Chapter 11: Cognitive Systems and Representing-in-the-World

Cognitive Systems and Representing-in-the-World analysis evaluates the friction and potential integration between classical cognitive science—defined by computation and representation—and the emerging paradigms of 4E cognition (embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended). The discussion begins by assessing the predictive processing framework (PEM), arguing that proponents like Hohwy present a conservative view that retains inferential and representational hierarchies, making it compatible with moderate 4E accounts but fundamentally at odds with radical, anti-representational enactivism,. A major portion of the chapter critiques radical enactivist approaches to social cognition, specifically challenging Froese’s claim that social understanding is constituted by dynamical interaction and mutual incorporation,. The author argues that phenomenology does not strictly constrain subpersonal mechanisms and that individual cognitive acts, such as minimal mindreading or detecting agency, are necessary prerequisites for any social coupling or genuine intersubjectivity to occur,. The text further scrutinizes the boundaries of cognitive systems, rejecting the "messy" and interest-dependent boundaries proposed by dynamical systems theory (Lamb and Chemero) and the broad "life-mind continuity" thesis associated with autopoiesis,. Instead, the author warns against "cognitive bloat" and the "coupling-constitution fallacy," advocating for an organism-centered view to preserve the stability required for explanations in developmental psychology and pathology,. Finally, the chapter concludes that while moderate frameworks like Menary’s cognitive integration offer valuable insights into tool use and niche construction without abandoning representations, radical proposals struggle to account for complex, representation-hungry tasks and lack objective criteria for identifying cognitive units,.