Chapter 19: Now We Have Untied Our Hands

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Welcome to the Deep Dive.

You sent us Chapter 19 of Michael Beschloss's The Crisis Years, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960 -1963,

and that's exactly what we're going to do.

We'll really dig into the key insights from this, well, incredibly crucial period.

Absolutely.

This chapter picks up right after the main climax of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Right, the resolution and the immediate aftermath.

So our mission here is to unpack all that complex diplomatic maneuvering, the political calculations, those personal tensions, you know, especially between Kennedy and Khrushchev.

And see how Beschloss analyzes the outcomes, the consequences, what it all meant as they stepped back from the brink.

It's a dense chapter, really gets into the nitty -gritty.

Consider this your guided tour through those critical days and weeks.

Yeah, Beschloss gives you this incredibly granular view.

It really highlights just how fragile that DS - Beschloss suggests this late emphasis might have been Khrushchev feeling pressure at home.

That's his theory, yeah.

That Khrushchev was possibly dealing with criticism from his own generals, maybe feeling they'd been, well, Beschloss uses the term hornswoggled.

Hornswoggled.

Okay, so this letter might have been his way of saying, look, we got the Turkish missiles out, it was a real trade, trying to shore up his position.

Makes sense.

A leader needing to cover his bases back home.

So Robert Kennedy's initial reaction to this letter.

According to Dobernan's account, RFK was pretty clear.

He said, accepting this publicly, framing it as a direct trade would be very hard.

Because of NATO.

Exactly.

NATO involvement, the time needed for approval.

But crucially, he did reaffirm the president's promise.

The missiles would be withdrawn within four to five months.

So confirming the plan, but pushing back on making it an explicit, immediate quid pro quo.

Right.

But then just a day later, October 30th, the stance hardens.

Robert Kennedy flat out rejects the idea of a public trade.

What changed overnight?

Well, Beschloss suggests Kennedy and the president really thought it through.

The implications.

Robert Kennedy's message to Dobernan was forceful, basically.

No explicit deal.

Take the letter back.

Reconsider.

Wow.

Yeah.

He warned that any public documents suggesting a trade would completely nullify the understanding and it would seriously damage future relations.

So the Kennedys were really focused on controlling the public story.

Avoiding any hint of a secret bargain.

Absolutely.

But even while rejecting the formal link, RFK did reassure Dobernan again.

The Turkish missiles were coming out soon.

But secrecy was paramount.

Utterly critical.

He stressed that any public link would make it look like they were purveying a falsehood to the American public,

politically toxic.

And Beschloss mentions Guantanamo came up briefly in Khrushchev's message.

Yeah.

Just a quick mention, which Kennedy apparently just brushed aside, shows other issues were still simmering.

Right.

But Beschloss sees this whole late push by Khrushchev on Turkey as damaging.

Definitely.

He calls it a 13th hour grab that really chipped away at the fragile trust they'd built.

And Robert Kennedy's final jab really drives that home.

Oh yeah.

When Dobernan assured him the letters would be kept secret, RFK reportedly shot back.

Speaking quite frankly, you also told me your government never intended to put missiles in Cuba.

Ouch.

Really underscores the trust issue.

Okay, moving on.

Kennedy's fear of public perception leaks.

This seems huge for him.

It was massive.

Beschloss stresses Kennedy explicitly forbade any public claims of victory.

Why?

Just because it might provoke Khrushchev?

Primarily, yes.

The fear was Khrushchev might retaliate by revealing the secret Turkey deal.

That would completely blow up the narrative of a purely American triumph.

And Kennedy had history on his mind too, right?

Thinking about FDR and Yalta.

Exactly.

Beschloss points out Kennedy was very aware of the criticism Roosevelt faced over alleged secret deals.

He'd even criticized FDR's Yalta diplomacy himself in the past.

He did not want that history repeating itself.

Plus the potential damage to NATO.

Right.

