Chapter 18: I Don’t See How We’ll Have a Very Good War

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Welcome to the Deep Dive.

We take a single source, or sometimes a collection, and really get into it, extracting the crucial knowledge you need without the fluff.

That's right.

Today we're locked in on chapter 18 of Michael Beschloss's The Crisis Years, Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960 -1963.

A really dense critical chapter.

Absolutely.

Our mission for you, the learner, is to get a clear, engaging, and thorough grasp of this pivotal week in the Cuban Missile Crisis.

We're talking insights, strategies, and, well, the surprising moments that defined it all.

Yeah, this chapter really throws you right into the deep end.

I mean, the sheer number of things happening at once is staggering.

You've got the public confrontation, these secret back channels buzzing, the intense debates inside both Washington and

Moscow.

It's just a masterclass in high -stakes decision -making under, well, unbelievable pressure.

Okay, let's unpack it then.

Starting Friday morning, October 26th, the U .S.

quarantine of Cuba is now active.

It's in effect.

And we see the U .S.

destroyer Joseph P.

Kennedy Jr., interestingly.

A ship, Robert Kennedy, had actually served on intercepting the freighter Marukla.

What did this first interception tell us?

Well, the Marukla incident, it was tense, definitely, but it also showed a degree of caution, maybe.

How so?

Here you have the ship, Panamanian -owned, Lebanese -registered, Soviet chartered, quite a mix.

Yeah.

But it wasn't actually carrying any contraband, no prohibited material.

So it suggests both sides were sort of feeling each other out, testing the limits without immediately wanting to trigger something huge.

And even with all this global tension, you have President Kennedy making this wry comment to Salinger, his press secretary, about the press and family publicity.

Yeah, about the Joseph P.

Kennedy Jr.

getting the publicity.

Right.

It's a small detail, but it really highlights that constant awareness of public image, even then.

Absolutely.

And meanwhile, the EXCOM, the executive committee of the National Security Council they're meeting, and Adlai Stevenson, the UN ambassador, he's already predicting what the Soviets will likely demand.

What was his prediction?

Basically,

guarantees for Cuba's security, its territorial integrity, and the dismantling of U .S.

Jupiter missiles in Turkey,

all in exchange for removing the Soviet missiles from Cuba.

So right away, he frames that central, incredibly delicate trade -off.

Exactly.

It links the Soviet move in Cuba, which they claimed was defensive, to this long -standing U .S.

deployment in Turkey, which the Soviets saw as a direct threat.

Yeah, right on their border.

So it immediately broadens the whole thing.

It's not just Cuba, but Dean Rusk, the secretary of state, he pushed back hard on equating the two.

Why?

What was his argument?

Well, from the American perspective, missiles in Cuba were a totally new direct threat to the U .S.

homeland, unprecedented.

Right.

The missiles in Turkey, while obviously a concern for the Soviets, were part of an existing NATO setup.

That difference in sort of immediacy and context, that was a key argument within the Kennedy team.

And it's at this point, Beschloss notes, that Kennedy realizes the quarantine alone isn't going to cut it.

Right.

It wasn't enough.

His choice, as he saw it, was stark.

Invading or trading.

What does that tell you about his thinking then?

It shows he grasped the limits of just playing defense.

The missiles were there.

To get them out, the U .S.

would likely have to either force them out with all the risks that entailed or find some diplomatic way out, one that addressed Soviet concerns.

Which leads into discussing this Brazilian proposal, something about a nuclear -free zone.

Yeah, a nuclear -free zone and a territorial guarantee for Latin America.

And Kennedy then asks this crucial question.

Could the U .S.

actually pledge not to invade Cuba?

A big question.

What were the different views on that inside the XCOM?

Well, John McHuney, the CIA director, was firmly against any pledge that guaranteed Castro's state in power.

His concern wasn't just the missiles themselves.

No, it was broader.

He feared Cuba becoming this permanent communist foothold, potentially spreading communism through Latin America.

It highlights that wider Cold War ideological battle.

And interestingly, this idea resurfaces about using the Brazilian ambassador in Havana.

Right.

To warn Castro that he was basically being used by the Soviets and that any solution to the crisis would probably lead to his overthrow anyway.

It feels like an attempt to maybe drive a wedge between Castro and Khrischev.

Possibly.

Or at least to suggest Castro's fate was sealed no matter what.

It also ties back to Kennedy's earlier stated red lines with Castro military ties to Moscow and aggression in Latin America.

The fact they revisited this shows they were still scrambling for different angles.

Kennedy himself, he was skeptical about this Brazilian ambassador plan.

Yeah, he wasn't sold on it.

And he sets this firm 48 -hour deadline for progress in the New York talks at the UN.

You can feel the pressure ratcheting up.

Definitely.

So if those talks failed, what were the main options Kennedy saw He basically boiled it down to three alternatives.

First, direct bargaining with the Soviets.

Okay.

Second, expanding the quarantine to include POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants, basically trying to cripple Cuba's economy and military.

Squeeze them harder.

Right.

And third,

the airstrike.

Each one carrying just immense risks.

Huge risks.

Unpredictable consequences for every single one.

Let's dig into those.

Bargaining Walt Rostow's view was that the Soviets might be aiming to, what,

solidify their position in Cuba, maybe sneak more in.

