Chapter 35: Infant Communication and Social Cognition

The text challenges the view that early pointing is merely a solitary or egocentric act, presenting empirical evidence that 12-month-olds possess sophisticated communicative competencies rooted in distinct layers of intentionality. It breaks down the three core components of infant pointing: communicative intention, where the infant addresses a partner with the expectation of a response; referential intention, which directs attention to specific content or absent entities; and social intention, which encompasses the flexible motives behind the act. These motives are categorized into cooperative requests (imperative pointing to get help), expressive sharing of attitudes (declarative pointing to align interest), and informative pointing (providing necessary information to ignorant partners). The summary further examines the cognitive mechanisms supporting these interactions, demonstrating that infants operate with a practical Theory of Mind (or Theory of Action) that allows them to track others' attention, knowledge, and epistemic states—such as false beliefs—to repair misunderstandings. Additionally, the chapter provides a critical evolutionary comparison, distinguishing human cooperative communication from the instrumental, proximity-based signaling of great apes, who generally lack the motivation to inform or share attention. Finally, the discussion touches upon the limitations of preverbal communication regarding iconic gestures and traces the ontogenetic roots of pointing to earlier social responsiveness and cultural influences.