If it looked like the U .S.

unilaterally traded away allied missiles without full consultation,

that weakens the alliance.

Makes the U .S.

look like strong -arming its partners, just like the Soviets were often accused of doing.

So information control became job number one.

Salinger giving non -answers.

Yeah, carefully managing press inquiries.

Like when asked how many letters were exchanged, just refusing to get pinned down.

And then the Roland Evans leak happened about Khrushchev's first more emotional letter.

Right, the Friday letter.

Kennedy was apparently furious about that.

He launched an investigation.

And they traced it back to a French diplomat.

Yeah, Sean Claude Winkler apparently shared some details with Evans after a dinner party.

Incredible.

So Kennedy clamps down even harder, demands all the correspondents back, tells XCOM only Bundy and Sorensen can talk to the press.

Total lockdown.

Beschloss draws this interesting parallel.

Kennedy took public responsibility for the Bay of Pigs, but privately blamed others.

Here he avoids public gloating, but works behind the scenes to ensure he's seen as one who triumphed.

Very strategic.

Refusing formal interviews, but doing background chats, letting flattering details leak out.

Like showing select excerpts to Walter Lippman, carefully crafting the image.

And that private comment Beschloss includes, I cut his balls off.

Tells you something about the personal stakes for Kennedy.

It definitely shows a much harder, more competitive edge than the public persona suggested.

A glimpse behind the curtain.

Okay, so while Kennedy's managing perceptions, the Soviets are trying to tie up loose ends.

Beschloss brings in Yuri Zhukov.

Right, Zhukov.

Pravda editor, close to Khrischev.

He arrives in Washington officially for a conference, but Beschloss calls him a pathfinder for post -crisis bargaining.

So unofficial diplomacy.

Pretty much.

He's meeting with guys like Llewellyn Thompson, James Reston.

Interestingly, Secretary Rusk apparently felt kind of sidelined, not part of this inner circle Zhukov was talking to.

Just Khrischev was maybe exploring different channels.

And Salinger had a pretty frank talk with Zhukov.

Oh yeah, Salinger basically warned him.

You guys need to follow through on Cuba, quickly.

He reminded Zhukov about the previous Soviet lies about the missiles, saying another crisis could erupt if they didn't deliver.

Putting the pressure on.

And Zhukov apparently expressed concern about Kennedy maybe backing down, which could weaken Khrischev's position with Castro.

And the idea of a summit came up again.

It did.

Zhukov floated it.

But Salinger was cautious, saying, you know, only if there were guaranteed results.

He wasn't keen on a summit just for show.

But Zhukov did offer some reassurance about Berlin.

Yeah, he indicated Khrischev wouldn't reopen the Berlin issue anytime soon, at least not without the U .S.

involved.

So trying to signal some stability on other fronts.

Even as they're trying to put out the fire in Cuba, these other flashpoints are always there.

OK, let's get to the dismantling in Cuba itself and Castro's reaction.

Beshlas paints a vivid picture of Castro's fury.

Fury is the right word.

He felt completely bypassed, betrayed.

The Soviets started taking the missiles out incredibly fast Sunday morning, even before Kennedy formally replied to Khrushchev's public letter.

And the U .S.

biplanes saw it all.

Yep.

Jag hammers, missiles being loaded onto ships.

Beshlas mentions Soviet crewmen actually waving at the American U -2s.

Wow.

But this speed just angered Castro more.

Absolutely.

He felt totally disregarded.

And just hours after Khrushchev's announcement, Castro goes public with his own demands.

The five points.

Right.

Lift the blockade, end subversive activities, stop airspace violations, U .S.

out of Guantanamo.

And he threatened to shoot down U .S.

reconnaissance planes.

Real defiance.

So U -Thant's visit to Havana must have been intense.

Extremely.

Beshlas describes Castro giving Thant a two -hour rant, dressed in fatigues, armed.

And he rejected the U .N.

inspection proposal.

Flat out.