Yeah, either that or use Cuba as a bargaining chip to get concessions elsewhere.

Specifically, those US missiles in Turkey and Italy.

So Rostow saw the broader geopolitical game.

Yeah.

Potentially weakening NATO in the Mediterranean.

Exactly.

It wasn't just about protecting Castro for the Soviets, potentially.

Okay.

Option two,

the expanded POL quarantine.

What was the State Department thinking there?

Their assessment was it could bring the Cuban economy to a halt pretty quickly, radically limit their military capacity, possibly even lead to total economic collapse within, say, six months.

So the idea was to buy time.

Buy time.

Yeah.

Create space for some kind of face -saving resolution without the US looking like it traded away an ally's security like Turkey just to get the missiles out of Cuba.

Right.

It emphasized tightening the screws gradually.

Maintaining that principle of not bargaining away allied assets.

Right.

That was key.

And then option three,

the most dangerous one,

the air strike.

Yeah.

The intelligence warnings were stark, potentially a strong Soviet reaction, maybe even war.

Did they think the Soviets would launch missiles from Cuba in response?

Unlikely was the assessment, unless Khrushchev had already decided on a much bigger conflict anyway.

The more probable Soviet response was seen as a riposte in kind, meaning potentially hitting those US missile bases in Turkey.

And from there,

well, the escalation potential was terrifyingly unknown.

Just fraught with peril.

The highest risk of immediate unpredictable escalation.

A direct clash between the superpowers.

Yeah.

Exactly.

Now the chapter then takes this fascinating and frankly kind of disturbing detour into the politics within the Kennedy administration.

Yeah.

The infighting.

We learned about Vice President Johnson leaking to the Dallas Morning News saying there was a 50 -50 chance of hitting Cuba.

What's the significance of that leak right then?

Well, it raises serious questions, doesn't it?

About Johnson's priorities at that exact moment.

It looks like he was maybe more worried about his political image back in Texas, wanting to seem tough on Cuba.

Even if it potentially wrecked the delicate diplomacy.

Exactly.

Beschloss mentions Johnson wanting a reporter on the first press plane if an invasion happened.

It really paints a picture of, well, self -serving motives.

Wow.

It's hard to imagine how furious the Kennedy brothers would have been if they'd known.

Robert Kennedy's later comments about Johnson feeling they were too weak, but offering no real alternatives.

It suggests deep distrust.

Oh, absolutely.

RFK's assessment really highlights those internal splits.

The lack of a totally unified front.

It suggests a real lack of confidence in the vice president's judgment during the heat of the crisis.

President Kennedy apparently tried to explain Johnson's hawkishness by blaming militant congressional cronies.

It almost sounds like he's making excuses for him.

It does a bit, yeah.

And that anecdote about the brothers joking about getting people to call Johnson and accuse the government of being a war party just to gauge his reaction.

That's pretty telling, isn't it?

About the tension, maybe even the gamesmanship going on.

A really strained relationship.

Deeply strained.

No real trust there.

And Beschloss includes Johnson's later complaints about JFK not understanding Congress.

So these issues weren't new.

No, long -standing friction.

Then we get Robert Kennedy's explosive account of Johnson allegedly strong -arming his way onto the VP ticket in 1960,

despite JFK initially wanting Senator Summington.

That is a bombshell claim.

It paints Johnson as incredibly aggressive in pursuing the vice presidency, maybe even against Kennedy's better judgment.

That history would definitely color everything that followed.

Kennedy's reported reason for picking Johnson avoiding trouble with Congress and, quote, those Texas bastards.

It just underscores the raw politics involved.

And the agreement to keep Johnson's second choice status secret speaks volumes, doesn't it?

About the maneuvering, the need to project unity, even if it wasn't real.

Kennedy tried to spin it positively, focusing on the states Johnson might help win.

But Ben Bradley observed Kennedy seemed uneasy around Johnson.

Bradley's observation kind of confirms that underlying tension suggests Kennedy never really got comfortable with Johnson as VP.

And Johnson's own motivations seem pretty clear in hindsight, wanting to shed that southern label already eyeing a run for president in 68.

Yeah, Len Billings apparently told Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs that every move Johnson made was calculated for that future campaign.

Provides a real lens for understanding his actions.

Kennedy even said he'd support Johnson more than the Eisenhower -backed Nixon, despite his own negative views and Jacqueline reminding him of them.

He even mused Johnson would be better qualified four years from now.

It's almost like JFK was trying to rationalize it, maybe see the VP role as a way to sort of contain Johnson until then.

Then there's a story about Johnson giving Kennedy this document at the inauguration, granting himself huge authority, which Kennedy apparently just lost.

Or misplaced, yeah.

And the Senate Democrats rejecting Johnson's attempt to keep residing over their caucus.

Kennedy saw that as a real hit to Johnson's ego.

These incidents just highlight Johnson's struggle, really, going from powerful Senate majority leader to the, well, much less defined VP role.

We hear about Johnson always checking if Kennedy was in the Oval Office and Kennedy asking dismissively, what is he doing in these offices?

Yeah, it suggests Kennedy didn't really see a clear role or integration for Johnson in the day -to -day White House operations.

Publicly, Kennedy called him the most influential vice president, tried to include him, but paradoxically, he never really used Johnson's famous lobbying skills with Congress.

