Chapter 23: Why Engagement? Second-Person Social Cognition

The text critically examines the concept of engagement, defining it through the lens of emotional involvement rather than simple interaction, and argues that it operates as a continuum across various domains, including relations with both persons and objects. A central distinction is drawn between second-person relations (the "I-You" mode of addressing and being addressed, rooted in Martin Buber’s philosophy) and third-person relations (the "I-It" or observational stance), emphasizing that the former generates a unique phenomenological openness and mutuality essential for developing minds. The chapter provides extensive empirical evidence from infant development to support the primacy of second-person engagement, citing phenomena such as neonatal imitation, the preference for direct gaze and infant-directed speech, and the distress caused by disrupted contingency in still-face experiments. It details the chronological progression of joint attention, arguing that infants first respond to attention directed at the self (manifesting as "coy smiles" or positive shyness around two months), then to attention directed at their actions (seen in "clowning" or showing off around eight months), and finally to attention directed at distal objects (triadic joint attention). Furthermore, the text explores the development of intention awareness through interactive practices, highlighting how infants make anticipatory bodily adjustments to being picked up as early as two months and later show compliance with verbal directives. Ultimately, the chapter contends that understanding the origins of social cognition requires a theoretical shift away from viewing the infant as a detached epistemic observer and toward recognizing them as an emotionally involved participant in mutual, dynamic engagements that shape the very capacity to cognize.