Called it humiliating.

Said it violated Cuban sovereignty.

Beshlas even mentions a popular song in Havana at the time, a conga rhythm mocking the missile removal.

Shows the public mood.

Castro felt Cuba was treated like a pawn, called Khrushchev's actions immoral.

Deeply disrespected.

How did Khrushchev try to smooth things over with Castro privately?

In a letter.

Yeah.

Beshlas details it.

Khrushchev basically acknowledged Cuba wanted to keep the missiles.

But he argued leaders have to see the bigger picture, the risk of global nuclear war.

Millions dead.

He framed it as avoiding catastrophe.

Exactly.

He said war was almost certain without the deal.

And he pointedly reminded Castro about his own cable from October 27th.

The one suggesting a possible first strike.

Yes.

Khrushchev asked Castro.

Wasn't that consultation?

He argued that if he'd followed Castro's implied suggestion of striking first, it would have meant global thermonuclear war and Cuba's certain, albeit heroic, destruction.

So he's saying we achieved the main goal, the non -invasion pledge, without war.

That was his argument.

The goal was security for Cuba and they got it, he claimed.

But Castro didn't buy it.

His reply was pretty bitter.

Extremely bitter.

Castro shot back saying,

Sure, we knew the risks, but we never asked you to remove the missiles or give in.

He denied ever suggesting a first strike, calling the idea immoral.

So he rejected Khrushchev's interpretation of his cable.

Completely.

He said they only advocated retaliation if Cuba or Soviet forces there were attacked first.

He stressed the deep bitterness and sadness in Cuba, the fear of another invasion, and zero trust in U .S.

promises.

This must have really worried Moscow.

A major rift with a key ally.

Oh, definitely.

Beshloz says Khrushchev was deeply wounded.

He apparently saw Castro, almost like a son, had sleepless nights over it.

Why so worried?

Just the relationship or bigger strategic concerns?

Both.

He feared Castro blocking inspections would unravel the whole deal with Kennedy, especially the non -invasion pledge.

Plus, Castro complaining could stir up trouble with other Soviet clients and give ammunition to Khrushchev's enemies in the Kremlin and, importantly, in Peking.

China was already critical, so he sends Mikoyan.

Anastas Mikoyan.

The Soviet leader considered closest to Castro.

He was the first high -ranking Soviet to visit after the revolution, seen as the best chance to mend fences.

Beshloz gives some background on Mikoyan.

Long career, survived Stalin.

A real political survivor.

Stalin apparently called him a genius in trade, involved in the Hungary crackdown in 56, but Khrushchev trusted him, partly because Mikoyan had opposed the anti -party group that tried to oust Khrushchev earlier.

Ehrman noted how awesome Khrushchev would say, Anastas and myself, showing their closeness.

And the mission was so important, Mikoyan stayed even when his wife died back in Moscow.

Yeah, a really stark illustration of the stakes.

His wife of decades passed away while he was in Havana, but he remained there to finish the talks.

Those talks sound incredibly difficult.

Castro was morose, demanding apologies.

Exactly.

Described as morose, brittle, he demanded a formal apology to the Cuban people.

Beshloz even mentions an unconfirmed report about Mikoyan being met with rotten fruit at one point.

Yikes.

And U .S.

intelligence was picking up rumors that Cubans may be kicking the Russians out.

Yeah, there were reports suggesting that possibility.

Rusk even briefed senators, warning the U .S.

wouldn't tolerate a Hungarian -type action if Soviet troops fired on Cubans.

Shows how volatile it was.

Okay, so while Mikoyan's trying to handle Castro, the U .S.

and Soviets are trying to finalize the main agreement.

And the aisle 28 bombers become a huge issue.

Right.

Suddenly these bombers, which weren't the big strategic missiles, become a major sticking point.

Why?

Weren't they older planes?

Older, yes, but still considered offensive weapons by the U .S., capable of carrying nuclear payloads striking parts of the U .S.