It is a paradox, isn't it?

Kennedy just seemed unwilling or maybe unable to fully leverage Johnson's main strength, which could have really helped his agenda.

Johnson got assignments, space, equal opportunity, foreign trips.

Kennedy addressed his complaints about staff treatment, but then Robert Kennedy later claimed the president wasn't happy with Johnson's work on equal opportunity.

So, a complex picture.

Public support, but maybe underlying tensions and distrust on policy.

Interestingly, even RFK acknowledged Johnson's loyalty, despite their animosity.

Which adds another layer.

Kennedy made that remark about Johnson's letters to Senator Hayden, saying he only needed one of me.

And by 62,

Evelyn Lincoln noticed Johnson was at fewer key meetings.

Kennedy complained about Johnson talking too much, which Johnson heard about.

Johnson felt he was only invited to NSC meetings if he kept quiet.

You can see the relationship deteriorating.

Johnson clearly felt sidelined.

Their private meeting time dropped off significantly.

Kennedy told Charlie Bartlett he didn't bother calling people who hadn't read the cables, implying Johnson wasn't keeping up.

Ouch.

By the second year, Kennedy apparently saw both Johnson and Stevenson as politically weakened, dependent on his goodwill.

That's a significant shift in perception.

Kennedy told Bobby Baker he knew Johnson was unhappy, but wished he'd speak up in meetings.

But Johnson told Baker he feared being called a traitor if he disagreed, and he distrusted RFK and the high flute in Harvard's.

Reveals the depth of Johnson's bitterness.

He later said he detested every minute of being VP.

And all this is happening while Johnson is cultivating the Dallas Morning News, whose publisher distrusted the Kennedys.

Johnson secretly gets Jack Krueger to send a reporter, Hugh Ainsworth, for a private meeting.

It feels like this separate, potentially damaging agenda running alongside the missile crisis.

It really underscores Johnson's focus on his own political game, his willingness to operate somewhat independently, even during a national emergency.

Okay, let's shift gears now back to the crisis itself and the emergence of these crucial diplomatic back channels.

Right.

The secret communication lines.

John Scali, an ABC News correspondent, gets contacted by Alexander Folman, a Soviet embassy counselor, for an urgent meeting.

Who was Folman?

Well, Folman had been used before as a secret link to the White House.

Another Soviet contact, Bolshakov, had lost credibility because of the whole missile deception.

So Folman was a potential alternative channel.

Right.

He'd met Scali before, kind of playing the new guy in town card, trying to understand Washington.

But U .S.

intelligence knew better.

Oh, yeah.

They identified Folman as a KGB colonel, actually involved in reorganizing Soviet intelligence in the U .S.

So that immediately puts his motives under a cloud.

Absolutely.

Highlights the murky world of Cold War diplomacy.

Definitely.

So when Folman tells Scali war seems imminent, it carries weight, but you also have to be suspicious.

Scali's response was pointed, though, basically saying, you guys put the missiles there.

Puts the blame squarely back on Moscow.

Exactly.

Then Folman makes this proposal.

Soviets remove missiles under U .N.

supervision.

Khrushchev pledges not to bring them back, and the U .S.

publicly promises not to invade Cuba.

A potential breakthrough.

Potentially huge.

It outlines a framework for de -escalation.

He even suggests Adlai Stevenson could propose it at the U .N., adding that international layer.

Scali wasn't sure Kennedy would make that non -invasion pledge,

though.

Folman pushed him to check immediately with high -level State Department friends.

So Scali reports it to Roger Hilsman, and initially the Americans assume Folman must be acting on Khrushchev's orders.

But later accounts contradict that.

They do.

Folman himself later claimed he acted independently, though he reported it.

Others in the Soviet camp also suggested he was freelancing.

It's ambiguous.

We don't know for sure how much authority he really had.

And adding to the confusion,

around the exact same time, Uthant, the U .N.

secretary general, makes a very similar proposal to Stevenson in New York.

Right.

Virtually identical.

So Kennedy has no way of knowing if this idea came from Khrushchev, maybe through Folman, or independently from Uthant.

Rusk recalled Kennedy never felt he had a concrete proposal he could act on from this channel.

And later, Thant apparently revealed his source was a Soviet official, a KGB guy known to Gromiko, which again raises the possibility Khrushchev was using these deniable channels to float ideas without committing publicly.

The convergence is fascinating, though.

Folman -Uthant suggests the Soviets were definitely signaling the core elements needed for a deal.

Whether authorized or not, the message was getting through multiple avenues.

Okay, while these back channels are humming a more direct and pretty unusual communication arrives, Khrushchev's Friday letter.

Ah, yes, the famous Friday letter.

The scene Beshlos paints is bizarre, rock -throwing Soviet students outside Spasso House, the U .S.

ambassador's residence, just before this long, handwritten letter arrives.

In violet ink, no less.

Yeah.

Directly from the Kremlin, bypassing the usual foreign ministry channels.

What did that signal?

Urgency.

Informality.

Maybe even Khrushchev acting somewhat personally, bypassing his own bureaucracy.

The violet ink, the direct dispatch, it all points to something unusual and highly personal from the Soviet leader.

Ambassador Davies noted how rushed it looked.

