Chapter 27: How Revisionary Are 4E Accounts?

The author, Mitchell Herschbach, contrasts the classical cognitivist view—which relies on Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory to explain how agents infer hidden mental states—with emerging 4E perspectives that prioritize direct perception and dynamic second-person interaction. The discussion systematically reviews contributions from other scholars in the field, beginning with Gallese and Sinigaglia’s concept of embodied simulation; Herschbach argues that while this accounts for goal understanding without mentalizing, it constitutes a modest challenge that remains compatible with representationalism. The chapter then critiques Newen’s pluralistic person model theory for failing to clearly distinguish direct perception from traditional inference and for being vague regarding the content of situation models. In examining De Bruin’s application of the Predictive Processing Paradigm to false-belief tasks, the author suggests that distinguishing between active and perceptual inference does not fully resolve developmental paradoxes or strongly support radical embodied theses. The review proceeds to Reddy’s second-person engagement approach, acknowledging the developmental importance of mutual interaction while criticizing the conceptual overlap between engagement and the second-person stance. Finally, the text scrutinizes De Jaegher’s enactivist claim that social interaction metaphysically constitutes cognition, with Herschbach arguing instead for an embedded cognition framework where social dynamics causally influence but do not compose individual cognitive processes. The chapter concludes that 4E approaches successfully highlight the embedded nature of social life but do not justify discarding the core role of internal, representation-hungry mindreading capacities.