Rusk was pushing for a solid contract with Khrushchev, not just loose understandings.

Kennedy had public support for removing the missiles, but the bombers were trickier.

The administration had downplayed them earlier.

Initially, yes, but Makony and others kept warning about them.

So Kennedy reversed course and demanded their removal, too, as part of the offensive weapons pledge.

And the Soviets pushed back.

Kuznetsov argued they were a new issue, not covered by the original understanding about strategic missiles.

Thompson advised Kennedy to give Khrushchev something to show to his colleagues, maybe some flexibility.

But the U .S.

stance hardened.

Robert Kennedy's visit to the Soviet embassy on November 3rd.

What was the offer then?

Right.

After briefly meeting the ballerina Maya Plissitskaya, RFK met privately with Dobrynin.

He offered a deal.

If the Soviets started removing the IL -28s within 30 days, the U .S.

would lift the naval quarantine.

Trying to provide an incentive.

Exactly.

But Khrushchev rejected this initially.

Dobrynin delivered a letter turning it down on November 6th.

Robert Kennedy described that conversation with the Bermines most unpleasant.

He even remarked on how often they were meeting secretly.

Sounds like the relationship was fraying under the strain.

It seems like it.

Kennedy himself fired off an angry cable to Stevenson and McCloy at the U .N., complaining about Soviet tactics, fudging bargains, reinterpreting things.

And Kennedy's letter to Khrushchev directly addressed the bombers.

Yes.

He expressed surprise at the Soviet claim that the L -28s were a new complication.

He insisted his October 27th letter covered all offensive weapons.

He stressed the deep and dangerous shock of the whole missile deployment and the need to rebuild trust through verified removal.

Beschloss mentions an earlier draft of that letter was even tougher.

Yeah.

Apparently threatened renewed action.

Shows how tense things remained.

Kennedy told the XCOM the situation could get dangerous again quickly.

And all this is happening right as the U .S.

midterm elections are held.

Literally the same day, Kennedy sends that firm letter to Khrushchev November 6th.

Kennedy voted in Boston, watched the returns at the White House.

And the political context.

Gallup poll showed his approval rating up after the crisis.

It did.

But Republicans were already trying to chip away at the narrative.

Curtis calling the crisis contrived for election purposes, gold water hitting the no invasion pledge.

Standard political maneuvering.

Kennedy decided not to campaign in the final days.

Right.

He stayed focused on managing the crisis aftermath.

And the White House was busy batting down rumors from Cuban exiles about hidden missiles.

Issuing denials, limiting exile radio broadcasts.

Even ordering the FBI to interrogate refugees making those claims.

Beschloss draws a parallel to Kennedy sissing the FBI on steel executives earlier.

Shows his determination to control the story.

And strategically, he kept quiet about the aisle 28 sticking point before the election.

Right.

Didn t want to give the impression the crisis wasn t fully resolved.

The election results turned out well for the Democrats, though.

Surprisingly well for a midterm.

Gained Senate seats.

Minimal House losses.

That s showing since 34 for the party in power.

Political lore, as Beschloss notes, credits the missile crisis handling for that.

Nixon apparently complained the Cuban thing hurt Republicans.

So Kennedy emerged politically stronger.

But the aisle 28 issue still wasn t settled.

There s this message from Zinchuk via Bartlett.

Yeah, another backchannel message.

Zinchuk basically urged the U .S.

not to push Moscow too hard, suggesting they wanted to resolve things quickly.

He also brought up the Turkish missiles again, kind of implying they justified the Cuban deployment.

Still trying to frame it that way.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev sends more letters refusing to budge on the bombers before the quarantine lifts.

Four private letters, apparently, dug his heels in.

And Kennedy s talking to McMillan, even considering calling off the deal.

Yes.

On November 14, he sounded frustrated, talked about potentially withdrawing the non -invasion pledge if the bombers didn t go, but McMillan urged him, you must not give in to him.