Jumbled text, corrections, words crossed out.

They scrambled to translate it, and Ambassador Kohler cabled Washington about a potential breakthrough.

But then there were frustrating delays getting the full text transmitted.

Yeah, those transmission delays, you can imagine the anxiety they caused.

And the letter itself, showing signs of haste, just underlines the pressure Khrushchev must have been under.

When it finally arrived, Rusk gathered the key advisors.

What were the main things Khrushchev was trying to get across in this very personal message?

It was long, yeah, and a bit rambling, but several key themes came through.

He sounded skeptical about just exchanging secret letters for something this big.

He acknowledged the shared fear, the anxiety for the world, urged against, you know, intoxication and petty passions, especially with U .S.

elections coming up.

He mentioned his own war experience.

He did, conveyed a real sense of the horrors of war.

And he tried hard to reassure Kennedy that the weapons in Cuba were purely defensive.

Use that analogy of a cannon defensive, if protecting,

offensive, only if you add troops to attack.

Question the logic of attacking the U .S.

from Cuba.

Tried to paint himself as rational?

Very much so.

Asserted his sanity, referenced their Vienna meeting as proof they could talk reasonably, dismissed the idea he'd do something only lunatics or suicides would do.

He stressed wanting peaceful competition, condemned the U .S.

quarantine as piratical, like something from the Middle Ages.

Did he offer anything concrete?

He maintained Soviet ships were carrying peaceful cargo, that Cuba already had enough defensive weapons, appealed for good sense.

And he did propose something based on U .S.

appeal.

Soviets halt armed shipments.

U .S.

halts the piratical actions against ships while negotiations happen.

Also linked the missile deployment back to the Bay of Pigs, didn't he?

Yes, explicitly.

Said the Bay of Pigs and U .S.

support for counterrevolutionaries provoked the weapons delivery.

He acknowledged Kennedy's admission that the Bay of Pigs was a mistake, which he seemed to value.

He stressed his own responsibility to his people, warned of global war, justified Soviet aid historically.

Referencing U .S.

interventions in Russia after the revolution.

Right.

And then came the core proposal, really.

If the U .S.

guarantees it won't attack Cuba or support others who might and recalls its fleet, then the need for Soviet military specialists in Cuba disappears.

He finished with that strong warning about the quarantine and that powerful analogy.

The knotted rope of war, urging Kennedy not to tighten it, but to help untie it.

It was quite emotional, quite personal.

Llewellyn Thompson, former ambassador to Moscow, suspected the informal style meant Khrushchev sent it without full presidium or foreign ministry clearance.

He thought Khrushchev dictated it under great strain.

So how did the XCOM react to this strange emotional letter?

Her reactions were mixed.

The essentials seemed promising to some, but it crucially didn't commit to removing the missiles already there.

That's a big omission.

Huge.

Rusk felt Khrushchev was disturbed, but genuinely trying to find a way out.

George Ball agreed, called it a critic -er, picturing Khrushchev in a tough spot.

Robert Kennedy felt the beginnings, perhaps, of some accommodation.

But not everyone was convinced.

No.

Dean Acheson was very dismissive, called it confused and almost maudlin, suggesting Khrushchev was either tight or scared.

He criticized his colleagues for being too eager to liquidate this thing.

Shows the Hawk -Dove split right there.

Rusk then tells Kennedy about the Scali -Folman conversation.

Right.

Kennedy wants to hear directly from Scali, authorizes him to tell Folman he consulted the highest levels.

They're still working on the assumption Folman is Khrushchev's agent.

So Scali meets Folman again.

Yes.

Kennedy instructs him to meet Folman, convey a generally favorable response, but without using Kennedy's name.

During this second meeting, Folman brings up U .N.

inspection again, but then adds this new wrinkle, inspecting U .S.

bases in Florida and the Caribbean, too.

Reciprocity.

How did Scali react?

Rejected it immediately.

Said that was new, politically difficult.

So Kennedy is assessing all this.

He sees Khrushchev understands the blockade is working, could be tightened, knows Khrushchev has international support, but probably won't risk nuclear war over Berlin,

recognizes U .S.

conventional superiority nearby.

He needs to respond carefully.

Exactly.

But the letter arrived too late Friday for an immediate response.

Kenny O'Donnell was apparently deeply moved by the letter.

Ted Sorensen saw the germ of a reasonable settlement in it.

Kennedy, despite the pressure, kept his dark sense of humor going.

Little jokes here and there, yeah.

Ruskin Thompson thought the letter, combined with Folman's proposal, assuming it was linked, could lead somewhere, despite the vagueness on missile withdrawal.

Ball felt it was a break in the clouds.

So Kennedy decides to take both seriously, but also check for traps.

And then he asks Salinger that chilling question.

About the potential death toll if they made a mistake.

Shows the weight on him.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev is publicly projecting calm, attending a Cuban concert in Moscow.

Gromyko saw that as deliberate reassurance.

But then came Saturday morning, October 27th, and Khrushchev significantly upped the ante.

He did.

Inside the Kremlin, Beschloss describes him questioning his military advisors, worrying about the risks of holding firm versus the perception of weakness, but also deeply concerned about nuclear catastrophe.

Like Kennedy, frustrated by communication delays.

So he decides on a new message.

Yes.

