Chapter 6: So, What Again Is 4E Cognition?

" The discussion begins by establishing a baseline using traditional "cognitivism," which typically distinguishes inner cognitive processing from overt behavior and views cognition as inferential, computational operations performed over representations, illustrated by problem-solving tasks like the Tower of Hanoi. The author systematically evaluates contributions from prominent 4E theorists, identifying significant gaps in their conceptual definitions. For instance, Di Paolo’s enactivist proposal, which links cognition to ongoing, precarious, and open-ended processes, is scrutinized for potentially failing to distinguish cognitive systems from general biological life or even massive non-cognitive physical systems. The critique moves to Kiverstein and the distinction between "wide computationalism" and Radical Embodied Cognitive Science (RECS), challenging the reliance on continuous reciprocal causation (CRC) and dynamical systems theory (such as the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model) to explain extended cognition without falling into the coupling-constitution fallacy. Furthermore, the summary examines the Skilled Intentionality Framework (SIF) proposed by Rietveld, Denys, and van Westen, noting that while it addresses skilled human action and affordances, it tends to bypass the investigation of endogenous cognitive factors entirely. Finally, the analysis critiques Hutto and Myin’s Radical Enactivism (REC) for appearing to collapse the distinction between cognition and behavior altogether without providing sufficient argumentation for equating the two, leaving the central question of the "mark of the cognitive" largely unresolved in recent literature.