The joint chiefs were recommending escalation.

They were.

Tightening the quarantine to include fuel, P .O .L., or even airstrikes against the aisle 28 sites if Khrushchev refused.

And here Beschloss points out something important.

This intense focus on the bombers might have distracted from other issues.

That s his argument.

Like the potential Soviet sub -base or the exact number of Soviet troops remaining.

Kennedy had raised the sub -base issue earlier, but didn t pursue it aggressively.

McCloy raised the troop numbers with Kuznetsov.

He did.

But Kennedy apparently accepted vague assurances that personnel linked to offensive systems would leave.

Beschloss notes this lack of clarity on numbers caused problems later.

So, the pressure ramps up again.

McCloy s meeting with Kuznetsov on November 18 sounds like an ultimatum.

Pretty much.

McCloy told Kuznetsov they needed a promise on the aisle 28 withdrawal before Kennedy s press conference on Tuesday.

Failure to do so would call the whole agreement into question.

What was offered in return?

A U .N.

declaration against invasion and U .S.

efforts to get other Latin American countries to do the same, provided Cuba behaved.

But Kuznetsov still rejected on -site inspections.

Absolutely.

Interminable inspection on the ground, he called it.

McCloy warned him about the dangers of leaving things unresolved, given Castro s volatility.

Then Robert Kennedy talks to Bolshakov again, turning the screws.

Yes.

November 19.

RFK tells Bolshakov low -level reconnaissance flights had stopped, but would resume if the aisle 28s weren t removed.

He warned if a U .S.

plane got shot down, things could escalate fast.

Demanded an answer before the press conference.

And Kennedy sends messages to NATO hinting at airstrikes.

Messages intended for Soviet ears, suggesting the U .S.

might bomb the aisle 28s if they weren t withdrawn promptly.

Plus that sabotage incident at a Cuban factory.

Yeah, by a U .S.-backed exile team.

Even though Kennedy had supposedly cancelled covert ops, Robert Kennedy was reportedly furious about these unauthorized missions, but it might have served as another signal to Khrushchev and Castro.

Castro was still telling McCoyan not to give in.

He was, but McCoyan apparently gave him a long, confusing exposition.

And finally, Castro just seems to get up on the bombers.

Oh, to hell with the airplanes.

That s the quote Beschloss uses.

Castro relented on the bombers, though he still vetoed any on -site inspections.

So Dobrynin delivers the letter from Khrushchev agreeing to remove the aisle 28s.

November 20.

Khrushchev complained they hadn t been mentioned earlier, called them obsolete, but agreed to pull them out within 30 days if the U .S.

lifted the quarantine.

Robert Kennedy thought the letter seemed rather disorganized.

Yeah, Dobrynin explained Khrushchev dictated it while walking.

Kennedy himself concluded the low -level spy flights were what finally forced Castro s hand on the bombers.

And then that odd scene with Bolshakov watching Kennedy s press conference at RSK s office.

Right.

Cocktails, watching the announcement.

Kennedy announces the aisle 28 removal, lifts the quarantine,

expresses hope for relaxing other tensions.

Bolshakov seems pleased.

Kennedy even calls Maya Plisitskaya and gets Bolshakov to sing Happy Birthday.

Surreal.

So Kennedy lifts the quarantine immediately.

Right away.

Terminates the SAC alert, releases air reserves, informs allies.

The immediate bomber crisis seems over.

But the formal non -invasion pledge is still tricky because of the inspection issue.

Exactly.

Kennedy s letter to Khrushchev the next day welcomes the aisle 28 news but regrets the inspection agreement.

And he includes that carefully worded phrase about no invasion while matters take their present favorable course.

Bischloss highlights those last seven words.

Says Kennedy deliberately withheld a formal ironclad pledge because Castro refused inspections.

He conditioned peace in the Caribbean on weapon removal, verification, and Cuba not exporting revolution.