Calls in the head of Soviet broadcasting to get it on the air quickly, gets copies made.

Starua and his Vestia editor sees Khrushchev looking calm while arguing with generals, dictating and revising this new message.

Starua senses it contains peace or war.

And back in Washington.

Robert Kennedy arrives at the Saturday morning EXCOM meeting feeling, as he put it, considerable disquiet.

He had seen FBI reports about Soviet diplomats in New York possibly destroying sensitive documents.

Plus, the Soviet tanker Grozny was still steaming towards the quarantine line.

A lot of ominous signs.

And then just as the EXCOM meeting starts,

Radio Moscow begins broadcasting Khrushchev's new message.

What was the crucial change this time?

This is the big one, isn't it?

The Saturday letter.

Yes.

While the Friday letter was emotional, focused on Cuba's security, this Saturday message explicitly links removing Soviet missiles from Cuba to the U .S., removing its Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

The direct quid pro quo.

Exactly.

That dramatically changed the game.

Khrushchev acknowledges Kennedy's desire for security, but argues Cuba deserves the same.

Points directly at U .S.

bases surrounding the USSR, especially Turkey, highlighting its proximity.

Challenges the U .S.

narrative of its deployments being defensive, while Soviet ones are offensive.

Right.

Says it's unequal.

And while welcoming UN talks, he lays out the new proposal.

We take our missiles out of Cuba, if you take your analogous weapons out of Turkey.

Proposes UN inspection in both places, quick timeline.

He still reassures Kennedy the Cuban missiles are under Soviet control, purely defensive.

Yes.

Tries to maintain that.

Appeals for reasonable actions suggest agreement could lead to broader arms control, like a test ban.

But the core is that direct linkage.

Cuba for Turkey.

How did Washington react to this sudden shift?

Immediate confusion and concern.

Why had Khrushchev upped the ante?

The Soviets later explained it by saying on Friday, they feared an imminent U .S.

invasion, so they dropped the Turkey demand for speed.

By Saturday, they reassessed the invasion risk is lower, so they put Turkey back in.

Plausible.

Maybe.

Kennedy was surprised, though.

Bundy called the change very odd.

Suggested just sticking to the Friday offer.

But Kennedy immediately saw the danger in rejecting the Turkey link outright.

He warned the EXCOMM they could be in an unsupportable position.

He noted the Turkish missiles were basically obsolete militarily anyway, and to a rational man, it might look a fair trade.

He worried about justifying an invasion of Cuba if they refused this trade.

Precisely.

He said it would be a very tough one to explain.

He was also really frustrated.

Khrushchev went public with it, making negotiations with Turkey and NATO incredibly difficult.

McNamara just asked, how can we negotiate when the terms keep changing?

So what do they suggest doing?

Bundy proposed privately, telling Khrushchev the Friday letter was good, but the Saturday demand for Turkey was impossible right now, basically urging him back to the first offer.

But Kennedy pushed back.

Yeah.

Kennedy lobbied for seriously considering bargaining over Turkey, maybe telling Khrushchev they would discuss it once the missile work in Cuba stopped.

Bundy warned that even hinting at trading Turkey would cause a radical decline in allies' faith in the US.

A huge risk for NATO unity.

Massive.

But Kennedy countered that rejecting the trade flat out and then invading Cuba could also cause a decline, maybe even lose Berlin or trigger an attack on Turkey anyway.

So he came to a conclusion.

His conclusion, as Beschloss quotes him, we're going to have to take our weapons out of Turkey.

Wow.

Despite the political fallout.

Seems he saw it as increasingly unavoidable.

Thompson, though, argued against an immediate trade, said Khrushchev needed to claim he saved Cuba, suggested discussing Turkey later.

Robert Kennedy backed Bundy's idea, the Trollope Ploy.

The Trollope Ploy.

Yeah.

Named after a novelist's trick.

Basically respond to the favorable Friday letter and just ignore the difficult Saturday one in the official reply.

The attorney general of I is just telling Khrushchev, we accept your Friday offer.

NATO is irrelevant right now.

Kennedy doubted that would work.

It flew in the face of his earlier public stance against bargaining over bases.

Absolutely.

And McNamara had given reporters this convoluted explanation earlier about why and Turkey weren't analogous.

Now suddenly Walter Lippmann's columns start drawing the parallel, even proposing a direct trade.

Did Khrushchev think Lippmann was speaking for the White House?

Possibly.

His advisors might have suspected it.

Kennedy had complained before about Khrushchev assuming Lippmann spoke for him.

There's no evidence Kennedy asked Lippmann to float this, but maybe he found it useful to have the idea out there without endorsing it himself.

A way to test the waters, perhaps?

Could be.

It just added another layer of complexity to an already incredibly complex situation.

And then Saturday afternoon gets even more intense.

Oh yeah.

The crisis escalates dramatically.

Kennedy's drafting a new letter.

The tension is, as Evelyn Lincoln put it, unbearable.

And then the U -2 incident over Siberia.

Right.

A U -2 reconnaissance plane accidentally strays into Soviet airspace over the Chukotka Peninsula.

Soviet fighters scramble, pursue it, but it gets back safely.

How did Kennedy react?

Khrushchev?

Khrushchev could have seen it as deliberate provocation, but likely concluded it was an accident.

