisenhower understood the power balance better, managed Khrushchev more coolly.

Kennedy, while brilliant at crisis management, maybe his sensitivity to perception, his desire not to look weak, led him to expose Soviet vulnerabilities in ways that actually scared the Kremlin.

Scared them into taking bigger risks, like Berlin and Cuba.

That's Beschloss's argument.

That Kennedy inadvertently pushed Khrushchev into those dangerous corners and pushed the Kremlin toward deciding they had to achieve nuclear parity, whatever the cost.

And that drive for parity might have prevented a slower arms race, maybe even delayed communism's collapse.

It's a huge counterfactual.

It is.

Beschloss raises it as a possibility that Kennedy's approach, while understandable, might have had these unintended long -term consequences for the arms race.

But he also asks, you know, would continued nuclear imbalance have been even more dangerous?

There's no easy answer.

By 1970, the Soviets had roughly caught up nuclearly.

A far cry from Khrushchev's economic promises.

Exactly.

And Beschloss notes Berlin calmed down after the wall, eventually leading to agreements.

And Castro, ironically, tried to claim credit for the Soviet military buildup.

What about Khrushchev afterwards?

Beschloss says he was just forgotten.

Pretty much vanished from public life, banished, reflecting.

Beschloss mentions his later thoughts on Kennedy, emphasizing trust, human connection.

And then those later echoes,

Jackie visiting Moscow, Sergey Khrushchev visiting the U .S.

Right.

Leading eventually to the fall of the wall itself.

Beschloss uses these moments to frame the whole Kennedy -Khrushchev period, highlighting its significance in the long arc of the Cold War.

So just to pull it together, we've walked through Beschloss's account of that incredibly fraught time right after the assassination, the Johnson transition, the changing U .S.-Soviet dynamic.

Right.

All the uncertainty and the long -term effects.

Yeah, what really comes through in Beschloss is how much personal relationships, leadership styles, and just sheer chance events shaped everything.

Kennedy's death created this vacuum, setting off a chain reaction that really altered the Cold War's path.

It leads you thinking, doesn't it?

How much individual leaders and their interactions can steer global events, especially in a crisis, and how the immediate fallout from one terrible event can set things in motion for decades.

This deep dive really covers Beschloss's analysis of that whole critical period.