So the XCOM meets at Hyannis port to try and draft something for the UN.

November 23rd.

They produce a draft saying the US could give assurances against invasion if weapons were gone.

But without verification, the assurance only held if Cuba didn t interfere with other ways of getting satisfactory information.

Meaning spy flights.

Clearly.

And the US would still follow the Rio treaty and UN charter.

Kennedy told McCloy to tell Kuznetsov this was the best they could do, trying to avoid a long and fruitless haggle.

The aisle 28s leave, but the US and Soviets can t agree on a joint UN declaration.

Aerial photos confirm the bombers gone in two weeks.

Kuznetsov pleaded with McCloy to remove the satisfactory information clause, fearing Castro s reaction.

McCloy refused.

Through December, they failed to agree.

So eventually they just ask you, Thant, to take it off the agenda.

Exactly.

Stevenson and Kuznetsov jointly requested it the following month.

Kennedy just let his November 20th statement stand as the final public word.

Sorenson thought the outcome was okay.

Yeah, really alright, Beschloss quotes him saying.

Kennedy might have preferred something cleaner, but the US kept its overflights.

And Khrushchev didn t get his firm no -invasion guarantee.

Which brings us to how different sides interpreted the outcome.

Khrushchev claimed victory in his memoirs.

Famously, said the whole gamble forced the US promise not to invade Cuba, portrayed it as making the American imperialist beast swallow a hedgehog.

But Beschloss argues that s just face -saving.

Completely.

He argues it was a failure for Khrushchev.

High cost, damaged Soviet prestige, didn t change the nuclear balance, made him look reckless.

Gromyko later said the world would have been better off without it.

Arbatov called it a humiliation.

And it hurt Khrushchev politically at home.

Beschloss suggests it fueled criticism of his harebrained scheming, contributed to his later ouster, strengthened military hardliners who wanted more defense spending.

Kuznetsov s warning to McCloy, you Americans will never be able to do this to us again, speaks volumes.

Though it also increased interest in arms control.

Yes.

The near -miss definitely spurred interest in a test van and detente, at least for some in Moscow.

Others saw detente as just a tactic until they reached nuclear parity.

What s striking is Beschloss noting how little criticism Kennedy faced at the time.

It really is remarkable.

No major press outcry, no congressional investigation like after Pearl Harbor.

The official story Khrushchev s reckless act was widely accepted.

Beschloss compares it to the Berlin Wall situation.

Public faith in Kennedy.

Good PR.

They averted attention from any potential U .S.

role in provoking the crisis.

Beschloss, looking back, questions if Kennedy s rhetoric on U .S.

superiority, Operation Mongoose, military buildup, might have pushed Khrushchev, and if an earlier warning might have stopped him.

But later, criticism did emerge, Moynihan George Will.

Yeah, by the late 70s, early 80s, questioning the victory.

Saying Khrushchev should have faced more consequences, criticizing the failure to sever the Soviet military link to Cuba, calling the no invasion pledge too soft.

And Beschloss argues Kennedy intentionally weakened that pledge.

That it was booby -trapped with conditions U .N.

verification, Cuba s good behavior precisely to allow future action against Castro.

Kennedy knew those conditions were unlikely to be met.

So Kennedy prioritized keeping options open against Castro.

That s Beschloss s reading.

He wanted to avoid the long -term political cost of accepting Castro permanently, even if he wasn t planning an immediate invasion.

And he never publicly clarified that Khrushchev didn t get a solid guarantee, probably fearing Khrushchev would reveal the Turkey deal if pushed.

And the pledge about Cuba not exporting revolution wasn t really secured from the Soviets either.

Kennedy included it in his conditions for peace, implying a stronger commitment than was actually obtained.

This caused problems for later presidents when Cuba did support revolutions elsewhere.

Bundy defended Kennedy s approach, though.

Argued that trying to bargain for more might have lost vital support.

Beschloss s overall take.