Still, it heightened sensitivity to how easily things could spiral out of control.

Kennedy, hearing about it after ordering flights canceled, just said wryly, there is always some son of a bitch who doesn't get the word.

Shows the potential for catastrophic accidents.

Exactly.

Then, back in the afternoon XCOM meeting, the Joint Chiefs are still pushing hard.

Massive airstrike.

Invasion of Cuba by Monday morning.

Unless they see irrefutable evidence, the missiles are being dismantled.

And then the news bulletin comes in.

The devastating news.

A U -2 photographing Cuba had been shot down.

And the XCOM had previously agreed?

To retaliate against a Soviet SAM site if a U .S.

spy plane was fired upon.

Kennedy immediately assumed it was a deliberate Soviet escalation.

This is much of an escalation by them, isn't it?

He asks.

How did McNamara respond?

He agreed it was an escalation, but, interestingly, suggested deferring the air attack until maybe Wednesday or Thursday, provided surveillance could continue with retaliation for any further attacks.

And the blockade held.

Kennedy was worried about losing another pilot.

Deeply worried.

General Taylor agreed.

No more U -2 flights until they retaliated and issued a strong warning.

But the truth was different.

It was.

The downing wasn't specifically ordered by Moscow.

The local Soviet commander in Cuba apparently acted on his own authority after failing to reach superiors.

Fired an SA -2 missile near Baines.

Killing the pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson.

Yes.

Sergei Khrushchev later said his father was very upset by this, saw it as a big mistake, feared losing control.

Defense Minister Malinovsky furiously reprimanded the Soviet forces in Cuba for acting hastily while a peaceful resolution was possibly forming.

What was the reaction in Cuba itself?

Wild celebrations, apparently.

Though some leaders worried it would just inflame things further, Jorge Rizkerat recalled the excitement, feeling they weren't defenseless anymore.

So back in the XCOM, they're debating how to respond to the U -2 downing and Khrushchev's conflicting letters.

Intense debate.

McNamara, rereading the Friday letter, now felt it lacked a clear offer.

Saw the Saturday message as completely changing the deal.

He became quite pessimistic about a quick agreement.

Makony.

Makony wanted a threatening letter.

Except the Friday offer.

Highlight the U -2 downing, despite announced surveillance, warn of retaliation if another plane was shot at.

Lyndon Johnson asked why Khrushchev raised the demands.

Yeah, Thompson speculated maybe Khrushchev was overruled or influenced by Lippmann and others suggesting a Cuba for Turkey trade.

Thompson advocated pushing harder, stop more ships, maybe take out a SAM site, surprisingly.

Believed the Soviets would back down if they kept up forceful action.

Which prompted Johnson's comment.

You war hawks ought to get together.

Yeah, Thompson laid out the choice.

Attack Cuba or try to get Khrushchev back to the Friday deal without mentioning Turkey, believing Lippmann had prompted the price increase.

Bundy summed up Kennedy's mindset then.

Yeah, hope from Friday's letter, anger at Saturday's hardening position, worry about accidental escalation from incidents like the U -2s, and intense pressure from the Joint Chiefs.

But Kennedy made a crucial decision regarding the downed U -2.

He vetoed immediate retaliation in Cuba, a huge decision, resisting that pressure.

He told Thompson he'd tell Khrushchev they should try the first route, the Friday letter, but acknowledged the Turkish missiles had to be discussed with NATO.

And then that powerful conclusion.

We can't very well invade Cuba when we could have gotten them out by making a deal on the same missiles in Turkey.

If that's part of the record, I don't see how we'll have a very good war.

Shows his thinking crystallizing around the Turkey issue.

Scali met Fomen again at this point.

Yes, Rusk sent him back to demand answers about the Turkey demand.

Fomen apparently seemed nervous, suggested maybe Khrushchev hadn't gotten his earlier message quickly, mentioned Lippmann again.

Scali forcefully told him the U .S.

was absolutely determined to remove the missiles and invasion was imminent.

Delivering a very strong warning.

Very strong.

So Kennedy's strategy solidifies.

Respond publicly only to the Friday letter.

Ignore Saturday's Turkey demand, at least in writing.

The trollop ploy.

Right.

Publicize the next letter for speed and to shape world opinion.

Kennedy worked on drafts with Rusk, Ball, Thompson, complained about Khrushchev bringing in European bases while feverishly working on the Cuban ones.

Robert Kennedy thought the initial language was too negative, helped draft a new version with Sorensen.

What did the final approved letter say?

It told Khrushchev instructions were sent for talks in New York with Ufant and the Soviets, aiming for a permanent solution along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26th.

Explicitly referencing the Friday letter.

The U .S.

committed to halting the quarantine and offering assurances against an invasion of Cuba if the Soviets dismantled and removed the offensive use weapons under U .N.

supervision.

Expressed confidence other hemisphere nations would do the same.

It also hinted at discussing broader detente after the crisis.

So publicly ignoring Turkey.

Oh, privately, the Turkey assurances were being prepared.

Johnson had asked Ball why they wouldn't trade the Jupiters.

Ball explained the earlier XCOM discussion about it maybe being acceptable to save Berlin with Polaris subs replacing the Jupiters for Turkey's defense via NATO.

And Kennedy decided Robert should deliver the letter to Ambassador to Brennan.