Kennedy achieved his main goal status quo restored, but it wasn t a clear win or loss.

The non -invasion assurance was heavily qualified, and future Soviet weapon developments in Cuba lessened the significance of the missile withdrawal over time.

But Kennedy s real victory was with U .S.

public opinion.

Absolutely.

He looked firm,

masterful, overcame earlier doubts about his leadership.

Richard Rivera called it perhaps the greatest personal diplomatic victory.

Newsweek reported soaring confidence.

It boosted Kennedy s political self -confidence, paving the way for detente efforts.

This year, terror of the crisis pushed arms control up the agenda.

Then there s the Alsop Bartlett article and the Stevenson controversy.

This really stirred things up.

Oh, big time.

Published in the Saturday Evening Post had this anonymous quote a non -admiring official claiming Stevenson pushed for a Munich at a key meeting trading U .S.

missiles in Europe for the Cuban ones.

Which deeply hurt Stevenson.

He suspected Kennedy was behind it.

He did.

Thought maybe Kennedy wanted him out.

Kennedy denied it, though Bartlett had discussed Stevenson with him.

And Kennedy apparently seemed not too displeased by the article s angle on Stevenson.

Kennedy asked for a change regarding Sorenson being called a dove, but not for Stevenson.

Correct.

Which fed Stevenson s suspicions.

Feschloss offers a Machiavellian interpretation.

Making the turkey for Cuba trade seem like a crazy pacifist idea attributed to Stevenson made it less likely the public would suspect Kennedy had secretly done something very similar.

Wow.

So Stevenson was kind of sacrificed to protect the secret.

That s the implication.

His vindication only came much later, in 87, when Kennedy s own consideration of the trade became public.

The description of Stevenson introducing Kennedy at a dinner afterwards?

Sarcastic.

Tense.

Yeah.

The audience reaction, Kennedy s tight smile.

George Ball noted how disillusioned Stevenson became after that.

A really unfortunate episode.

Despite all that, the crisis did seem to genuinely push both sides towards arms control.

It certainly created momentum.

Kennedy told Ormsby Gore the world couldn t survive with huge nuclear arsenals.

Khrushchev, via Zhukov, signaled real interest in a test ban, seen as a way to cut defense costs, focus on the economy, maybe even pressure China.

But Rostow warned the Soviets might just find other ways to catch up.

Right.

Urging the U .S.

to support Soviet officials who genuinely favored inspected arms control.

Arthur Dean was discussing a test ban with Kuznetsov.

McCoy and visited Kennedy, suggesting talks on all issues, including Berlin.

And Khrushchev sent that long letter promising to break the test ban deadlock.

A nine -page letter, December 11th, seemed like a real opening.

But China was furious with Khrushchev s handling of the whole crisis.

Peking denounced him for adventurism and capitulationism.

Classic ideological attack.

Khrushchev hit back hard, though.

He did, before the Supreme Soviet, accused the Chinese of hypocrisy for tolerating Hong Kong and Macau, argued he averted World War, saved millions of lives, saved Cuba from destruction, unlike the loud mouths,

claimed Americans now understood nuclear war, influencing the midterms against Nixon.

Kennedy apparently admired the quality of Khrushchev's writing here.

So Kennedy responds to Khrushchev, acknowledging the Cuban affair seems closed, looking towards the test ban.

Yes, thanking Khrushchev for his flexibility.

But he also subtly needles him about misleading information coming through confidential channels, mentioning the Scali connection.

And he reminds Khrushchev not to mistake U .S.

press reports for government policy, asks about Khrushchev's test ban ideas and China's position.

And then Khrushchev drops the bombshell offer on inspections.

December 19th says the time for a test ban has come, acknowledges the U .S.

needs on -site inspections for ratification, offers two to three inspections a year on each side.

Two to three.

That caused confusion, right?

Yeah.

Kennedy was expecting more.

Huge confusion.

Kennedy was elated, but puzzled.