Yes, Thompson suggested RFK would carry more weight personally.

Thompson even apparently tutored Robert on how Dobernan might react.

Before Robert left, the president met with him, Rusk, Bundy, McNamara, Sorensen set a Monday deadline for a reply before military action.

And gave Robert an additional oral message.

The crucial one.

Tell Dobernan the Turkish missiles must not be allowed to cause a war.

Sorensen recalled the president recognizing it would help Khrushchev sell the deal to his colleagues if he knew there were assurances on Turkey.

So what happened in that meeting between Robert Kennedy and Dobernan?

Dobernan arrived at the Justice Department just before Kennedy's letter was publicly released.

Robert gave him the letter.

Warned strongly about retaliation if another US plane was shot down.

Stated they needed a commitment on removing the bases by at least tomorrow.

Not an ultimatum, he said, but a statement of fact.

And the Turkey part.

Robert conveyed the president's willingness to include the Turkish missiles.

But stressed it cannot be made part of a package and published due to NATO.

He said it was completely impossible for NATO to agree under the current threat.

But the matter could likely be resolved satisfactorily in four or five months.

Critically, this understanding was void if the Soviets publicly claimed credit for it.

A secret side deal.

Essentially, yes.

Dobernan recalled Robert warning him other US contacts didn't reflect the White House view.

Dobernan should only deal with him.

And Robert urged repeatedly for an answer by Sunday.

Dobernan cabled Moscow immediately.

Robert reported back to the president feeling the chance of a weekend settlement was still a long shot at best.

So even with this secret channel working, they continue preparing for the worst Saturday evening.

Absolutely.

XCOM met again.

President approved calling up 24 air reserve squadrons.

The contingency plan was set.

If US planes were attacked Sunday and New York talks failed, they'd take out the SAM sites in Cuba Monday.

The Grozny was nearing the quarantine line.

Stevenson was told to ask that to remind the Soviets to keep ships away.

Robert Kennedy argued against mentioning Turkey at the NATO meeting on Sunday.

Yes, wanted to keep the secret deal secret, feared Moscow might exploit it or demand more if it became public.

McNamara was pessimistic, urging readiness for post -invasion government in Cuba,

response plans for Soviet moves in Europe.

There was even dark humor about making Robert mayor of Havana.

They adjourned dear midnight.

Kennedy, planning to review airstrike plans in the morning, felt it could still go either way.

Yeah, and then apparently went to watch the movie Roman Holiday.

Incredible contrast.

And there was another secret contingency plan, even more secret.

Apparently known only to Rusk and the Kennedys.

A private agreement.

If Khrushchev didn't accept the terms, including Robert's secret assurances, by Monday, they would quietly ask you Thant to propose the Turkey for Cuba trade publicly, and Kennedy would then accept that.

The Cordier ploy.

Right.

Named after Andrew Cordier, who Rusk asked to draft a statement for Thant, ready to go on signal.

Rusk believed Kennedy would have tried this before ordering an invasion, seeing invasion as a massive escalation.

Meanwhile, what was happening in Havana, Castro was getting nervous.

Extremely.

On Friday, he warned the Soviet ambassador Alexeyev of an imminent U .S.

attack, even asked to shelter in the Soviet embassy bomb shelter.

Then, with Alexeyev's help, he wrote this secret, urgent letter to Khrushchev.

What did Castro say?

Predicted an attack within 2472 hours.

Praised Cuban morale, but warned of devastating consequences if U .S.

aggression wasn't stopped.

He then implored Khrushchev to prevent the imperialists from launching a first strike nuclear war against the USSR, considering a Soviet first strike an act of self -defense, as there'd be no other solution.

Wow.

How was that interpreted in Moscow?

Well, Castro's allies later framed it as urging firmness.

But Khrushchev seems to have interpreted it as Castro advocating a preemptive Soviet nuclear strike on the U .S.

Which must have terrified Khrushchev even more.

You'd think so.

By Saturday night, Khrushchev was apparently more fearful than ever of the Pentagon influencing Kennedy, maybe even taking over, reflecting his own political context, perhaps.

Dobrinin's cables about Pentagon pressure reinforced this.

Alexeyev's telegram from Havana about invasion fears added to it, and Castro's message, plus the U -2 downing, sharpened his fear of accidental war, of losing control.

So the pressure on Khrushchev was immense from all sides.

Which leads us to Sunday morning, October 28th, the resolution.

Khrushchev wakes up and drafts another response.

Yes, a response to Kennedy's Saturday night letter, the one Robert delivered.

A nervous messenger rushes it to Radio Moscow.

Gromyko recalled the extreme urgency, the need to secure Cuba's status.

And in Washington.

Kennedy and his team wake up to a beautiful Sunday morning.

George Ball made some dark joke comparing it to a Georgia O 'Keefe painting.

Then Radio Moscow announces an important statement coming up.

The XCOM waits, anticipating.

Well, fearing they might have to order the airstrike after all.

9 a .m.

Washington time.

Radio Moscow starts broadcasting.

Khrushchev's 10th message since the crisis began.

And this one.

This was the breakthrough.

What did it say?

Khrushchev acknowledged Kennedy's October 27th message.

Express satisfaction thanked Kennedy for his sense of proportion and responsibility.