Two to three seemed way too low based on U .S.

positions.

Dean denied ever suggesting that few.

Maybe confusion with an earlier Wiesner suggestion.

Anyway, Kennedy replies, clarifying the U .S.

negotiator mentioned eight to ten, hoping for a Soviet concession towards that.

And Khrushchev was furious at this apparent rejection.

Thompson thought so.

Khrushchev felt he'd made a huge concession, maybe based on bad info from his own side about U .S.

flexibility, and Kennedy threw it back in his face.

This had consequences for Bolshakov, the back channel guy.

Yeah, identified as the one who misled Kennedy about the missiles initially.

He was abruptly recalled to Moscow.

Robert Kennedy wanted to help him personally, but couldn't be seen doing so.

Bartlett hosted a farewell lunch at RFK's urging.

Awkward lunch.

Sounds like it.

Another Soviet diplomat gave a dismissive speech about misunderstanding the lies.

RFK privately asked Bolshakov why he didn't speak up.

Bolshakov's cryptic answer.

He doesn't know what I know.

RFK later sent him a friendly note in Moscow.

Ebeshloz ends the chapter with Kennedy in Palm Beach, meeting the Bay of Pigs veterans.

Right.

Closing the year, December 29th, at the Orange Bowl in Miami.

A very symbolic emotional event.

Rusk and Bundy opposed Kennedy going.

Feared it implied another invasion attempt.

Robert Kennedy thought it would help alleviate guilt.

RFK had worked on getting the prisoners released.

Yeah, during the crisis and after.

Complex negotiations, ransom money raised by Cardinal Cushing, Lucius Clay, maybe even the Kennedy family and Jake the barber factor involved.

The last prisoners got out by Christmas Eve.

The scene at the Orange Bowl sounds dramatic.

Jackie speaking Spanish.

Exiles shouting, GERA!

War.

Pebe San Roman presenting the brigade banner to Kennedy, saying they'd keep it safe for him.

And Kennedy's famous line.

I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this brigade in a free Havana.

Powerful words, but potentially inflammatory given everything else.

Exactly.

The speech text went to Khrushchev, who, lacking a firm non -invasion pledge and feeling betrayed on the test ban, might well have seen it as Kennedy signaling renewed efforts to overthrow Castro.

So the chapter ends not with a clean resolution, but lingering tensions.

Khrushchev's New Year letter acknowledges compromise averted war, but the issues remained.

And Beschloss includes a ton of concluding notes.

Soviet radio bringing up Turkey and Guantanamo again, differing accounts, the secrecy around documents, estimates of Soviet troops, the later significance of the agreement, all sorts of details fleshing out the complexity.

Well, we have certainly completed our deep dive into Chapter 19 of Beschloss's The Crisis Years.

We've gone through the key events, the strategies, the diplomacy, the crises within the crisis, the historical backdrop,

and Beschloss's analysis of this absolutely pivotal moment.

Absolutely.

From De Brennan's visits to McCoyan's difficult mission in Havana, the aisle 28 bomber standoff, the non -invasion pledge complexities, the domestic political fallout, the Stevenson affair, right up to Kennedy's Orange Bowl speech, we've covered the ground.

We looked at the key figures, the dates, the back and forth, the secret channels, the internal fights on both sides, and what Beschloss thinks it all meant long term.

Yeah, the divergent interpretations of victory, the seeds of detente mixed with ongoing suspicion, the way Kennedy managed public perception versus the private realities.

It's a really complex picture.

So for you, our learner, hopefully this gives you a much richer, more textured understanding of how the Cuban Missile Crisis actually wound down.

It wasn't just flipping a switch from crisis to peace.

Not at all.

It was messy, dangerous, full of near misses, even after the main confrontation.

It really forces you to think about how fine the line is in international crises.

How much depends on individual judgment, communication, and maybe just luck.

We've definitely covered the whole chapter now, leaving no stone unturned from Beschloss's account.