Stated he understood American anxiety about the formidable offensive weapons.

And the key part.

He declared that to rapidly eliminate the conflict, the Soviet government had issued a new order.

Dismantle the weapons described as offensive, create them and return them to the Soviet Union.

Construction work would also cease.

Bundy got the news first.

Heard it while having breakfast, rushed to tell the president.

Bundy recalled the beautiful morning becoming many times more beautiful feeling the world had changed for the better.

What else did Khrushchev say in the letter?

He expressed respect and trust in Kennedy's assurance of no attack or invasion of Cuba.

Said the motives for Soviet aid had therefore disappeared.

Expressed readiness for UN verification of the dismantling.

Concluded that with Kennedy's assurances and the dismantling order,

every condition has been met to eliminate the present conflict.

Did he mention Turkey?

Only briefly mentioned the possibility of detente between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as Kennedy had hinted at.

He stressed Soviet sacrifices and WWII, their commitment to peace, but also their firmness.

Expressed confidence reason would triumph.

The relief in Washington must have been incredible.

Palpable.

Russ called Robert Kennedy.

Don Wilson at USIA felt like laughing or dancing.

State Department officials heard it while watching football.

Kennedy told Dave Powers he felt like a new man, grateful it was over, thinking about the airstrike plan for Tuesday.

De Brinnan met Robert Kennedy smiling, conveying Khrushchev's best wishes.

The immediate crisis was over.

Seemingly,

yes.

Kennedy returned from mass, looking 10 feet tall.

McNamara reported the Grozny had stopped short of the quarantine line.

Kennedy ordered a halt to provocative operations by Cuban exiles.

Russ called it a highly advantageous resolution.

Bundy said it was a day for the doves.

But Kennedy warned against gloating.

Yes, famously told the press, Khrushchev has eaten enough crow, let's not rub it in.

Then he made that dark comment about Lincoln being assassinated after his greatest victory, saying, this is the night I should go to the theater.

Robert apparently wanted to join him, which was later interpreted as disgust at Johnson's performance during the crisis.

Johnson himself was hosting the reporter Ainsworth, complimenting Kennedy's poker skills.

Yeah.

Meanwhile, Alexia Van Havana was dismayed, hadn't been informed beforehand, dreaded telling Castro.

Khrushchev sent Castro a message urging restraint, saying the conflict ended favorably by preventing invasion.

How did Castro react?

Furious.

Denounced, Khrushchev refused to take Alexia's calls.

Cuban exiles in Miami felt betrayed by Kennedy's no invasion pledge.

Soviet citizens were stunned, having been told the crisis was an American fabrication.

Kennedy approved a formal response to Khrushchev.

Yes, drafted by Thompson and Ball, released to the press, called their exchange firm undertakings, hoped for UN action to allow lifting the quarantine and ending surveillance.

Mentioned the need to address nuclear proliferation, a test ban.

But the military wasn't happy.

Not at all.

Kennedy briefed the Joint Chiefs, praised their advice and behavior, but Admiral Anderson apparently exclaimed, we have been had.

General LeMay was furious, called it the greatest defeat in our history, demanded they invade anyway.

McNamara noted Kennedy was shocked, stammered a response.

Kennedy knew this would be the reaction.

Seemed so.

Told Schlesinger he expected Republican attacks for guaranteeing Castro, asked McNamara for invasion casualty estimates, noting the military was mad.

He briefed congressional leaders, called it a great victory, but predicted future crises, especially with China getting the bomb.

And Beschloss rounds out the chapter with other post -crisis details,

disputes,

context.

Yeah.

Disputes between Johnson and Robert Kennedy about meeting attendance.

Anecdotes about Thompson knowing the Friday letter was likely personal.

Malinovsky's anger at Khrushchev negotiating.

Dobrinin denying burning papers but admitting contingency plans.

The secret taping of XCOM meetings.

RFK later taking credit for the trollop ploy.

McNamara conceding the Soviet view on Turkey later on.

Details about Major Anderson conflicting accounts of who ordered the shoot down.

Castro's angry letters.

It's all in there.

Plus the details about the secret courtier ploy and Rusk's belief Kennedy would have used it before invading.

And Khrushchev's fear the U .S.

military might overthrow Kennedy.

It really ties up all the threads of that incredibly intense period covered in the chapter.

And with that, we really have reached the end of our deep dive into chapter 18 of the crisis years.

We've covered, well, everything significant.

The key events, the political maneuvering, the diplomatic back and forth, the near misses, the historical context, and Beschloss's analysis.

We hit the key figures.

Those critical dates from Friday, October 26th to Sunday, the 28th, and the huge real -world implications.

Absolutely.

We haven't skipped any crucial details from this chapter, giving you, we hope, a comprehensive understanding of this pivotal week where the world held its breath.

It really is a powerful and frankly quite sobering account how close things came.

It underscores the role of leadership, communication, both overt and secret, and maybe even just a bit of luck in pulling back from the brink.

So for you, our listener,

maybe something to think about.

That incredibly delicate balance of power and communication that did ultimately avert catastrophe.

What lessons from those few terrifying days in October 1962 remain relevant now in our own complex global landscape.

We definitely encourage you to delve further into the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Think about the decisions made under that immense pressure.

Thanks for taking the deep dives with us.